CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL STRUCTURES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE:

EVIDENCE FROM CONTROL POTENTIAL, AGENCY, AND CONTROL DOMINANCE-CONTESTABILITY PERSPECTIVES ON UK LISTED FIRMS by DINGA, ABDELLA,KORMIE
Durham E-Theses
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
STRUCTURES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM CONTROL POTENTIAL,
AGENCY, AND CONTROL
DOMINANCE-CONTESTABILITY PERSPECTIVES
ON UK LISTED FIRMS
DINGA, ABDELLA,KORMIE
How to cite:
DINGA, ABDELLA,KORMIE (2011) CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL STRUCTURES
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM CONTROL POTENTIAL, AGENCY, AND
CONTROL DOMINANCE-CONTESTABILITY PERSPECTIVES ON UK LISTED FIRMS , Durham
theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/638/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
0 
 
 
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND 
CONTROL STRUCTURES AND 
FIRM PERFORMANCE: 
 
EVIDENCE FROM CONTROL POTENTIAL, 
AGENCY, AND CONTROL DOMINANCE-
CONTESTABILITY PERSPECTIVES ON UK 
LISTED FIRMS 
 
PhD   THESIS 
AUTHOR:  
ABDELLA   KORMIE   DINGA 
 
RESEARCH CONDUCTED AT: 
DURHAM   BUSINESS   SCHOOL 
 
DOCTORAL THESIS SUBMITTED TO: 
DURHAM   UNIVERSITY 
UK 
FEBRUARY 2011 
1 
 
In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful and the Most 
Magnificent 
 
PRELIMINARY 
Corporate system is the outcome of the human innovation that has resulted in 
the transformation of property ownership system to the modern corporate 
property ownership system. It is an important global concern today since the life 
of every person, including even my mother, to whom this Thesis is dedicated 
and who is still living on agricultural property knowing nothing about corporate 
system, is influenced by corporate systems and life.  
Millions of individuals and families, and several firms, institutions, and public 
sectors that are related to our economic and social life own equity shares in 
corporations. Billions of people and several institutions use or consume the 
goods and services they need from corporations. Hence, the proper functioning 
of the corporate system, particularly good performance of corporations, is a 
matter of concern for us. However, good performance of corporations depends 
not only on the opportunities arising in the environment that should be grabbed 
on but also on the human factor that controls the firms and make strategic 
decisions to grab on the opportunities. This makes corporate control system an 
important issue. This PhD Thesis is concerned with the analysis of the ownership 
and control structure and firm performance of listed corporations.  
As a curious concerned individual, I undertook this research during my PhD 
research study at Durham Business School, Durham University, after 
experiencing life in the society with a developed corporate system and motivated 
during my studies for degrees in Bachelor of Science in Economics and Business 
Administration and Masters of Science in Finance and International Business in 
Denmark.  
The PhD Thesis presents several key findings and evidence that support the 
relevant theoretical frameworks and empirical studies and a new concept of 
control dominance-contestability framework, which is an important contribution 
to knowledge and the debates around corporate control. It is hoped that 
concerned researchers will further take upon the issue and contribute their 
inputs in the due process of innovating corporate control model in general and 
corporate board model in particular in the best interest of good performance of 
corporations and the well functioning of the corporate system.  
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AGENCY, AND CONTROL DOMINANCE-CONTESTABILITY 
PERSPECTIVES ON UK LISTED FIRMS 
BY: ABDELLA KORMIE DINGA 
MATERIAL ABSTRACT 
The research study comprises of two preceding Chapters, three main empirical Parts, 
and CONCLUSION. The first Chapter, Introduction, presents the overall research 
objectives and questions of the study based on the existing agency perspectives 
regarding the issues of control and governance conflicts in modern corporations. The 
second Chapter, Review of Theoretical Frameworks, presents a brief account of 
similarities and differences between the existing theoretical frameworks relevant to the 
control of corporations. The review identified that the agency theory provides powerful 
testable models and tools that can be used in the investigation of the agency conflicts 
and the possible solutions that mitigate the governance problems.  
The three empirical Chapters follow mainly the deductive research approach of 
making statistical inferences using a sample of major UK listed firms in the FTSE All 
Share Index for the period 2003-2007. Chapter Three deals with the analysis of the 
state and trends or evolution of corporate ownership and control structure and some 
board structures of the UK listed firms. The Chapter has been instrumental in preparing 
the raw materials of ownership and control structure variables that are used in the 
succeeding two chapters. Chapter Four deals with the analysis of the relationship 
between ownership structure and performance using aggregate stake of all identifiable 
blockholders’ categories and all external blockholders in the agency perspective. 
Chapter Five presents analysis of the relationship among ownership, control structures 
and firm performance using the structural equations framework in the control 
dominance-contestability perspective. Finally, the Thesis closes with a Conclusion. 
In summary, the Theses of this empirical research study suggest the followings. Firstly, 
there is the prevalence of multiple significant blockholders in the modern listed firms 
even when share ownership is dispersed. Secondly, in the presence of multiple 
significant blockholders in the firm, there is a likelihood that the second-type agency 
conflicts between large shareholders and minority shareholders exists, and that might be 
the dominant force that determines the possible control configuration even in listed firms 
with dispersed ownership. Thirdly and finally, the traditional one-equation modelling and 
their estimations in the methodology of looking into the relationship of separate share 
ownership categories or accounting for few of the categories might not precisely identify 
(1) the blockholders’ (control forces’) incentives and ability of exerting control over the 
modern corporations, (2) the problem of endogeneity that might arise in the 
relationships, and (3) the way significant multiple blockholders interact and share control 
of the firms. Hence, the use of structural equations modelling and control dominance-
contestability perspectives, in which the roles of blockholders structure control forces, 
internal and external governance mechanisms, and the problems of endogeneity are 
accounted for might be appropriate to reveal the control configuration of modern listed 
firms with multiple large blockholders.   
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Chapter   One 
INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH 
1.1 THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research deals with the investigation of corporate ownership and control structure and its 
impact on firm performance in listed firms using the UK data. The theme has been an important 
research area of corporate governance, which deals with the various governance arrangements used 
to control the corporation within the objective function of maximizing shareholders (owners) 
wealth. The importance of the theme has been highlighted in research literature based on the 
suggestion of the existence of governance problems in corporations related to divergence from 
shareholders’ value maximization. The premise is that there is conflict of interest between 
management and shareholders (Berle and Means, 1931; Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and between 
large controlling blockholder(s) and minority shareholders (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shliefer and 
Vishny, 1986, 1997; Holderness 2003), which leads to the appropriation of shareholders.   
As corporate conflict is a corporate governance issue, it is worthwhile to define corporate 
governance in accordance with the purpose of this study. The definition varies depending on the 
issue to deal with and on the inherent outlook to be reflected, which is described by Gillan (2006, 
p382) as “one’s own view of the world”. The later refers to shareholders perspective (defines the 
objective function of firms in terms of shareholder value maximization) and stakeholders 
perspectives (defines the objective function of firms in terms of stakeholder value maximization). 
Overall, the wider definition of corporate governance from scholars is based on the organizational 
perspective. For instance, Zingales (1997) writes that corporate governance deals with the directing 
and control mechanisms that ensure proper organisation of business, the formation and 
management of joint stock companies, company law provisions on capital, the regulations through 
bylaws and statutes of manager-shareholder relations, the procedures for the appointments of the 
boards, and the definition of the respective responsibilities of managers, boards, and officers of a 
corporation. Similarly, Tricker (1984, p.10) writes: “Governance is different from management; and 
involves setting the corporate direction, involvement in executive action, supervision and 
accountability.” This shows that corporate governance is more than management. In short, Gillan 
and Starks (1998, p.382) states that it is the system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations 
at a company.  
However, the definitions based on organizational context are too general and they do not provide 
theoretical frameworks that can be tool for modelling or testing relationships. The popular 
theoretical framework that provides such a relationship is the agency theory, which defines 
corporate governance in the context of the agency relationship that focuses mainly on the intra-firm 
conflicts of control. The baseline definition provided by Denis and McConnell (2003) relates 
corporate governance to the affirmation of the private property rights of the shareholders as owners 
of the company. The starting point for establishing relationships in the firm is hence to assume that 
investors (shareholders) are the rightful owners of the company.  
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One such definition of corporate governance in terms of economic interests and conflicts worth to 
mention is from Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p737). They write that it “deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. The 
suppliers of finance referred here include not only shareholders but also creditors. The general 
corporate control framework is that it is not possible for the entire prevalent multiple owners in a 
firm to make the decision on running a corporation, and hence, only few are delegated to act in the 
best interest of all owners. In such a situation, governance problems (conflicts of interest between 
those who control the corporation and the shareholders) arise if the shareholders do not get the 
expected returns on their investments. The premise of the definitions is that the resulting agency 
costs due to the conflicts reduce firm performance lower than when the owners have control of the 
firm. Hence, corporate governance issues or problems are irrelevant in the absence of agency 
problems in corporations (Hart, 1995).   
Moreover, the agency relationships and the conflicts that ensue from the relationship might lead to 
private benefit of control and the expropriation of the wealth of owners (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
Dyck and Zingales, 2004), bankruptcy or liquidation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), etc. which are 
agency costs, are detrimental to the investors and to the corporation as a whole. From this point of 
view and the need to mitigate the problems, Zingales (1998) defines corporate governance as the 
complex set of constraints that determine the arrangement and the distribution of the surplus rents 
generated by the firm. Similarly, considering the insiders as agents in the relationship, La Porta et al. 
(2000, p.4), write: “Corporate governance is, to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which 
outside investors protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders.” Hence, the objective of 
corporate governance might be to ensure the defence of shareholders’ value (Tirole, 2001).  
Furthermore, according to the agency perspective, the governance relationship the firm faces is also 
extended to its environment. Regarding this, Keasey et al. (2005, p.251) define corporate 
governance as “the set of mechanisms – both institutional and market based – that induce the self-
interested controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will be 
operated) to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners (the suppliers of 
capital).” Hence, the agency theory asserts that besides the internal institutional mechanisms like 
the board of directors, the market based mechanisms like debt financing, takeover markets, stock 
markets, and managerial labour markets also mitigate the agency conflicts (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Morck et al, 1989).  
Now that corporate governance is defined in terms of agency perspectives, it is vital to discuss the 
types of conflicts inherent in the firm. The classical agency theory is based on the classical principal-
agent conflicts. One important thing to note is that the classical principal-agent theory is based on 
the theoretical assumption of the separation of ownership from control proposed in the seminal 
work of Berle and Means (1932). The classical principal-agent theory assumes that managers are 
agents delegated to decide on behalf of suppliers of finance (principals) that are not involved in the 
day-to-day running of the business. The basic control premise of the theory is that corporations are 
controlled by the management not the owners (shareholders). In this setting, the principal-agent 
problem, which is related to the conflict of interests between owners and managers, might result in 
agency costs that affect shareholder returns (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Sappington, 1991). Hence, 
the shareholders-manager conflict is the classical principal-agent problem, which is the governance 
problem to be dealt with by corporate governance.   
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Literature provides extensive theoretical framework on the causes or reasons for the shareholders-
managers conflict, the consequences of the conflict and how the conflict can be resolved or reduced 
in the agency perspective. The conflict arises because managers have the tendency to diverge from 
shareholders’ interests and follow their own objectives and act in their own best interests at the 
expense of shareholders. It can be argued that the reason for potential divergence of preferences 
are, on the one hand, that professional managers only tend to hold small stakes in the firms they run 
and therefore might be more interested in personal benefits via high pay, perks and shirking and less 
in long-term firm performance than other shareholders. On the other hand, it might be suggestive 
that those managers who do have high ownership stakes in the firms they operate tend to have 
highly concentrated investment portfolios (via firm investment and employment), which is likely to 
lead to a divergent risk attitude compared to more widely diversified shareholders. Such self-interest 
serving opportunity exploited by the managers might arise in firms with poor performance and those 
that are characterised by the absence of effective monitoring and disciplining mechanisms.  
Empirical research triggered by the shareholders-manager conflict show important insights into the 
consequences of the conflict in which managers of such firms are more likely to adopt suboptimal 
strategies and resist takeovers. The findings show that well entrenched managers (1) choose long 
term debt (Guney and Ozkan, 2005; Datta et al., 2005), (2) hold large amounts of cash (Jensen, 1986; 
Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Harford et al., 2008), (3) prefer leverage below the 
optimal capital structure (Berger et al., 1997; de Jong and Veld, 2001; Brounen et al., 2006), (4) 
undertake overinvestment (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005), (5) pay 
lower dividends than others (Hu and Kumar, 2004; Khan, 2006), and (6) exhibit significant 
underperformance (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Gompers et al., 2003; Davies 
et al., 2005; and Core et al., 2006). 
Hence, the detrimental effect of the agency costs on the performance of the firm has called for 
suggestive mechanisms to mitigate the problem. A strand of the literature that focuses on the 
correlation between different governance mechanisms and agency costs suggest that firms can 
reduce the agency costs and enhance their performance by designing and adopting appropriate 
external and internal governance practices that mitigate or control the costly incentives of 
managers, thus limiting the potential for suboptimal managerial behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Walsh and Seward, 1990;  Rediker and Seth 1995; Weir et al., 2002).   
The classical corporate finance literature based on the principal-agent perspective dealt with the 
problem of dispersed share ownership where (1) no shareholder has significant stakes, and (2) 
ownership is concentrated in the hand of a large shareholder that has effective control over the firm 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Burkart et al., 1997). In Berle and Means (1932) widely-held firms share ownership is assumed 
to be completely separated from control (figure 1.1). However, later empirical studies have shown 
that corporate share ownership is typically concentrated in the hands of multiple large shareholders 
(La Porta et al, 1999; Barca and Becht, 2001; Becht and Mayer, 2002). The evidence that many 
companies have multiple large shareholders and the view that some multiple controlling large 
shareholders might exert control or monitoring pressure has shifted the traditional principal-agent 
conflict between shareholders and managers (Berle and Means, 1932) towards another form of 
agency conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The later 
governance problem is termed as the second-type agency conflict (figure 1.1).  
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In a firm where the controlling shareholder exists, the agency theory suggests two views. On the one 
hand, it is argued that large controlling shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by exerting 
monitoring control over managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, it is 
suggested that large controlling shareholders might be harmful to minority shareholders if they 
pursue their own private goals that diverges from shareholders’ wealth maximization or if they 
reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shliefer and Vishny, 1997; Burkart et al., 1997) and 
expropriate minority shareholders by diverting funds towards the generation of private benefits 
(Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Barclay et al., 1993; Zingales, 1994). The large controlling 
shareholders might influence the firm’s decision that might harm minority shareholders. For 
example, the difference in preferences between dividend payment (probably favoured by small 
shareholders) and capital gains (likely preferred by large shareholders) might create conflict of 
interests due to taxation difference (Shliefer and Vishny, 1986).  
Moreover, it can be argued that there might be the potential relationship between multiple 
blockholders in the same firm that interact and share control power (Leech, 1988; Zwiebel, 1995; 
Fig. 1.1: Theoretical framework of firm ownership and control of corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified and constructed from Gutierrez and Pombo (2009). The part from blockholders 
structure and the control dominance-contestability model is modified based upon the Thesis of 
this research.  
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Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenszon, 2000; Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Maury and 
Pajuste, 2005; Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009). In such setting, there might be multiple blockholders that 
might either cooperate in pursuing exploitation or in restricting each other’s exploitative behaviour. 
Little is known in literature about the way multiple large shareholders interact and share control 
power, which is referred to as blockholders structure in this research. To fill the gap, this Thesis has 
developed a control dominance-contestability model and hypothesis, which suggests that control of 
modern corporations in which multiple large shareholders are prevalent, is always contested. This is 
based on the fact that a single blockholder might not be able to assume majority or absolute control 
in the firm. The main assumption is that two opposing poles over control of the firm – dominant 
coalition and contesting coalition – might be formed in order to attain cumulative voting power that 
creates the incentives and ability to exert control pressure.  
Hence, considering the principal-agent problems of governance and the second-type agency conflict 
between large shareholders and minority shareholders, this research investigates the following 
important research questions using UK listed firms in the FTSE All Shares Index for the period of 
2003-2007: How is corporate share ownership distributed among ownership categories in the major 
UK listed firms and how are ownership and control structures and some board structures evolved 
during the period? What are the impacts of different aggregate blockholder categories on firm 
performance?  What are the possible patterns of blockholders structures that exist in firms, and how 
do they affect each other and performance?  
Hence, the research study investigated the (1) state and trends in the changes of share distribution 
among different shareholder categories and the extent and levels of ownership concentration from 
the control potential perspectives, (2) link between ownership and control structure (blockholders 
and other ownership variables) and firm performance from the agency perspectives based on the 
assumption that shareholders with significant voting power have the incentives to control and 
enhance firm value (Leech and Leahy, 1991), and (3) the way blockholders interact and share control 
power (blockholders structure) and impact firm performance from the control dominance-
contestability perspectives using a panel data from a sample of UK major listed firms in FTSE All 
Share Index for a period of 2003-2007.  
1.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The research study comprises of two preceding Chapters, three Empirical Chapters, and Conclusion. 
The first Chapter, Introduction, presents the overall research objectives and questions of the study 
based on the existing agency perspectives regarding the issues of governance conflicts in modern 
corporations. The second Chapter, Review of Theoretical Frameworks, presents a brief account of 
the similarities and differences between the existing theoretical frameworks, which are related to 
the control of corporations. The review identified that the agency theory provides powerful 
empirically testable models and tools that can be used in the investigation of the agency conflicts 
and the possible solutions that mitigate the governance problems. The rest of the Thesis is organized 
in a working paper format so that it comprises three interconnected empirical chapters. The 
Empirical Chapters are designed in a manner that the succeeding Part solves the problem that could 
not be solved by its predecessor.  
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Chapter Three of the empirical chapters presents the state and trends of corporate ownership and 
control structure of the UK listed firms during 2003-2007, during which there was health in the 
economy. The study is relevant from the following perspectives. Firstly, it is important to investigate 
the state and evolution in ownership structure primarily and board structure secondarily after the 
recommendations of the Higgs Report (2003) and the UK Code of 2003 that are preceded by series 
of corporate governance reforms triggered by financial crises and corporate scandals. Secondly, it is 
vital to compare the state and evolution of patterns of ownership structure in the UK stock market 
that is characterized by high liquidity. Thirdly, the issue deemed relevant since it is necessary to 
compare the state and evolution of corporate ownership structure of the period with the previous 
empirical evidence from similar studies. Finally, it is important to provide recent evidence using (1) 
lower control threshold based on the UK mandatory disclosure level (3%) instead of higher cut-offs, 
(2) recent and panel data instead of old and cross-sectional data, and (3) the concept of aggregate 
blockholder ownership that provides a continuous measure of ownership and control structure 
variables instead of the concept of controlling (ultimate) owners that uses dummies to measure 
owners and ownership concentration.  
Chapter Four deals with the analyses of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance using aggregates of different blockholders categories and aggregates of all external 
blockholders from the agency perspective using one-equation modelling following similar studies in 
literature. However, due to the differences and ambiguity of the results, this study undertook the 
investigation by (1) incorporating all major blockholders categories instead of one or few, (2) using a 
panel data based on 3% cut-off level instead of cross-sectional data and higher threshold levels for 
control, (3) controlling for the control effects of governance mechanisms based on the agency 
perspectives following some similar studies instead of disregarding them in order to avoid omission 
bias, (4) accounting for dynamic endogeneity relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance by including lagged performance variable as independent variable, and (5) making 
simple pairwise correlation technique to analyse the complementarity and substitution effects 
between board structure and external governance mechanism.  
Chapter Five presents the relationship between ownership control structures and firm performance 
using the structural equations framework in the control dominance-contestability perspective. In the 
presence of multiple blockholders and where ownership concentration is very low, control by the 
major blockholder is absent (Leech, 1988), and hence, control is contestable and there might be the 
second-type agency conflict. Hence, it might be suggestive that the significant blockholders 
cooperate to pursue exploitation or restrict other’s exploitative behaviour in the interaction to share 
control power in the firm. This implies that there might be coalitions of blockholders for collective 
actions (Leech, 1988; Zwiebel, 1995; Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen and Wolfenszon, 2000; 
Gomes and Novaes, 2001; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009). The fact that little is 
done on the theoretical frameworks of the control contestability hypothesis regarding blockholder 
structures and that there are few studies that investigated the issue empirically, the research theme 
is found to have relevance and importance for corporate governance. Hence, the study developed a 
theoretical control dominance-contestability framework, and undertook empirical analysis from the 
control dominance-contestability perspective using structural equations modelling.  
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1.3 KEY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The main findings of Chapter Three are that there are several multiple blockholders in the UK listed 
firms and that the UK listed firms’ share ownership is widely dispersed at the UK mandatory 
disclosure rule level confirming the previous notion of ownership dispersion from the studies that 
used higher thresholds.  
The contribution of this Chapter of the study is that it reveals the evolution and developments in the 
patterns of ownership and control structures and trends in the evolution of board structures in the 
major UK listed firms in FTSE All Share Index after the Higgs Report and the 2003 Code of Best 
Practice of corporate governance and before the inception of the current global financial crisis. 
Serving as an extension to the previous studies, the study also reveals evidence on the pattern of 
ownership structure and concentration of the UK listed firms in the period that the previous studies 
have not covered. Finally, from comparison of the period’s average and between years’ averages, it 
might be suggestive that change in the magnitude of ownership might remain almost stable around 
the mean during five years, thus strengthening the hypothesis of the equilibrium state of ownership 
structure within a long-run time horizon.  
Finally, the key finding of research interest is that the first largest blockholder might not be ultimate 
(sole) controller of the firm, and that the coalition of the first 5 largest shareholders on average 
cannot even attain majority control in terms of their aggregate voting power. Hence, this study 
suggests that individual blockholder might not have the ability to solely control the UK listed firms 
and that control might be contested in the firms. Hence, the important research issues this initiated 
are (1) the investigation of the impact of different aggregate blockholders categories and ownership 
concentration on firm performance, and (2) the way the multiple large shareholders interact and 
share power (blockholder structure) in the UK listed firms from the control dominance-contestability 
perspective.  
Chapter Four reveals the impact of ownership structure variables on firm performance, which could 
not be observed from undertaking mainly descriptive statistics in the analysis used in Chapter Three. 
Most of the evidence in the Fourth Chapter is consistent with some of the existing relevant theories.  
The contribution of the study to knowledge is that it provides (1) some comprehensive evidence 
using some procedures that incorporate some of the main gaps, including the use of all identifiable 
blockholder categories, regarding the sources of differences in the research literature on the impact 
of ownership structure on firm performance; (2) the most updated evidence from the recent panel 
data on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in the major UK public 
firms; (3) evidence that confirm the existing agency perspectives on insider ownership, and the 
second-type agency perspective on the external blockholders in the UK listed firms that have highly 
diffused ownership; and (4) consistent evidence that confirm some of the premises behind the 
recommendation in the UK Codes concerning board structure (duality and board size) that 
negatively influence firm performance. 
Finally, the key finding of research interest is that the results on certain important variables such as 
the proportion of nonexecutive directors and debt financing show surprisingly unexpected evidence 
inconsistent with the agency theory. This led to the suspicion that the problem might arise from not 
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properly accounting for the endogeneity relationships in the methodology, and problems in the 
empirical modelling and analysis, which are accounted for in Chapter Five. 
Chapter Five reveals the following key findings, among other things. The evidences support (1) the 
existing agency perspectives on the determinants of firm performance, (2) the agency theory view 
and the rationale of the UK Code on board structure, (3) the contestability of corporate control, and 
(4) the endogeneity relationships between board structure and performance, board structure and 
external governance mechanisms, and ownership structure and performance.  
The contribution of the Chapter to knowledge is the development of theoretical frameworks of 
control dominance-contestability model besides providing evidence that confirm (1) the control 
dominance-contestability hypothesis, and (2) the endogeneity relationships presented above. 
Overall, the research study indicates that (1) the use of structural equations modelling (SEM) and 
3SLS estimation efficiently controls for the endogenous relationships that arise between ownership 
structure and board structure, ownership structure and firm performance, and board structure and 
performance, (2) the methodology is well-equipped to handle the far reaching endogeneity 
problems that plague economic studies and simultaneous involvement of both control dominance 
factors and control contestability factors, and thereby to reveal the empirical validity endogenous 
relationships and control dominance-contestability hypothesis, and (3) in contrast to the evidence of 
negative impact of PNED on firm performance Chapter Four of this research and other studies that 
did not efficiently control for endogeneity using one-equation modelling, the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors has now positive impact on firm performance, thus confirming the agency 
perspective, after accounting for endogeneity problem.  
Hence, this research study contributes to the existing debate on the how large blockholders interact 
and share control power, which we refer to as blockholders structure. It particularly expands the 
existing theoretical models of control contestability into a model of control dominance and 
contestability. The model suggests that corporate control configuration might be the outcome of the 
interaction of several control forces that pursue dominance and contesting depending on the costs 
and benefits of control.   
Now that the research objectives are introduced, it would be important to review the existing 
theoretical frameworks and its ownership and control structure of the firm as motivational recipe 
before presenting the three empirical chapters.  
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Chapter Two 
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The assumption of neoclassical theory regarding governance issues in firms is that effort choices and 
costs are observable, and people act rationally and independently on the basis of full and relevant 
information. This might imply that there are no transaction costs and there is the ability to write 
complete contract. Hence, the idea is not related to the manager-owner conflict, even though it 
might fit to the original entrepreneur model of businesses. Hence, the neoclassical theory does not 
provide a powerful model to explain the governance issue of modern listed firms.  
However, departing from the neoclassical views, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theories 
make the assumptions (1) there are transaction costs, (2) there is information asymmetry, and (3) 
contracts are incomplete to include everything (Williamson, 1979; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart 
and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). Finally, the integration bounded rationality (suggested by Simon in 
1957) assumption equipped the NIE with a viewpoint of limited rationality of decision-makers 
(Williamson, 1988; Furubotn, 2001). Bounded rationality implies that a decision maker has only 
partial knowledge and limited computational power, and that the process of making decision has 
significant costs (Furubotn, 2001). Hence, the two basic assumptions of NIE proposed by bounded 
rationality are that (1) the positive transaction costs are ubiquitous and unavoidable, and (2) human 
decision makers are naturally limited in their computational power – to acquire, store, retrieve, and 
process information (Simon, 1986; Williamson, 1988; Bardhan, 1989; Furubotn, 2001). 
Therefore, this research study uses the NIE, which comprises different fields such as the property 
rights theory, the transaction cost theory, the agency theory, the resource dependency approach, 
and the legal approach to finance. So, the assessment of the similarities of the theoretical and 
empirical tools these NIE fields are made in the following subsections. The NIE fields chosen for 
assessment that might provide some theoretical explanations and interpretations to the conflict 
between managers and shareholders are (1) the agency theory, (2) the transaction cost economics 
(TCE), which was developed and named by Williamson (1985, 1988), and (3) the property rights 
economics or theory (Coase, 1960; Alchian, 1965; Demsetz, 1967; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, 1973). 
Table 0.2 presents a short summary of comparison of the principal-agent theory, the transaction 
const theory, and the property rights theory.  
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2.2 THE AGENCY THEORY 
2.2.1 Introduction 
The organisational framework of large corporations is a setup in which there are the separation of 
ownership and control and the principal-agent relationship, the setting in which the owners 
(principals) hire a managers (agents) to run the firm in the best interest of the owners for a reward 
for the efforts in return (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Sappington, 1991; Hart, 1995). Conflict of 
interests arises in the relationship due to the divergence of managers from the shareholder interest 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). This view is referred to as the agency theory.  
Generally, the core assumptions of the agency theory are that: (1) managers may maximize their 
own utility instead of enhancing shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1983); (2) 
information is distributed asymmetrically between principals and agents; (3) contracts are not 
costless when writing and enforcing (Fama and Jensen, 1983); and (4) the parties have perfect 
rationality or limited (bounded) rationality. In this setting, agency conflicts might arise resulting in 
agency costs that would affect firm value.  
In the principal-agent relationship, the outcome or performance depends on the extent of the 
agent’s efforts and the risks available. The fact that the level of efforts made or chosen is only 
observed by the agent (hence asymmetric information) makes it difficult for the principal (owner) to 
decide the level of compensation for the agent, which should be paid from the realized profit 
(Sappington, 1991). The conflict of interests arises due to the mismatch of incentives and the parties’ 
behaviour towards risks. Shareholders’ incentives are related to future financial and share price 
performance and the managers’ incentives depend on the conditions of their employment contract 
and remuneration packages. Also, shareholders who provide equity finance expect maximized 
returns do not bear risks related to firm operations, while managers are risk-bearers, thus implying 
no risk-sharing between the parties. This might force managers to bear only lower risks. In the 
setting, it is difficult to measure the future performance and the level of the risk precisely. Hence, it 
can be argued that both parties face the trade-off between (1) incentives, where the agent should 
be motivated by creating attractive performance based incentive, and (2) risk sharing, where the 
agent need to be protected from risk by low performance based incentive. Therefore, agency 
problem stems from the incentive-risk sharing puzzle (Hart, 1995). The relevant principal-agent 
question is thus how to determine the optimal balance between efficiency and risk-bearing 
(Sappington, 1991).   
The classic principal-agent model, the divergence of managers from shareholder value maximization 
and pursuing their own interests at the expense of shareholders causes agency problems. Agency 
costs are incurred in a setting where the level of efforts and intents of decisions made can only be 
observed by managers, who have competitive information advantage on the company operations. 
Due to information asymmetry, owners may not know whether managers are making the necessary 
efforts or the right decisions. The owners incur monitoring costs when they attempt to gather 
information on the behaviour and actions of managers. On the other hand, managers also take upon 
themselves costs, called bonding costs, which is difficult to practically observe, by making efforts at 
the expense of their own utility and implementing the contractual terms in order to reduce the 
agency conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).   
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So, inasmuch as the agents make decisions that deviate from those which would maximize the 
benefits of the principals, the principals suffer from the losses of potential profits; and the returns 
that may fall short of the actual level if the owners themselves assume direct control of their firm 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Regarding this issue, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that the agents 
do not bear the substantial wealth effects of their own decisions, and that managers have the 
tendency to appropriate perquisites due to opportunism.  
However, the agency theory has got its own limitations like other theories. Hart (1995) explains that 
it does not by itself provide a role for governance structure (or asset ownership) due to the fact that 
the principal-agent contracts are not optimal or complete enough to provide the best and 
appropriate incentive scheme and other decision areas. The contractual problem to note is that the 
incentive is based not directly on efforts but on the future performance. It is obvious that the future 
performance of the firm can be affected by situations which are outside the control of the managers, 
who may be blamed or penalised for doing nothing wrong in the absence of terms that protect 
them. Hence, the best contract formulation to reflect all the future state of the world, which the 
agency theory does not yet provide, is an outstanding issue of corporate governance.  
Nevertheless, the principal-agent theory provides a powerful theoretical basis for explaining the 
relationships and suggesting solutions for the agency problems between shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983). The theory provides a useful tool for providing 
insight into the suggestions for corporate governance mechanisms or arrangements that would 
mitigate the agency costs and enhance shareholder returns. It also provides the insight into why 
managers might be rewarded with performance based incentives in the form of stock, and the role 
of external significant owners in exerting monitoring control. On the other hand, agency theory 
literature suggests that other external governance mechanisms like takeover markets, debt 
financing, stock markets, and managerial labour markets also exhibit a monitoring or control 
function on the behaviours of managers, thus mitigating agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In conclusion, the important aspect of the principal-agent paradigm is it (1) suggests explanations 
and the solutions to the different types of agency costs, and (2) provides both dispute avoidance 
approach by crafting incentive-alignments and conflict resolution approach of crafting governance 
mechanisms. This makes it a stronger and more intuitive tool than others.  
2.2.2 Streams of the Agency Theory 
The theory has developed along two lines: positive agency theory and normative principal agent 
research or theory. The two streams are supplementary to each other and they share in common (1) 
the unit of analysis – the contract between the principal and the agent, and (2) the general 
assumption about people, organisations and information (Jensen, 1983). Table 2.1 presents the 
differences between the two streams.  
The positive agency theory focuses on the broad situations in which the principal and agent are likely 
to have conflicting goals and then prescribes the governance mechanisms that limit the agent’s self 
serving behaviour. The core assumption of the theory is that individuals do maximize their expected 
utility. So, it recognises much more clearly property rights claims by both agent and principal, which 
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influence potentially a pareto-efficient outcome in the design of the contracts. Hence, based on this 
assumption, the theory assumes that private individuals solve these normative problems, and 
investigates which and how incentives and other elements (for instance, governance mechanisms) 
affect the determination of equilibrium contracts between principals and agents. This implies that 
positive agency theory is basically descriptive.  
On the other hand, the normative principal agent theory focuses on how to structure contractual 
relationships between principals and agents in order to provide incentives for the agent to maximise 
the principal’s welfare in a situation characterised by uncertainty and imperfect monitoring (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). The theory is based on based on the normative assumption that people should 
maximise their own expected utility. Since it tries to focus on shareholder value maximization, the 
normative principal-agent theory is prescriptive. It involves a careful specification of assumptions 
that are to be followed by logical deductions and quantitative rigor (Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
It attempts to offer recommendations on the design of contracts based on quantitative optimum 
calculations in its endeavour to establish conditions for optimal contract satisfying quantifiable 
pareto-optimum criterion.  
The research in positive agency theory is less quantitative than the normative counterpart (Jensen, 
1983). Its research focuses on the special principal-agent relationship case of large, public 
corporations. The most influential works in the positive agency theory are: Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Fama (1980), and Fama and Jensen (1983). In contrast, the research in the normative stream 
is more quantitative - abstract and mathematical, in an attempt to quantify every contractual 
relation and situation mathematically (Jensen, 1983). Organisational theorists criticize positive 
agency theory as being minimalist (Hirsch et al. 1987; Perrow, 1986) and its methods as justifiably 
unconstrained and often close to be tautological and lacking rigor or mathematical proof (Jensen, 
1983). Moreover, while the normative principal-agent theory literature concentrated on modelling 
the effects of factors related particularly to principal-agent, such as the structure of preferences of 
the agents and principals, the nature of uncertainty, and the informational structure available, the 
Table 2.1: Differences between the two streams of agency theory 
 
Positive Agency Theory Normative Principal-Agent Theory 
Assumes that individuals do maximize their own 
expected utility. 
Assumes that individuals should maximize their own 
expected utility. 
Non-quantitative approach. Generally quantitative and mathematical rigor. 
It is descriptive It is prescriptive. 
Empirically oriented. Non-empirically oriented. 
Focus on large, public corporations. Applies to employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-
supplier, and other relationships. 
Concentrate on modelling effects of aspects of 
contracting environment and technology of 
monitoring and bonding in addition to those 
related particularly to the principal-agent. 
Concentrate on modelling effects of the structure of:  
(1) Preferences of parties,  
(2) Uncertainty, and  
(3) Information in the environment.  
Deals with general and wider aspects of the 
relationships. 
Deals with specific and focused aspects of the 
relationships. 
Attention on scanning various monitoring and 
bonding practices and costs to determine 
contractual forms/ alternatives. 
Attention focused on risk sharing and form of 
optional contracts and on equilibrium (optimal) 
contracting solutions (without agency costs). 
Source: Constructed from Jensen (1983). 
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positive agency theory literature concentrated on the effects of additional aspects of contracting 
environment (for instance, capital intensity, information costs, asset specificity and specialization, 
capital and labour markets) and the relevant technology of monitoring and bonding (Jensen, 1983). 
Furthermore, unlike the positive agency theory, which focuses more exclusively on special cases of 
owner-top manager relationship, the normative principal-agent theory makes focus on a broader 
and a more general situations that might lead to many more testable research implications. Finally, 
the normative theory can generally be applied to the employer-employee, lawyer-client, buyer-
supplier, and the other agency relationships (Harris and Raviv, 1978), while the positive theory is 
extended to aspects related to corporations. 
The work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) defines the principal-agent relationship and explores the 
ownership structure of corporation from the positive theory perspectives, especially the role of 
equity ownership of managers as a mechanism to align the manager’s interest with that of owners. 
Additionally, Fama (1980), and Jensen and Fama (1983) make discussions focusing on the role of 
efficient capital markets and labour markets as information mechanisms to monitor the behaviour of 
the top executives. Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the role of the board of directors as 
monitors of the opportunism of the executive managers in large corporations. Later, the positive 
agency theory is extended to theoretical ideas of the practices of golden parachutes and corporate 
raiding (Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).  
Hence, the positive agency theory strives to give the theoretical explanations in terms of the way 
real world works (Jensen, 1983). So, it is concerned with the explanation of the institutional 
arrangements (ownership structure, organisational structures, and the markets) that might mitigate 
the agency conflicts. This makes it closely related to the property rights theory since the effects of 
the distribution of property rights are important focus in the analysis. Moreover, the positive agency 
theory has offered a broader and complex view and conception of organizations in general (Jensen, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1989) and resulted in considerable research works. Therefore, recognizing the 
broader scope and factors that interplay in the principal-agent relationship, it is found that the 
positive agency theory is the main tool for this research study even though the quantifying 
procedures in normative principal-agent theory can have a complementary role.  
2.3 The Transaction Cost Theory  
Even though the agency theory and the TCE have some common perspectives, namely following 
shareholder view, assumptions of incomplete contracting, risk neutrality of both parties, self-seeking 
opportunism of human being, the existence of transaction costs, bounded rationality (even though 
some agency theorists also assume perfect rationality) in managerial discretion, and moral hazard 
from information asymmetry, they differ in some aspects. The TCE, which takes transaction cost as a 
unit of analysis. The assumption of limited or bounded rationality has implications for monitoring 
costs (if perfect rationality prevails there should be no transaction costs including no monitoring 
costs) and therefore the need to use incentive mechanisms to align preferences.  
However, TCE exhibit some differences with classical and neoclassical theories (table 2.2). Firstly, 
whereas with classical and neoclassical contracts assumptions are that contracts can be (fairly) fully 
specified, which suggest that relationships can largely be settled using ex-ante contracting, the TCE 
with relational contracts assumptions tend to suggest that due to incompleteness of contracts ex-
post adjustment mechanisms need to be introduced (Coase, 1960; Williamson, 1979, 1980, 2001). 
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Additionally, in contrast to the agency theory’s focus on the preventative ex ante incentive 
alignment schemes and corporate governance arrangements, the TCE does not give any clear ex 
ante arrangements necessary to prevent conflicts in order to enhance shareholder returns. Finally, 
unlike the agency theory, the TCE rejects the viability and feasibility of the neoclassical economics 
view of profit maximization and utility maximization based on the bounded rationality reasoning 
(Williamson, 1988, 2000; Furubotn, 2001).  
Therefore, the TCE cannot, for the purpose of this research, be as strong as the agency theory in 
dealing with the relationship between owners and managers and the investigation of the 
relationship between ownership and control structure and firm performance. However, it can serve 
as an alternative tool in providing explanations and interpretations and proposing the ex post 
governance structures in case the contractual terms are not fulfilled. In this respect the TCE exhibits 
some similarities to the legal approach to finance.  
2.4 The Property Rights Theory 
Another New Institutional Economics (NIE) view comes from the property rights theory (PRT), which 
gives some theoretical explanations of the ownership structure of corporations. Its approach is 
associated with the law and economics literature. The research on property rights, initiated by Coase 
(1960) using the neoclassical economics thought, developed to its peak with Demsetz (1967) and 
Alchian and Demsetz (1973). Demsetz (1967) defines property rights as an instrument of society 
expressed in its laws and customs, based on which people, in dealing with each other, form 
expectations that reasonably hold.  
Property rights might be defined as the social institutions’ framework that defines or delimits the 
range of privileges granted to the individual or group who owns specific resources (Mahoney, 2005, 
Kim and Mahoney, 2005). It is the exclusive authority that determines how a resource is used. The 
three criteria for the efficient property rights are (1) universality – all resources are owned by 
someone; (2) exclusivity – the owner has the exclusive rights on the property; and (3) transferability 
– ensuring the allocation of resources from low to high yield uses (Demsetz, 1967; Mahoney, 2005). 
The pioneering works of Alchian (1959, 1961), Coase (1960), and Demsetz (1967) Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) on the traditional conceptual framework of the PRT, namely how the traditional, 
Table 2.2: Comparison of the NIE theories 
Comparison Items  Agency Theory Transaction Costs Theory Property Rights Theory 
Unit of Analysis Principal-Agent Contract. Transaction. Institution. 
Focal Dimension Incentives. Various types of asset specificity. Property rights. 
Focal Cost Concern Residual loss. Maladaptation. 
Holdup problems. 
Externalities. 
Rent-seeking. 
Contractual Focus Ex ante incentive 
alignment, 
Monitoring mechanisms 
Choice of (ex post) governance 
mechanism. 
Ex ante property rights allocation 
and ex post distributional 
conflicts. 
Theoretical 
Orientation 
Constrained optimization. Comparative assessment. Comparative assessment. 
Strategic Intent Shareholder view. Shareholder view. Stakeholder view. 
Source of Market 
frictions 
Information asymmetry, 
unobservability, risk 
aversion (by agents). 
Bounded rationality, uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, 
opportunism, and asset 
specificity.  
Externalities, unclearly defined 
and difficult to enforce property 
rights (weak appropriability), and 
vested interests. 
Source: Adopted and constructed from Kim and Mahoney (2005) 
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technological, and institutional (including hierarchical authority) constraints enter into the decision 
processes of assigning property rights that would lead to efficient contractual outcomes. However, 
discussions of the property rights in the context of NIE and modern listed corporations are later 
developments. It is worthwhile to mention Furubotn and Pejovich (1972) Libecap (1989), Barzel 
(1989), North (1990), Eggertsson (1990), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) for their important 
contributions to the modern property rights research literature. From the context of the existence of 
shareholders and hired managers and the fact that multiple shareholders own one firm, the NIE 
property rights tends to distinguish, for instance, the right to use, the right to transfer and the right 
to gain income from the use of an asset as a set of ownership rights which can be distributed across 
various individuals.  
Though yet distinct, the PRT has common antecedents with the transaction costs and agency 
theories even though it differs from them in that it follows stakeholder view (Kim and Mahoney, 
2005). However, condsidering the crucial changes to NIE theory, the PRT assumes that: (1) 
individuals are assumed to maximize their own utility, (2) transaction costs are recognized as being 
practically positive, and (3) more than one pattern of property rights can exist and that profit 
maximization is not assured (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). It postulates that managers are able to 
pursue their own goals and divert the firm away from profit maximization only within certain limits 
due to certain circumstances in the competitive environment (Furubotn and Pjovich, 1972). The 
three assumptions are not in much contradiction with the agency theory perspectives.  
In contrast to focusing on reducing costs as the TCE and the agency theory do, the property rights 
theory (1) focuses on improvements in the social welfare by assigning property rights in the 
presence of constraints or externalities (Kim and Mahoney, 2005), (2) views that property rights 
have not been assigned to the contractual party with the economic incentive and ability to maximize 
utilization of the resource, (3) suggests that there are sets of constraints regarding property rights 
would internalize externalities, thus facilitating cooperation, reducing conflicts and transaction costs 
(Nabli and Nugent, 1989), (4) incorporates the elements of property rights into the analysis of 
contracts and of institutions with circumstances inhibiting the failures to reach satisfactory 
contractual agreements (Libecap, 1989; Eggertsson, 1990; North, 1990).  
According to the PRT, ownership is conceptualized as residual control and obligations (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Ownership confers to the owner the residual rights of control 
over the firm’s assets in contrast with the income rights of the neoclassical PRT view. The providers 
of risk capital (owners) guarantee also to pay the obligations to other contractual partners and 
therefore protect them from losses, should the overall venture make a loss (up to the liability 
limitations of shareholders). Therefore, according to the modern property rights theory, the rights to 
residual control over assets and to residual returns are equated with asset ownership that 
safeguards the contracting parties from contractual hazard such as ex post holdup problems or 
distributional conflicts.  
Given the conceptualization above, the problem with the PRT, firstly, is that it does not give answer 
to the question of Alchian and Demsetz (1972): who will monitor the monitor? The agency theory 
provides its possible answers to the question, whereas the PRT does not provide governance 
structures or models as solutions. Hart and Moore (1990, p.1120-21) put residual control rights over 
assets as “the right to decide how these assets are to be used except to the extent that particular 
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usages have been specified in the initial contract the ability to exclude others from the use of that 
asset”. The definition is not explicit and the concept is criticized for being ambiguous on the ground 
that it is difficult to precisely specify residual rights and thus equating residual control rights with 
ownership (Demsetz, 1998). Hence, the concept of principal-agent relationship in modern listed 
firms is not explitly established in the PRT. Secondly, even though the PRT provides the contractual 
focus of the framework of ex ante property rights allocation and ex post distributional conflicts 
resolution, it only gives much attention to vested interests like institutions or state (Kim and 
Mahoney, 2005) in its endeavour to suggest efficient property rights. Thirdly, unlike the agency 
theory that provides the ex ante incentive schemes and monitoring mechanisms as solutions to the 
contractual conflicts, the PRT suggests only the legal system or institutional framework to define 
property rights, to enforce property rights and contractual terms in case of conflict. Finally, the PRT 
is ambiguous in its definition of ownership in its conceptualization of ownership as claimancy of both 
the residual rights to income (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) and residual control rights (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990).  
Therefore, the PRT is not as strong as the agency theory, for the purpose of this research in 
providing the testable relationship between managers and shareholders. However, since it is more 
satisfactory than the TCE and agency theory in handling the strategic issues of shared ownership 
(Kim and Mahoney, 2005) the PRT might play the complementarty role.  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
The degree of applicability of the different NIE theories to the conflict between managers and 
owners of the firm per se the research’s general objectives in the Introduction is assessed above. In 
the review of made above, the three NIE theories are found (1) to deal with the conflict between 
managers and owners; (2) to have a common view that there are costs (be it agency costs or 
transaction costs) involved in the control of modern corporations; and (3) to assume that there are 
externalities that are manifested in residual loss (in agency theory), maladaptation and holdup 
problems (in transaction cost economics) and costs associated with externalities and rent-seeking (in 
property rights theory) in their focal cost concern. Moreover, both agency theory and TCE believe 
that there should be cost reduction even though they differ on how the costs are reduced.  
However, the three NIE theories differ in the way they approach the contractual framework in their 
efforts to suggest devices that mitigate the costs or externalities. This might arise from their 
difference in their unit of analysis. It is only the agency theory that considers principal and agent (as 
parties to the conflict) and their relationship as a unit of analysis. However, the other two NIE 
theories (TCE and PRT) fall short of clearly modelling and providing testable hypothesis for 
managers-owners conflicts since they diverge from managers-owners relationship and conflict as a 
unit of analysis.  
Moreover, as noted above, the TCE and PRT makes focus on the ex post governance mechanisms 
and distributional conflicts respectively, while the agency perspectives focuses on preventive ex ante 
incentive alignment schemes and monitoring mechanisms. Even though, the PRT gives ex ante 
property rights allocation, it does not provide preventive incentive alignment or monitoring scheme 
as a preventive scheme before defaults to the contractual terms happen. Based on these two 
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arguments, the agency theory is found to be better equipped than TCE and PRT in the analysis of 
managers-owners conflicts.  
Nevertheless, other theories are not reviewed. Firstly, the stewardship theory, which assumes that 
managers are rational stewards of shareholders working in the best interest of owners without 
divergence from shareholders wealth maximization, is not included in the review since it does not 
serve the purpose of looking into manager-owners conflicts. It does not yet have empirical 
underpinning and wider acceptance among researchers to beat the alignment of interest hypothesis 
of the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). Secondly, the legal approach to 
finance is not reviewed because of it focus solely on the ex ante and ex post institutional governance 
(law and court) definition of rights and solution respectively to the conflict between managers and 
owners. The ex ante rights allocation in the approach does not provide empirically testable models 
as the agency theory. Finally, the stakeholder theory is left out of the review because it diverges 
from the shareholder value maximization perspectives of the objective function of the firm.  
To sum up, the agency theory has developed in form and content to the current state by 
incorporating some of the views of the property rights theory, bounded rationality, incomplete 
contracts approach in its endeavour to find the ex ante contractual relationships. This empowers it 
to gain a superior position in providing intuitive and testable tool of investigation of relationships 
and suggestive solutions and explanation of solutions to the principal-agent relationships and 
conflicts than other theories discussed above.  
The important aspect of the principal-agent paradigm is its suggestions of explanations and the 
solutions to different types of agency costs. In its contractual focus and design, the agency 
perspectives provide both dispute avoidance approach by crafting incentive-alignments and conflict 
resolution approach of crafting governance mechanisms. So, this research uses it as the basic 
theoretical tool even though it employs other theories as alternative or complementary tools.  
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CHAPTER   THREE 
THE RECENT EVIDENCE ON CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 
AND CONTROL STRUCTUES IN THE UK: 
CONROL POTENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The long standing notion of corporate ownership structure is that equity ownership is dispersed in 
the countries of the UK and the US, whereas it is concentrated in the developed economies of 
Continental Europe (Franks and Mayor, 1997; Faccio and Lang, 2002). Most of the research studies in 
the area of ownership structure, and particularly the agency perspectives, often start argument from 
the Berle and Means (1932) seminal work that warns against the problems ensuing from ownership 
dispersion, a situation in which ownership is separated from control and managers are in full control 
of modern firms. The view has been dominating the public policy discussion and academic research 
in corporate governance for the last few decades.  
The notion of diffuse ownership motivated several researchers that have tried to question the 
validity of the view of Berle and Means (1932) by studying the ownership structure of firms in some 
economies that has presented evidence of the existence of blockholders even in the UK and the US 
firms (La Porta et al., 1999; Gadhoum et al., 2005; Holderness, 2003, 2007). Interestingly, investor 
protection is higher in the UK than the US and this might encourage investors to invest in corporate 
shares and accumulate blocks of shares. Contrary to this argument is that investor protection might 
encourage minority shareholders’ protection to diversify their portfolio thus discouraging the 
accumulation of blocks of shares (La Porta et al., 1998; Franks and Mayer, 2002; Franks et al., 2001; 
Crespi and Renneboog, 2003). Hence, it is important to know the trends of ownership pattern in the 
higher investor protection regime of the UK.  
Moreover, there are series of corporate governance reforms with the objective to curb corporate 
failures and protect investors since the beginning of 1990s in the UK. From the Cadbury Report 
(1992) to the Higgs Report (of end of 2002, published in 2003) reform recommendations focused, 
among other things, on improving corporate board structure, and encouraging shareholders to 
participate in corporate control. These steps might also have the effect of encouraging investors to 
invest in firms and to exert their control pressure in their firms besides the investor protection.  
Furthermore, since the year 2002 had been the year in which the UK and the world economy 
showed recovery from the corporate crisis that started at the beginning of the millennium, it is 
interesting to study the developments or trends in ownership structure and board structure of the 
UK after the Higgs Report and the publication of the 2003 Code of Best Practice. The year 2007 is 
also important since it is just before the beginning of the current global financial crisis. It might be 
arguable that the provisions in the Code that encourage shareholder activism and include reform of 
the internal control mechanism might create optimism in investors that might encourage them to 
invest more in the firm or pessimism that drives diversification of portfolio or even divesting. Hence, 
it is interesting to investigate the pattern of ownership, principally blockholder categories and 
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ownership concentration and board structure in the UK during the period of good economic health, 
2003-2007.  
Therefore, the relevant research questions: how is corporate share ownership distributed in the UK 
listed firms between 2003 and 2007? What are the features of ownership concentration and 
blockholder concentration? How has the board structure evolved after the Higgs Report and during 
the regime of the 2003 UK Code of Best Practice?1 How has the ownership power, which might be the 
control potential in the firm, of the first largest shareholders evolved during the period?  
Hence, in spite of the popular notion of diffuse ownership in the UK it is still interesting and relevant 
to know the changes or trends in ownership and control structures of the listed firms during the 
period 2003-2007. So, this study undertakes investigation of the extent and trend of ownership 
pattern, ownership concentration, the prevalence of blockholders and the control potential of 
ownership categories in the major listed firms in the UK.  
The relevance of this study is, firstly, related to the corporate governance reforms in the UK. After 
series of the UK corporate governance and the financial crisis that started in 2000 and the famous 
corporate scandals (Parmalat and Ahold and then followed by Enron and Worldcom) the Higgs 
Report was published in 2003. The existing relevant recommendations of the corporate governance 
reforms (from the Cadbury Report of 1992 onwards) were incorporated in the Combined Code 
published in 2003.2 Some of the recommendations incorporated in the UK Combined Code of 200 
regarding board structure, which is vital in the control of corporations, are interesting and relevant 
issues of investigation besides the ownership structure. Hence, this study also analyses, as its 
secondary objective, the trends and evolution of some internal corporate governance variables and 
the compliance with the recommendations of the UK Combined Code related to the variables. 
Secondly, the relevance of this research study is related to the high liquidity of stock markets in the 
UK especially in the environmental situation of the period under review. The country is among the 
prototype countries with a well developed modern stock ownership and corporate system, and the 
most liquid stock market along with the United States. Regarding liquidity, Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
rank the UK stock market first or second in the world in previous six decades and among the top five 
markets in the later three decades of the nine decades of the last century. More diffusion of share 
ownership might be expected to be facilitated by high liquidity of UK stocks, which might encourage 
the buying and selling of stocks and the prevalence of blockholders. As already noted, it might be 
arguable that high market liquidity in the regime of board reforms, high investor protection and 
encouragement of shareholder activism might lead to accumulation of shares to exert control 
pressure or diversification of portfolio, which might in turn affect ownership and control structure. 
Hence, the study might reveal some changes or trends in the ownership patterns of listed firms. 
Thirdly, according to the existing similar studies in literature, attempts are made to study and 
provide ownership structure of the UK firms for the periods up to the beginning of the millennium 
(recently Marchica and Mura, 2005; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). The most recently study by Florackis 
and Ozkan (2009) covers the period of 1999-2005, which includes the period of financial crisis and 
                                                          
1 Note: There is also a reviewed version of the code published in 2006.  
2 Note: There was a Combined Code of 1998, which was published by the London Stock Exchange in June 
1998, and annexed to the Stock Exchange Listing Rules.  
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corporate scandal of the beginning of the millennium. However, the investigation of ownership and 
control structure in the period (2003-2007), in which the economy showed some developments and 
was free from negative shocks, is interesting and relevant. Hence this study includes 2006 and 2007 
and, this research on the recent historical (evolutionary) development in the ownership structure 
might reveal the state, trends and tendencies during the period.  
Finally, the relevance of this research is related to the thresholds for identifying blockholders. It is to 
be recalled that more of the conclusions on the diffuse ownership were drawn from the studies that 
use (1) higher threshold levels, (2) old and cross-sectional data, and (3) the concept of controlling 
owner (ultimate controller) at a certain threshold level and considering the rest as diffusely held (La 
Porta, et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Marchica and Mura, 2005; 
Gadhoum, et al., 2005). However, this study uses a much lower threshold level of 3% (the UK 
disclosure level), a panel data, and aggregate blockholder ownership in order to investigate the 
patterns of ownership and control structure and to identify the blockholders that have the 
incentives or ability to exert control pressures on the management of the UK listed firm. Hence, the 
investigation of ownership and control structure as well as ownership concentration from the panel 
data of the UK listed firms when the disclosure level (3%) is used to identify significant blockholders 
and aggregates of blockholder categories is an interesting relevant issue of this research.  
Nevertheless, one of the delimitations worth to mention regarding the study is that the data 
coverage is from 2003 after the Higgs Report (January 2003). We would like to note that the study is 
not with the objective to compare changes in ownership and control structures during the period 
chosen with prior years. It is only concerned with the trends and developments within the period 
under review. Hence, the option is to compare the results with previous findings on ownership and 
control structures in the UK listed firms. Finally, this study is not designed to investigate whether the 
reform in corporate governance has the causal impact on the trends and changes in ownership and 
control structures of UK listed firms or not, since the issue of accounting for the factors like 
investors’ identity, behaviours, incentives, and ability to exert control pressure is beyond the scope 
of this study.  
The other delimitation of the study is related to board structure variables recommended in the UK 
corporate governance reform Code. The Combined Code of the UK recommendations that are 
relevant to this study and are objectively and directly measurable, among others are (1) that most of 
the board members should be nonexecutive directors (NEDs), especially balance of executive and 
independent NEDs excluding the chairman who should be independent, (2) that the CEO should not 
assume the position of chairmanship of the board of directors, which can be traced to Cadbury 
Report (1992), and (3) that the board should not be so large but sufficient size with the balance of 
skills and experience. However, the recommendations of the Combined Code of 2003 and 2006 also 
give more provisions on board independence: mainly that (1) the chairman should hold meetings 
with the non-executive directors without the presence of the executives, (2) the board composition 
should have the balancing of executives and NEDs, particularly independent NEDs, and smaller firms 
should have at least two independent NEDs, and (3) certain criteria should be fulfilled for 
nonexecutive directors to be independent. The Code provides also recommendations on board 
subcommittees. Nevertheless, this study is delimited to the use of only objectively identifiable NEDs, 
CEO-duality and board size, because (1) the principal objective of the research is to investigate the 
ownership and control structure and their impacts on firm performance in the UK listed firms, (2) 
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board structure variables are used in the research thesis as control variables for internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, and (3) as mentioned above, the board variables chosen can be objectively 
and directly measureable and thus do not involve any subjective measuring decisions, which might 
be a source of biases. 
The main findings of the study are that: (1) the first largest shareholder and even the coalition of the 
first five largest shareholders in the firm do not attain majority or absolute control over the firm in 
terms of their voting power; (2) the corporate ownership structure of the listed firms of the UK show 
ownership dispersion even at the UK disclosure rule level; (3) there is evidence that the presence of 
more blockholders would not be enough to imply or to conclude that share ownership is 
concentrated; (4) the level of holdings by blockholders changes across years and across the owners; 
(5) outside ownership and aggregate block ownership showed steady increases, whereas widely held 
ownership showed steady decreases during the period; (6) the change in ownership and control 
structures – blockholder ownership pattern and ownership concentration – is found to be significant 
for the period between 2005 and 2006 as well as 2006 and 2007; and (7) the trends in the board 
structure variables in the period confirms more compliance to the provisions of the UK Combined 
Code of 2003 regarding the proportion of nonexecutive directors, board size and CEO-duality.  
The contribution of this study is that it reveals the developments in the patterns of ownership and 
control structures and trends in the evolution of board structures in the major UK listed firms in FTSE 
All Share Index after the Higgs Report and the 2003 Code of Best Practice of corporate governance 
and before the inception of the current global financial crisis. Serving as an extension to the previous 
studies, the study also reveals evidence on the pattern of ownership structure and concentration of 
the UK listed firms in the period that they have not covered. Finally, from comparison of the period’s 
average and between years’ averages, it might be suggestive that change in the magnitude of 
ownership might remain almost stable around the mean during five years, thus strengthening the 
hypothesis of the equilibrium state of ownership structure within a time horizon.  
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly accounts for the review of the 
literature regarding the background of the UK equity ownership that has the motivation effect on 
this study. This section would also describe the rationale behind the use of the chosen control 
thresholds and of the identification of blockholder categories. It also will include a short review of 
the prior research literature in order to identify and fill the gaps. Section 3.3 deals with the 
methodology of the research. The results of the analyses would be presented in section 34; and this 
would be followed by discussion and conclusion.  
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1 Background: UK Share Ownership 
It is recorded in literature that the British industrial performance at the turn of the 20th century 
relied on family, and that there were powerful and dominant families, and that family share 
ownership had been dominant in the British business history and in corporate share ownership 
(Becht et al., 2009). Gradually, the pattern of share ownership showed changes, where families sold 
some of their stakes that led to the dilution of ownership. It is recorded that almost two-thirds of the 
decline in directors’ shareholdings over 1900-1950. Becht et al. (2009) explain that the historical 
change of the pattern of ownership of British firms in the century was primarily due to the immense 
amount of the waves of takeover activity since 1960s. 1940s and 1950s are marked by the changes 
in the UK capital markets where (1) minority investor protection was strengthened by improving 
disclosure and setting up of anti-director provisions after a number of scandals by the end of 1940s, 
and (2) there was a sharp increase in institutional ownership that became the largest shareholder in 
several companies by 1960. Hence, family ownership continued to decrease overtime being replaced 
by other investor categories. On the recent state of family ownership, Becht et al. (2009) write that 
the largest voting blocs in the UK usually casts less than 10% of votes; and portion of votes casted by 
families is less than 5%. They add that block of shares owned by families on average is only 5%. This 
indicates that families have less significance in corporate control in the UK unlike Continental 
Europe.  
Moreover, the survey of the UK beneficial share ownership of the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
of the UK, as shown in table 3.1, shows how shares are distributed among the principal investor 
categories. Firstly, it can be seen that individual (family) investors were holding the highest UK 
shares (54%) in 1963 and that it has decreased overtime up to its 12.80% stake in 2006. The 
historical evolution of the beneficial ownership of UK shares indicates that foreign ownership (the 
rest of the world) has been increasing since 1963 (7%) to 40% in 2006. From the trends over the time 
period, it might be suggestive that the ownership of individual investors has been substituted mainly 
by the increase in institutional ownership and foreign ownerships. It might also suggest that with the 
growth in size of corporations, individuals or families might not be able to supply enough capital 
alone to undertake projects or investment opportunities to a large scale and it might have been be 
necessary to finance the investments with pooled capital from institutions. It might also be 
suggestive that the steady increases in foreign ownership in UK firms shown in the table might have 
been facilitated by the financial liberalization that set strong foot in 1980s.  
Secondly, the historical development in equity ownership viewed from the table confirms that the 
UK institutional investors are the most significant shareholders, whose holding increased since 1963, 
attaining its maximum holding of 61.20% of UK equity in 1993, and then decreasing until the period 
under review, where it is still the highest owner. Regarding this Dubbins and Cuthbert (1985) state 
particularly insurance companies and pension funds are consistent purchasers of shares of UK 
quoted companies in the period of 1966-1980. They also suggest that ownership of ordinary shares 
is of particular interest for investors since the votes attached to the equities give shareholders legal 
powers to influence management through General Meetings.  
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The later decrease in institutional share holding might be due to the substitution by the rest of the 
world (foreign investors that are mainly institutional investors), which shows an increase from 7% in 
1963 to 40% in 2006. Nevertheless, it is observable that there is an increasing influence of both the 
domestic and foreign institutional investors on the UK share market. This might indicate that they 
have changed their investment patterns and choice of portfolios whereby they might have increased 
their investment in share capital. The reason for the high presence of institutional investors might be 
partly due to, among other things, the liquid and deep UK stock market that might have encouraged 
the institutional investors to undertake large investments in shares or to trade in securities avoiding 
market risks. The ONS show that the institutional investors have more preference to invest in large 
quoted companies, the FTSE 100 firms, in more liquid capital markets, than in smaller listed firms.  
Hence, the important insight form table 3.1 is that share ownership in the UK has been undergoing 
institutionalization (Kahn, 2006; Rydqvist et al., 2008). In other words, the historical increase in 
stakes of institutional owners and the decrease in the shares of individual owners might show the 
substitution effects between the two investor categories. Regarding this issue, Duggal and Miller 
(1999) write that institutional investors are rapidly replacing individual investors in the stock market 
also in the US. It might be the case that individual investors might have been investing via 
institutional intermediaries rather than directly. Another insight is that the decrease in the 
institutional ownership might have been due to the substitution effects with the rest of the world. 
However, as most of the foreign owners are also institutional investors, the proportion of UK equity 
held by institutional investors can be higher (Franks and Mayer, 1997).  
Another important thing to note in the table is that equity ownership by the private nonfinancial 
institutions, public sector and banks remained to be low and volatile over the period. However, the 
stake of public sector shows decreases whereas that of the banks shows increases since 1980s 
coinciding with more financial liberalization and huge privatization in the UK. In contrast, the 
holdings of the nonfinancial firms show overtime decrease.  
Regarding the period under review and assuming that data values of 2008 closely might be 
approximate values for the missing data of 2007, private nonfinancials ownership, institutional 
ownership and Individual/ family ownership show decreases by about 33.33%, 10.94%, and 31.54% 
respectively over the period between 2003 and 2007. However, bank ownership shows stability at 
the beginning of the period until it showed a 10% increase at the end of the period. The stake of the 
public sector shows decreases at the beginning but dramatic increase (about 67%) at the later part 
Table 3.1: Evolution of beneficial ownership of UK shares; Percent of total equity; 1963-2008 
SECTOR 1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1993 1999 2002 2003 2004 2006 2008 
Rest of the World 7 6.6 5.6 3.6 12.8 16.3 33 35.9 36.1 36.30 40.00 41.5 
Individuals 54 47.4 37.5 28.2 20.6 17.7 15.3 14.3 14.9 14.10 12.80 10.2 
Institutional Investors 29 34.2 47.3 57.6 57.8 61.2 47.1 45.7 44.8 45.00 41.00 39.9 
Private Nonfinancials 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.10 0.90 0.8 
Public Sector 5.1 5.4 3 5.1 3.8 1.5 2.2 0.8 0.7 0.60 1.80 3 
Banks 1.5 2.6 3.6 3 2 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.10 0.10 1.1 
Total  98.7 98.3 99.3 99.7 99.3 99.6 99 97.9 97.8 97.20 96.60 96.5 
Source: Office for National Statistics, UK, Updated 09//12/2009. 
39 
 
of the period. Foreign ownership shows an increase of about 14.96%, whereas institutional 
ownership shows decrease by about 10.93% over the period. However, it is arguable that the 
increase in the bank ownership might have been influenced by government’s credit crunch rescues 
to the banks and the increase in the public sector might have been due to the bailouts to banks by 
the state in 2008.  
From the most recent update of beneficial ownership of UK shares from the UK Office of National 
Statistics presented as figure 3.1 it is observable that the holdings of insurance companies and 
pension funds show decreases to the lowest level since 1975 to 26.20% in 2008, when we exclude 
other institutional investors like investment trusts, unit trusts, other non-profit institutions like 
churches and charities. Individual/ family holdings also show decreases to 10.2%, which is the lowest 
record in history of the survey (ONS, Share Ownership 2008). Foreign ownership (rest of the world) 
has risen from 40% in 2006 to 41.50% in 2008.  
However, the share distribution from the ONS described above does not tell the control structures of 
the firm and ownership concentration level because they show aggregate figures of all beneficial 
shareholder categories of the firms. Since many of the shares are not voted on the General Meeting 
and many of the shares carry very insignificant proportion of the firm’s outstanding equity, the 
assessment of control needs to be related to the cash flow rights that give the incentives and ability 
to exert control pressures to influence firm value. The ability to exert control pressure by 
shareholders is thus related to the proportion of block of shares they own (voting rights attached to 
the shares). Hence, it is vital to review research literature in order to show how researchers 
identified and reported the shareholders and ownership structures that might enable the owners to 
exert control pressure.  
The empirical evidence from Eisenberg (1976), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) show that the largest US firms have the modest concentration of equity ownership, where 
there are several large or controlling shareholders. For instance, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that 
the largest 5 and 20 blockholders owning 0.2% or more of company’s shares own 24.81% and 
Fig. 3.1: Beneficial Ownership of UK shares: end-2008. 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics, Share Ownership 2008. 
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37.66% respectively of the equity of a sample of 511 US listed firms. Likewise, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) find that the average holding of the largest shareholder owning 5% or more of a firm’s equity 
among the 456 firms of the Fortune 500 is 15.4% and the total average holding of the 5 largest 
blockholders is 28.8%. Regarding blockholder types, Denis and Denis (1995) report that insider 
ownership in the US is 11.7%. More extreme, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) show that 13% of all 
listed firms and 5% of firms traded on the NYSE and AMEX exchanges have a single shareholder 
(family or another firm) that holds majority of outstanding equity shares.  
Regarding the UK firms, the study by Franks et al. (2001) provides evidence (data ownership of 0.1% 
or more directors’ holding for all years, and 5% or more outside blockholding from 1988 to 1989, 
and 3% from 1990-1993 following statutory disclosure rule change) that the total equity ownership 
of the first largest blockholder is 15.3% on average for all years, and that the aggregate holdings of 
the first 5 blockholders control more than 33% outstanding shares on average for the period 1988-
1993, ranging between 29.7% and 36.7% of firm’s shares depending on the year. The aggregate all 
large blockholding varies between 30.6%-42.7% of the sample’s equity depending on the year. They 
also report the average insider ownership in the UK is 11.8% and that a single blockholding majority 
blocks of outstanding shares is 3%. Hence, the evidence shows that the level of ownership 
concentration in the UK is similar to that of the US, as shown in the studies mentioned above. 
Moreover, Marchica and Mura (2005) provide evidence on UK ownership structure for the period of 
1991-2001 with two-year intervals for a sample of approximately 1100 nonfinancial listed firms 
(5425 observations) from London Stock Exchange using the threshold of 5% for 1991 and 3% for 
1993-2001 based on the UK disclosure rule. In order to compute the ultimate ownership and control 
structures, they randomly selected and constructed a sample of about 550 nonfinancial UK listed 
companies for a period of 1993-2001. As an extension to Franks et al. (2001) study, their result show 
that insider ownership range from 10.69%-16.54%, and widely held ownership (held below the 
disclosure rule) accounts on average range from 51.85% to 61.16% during the period. The result 
shows that while the stakes of directors showed steady decrease, widely held ownership (float) and 
outsider ownership showed steady increase during the period of 1991-2001. The interesting 
evidence from the study is that the float showed volatility during the period ranging between 
51.85% in 1993 to 56.41% in 2001 for the main sample, and that outsider ownership remained 
relatively stable during the period. They also report that the largest blockholders an average of 
between 18.88% in 1993 and 17.76% in 2001, thus showing slight decreases during the period. The 
average holdings for the first largest blockholders (18.14%) is a bit higher than the result (15.3%) of 
Franks et al. (2001), and this might, among other things, be due to the difference in the thresholds 
used. They also find that institutional ownership and bank ownership show decreases, whereas 
individual/family ownership shows slight increases during the period. Consistent with Ersoy-Bozkuk 
and Lasfer (2000) they find the decrease of institutional ownership during the period. Finally, bank 
ownership show decreases, whereas individual/ family stakes slightly exhibits increases in the period 
under review. 
Furthermore, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) provide some evidence on the ownership and control 
structure of UK listed firms for the period of 1999-2005, and it can serve as an extension to Marchica 
and Mura (2005) since it provides evidence on UK share ownership patterns for more recent years. 
They report that the stakes of all blockholders increased from 32.88% (26.93%) in 1999 to 40.86% 
(32.65%) for 3% and 5% cut-offs respectively in 2005, indicating that ownership concentration shows 
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increases throughout their period of review. Their result also shows that the proportion of firms with 
controlling blockholders (at 20% cut-off) increased from 15.68% in 1999 to 19.74% in 2005. They also 
report significant decline in the executive ownership during the period (from 10.19% in 1999 to 
6.79% in 2005) consistent with the result of Marchica and Mura (2005).  
Generally, literature show that the market-based governance system in the UK and the US is 
characterized by more markets’ liquidity and less concentrated ownership, relative to the 
relationship-based systems of Continental Europe and Japan (Frank and Mayer, 1997; La Porta et al., 
1999; Ersoy-Bozcuk and Lasfer, 2000; Thomsen et al., 2006). Despite the general similarities between 
the UK and the US, there are differences in the pattern of share ownership even though they both 
have common law regulatory systems (La Porta et al., 1988). The UK financial institutions, the largest 
share owners, hold more proportion of the total outstanding shares than their counterparts in the 
US. Additionally, individuals are reported to hold less equity in the UK compared to their higher 
stakes in the US. Another characteristic of UK institutional investors is that they are highly 
concentrated and that they invest most of their assets in equities (Franks et al., 2001; Franks and 
Mayer, 2002; Faccio and Lasfer, 2000).  
Hence, having explored the reports on the states and evolution of corporate ownership and control 
structures in research literature that are relevant to this study, it is important to identify the owners 
with significant blocks of shares based on the control potential perspectives. The control potential 
perspective is a viewpoint that assumes that control power is derived from voting power that is 
attached to ownership rights. Therefore, the discussion of the rationale behind the identification of 
blockholder categories and choice threshold levels to measure the categories is vital.  
3.2.2 Motivating Factors of Block Ownership 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) note that the identity of owners (blockholders) is important for 
corporate strategy and firm performance because their objectives, incentives, the way they exert 
their influence is manifested in the strategy formulated on profit goals, dividends, capital structure 
and growth rate. So the identification of the blockholders is important for this research. 
In order to identify the blockholders, the important questions would be: Why do blockholders 
assemble and hold blocks of shares or diversify their portfolios of stocks? How do we measure and 
identify the blockholders that have the ability to exert control pressure? What are the identifiable 
blockholder categories from the perspectives of their characteristic features, investment behaviours, 
and liquidity?  
The motivating factors behind holding blocks of shares and blockholders are (1) private benefits of 
control, and (2) shared benefits of control, which are not mutually exclusive (Holderness, 2003). The 
premise is that some shareholders own blocks of shares in firms in order to attain the ability to exert 
control for the shared and or private benefits of control. Regarding private benefits of control, 
Barclay and Holderness (1989) suggest that the benefits are the driving forces of block trades, block 
premiums and the amassing of block of shares. The private benefits they mention are: (1) the 
expected stream of dividends, (2) pecuniary benefits like high salaries for individual blockholders by 
being in the management, and (3) securing enough voting power in order to influence control in 
anticipated management changes, to decrease the effective control of existing large shareholder, or 
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to impede an outsider’s voting control. The shareholder can attain substantial blocks of shares by 
assembling of blocks through a series of small open-market transactions and/or purchasing blocks of 
shares at premiums (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).  
Moreover, large owners might have the incentives to amass blocks of shares to exert control and 
monitor the management for the shared benefits of control which accrues the smaller shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Barclay and Holderness, 1989). Holderness (2003, p.54) states that the 
shared benefits of control arise from superior management or monitoring that can result from the 
substantial collection of decision rights and wealth effects that come with large block ownership. 
The cash flow from the profits as the result of managerial decisions and stock price increases that 
has the wealth effects eventually accrue to minority shareholders. He explains that if the higher cash 
flows arising from the increase in firm value are shared by minority shareholders, this constitutes the 
shared benefits of control. 
3.2.3 Thresholds to Identify Ownership and Control Structures  
In order to measure ownership structures from the control potential perspective, this research uses 
cut-off level or threshold of control that identifies the existing blockholders and ownership 
concentration of a firm. In firms with shareholders owning more than 50% of the outstanding shares, 
control is uncontested and there might be absolute control or majority controller. This can be 
generalized for firms with highly concentrated ownership structure. However, the share ownership 
in modern corporations is dispersed and the control configuration might be different. Regarding this, 
Sorensen (1974) explains that corporate stock ownership appeared to have become more widely 
diffused since Berle and Means (1932), indicating that it is no more required to hold 50% or more to 
exert effective control. It is uncommon to have large shareholdings that give absolute control in the 
UK (less than 1% for blockholder type, 2.9% for all categories considered in Franks et al., 2001). Our 
data on the UK being used in this research also confirms this. Hence, as share ownership has become 
more widely diffused, the level of block ownership needed to effectively control firms has fallen 
down. The other possible explanation for the uncommon majority stake holdings by investors might 
be the institutionalization of equity ownership, especially in the UK. Mayer (2002) suggests that 
share ownership is dispersed such that it is not required for investors to hold large equity stakes in 
order to assemble majority stake in order to exert control pressure.  
Hence, considering the continuous overtime increase in dispersion of ownership and the rise in the 
institutionalization of ownership, the use of control thresholds less than 50%, which gives majority 
vote to ensure uncontested control, may not nowadays be the criteria to define the control 
structure of modern large listed firms. So, the interesting research question is how to define the 
control criteria that enable to identify controlling blockholders. What threshold level would ensure 
control in firms with diffuse ownership, like the UK case? Put in another way, how is the configuration 
corporate control when minority controllers do not exist in a firm?  
For the purpose of this study the use of the UK national disclosure mandatory rule might be 
appropriate as used by Franks et al. (2001), Marchica and Mura (2005), and Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009). A 3% criterion is used to collect all blockholders that hold substantial shares in each firm and 
the proportion of stakes the hold (as percentage of outstanding equity of the firm) in the sample. 
This is considered to be appropriate because it is the level at which shareholders are typically 
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required to disclose their stakes (Holderness, 2009) and it would reveal the ownership structure (the 
distribution of share ownership among owners and the extent of ownership concentration) of firms. 
As for the UK, the Company Law provides that the individual or group should notify the company (1) 
any acquired equity stake of at least 3% or more, and (2) any increase or decrease of the stakes if 
they exceed 1% to the company; and that the company must record in its share register the notified 
stake as substantial shareholdings (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). Additionally, the London Stock 
Exchange provides the listing rule that requires the mandatory disclosure of the firm’s ownership 
with at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares. Hence, this provides facilities or the bases for 
identification of blockholders with significant shares and the availability of data to study the 
ownership of UK firms.  
Literature reveals some argument for the lower cut-off level. For instance, Crespi and Renneboog 
(2003) argue that in spite of diffuse ownership, the UK blockholders might actively monitor firms and 
reduce the free-riding problem by creating voting coalitions, which are difficult to directly test since 
their existence is not usually disclosed. Such coalitions exist as ad hoc basis for specific aim like the 
removal of underperforming managers since the coalitions that are formed for longer time are 
considered to be an investor group bearing all the legal requirements of disclosure, reporting and 
governance as a large shareholder by regulatory authorities. In the UK a coalition of 15% or more of 
shares is required to disclose its strategic intent, and a coalition of 30% or more is required to 
comply with the take-over rule (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). The formation of the voting 
coalitions can be from the identifiable significant blockholders owning as low as 3% or more of the 
firm’s outstanding shares. Hence, the blockholders owning 3% or more stakes might have the 
incentive to form voting coalitions and attain the ability to exert control pressure in their firm.  
However, according to literature search, the issue of shareholder voting coalitions has not been 
empirically investigated. Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) developed 
interesting theoretical models. Applying game theory, Zwiebel (1995), assuming divisible control 
benefits, provides a model which predicts that (1) large blockholders will create their own space by 
forming coalition that deter other block investors from control; (2) there is a clientele effect in the 
shareholder structure, where in the equilibrium consists of (a) firms with one very large blockholder 
and no smaller blockholders, (b) firms with one large blockholder and many smaller blockholders, 
and (c) firms with numerous small blockholders but no dominant shareholder; and (3) there will be a 
threshold size beyond which large investors might not be challenged or contested by others. In the 
UK, where ownership dispersion is very high, it might be suggestive that the predominant 
equilibrium states of clientele effect are (c) and (b) type firms. Hence, the assumption of coalition 
formation in order to control or to contest the dominant might be appropriate. It might be arguable 
that same-type investors (blockholders’ categories) are likely to cooperate or form coalition more 
easily with each other than different types of block owners.  
On the other hand, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) develop a model of control contest in which 
an initial owner chooses ownership structure with multiple large blockholders in which a single 
shareholder is prevented from taking unilateral action that might hurt other shareholders. They 
argue that the diversion of funds from the firm requires the consent of a coalition of blockholders; 
and that the coalition of shareholders diverts fewer funds than any individual controller. This might 
subsequently help the founder manager to maintain control by forming coalitions at the cost of 
diluting own power. Nevertheless, it might also give rise to the formation of stronger coalition that 
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would question or contest the position of the founder manager. Even though their model is for 
closely held corporations, it might be indicative that the formation of coalitions of controlling or 
contesting is even relevant in firms with highly dispersed ownership structure. Hence, it is arguable 
that the model of Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) might be extended to the UK case, where share 
ownership is dispersed and there are several small blockholders that might collude to form coalitions 
in order to exert control pressure. Accordingly, it might be suggestive that selecting blockholders 
owning as lower as 3% or more might enhance the voting power of a coalition that might influence 
the control of the firm in firms with diffuse ownership.  
To sum up, given the uncommon large shareholdings in the UK, based on the arguments made 
above; the arguments for the incentives and ability to exert control pressure and the prospects of 
the formation of coalitions of blockholders to exert control pressure; in line with the recent studies 
on the UK by Crespi and Renneboog (2003) and Florackis and Ozkam (2009); in conformity with the 
regulatory regimes in the UK; and based on the provision of the UK Company Law and the London 
Stock Exchange listing rules, it would be reasonable to use 3% as a base or recipe for computation of 
some aggregate blockholder types and ownership concentration measures – blockholder types, 
ultimate controller types, ownership concentration and blockholder concentration in the 
methodology section of this study.  
3.2.4 Identifiable Blockholder Categories 
Based on certain common attributes or characteristics of different shareholder types, Frank and 
Mayer (1997) classify the category of blockholders from control potential perspective at 25% cut-off 
level into sectors (1) insurance company, (2) trust /institutional investor, (3) family group, (4) bank, 
(5) State (local and national level), (6) other companies (nonfinancials), (7) foreign company, and (8) 
unknown. They take the remainder of the share stakes below 25% cut-off as widely held and treated 
the institutional investors separately as insurance and trusts. La Porta et al. (1999) presents 
blockholders as (1) family, (2) State, (3) widely held financials, (4) widely held corporations, and (5) 
miscellaneous using 20% and 10% cut-off levels. They grouped some important shareholder entities 
like cooperatives, voting trusts, or a group with no single controlling investors as miscellaneous, and 
the rest of shares are taken as widely held. Later studies like Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang 
(2002) follow the methodology of La Porta et al. (1999).  
However, in this study we have condensed blockholders types into (1) family or individual, (2) 
insiders or management, (3) nonfinancial companies, (4) institutional investors, (5) banks, (6) state 
based upon some common characteristic features and behaviours of the blockholders. It should be 
noted that the reported substantial equity owners provided in the Waterlow Stock Exchange 
Yearbook does not make distinctions between domestic UK owners and foreign owners; hence, 
foreign owners, most of which are found to be institutional investors and banks, are not treated as 
separate blockholders but they are included in their respective categories.  
The final note is that the ownership data source also provides only a lump-sum of directors’ 
ownership for each firm instead of separate ownership of easily identifiable executives and 
nonexecutives. Hence the identified 6 categories mentioned above can fall into two groups – insider 
and outsider investors (figure 3.1). Literature shows that the insiders who manage the firm might 
exploit the shareholders in contrast to the view fiduciary duty of directors, and that certain outside 
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investors might also have the potential ability to exploit minority investors or gain benefits e.g. from 
the sale of services in contrast to the monitoring hypothesis that suggests large outside shareholders 
might play the monitoring role to curb rent extraction by managers.  
3.2.4.1 Family or Individual  
The consideration of family or individual ownership as a separate blockholder category stems from 
its prevalence in the control of firms around the world. Empirical sources support the relevance and 
significance of family as distinct blockholders in corporate share ownership. For instance, in a 
comparative study that uses 10% threshold, Gadhoum et al. (2005) report that family or individual 
controls significant proportion (25.27%) of UK corporations. Additionally, Faccio and Lang (2002) find 
that families control 23.68% of the UK firms in their sample using 20% threshold. Literature shows 
also that family ownership is common all over the world (Burkart et al., 2003), and that it is 
dominant among listed firms (La Porta et al, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
We define families or individuals as private households and those related to them that invest as 
private individual/family or group of partners/families rather than as an institution or organization. 
Family ownership is usually characterized by (1) low investment diversification, where they put most 
of their assets in the firm; and (2) high ownership concentration, where they hold large blocks of 
shares. In our analysis the founders and their heirs or their representatives that might be part of the 
board are not included as family or individual ownership since they are often in the management.  
For the purpose of this study, individuals or families that are directors are not included in this 
category even though they can be individuals/ families because they have peculiar incentives as 
being part of the management of the corporation. This is also shaped by the nature of our ownership 
data source, the Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook, where the interest of the insiders in their firm 
are provided as a separate aggregate holding of all directors and that of families are given 
separately. Hence, the family or individuals we refer in this work are blockholder categories that are 
external shareholders.  
3.2.4.2 Insiders 
We define insiders as shareholders that are part of the management (executives and nonexecutives) 
that aggregately own blocks of shares above the UK disclosure rule. According to the agency theory 
the interests of management or directors diverge from that of the outside shareholders where the 
insiders have the incentives to maximize their own utility rather than maximizing shareholder value. 
The incentivization to align the diverging interests of the managers and shareholders in the agency 
perspectives has given insiders (managerial) share ownership extensive attention in corporate 
finance literature. The alignment of interest hypothesis also suggests that firm performance is 
enhanced as managerial ownership increases (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). In contrast, 
the entrenchment hypothesis suggests that firm value declines as management holds higher share 
stakes in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1988). Hence, it is suggestive that insiders or 
management (including nonexecutive directors) are identified as a separate block owner’s category.  
Extensive research work is done in order to investigate the effect of managerial ownership on firm 
performance (Stulz, 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988, 1991; Cho, 1998; Bethel et al., 1998) and 
several researchers have used to compute other block ownerships and managerial ownership 
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separately (McConnel and Servaes, 1990; Agrawal and Mendekler, 1990; Merhan, 1995; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Short and Keasey, 1999). Some researchers that have 
investigated only the patterns of ownership and control structures of listed firms also computed 
managerial ownership separately in order to find the extent of managerial control position in terms 
of share ownership (Marchica and Mura, 2005, Holderness, 2009).   
Moreover, some studies computed CEO ownership or executive management ownership separately 
by differentiating them from the nonexecutive directors’ interest in the firm (Slovin and Sushka, 
1993; Weir et al., 2002; Holderness et al., 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). It is clear that 
management is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the firm whereas nonexecutive 
directors are considered as monitors or supervisors of the executives from the agency perspectives. 
However, sitting in the same board in the one-tier system of the UK might question the supervisory 
role of the nonexecutive directors. Hence, this research will follow those who aggregate the 
ownership stake of all directors as insider or management ownership and compute it separately. It is 
to be noted, as already mentioned, that family or individual share owners and their heirs and 
representatives in the board of directors are included in this blockholders category. Finally, the data 
source used for ownership, the Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook, also facilitates this classification 
by providing a lump-sum of directors’ ownership as substantial stakes. However, this is not the 
determinant reason since the ownership stake of directors above 0.1% is to be disclosed according 
to the disclosure rule and the aggregate is disclosed in annual reports of listed firms.  
3.2.4.3 Nonfinancial Firms 
By nonfinancial firms, we refer to non-regulated industrial companies that exhibit a form of 
independence in conducting their businesses. Unlike other firms like the regulated financials and 
utility companies, they are involved in the production and marketing of commercial products and 
services to customers and it is inconvenient to include them in other relevant blockholder 
categories.  
Literature reveals that nonfinancial firms hold significant proportion of equities in other firms in 
Continental Europe. Frank and Mayer (1997, 2001) provide evidence that they own 46.7% of French 
equity shares at 25% cut-off. In Germany, they account for 27.5% of dominant shareholdings as 
single blockholder owning more than 25% (Franks and Mayer, 2001). For large firms, La Porta et al. 
(1999) show results that at 20% cut-off level for control, nonfinancial firms own 15% in Argentina, 
25% in Australia, 15% in Canada, 10% in Portugal and 10% in Ireland. For the US, Gadhoum et al. 
(2005) provide results that widely held corporations hold about 2.5% of US equity shares at 20% cut-
off level for control. However, the nonfinancial firms own less than 1% in the United Kingdom (ONS). 
The evidence from Marchica and Mura (2005) on a sample of UK firms also confirms this fact. 
However, Franks et al. (2001) report that industrial companies are the third major largest 
blockholders (controlling 13.0% of the listed firms as the largest shareholder) next to institutional 
investors (52.6%) and families/ individuals (28%) using the mandatory disclosure rule in the UK as 
threshold.  
It can be argued that nonfinancials as significant category of shareholders exist in insider systems, 
where cross-shareholdings are common. In Japan, the conglomerates are involved in cross-
shareholdings and interlocking directorships (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). In outsider systems, 
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where ownership is dispersed among large number of individuals and institutional investors, like the 
UK and the US, cross-shareholdings are rare (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992) and hence, the stakes of 
nonfinancial firms in other firms might be less. On the other hand, it might be argued that 
nonfinancial companies might own blocks of shares in high growth smaller firms in order to benefit 
from their firm’s profitability or to exert control over suppliers, customers and competitors through, 
among other things, integration and mergers (Grossman and Hart, 1985).  
Additionally, they might have several non-listed subsidiaries, in which they might have higher 
interests than their usual lower blocks of shares in listed firms. As they are industrial or commercial 
firms, they have also the incentive to control other firms by investing in the equities of other 
companies so as to clear the way for vertical or horizontal integration. Finally, it might be argued 
that they might diversify their portfolio against the market risk and their own nonsystematic risk by 
spreading their holdings in smaller insignificant stakes across several firms, and this is difficult to 
trace below the mandatory disclosure level. However, diversification has the cost of reducing the 
incentives to monitor or control the firms they invest in (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1992). Hence, despite 
the low level of participation in other firm’s equity by the sector, based on the prevalence and 
importance of nonfinancial firms as equity investors in other firms and their investment behaviour, 
we classify them as a separate blockholder category. 
3.2.4.4 Institutional Investors 
Institutional investors are defined as the aggregate of nongovernmental and nonconventional 
banking institutions like pension funds, insurance companies, trusts, mutual funds and trustees 
holding blocks of shares in listed companies at or above the disclosure rule level. Institutional 
investors exhibit common characteristic features that include: (1) risk pooling and diversification, (2) 
preference of liquidity, (3) the ability to absorb and process information, (4) matched assets and 
liabilities in terms of maturity, (5) ability to transact in large volumes due to their size, (6) 
considerable countervailing power from their size, (7) asset management processes (Davis and Steil, 
2001).  
Nevertheless, the individual institutional investors have some differences and their own 
peculiarities, which are also vital to consider. Among other things, the main characteristics to 
consider are the need for liquidity and level of equity holding. Similar to banks, some institutions like 
mutual funds, and insurance firms need liquidity because their shareholders, depositors or 
policyholders can withdraw their funds on short notice and they might not be able to assemble large 
blocks to take control position in firms they invest (Coffee, 1991). Hence, they generally play the 
dual role as both principals and as agents with a fiduciary responsibility to their beneficiaries. The 
fiduciary duties mean that they are conflicted in serving the interests of those roles – owner-
shareholders and intermediaries (Ingley and Walt, 2004).  
With respect to governance, most fund managers are short-term speculators talking decisions or 
actions in order to serve the interest of their clients (mostly corporate investment pool firms). In 
competing for and to attract customers’ funds, mutual funds need to be engaged in active trading 
and assert their ability to outperform their competitors. So mutual funds need high level of liquidity 
and they are characterized as having short-run and opportunistic goals (Kirby, 1996) rather than 
participating in governance of their firm in order to solve agency problems. Also similar to banks, 
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insurance companies are highly regulated investors. Hence, they used to lack the capacity to hold a 
significant portion of volatile investments like equity securities, especially in the US. However, 
insurance firms have uniquely lower need for liquidity than mutual funds and banks.  
However, there are structural differences between the UK pension funds and its US equivalent. With 
regard to the UK, the pension funds could be active and substantial shareholders, in contrast to the 
US pension funds. They tend to be long-term equity holders who do not need the overnight liquidity 
of the stock markets, because unlike mutual funds and unlike the US practice, UK pension funds do 
not face shareholder redemptions and nor are they engaged in an active competition for investors’ 
funds (Coffee, 1991). Generally, UK funds heavily invest in long term assets including real estate and 
foreign stocks. They tend to do their investing via ‘in-house staffs’ or internal money managers 
unlike the normal US practice of investing by allocation of the management of their assets among 
several investment advisers. British funds make up a disproportionate amount of the British financial 
markets, holding a large block of stock that might tempt to accept a substantial block discount. 
However, the fact that they tend to limit their holding to a low percentage of each issuer’s 
outstanding stock reflects that they prefer for liquidity over control (Coffee, 1991).  
The other feature to consider is the incentive and effectiveness of monitoring, which vary among 
institutional investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Pound (1988) argues that institutional investors have 
the tendency to help entrenched managers by voting with them. Voting with management may be 
initiated by the current or prospective business relationship the institutional investors have with 
firms in which they invest (Almazan et al., 2005). Moreover, Brickley et al. (1988) differentiate 
institutional investors as pressure-sensitive and pressure-insensitive based on business relationship 
institutional investors have with the firms in which they invest. For the US case, Almazan et al. 
(2005) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that monitoring influence on executive 
compensation is associated more with potentially active institutions like investment companies and 
fund managers that are less sensitive to pressure (pressure-insensitive) due to lack of business 
relationship than with potentially passive institutions like insurance companies and banks that are 
more sensitive to pressure (pressure-insensitive). For the UK case, Black and Coffee (1994) argue that 
there is difference in activism across British institutions; and they conclude that insurance 
companies are the most active, followed by pension funds, and little interest in activism by mutual 
funds followed by banks. They argue that British institutions, particularly insurance companies, are 
more active than their US equivalents.  
A characteristics feature to mention about institutional investors is the ability to absorb and to 
process information (Davis and Steil, 2001). They are considered as well-informed investors 
compared to others and that raises their ability to provide effective and active monitoring besides 
their voting power. The advantage over information asymmetry makes them to be considered as 
prudent investors among less-informed investors (Gillan and Starks, 2003; Almazan et al., 2005). So, 
their action, voice, or sale of their share blocks can be signal for others and that might have impact 
on firm share price.  
Finally, the factor to consider is the institutional relationships. UK institutional environment allows 
collective strategy which is in sharp contrast to the classic Wall Street Rule of exit strategy, where 
dissatisfied institutions dump their shares into the market and exit. Hence, there is the option to 
keep on exercising greater ‘voice’ when the costs of exiting is high and the ability to exit is 
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diminishing (Coffee, 1991). British institutional investors tend to act collectively through umbrella 
institutions when dealing with corporate management. Four industry association covering pension 
funds, insurance companies, unit trusts, and investment companies developed in the UK enables 
them to share the expenses and political burden of confronting and opposing individual corporate 
managements. When an emergency situation arises, like a takeover defence, the four associations 
will form a ‘case committee’ in order to deal with the corporate management. The Bank of England 
also plays a behind-the-scene mediating role when tensions arise between dissatisfied institutional 
investors and corporate managements that appear to have been underperforming (Coffee, 1991).  
Table 3.1 shows that institutional investors are the dominant shareholders exhibiting the trend of 
steady increases and then decreases over time from 1963 to the present. From the control 
perspective, Franks et al. (2001) show that institutional investors are the first largest shareholders in 
52.6% of the UK firms in their sample for the period between 1988-1993 using the mandatory 
disclosure rules in the UK as threshold. Several other studies like Marchica and Mura (2005), and 
Florackis and Ozkan (2009) also confirm this for different periods of time. Hence, the significant 
prevalence of institutional investors as dominant investors in the UK can be one of the reasons for 
treating them as a separate blockholders category.  
The prevalence and the dominant share ownership of institutional investors might indicate that they 
are potentially capable to exert monitoring pressure even though their reported activism tells a 
different story. However, recognizing the potentiality of institutional investors in share ownership in 
the UK and the common characteristics and behaviours they share, this research classifies all of 
them as a group of owners except the deposit-accepting banks. Even though, literature reveals that 
some researchers (Franks and Mayer, 1997; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Ghadoum 
et al., 2005) aggregate the institutional investors into fewer entities based on their common 
features, we follow Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio and Lang (2002) and Ghadoum et al. (2005) and 
aggregate all financial institutions except banks as a separate blockholders’ category.  
3.2.4.5 Banks  
For the purpose of this research study, banks are defined as those financial institutions in the 
banking industry that accept deposits and undertake in lending activities. Literature show that UK 
banks own very low proportion of outstanding shares of companies (table 2.1, Franks et al., 2001; 
Marchica and Mura, 2005; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). In Continental Europe and Japan banks are 
allowed to own interests in firms and they have relatively high ownership stakes in them.  
The difference in the bank holdings between the UK and the US on one hand and Continental Europe 
and Japan on the other hand might be explained by the debate on bank-firm relationship, which 
hinge mainly around two extreme outlooks, namely between market centred systems of Anglo-
Saxon type and German-Japanese bank centred systems (Solomon and Solomon, 1999; Franks and 
Mayor, 2002). Even so, there are those that fall between the two extremes. In the market centred 
systems banks are relatively unimportant and have arms’ length relationship with firms, whereas in 
bank centred systems banks are allowed to invest directly in nonfinancial firms and many companies 
are related to a bank through exclusive relationship called main bank liaison (Barucci and Mattesini, 
2008).  
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The known function of bank relationship with firms is to provide debt financing and other types of 
services to firms, including vehicle of transaction, rescuing those in financial difficulties, etc. In the 
UK, deposit-taking banking firms are also allowed to underwrite and trade securities (La Porta, 
1999). Hence, this might be an advantage for banks to be better informed about the 
creditworthiness of firms and the risks they face when they select the firm from which they purchase 
equity. However, one of the motives behind acquiring shares of nonfinancial firms by banks can be 
simple investment in order to have interests that would generate income. Secondly, when banks 
invest in firm’s equity, the relationship is no more creditor-debtor relationship (Coffee, 1991; Barucci 
and Mattesini, 2008). The bank becomes a shareholder and is able to access additional information 
in the operations of the firm (asymmetric information advantage) and obtains significant benefits. 
The bank could detain equities of companies where monitoring costs are large, namely in large 
companies and firms with good growth opportunities; and this might lead to higher agency costs 
usually where ownership is less concentrated. Hence, the motive behind acquiring of debtor firm’s 
equities (detaining a relevant stake) and sitting on the board might provide a means to play a 
monitoring role in order to solve the problem of the separation of ownership and control (Barucci 
and Mattesini, 2008).  
Finally, the third motive might be the desire to influence the management of the firm. This is related 
to the goal of banks which is different from that of other shareholders. In times of bankruptcy, banks 
are to be the first to be served a fixed payment for the debt the firm owe the bank from the assets 
of the firm except where there is a significant loss, whereas shareholders actually capture benefits of 
investments in good states and they are shielded from loss by the limited liability scheme. So, a bank 
owning equity in a nonfinancial firm has the incentives to influence the management to undertake 
more conservative policies directed towards debt repayments. This explains the conflict of interest 
between debt-holders and shareholders, which is strong where ownership is less concentrated and it 
becomes critical when banks convert part of their credits to shares (Barucci and Mattesini, 2008).  
Mallin et al. (2005) write that banks as lenders to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 
Continental Europe have traditionally played a major role in corporate governance through equity 
holdings, cross shareholdings and reciprocal board-ship. They argue that UK banks, in contrast, are 
not major shareholders in nonfinancial firms and traditionally institutional sector, including banks, 
have been strategic investors that are regarded as ‘outsiders’ to the firms. In Germany, the roles of 
banks have been more than lending but also in corporate governance. Since most German shares are 
unregistered bearer shares and are often deposited with banks for security reasons, the respective 
holding bank holds the voting rights attached to the shares and inform their vote to their clients. 
Additionally, unlike the UK case, banks are often elected to the supervisory boards of firms as 
shareholder representatives in Germany, often chairing the board, and this allows banks to monitor 
management of companies (Edwards and Nibler, 2000).  
However, the gap between the conceptual outlook of market centred systems and bank centred 
systems are converging significantly stimulated by financial deregulation around the world in 1990s 
and regulatory legislations like the Second Directive on Banking in the EU in 1993 and the Gramm-
Leach-Biley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 in the US. The legislations removed several 
of the restrictions on bank ownership of equity in nonfinancial firms in the US and in many European 
countries. This opened the way for banks to be involved in the capital of firms (Barucci and 
Mattesini, 2008). Lee and Mullineaux (2003) argue that the process of convergence between the two 
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systems is underway. On this issue, Mallin et al. (2005) write that the European-style universal 
banking (that combines commercial and investment banking) and bancassurrance (that combines 
banking and insurance) is developing in the US, whereas the increase in the importance of capital 
markets driven by privatization and pensions systems that in turn lead to the growth in importance 
of pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies as institutional investors in Continental 
Europe. Nevertheless, they add that the conflict of interest in investment banking in the US and the 
UK have challenged the viability of the universal banking style.  
The evidence on bank-ownership relationships, which is more limited in literature and mainly 
concentrated around Germany and Japan, show mixed results. The well established results are from 
Hoshi et al. (1991), and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) for Japan and Petersen and Rajan (1994) for US 
that indicate companies with main bank relationship are less liquidity-constrained. However, and 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) show that firms with a main bank relationship in Japan are characterized 
by lower profitability, lower growth and higher interest expenses. Moreover, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) 
show that banks holding a large equity stake in Japan do not limit management private benefits. 
Consistent with them, Chirinko and Elston (2003) provide evidence for Germany that bank control 
has statistically insignificant negative effects on firm profitability. Furthermore, Gorton and Schmid 
(2000) find that firm performance is enhanced from concentrated ownership and in particular from 
bank influence. It might also be arguable that banks also have an interest in lower risk taking by 
firms in which they also hold large stakes. This might not only impact on liquidity but also gearing, 
investment diversification etc. Banks might also be interested in selling services to firms and 
therefore they have a similar potential conflict of interest with minority shareholders like 
institutional investors. 
To sum up, it is obvious that banks and other financial institutions including institutional investors 
discussed previously have some features in common. However, since banks have lending and 
deposit holding functions, liquidity is very crucial for them. They have to be highly liquid to satisfy 
their customers that might withdraw assets in a short time possible and their investment strategy is 
based on the need of liquidity in the UK. Additionally, theoretical and empirical evidences suggest 
that banks have their peculiar means of monitoring firms and they might influence firm 
performance. Considering these facts, it is decided to treat banks as a category of blockholders.  
3.2.4.6 State 
By state, in this research, we refer to any national or local government agency. The main 
characteristic feature of the state as share owner is that it invests or interferes in firm’s equity 
holding using taxpayers or public money. State that owns share blocks in firms may have the 
incentives related to political objectives such as putting the risk of paying the losses of the firm on 
the public (La Porta et al., 1999). On the other hand, local governments might hold equity blocks in 
firms in order to exert control besides their income related private benefits.  
Moreover, state plays a role in bailing out distressed private banks or even nationalizes them as seen 
in the recent crisis in the UK. Nationalization of banks has the benefits of recapitalization to the 
ailing institution. It might also try to protect depositors from potential losses by limiting or 
contracting deposits. It is arguable that state ownership of banks provides an indirect means of 
regulating the conduct of private banks using market instruments rather than administrative-judicial 
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intervention or law enforcement to curb monopoly and ensure competition. Furthermore, state 
might intervene in nonfinancial firms’ share ownership via the injection of capital by buying shares at 
prices above their fair values when their share prices fall during crisis in order to the stop further 
erosion of shareholders wealth. Even though such crises come seldom, it might have impact on the 
distribution of corporate share ownership for some time.  
It might also be argued that states have the incentives to control firms being involved in the share 
ownership of firms that manufacture strategic military products and services; and a significant block 
of share ownership in such companies might assure their control. Hence, even though state 
(government) controls negligible fraction of the UK firms (Gadhoum et al.; 2005; Faccio and Lang, 
2002), based upon the arguments on the intervention of the state in listed firms and following some 
of the researchers, we classify state as a separate ownership category.  
To sum up, the discussions and arguments presented in this section lay down the rationale behind 
the choice of block ownership thresholds that provides metrics for measuring or identifying 
ownership of blockholder categories and ownership concentration levels. Moreover, the identity of 
individual shareholders identified is classified into six main blockholder categories based on their 
similarity in their characteristic features and behaviours.  
Hence, using the ownership and control structure variables, which will be discussed in methodology 
section in details, the study contributes to the research and knowledge gaps whether the degree of 
block ownership has noticeably changed in the past few years, whether there is a relationship 
between key features of board of directors structures and ownership patterns, how taking into 
account different concentration ratios changes the patterns of ownership concentration in UK listed 
firms.  
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 Sample and Data 
The ownership and directors’ data on the UK firms in the FTSE All Share Index covers the period of 
2003-2007 so that the recent empirical evidence can be provided. The period chosen corresponds to 
the time the UK economy recovered from the financial crisis of the millennium up to the start of the 
recent global corporate scandals and financial crisis that has affected businesses. Hence, the 
research also helps to view the trends of ownership and control structure and board structure and 
the trends of the compliance with some recommendations of the corporate governance reforms 
since the Higgs Report of 2003 and the 2003 Combined Code on Corporate Governance. As it is 
sought to study the corporate ownership and control structures of the UK listed companies, the FTSE 
ALL SHARE Index is found to provide a fitting sample because it is the broadest index including 
smaller and largest listed firms and represents about 98% of the UK market capitalization (FTSE 
Factsheet, 2008).  
The ownership and directors’ data are collected manually from the Waterlow Stock Exchange 
Yearbook. Since the firm year for UK firms is assumed to end 31 March, the data collection is based 
on the FTSE ALL SHARES in DataStream in April 2008, which is found to give the same lists of active 
and inactive firms for 2003-2008. For each firm in the Index and for every year, the data is 
constructed by registering the blockholders owning at least 3% share and their stakes, the number of 
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nonexecutive directors, board size and CEO-duality. These variables are collected manually for the 
active firms out of the total 665 FTSE ALL SHARE Index companies. For the period of 2003 to 2007, 
only those members of the Index whose ownership data is available on the Waterlow Stock 
Exchange Yearbook are collected. This provides the potential omissions for each year due to missing 
data. The ownership data on the firms is checked twice during collection in order to avoid significant 
errors. From the collected raw data, first we identified the blockholder category to which all 
substantial blockholders in each firm belong.  
The final number of companies was determined after omissions. First, the companies in the Index 
that lack ownership data are removed from the data set. The final database comprises data on 2656 
firm years, of which on average 38.37% are financial firms, 29.82% are manufacturing companies, 
11.78% are in the consultants sector, 8.13% are Information and Technology Services (ITS) firms, 
6.85% are media and entertainment firms, and 5.05% are utility and energy (ENERGY) companies 
(table 3.2).  
Moreover, as it can be observed from table 3.3, the sample comprise of different categories of firms. 
Firstly, only 16.57% and the remaining 83.43% of the firms in the sample are FTSE100 (FT100) and 
non-FTSE100 (NOFT100) companies respectively. Secondly, with respect of the exposure to 
regulation, 43.41% and 56.59% of the firms in the sample are regulated firms (REG) and non-
regulated (NOREG) firms respectively. Finally, 38.37% and 61.63% of the firms in the sample are 
financial (FIN) and non-financial (NONFIN) companies respectively.  
 
  
Table 3.2: Means of industrial sectors in the pooled sample, at 3% threshold, for the period of 2003-2007 
Note: INDUSTS is the sector for goods production or manufacturing companies; CONSULTS is the sector for providing of 
consultancy and advisory or supportive services for clients; MEDIA is the category that include media, and the 
intertainments and leisure services; ITS is the category for the information technology firms; ENERGY is the sector for utility 
and energy, and FINANS is the sector for the financial industry (Institutional investors and banks). 
                                                                      
    mean       .3837     .2982     .1178     .0813     .0685     .0505
       N        2656      2656      2656      2656      2656      2656
                                                                      
   stats      finans   industs  consults       its     media    energy
Table 3.3: Means of different categories of the firms – FTSE100, Non-FTSE100, Regulated Firms, Non-
Regulated firms, Financial firms, Non-Financial firms in the pooled sample, at 3% threshold, for the period of 
2003-2007 
Note: FT100 is category of firms in FT100 Index; NOFT100 is category of firms not in FT100 Index, REG is category of 
regulated frims that include financial institutions and utility companies; NOREG is category of nonregulated firms; FIN is 
category of financial firms (institutional investors and banks); NONFIN is category of nonfinancial firms.  
                                                                      
    mean       .1657     .8343     .4341     .5659     .3837     .6163
       N        2656      2656      2656      2656      2656      2656
                                                                      
   stats       ft100   noft100       reg     noreg       fin    nonfin
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3.3.2 Ownership and Control Structures Variables  
Blockholder Categories:  For each firm, the aggregate share ownership stake of the relevant 
blockholder categories are computed from registered significant blockholders. Additionally, the 
aggregate ownership of all outsider shareholders (OUTO), aggregate of all blockholders’ ownership 
(ABHO), and widely held ownership are computed.  All of the significant shareholders in the 
identifiable aggregate blockholder categories are summarized as (see figure 3.2 below): (1) insider 
ownership (executives + non-executives), (2) outsider ownership (institutional investors + 
nonfinancials + family or individual + banks + government). The outside blockholders would be 
broken down into (1) institutional investors, (2) nonfinancial firms, (4) banks, and (5) state or 
government.  
The share ownership of the blockholder categories mentioned above that are measured in the 
proportion of aggregate share stakes they hold in a firm’s outstanding shares, are also useful in 
investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. These ownership 
variables are defined and explained in table 3.4 (Panels A and B).  
Ultimate Controller:  Despite the complexity of control structure, we make a theoretical 
assumption that the first largest blockholder type with 3% or more stakes in each firm is the 
‘ultimate controller’ of the firm irrespective of any criterion for control except the mandatory 
disclosure rule of the UK. By ‘ultimate controller’ we refer to those blockholder types with the power 
to influence the decision of the firm by the virtue of having the highest voting power in the firm. 
Literature suggests that the largest blockholder type plays a role in moderating the conflicts 
between shareholders and managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Marchica and Mura, 2005).  
  
Fig. 3.2: Blockholders in terms of agency problems  
  
      Executives 
      Non-Executives  è Insiders  
          Institutional investors 
           Nonfinancials   
            Family/ Individual   è Outsiders  
      Banks 
      State 
Source:  Own construction.     
ALL 
BLOCKHOLDERS 
(ABH) 
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Hence, in order to identify the control power of the ultimate controller type, we use only the voting 
power of the first largest shareholder type in a firm, not dummies for the presence of controlling 
blockholders that depend on the criterion for control. It might be arguable that the use a zero-one 
dummy to measure controlling blockholders is inappropriate because (1) the subjective bias assumes 
several firms not having blockholders above the threshold as without-controlling-blockholders 
(Holderness, 2009), and (2) it also ignores the possibility of coalition formations among shareholders 
and the contestability of control, thus concealing the potential blockholders (Zwiebel, 1995; Bloch 
and Hege, 2001; Bennedson and Wolfenzon, 2000). Cubbin and Leech (1983) also suggest that the 
use of zero-one dummy variables is just statistical criterion in terms of a controlling shareholding 
and they conceal the differences in shareholding dispersion across firms. This is supported by 
Holderness (2009). Hence, we identify which blockholder category is the first largest blockholder for 
each firm. The ultimate controller variables identified (table 3.4, Panel C) are insiders (INC), 
institutional investors (INSTC), nonfinancial firms (NFC), family or individual (FAMC), banks (BANKC), 
all outsiders (OUTC), and no controlling blockholder (NONE) when there is no blockholder in the firm 
below 3%. 
Table 3.4: The definition and descriptions of blockholders’ categories and ultimate controllers 
 
Symbol Descriptions and measures 
Panel A: Blockholder Categories 
Family/ individual Household investors. 
Insiders Investors that are directors 
Institutional Investors Investment funds, pension funds, insurance companies (funds), trusts, trustees, 
universities, foundations, etc. 
Nonfinancials Firms not financial companies and/ or not banking or deposit accepting institutions  
Banks Banks and deposit taking financial institutions  
State  State or national and local governments 
Panel B: Ownership types/ variables 
INO Insider ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by executives and nonexecutive directors. 
INSTO Institutional ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
NFO Nonfinancial firm’s ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares held by nonfinancial corporations. 
FAMO Ownership by families or individuals; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% 
of the firm’s outstanding shares held by family, individuals or related.  
BANKO Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by banks and deposit taking and credit issuing financial institutions.  
GOVO Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by state or national or local governments. 
OUTO Outsider ownership, the sum of institutional ownership, Nonfinancial firms’ 
ownership, banks ownership, and state (national or local government) ownership. 
ABHO Proportion of aggregate of block of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by all blockholders. 
WHO Widely held ownership (= 100% - ABHO) 
Panel C: Ultimate Controllers by Blockholders Types 
INC Control by insiders 
INSTC Control institutional investors 
NFC Control by nonfinancial firms 
FAMC Control by family or individual 
BANKC Control by banks 
OUTC Control by outside blockholders 
NONE No blockholder control 
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Ownership Concentration:  Table 3.5 presents ownership concentration variables that are 
identified and used in this research. Even though there are not standard metrics yet to measure 
ownership concentration, we use the conventional measures such as concentration ratios, 
Herfindahl Indices and aggregation methods. The identified variables that measure ownership 
concentration are C1-CC5, HI3, HI5, ABHO, and WHO as measures of ownership concentration. We 
would like to note that they are not calculated for the identity of blockholders that are similar, even 
though it might be easy to form a coalition of those that are in the similar group.  
Concentration ratio is the aggregate of proportion of shares of a firm concentrated in the hands of a 
number of blockholders. They are arbitrarily chosen metrics lacking clear benchmarks for decision 
rule on ownership concentration level. We compute the ratios for the first 2 largest, 3 largest, 4 
largest and 5 largest blockholders (CC2, CC3, CC4, and CC5) based on the mergers guidelines in the 
UK and the US.3 Even though the concentration ratios show the proportion of firm equity 
concentrated in the hands of few blockholder, they do not exactly indicate the overall ownership 
concentration since they omit the rest of significant blockholders and the float or ‘ocean’ (aggregate 
stakes of all owners below the cut-off level).  
Dahya et al (1998) state that the average number of blockholders in UK firms holding share stake 
greater than 3% revealed from Company Register analysis 4.5. Even though it might be difficult in 
the UK listed firms to overtly form a coalition of 5 blockholder due to the mandatory regulatory rule 
on notifying intentions, we use the concentration of shares in the control of the first 5 largest 
shareholders  (CC5) as a maximum concentration ratio (1) since a contesting coalition might be 
                                                          
3 (a) Competition Commission (2007): Merger References: Competition Commission Guidelines, June 2003 CC2, the UK. (b) 
Consultation Document, (April 2009): Merger Assessment Guidelines, A joint Publication of the Competition Commission 
and the Office of Fair Trading. U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1997): Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, issued April 1992. 
Table 3.5: The symbols and definition or descriptions of ownership concentration variables 
Symbol Description 
CC1 The first largest blockholder with at least 3% of share stakes. 
CC2 The aggregate blocks of shares owned by the first 2 largest blockholders with at 
least 3% of share stakes. 
CC3 The aggregate blocks of shares owned by the first 3 largest blockholders with at 
least 3% of share stakes. 
CC4 The aggregate blocks of shares owned by the first 4 largest blockholders with at 
least 3% of share stakes. 
CC5 The aggregate blocks of shares owned by the first 5 largest blockholders with at 
least 3% of share stakes. 
HI3 Herfindahl Index of the first 3 largest blockholders with at least 3% of share stakes. 
HI5 Herfindahl Index of the 5 largest shareholders plus widely held stakes (WHO) 
ABHO Proportion of aggregate of block of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares held 
by all blockholders. 
WHO Widely held ownership (= 100% - ABHO) 
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formed against the dominant coalition, (2) based on the data of Dahya et al (1998), and (3) following 
some other researchers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Leech and Leahy, 1991).  
CC1 is considered so that the control potential of the first largest blockholder is identified or 
analyzed. CC2, CC3, CC4 and CC5 are considered since the first 2-5 largest blockholders might form 
potential controlling or contesting coalitions. In a way they indicate the proportion of shares 
concentrated and held by the respective theoretical blockholder coalitions, thus implying that the 
rest of corporate shares are dispersed among multitude of blockholders and the float.  
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HF) is the measure of concentration computed as a sum of the squares 
of a number of blockholders. In this study, we compute Herfindahl-Hirschman indices (HF) for the 
first 3 and 5 largest blockholders (HI3 and HI5) both of which are commonly used for calculating 
market concentration and industry concentration to deal with mergers. We have chosen HI5 
following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and HI3 following Maury and Pajuste (2005), Franks et al., 
(2006), and because up to 5 of the blockholders in our data hold high proportion of firm’s equity. HI 
can provide better benchmark to decide on the level of concentration than concentration ratios. It 
takes into account the relative size and distribution of blockholders of the firms, and increases as the 
number of blockholders in the firm decreases and as the disparity between the sizes between the 
blockholders increases. HI approaches zero as the firm consists of a large number of relatively equal 
sized blockholders. The benchmarks used for market concentration and we adopt is that 1000-1800 
points is regarded as moderately concentrated and more than 1800 is concentrated. By implication 
HI less than 1000 points is considered to be dispersed. Nevertheless, it should be noted that HI might 
not be robust metrics to measure ownership concentration but just arbitrary arithmetic choices and 
benchmarks of concentration level based on the major blockholder entities under consideration.  
Finally, we argue that the ownership concentration measures that are straightforward and can give 
better approximation of the level of ownership concentration are aggregate of all blockholders 
holdings (ABHO), widely held ownership (WHO), and for blockholders concentration is the number of 
blockholders (NBH). ABHO and WHO might arguably be the most appropriate metrics to-date for 
measuring ownership concentration because they precisely approximate the extent to which equity 
shares are held concentrated in few hands. Figure 3.3 shows ownership concentration measure 
scales using ABHO and WHO. 
It is assumed that 50% is the midway cut-off for ownership concentration level. ABHO more than 
50% or WHO less than 50% is considered as concentrated ownership. 75% and 25% are chosen on 
the scales arbitrarily because they divide the distance between 50% and the extreme ends equally. 
We suggest that ABHO of 75% or more and WHO below 25% as highly concentrated ownership. In 
contrast, ABHO less than or equal to 25% and WHO greater than or equal to 75% might be classified 
Fig. 3.3: Ownership concentration metrics scale, ABHO and WHO in percentages 
 
Source: Own construction to set up benchmark on ownership concentration for this study. 
ABHO  0      25       50   75    100  
  
WHO 100     75      50   25         0  
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as highly diffused ownership. The midways between the two extremes stated here might be 
classified as moderately concentrated or diffused ownerships respectively.  
Blockholders Concentration:  We argue that the number of blockholders (NBH) is one of the 
features of blockholders structure that we use as the proper metrics for blockholders concentration 
since it clearly reveals the identifiable key players in the ownership and control structure. However, 
it is arguable that it is difficult to set a benchmark for the NBH to reveal the extent of blockholders 
concentration since it does not indicate the control or voting power of the blockholders. 
Nevertheless, several mechanisms in which the number of blockholders impact ownership and 
control structure and firm policies or outcomes might exist. Tribo et al. (2007) suggest that the 
corporate investment policy is determined by the number of blockholders (NBHs) necessary to 
control the firm besides the type of blockholders.  
The NBH, which is a variable that has not been explored enough in previous research, is important 
since it is not the voting powers that interact but the human dimension that represent the powers in 
corporate decisions. If coalitions of blockholders are formed, the number of the blockholders in the 
group would interact in the decision or collective action processes (arguably even irrespective of the 
voting power). It might be suggestive that more blockholders could signify a higher potential for 
difficulties in organizing collective action (disagreement effects) or less ability to exploit minority 
shareholders as more blockholders with potentially diverging interests need to cooperate or 
different groups of blockholders might be able to control each other (agreement effects). On the 
disagreement effects, Tribo et al. (2007) argue that the increases in the number of blockholders 
within control group negatively affect R&D investment policy. They also add that the existence of a 
large number of blockholders weakens the level of monitoring of managers’ action and behaviour 
because responsibilities are diluted among a number of dominant large blockholders.   
Edmans and Manso (2008) also propose a model of optimal number of blockholders that maximize 
firm value in the equilibrium. They argue that the optimum NBHs arises from a trade-off between 
voice and exit, where fewer blocks persist with incentive to intervene but more blocks increase 
trading to exit. The exit might have the effect of reducing the market value of the firm and the 
number of blockholders in the firm, whereas persistence of voice might raise the manager’s concern 
for short-term stock prices, and finally result in the optimal number of blockholders that is efficient 
to maximize firm value, which depends on the relative productivity of the efforts of managers and 
blockholders. Hence, based upon these arguments NBHs might be regarded as an important 
measure of blockholders structure or concentration.  
Empirically, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2008) provide evidence that the number of blockholders 
fixed effects as source of blockholder heterogeneity determines firm performance measures and 
differences in corporate policies. Tribo et al. (2007) provide empirical result showing evidence that 
the number of blockholders in the controlling coalition is significantly lower for firms that 
significantly invest in R&D, thus confirming the disagreement effects as the number of blockholders 
in the coalition increases. Hence, based on the theoretical and empirical discussions and the scant 
empirical evidences above, we propose NBHs is an important blockholder structure variable that can 
be used to measure the concentration/ dilution of blockholders concentration and that blockholders 
concentration increases as NBHs will increase; and despite its shortcomings, we can use NBH as a 
proxy to measure blockholder concentration. Hence, we computed variables related to the number 
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of blockholders, namely number of all blockholders (NBH), and number of each blockholders’ 
category used in this research (see table 3.5) are computed.  
Board of Directors:  The board of directors variables used in this research study as presented in 
table 3.7 are: number nonexecutive directors (NED), the proportion of nonexecutive directors 
(PNED), number of executive directors (ED), board size (BSIZE) and CEO-duality (DUAL). 
Table 3.7: Symbols and descriptions of board variables  
 
  
Table 3.6: Symbols and descriptions of number of blockholders  
 
Symbol    Descriptions and measures 
NINO Number of insider blockholders with at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares.  
NINSTO Number of institutional blockholders with at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares.  
NNFO Number of nonfinancial firms owns blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares.  
NFAMO Number of family, individual or related owners with blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares held.  
NBANKO Number of banks and deposit taking and credit issuing financial institutions 
holding blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding shares.  
NGOVO Number of national or local governments holding blocks of at least 3% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares.  
NOUTO Number of outsider owners, the sum of the number of institutional investors, 
nonfinancial firms, banks and governments holding block of at least 3% of the 
firm’s outstanding shares.  
NBH Number of all blockholders holding block of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares. 
 
Symbol Descriptions and measures 
NED Number of nonexecutive directors 
PNED Proportion of non executive directors 
ED Number of executive directors 
BSIZE Board size; aggregate number of executive and nonexecutive directors. 
DUAL CEO-Duality; takes the value 1 if the CEO sits on the board also as chairman, or 0 
otherwise 
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3.3.3 Analytical Methods 
Some of the methodological issues of analyses related to measurements and computations of 
variables are discussed in section 3.3.2. Since this study is just exploratory and descriptive analyses 
of ownership structure and control structures, we use simple descriptive statistics (minimum, 
maximum, median, mean, third quartile, skewness and kurtosis) outputs of the variables chosen. 
This identifies the state and trends of the variables.  
Moreover, the mean values of the variables for the pooled data are analyzed taking account of the 
differences in industry or sector, and company categories with respect to size and regulatory 
exposure. Furthermore, year-to-year descriptive statics of the variables are used to investigate the 
evolution (changes, trends and developments) of the ownership and control variables during the 
period together with the pooled sample average. T-test for the mean difference of independent 
samples, where year is taken as a categorizing factor, is undertaken in order to investigate whether 
the changes between the years are significant or not.  
3.4. ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
3.4.1 The Patterns of Block Ownership 
3.4.1.1 Block Ownership in the Period 
The descriptive statistics of the five years’ pooled samples on block ownership, presented as table 
3.8, shows evidence that the average share stakes of the firms in the sample that are held by all 
blockholders (ABHO) is 39.99% and the remaining 60.03% is widely owned at 3% threshold. This 
implies that even at 3% cut-off level, the UK listed firms have dispersed ownership. It is also 
indicative that the external blockholders (OUTO) own 36.07% of the shares held by the aggregate of 
all blockholders (ABHO), whereas the insider ownership (INO) amounts, on average, is about 3.89%. 
This implies that, on average, the proportion of share stakes held by directors is lower than 4% in the 
UK firms.  
  
Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics of block ownership structure of the pooled sample, at 3% threshold, for the 
period of 2003-2007 (percentage of shares) 
                                                                                              
         who        2656       .09     62.22     60.03     76.48     98.99    -.3902      2.68
        abho        2656       .01     37.84     39.99     54.82     99.91     .3868     2.684
        outo        2656         0     33.59     36.07     49.69     99.91     .4759     2.841
        govo        2656         0         0     .1519         0      18.9     8.463     90.61
       banko        2656         0         0     2.223      3.32     78.48     6.175     67.72
        famo        2656         0         0      1.73         0        97     5.701     47.62
         nfo        2656         0         0     2.587         0     70.79     4.448     25.23
       insto        2656         0     26.24     28.94     41.39     99.29     .6716     3.098
         ino        2656         0         0     3.885         0     77.99     3.433     15.91
                                                                                              
    variable           N       min       p50      mean       p75       max  skewness  kurtosis
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Furthermore, the stakes held by the external blockholders can be broken down into different 
constituents of the blockholders – institutional investors (INSTO), nonfinancial firms (NFO), family or 
individual (FAMO), banks (BANKO), and state (GOVO). It can be observed from the table that 
institutional investors are the major blockholders that own 28.94% of the UK firm shares in the 
sample at 3% cut-off. Due to their investment behaviour discussed previously, institutional investors 
might own more than this by spreading their investments in several stock portfolios below the 
threshold. The result conforms to the other facts reported on the predominance of institutional 
ownership in the UK. As it is expected, on average, nonfinancial firms, banks, family, and 
government owns small fractions own 2.59%, 2.22%, 1.73%, and 0.15% respectively of the UK firms 
in the sample. It is also shown that nonfinancial firms in the UK hold share blocks of less than 3% of 
the shares of FTSE firms.  
Statistically, it is suggestive that the median is less sensitive to extreme values and it measures the 
midway value of the observations of a sample, and hence it is a better measure of central tendency. 
The median of INO, NFO, FAMO, BANKO, and GOVO is 0, which is less than their means for the 
sample, indicating that most of the higher values lie to the left of the distribution, thus confirming 
their positive skewness statistics. The result shows the median of institutional investors, outsiders, 
all blockholders, and widely held stakes (WHO) is 24%, 33.6%, 37.84%and 62.22% respectively. They 
are all less than their corresponding mean value except for WHO, which is negatively skewed, thus 
indicating that most of the higher values of WHO for the sample lie to the right of the distribution. 
However, since the mean and median stakes for the different ownership categories are closer to 
each other, it might be concluded that relying on the mean for the central tendency is an acceptable 
procedure.  
It is interesting to find that the maximum holding among institutional investors is 99.29%. This might 
not be surprising because the category can be the aggregate holding of a number of institutional 
investors that are the major share owners in the UK listed firms. The maximum block held next to 
institutional investors is family ownership, which is 97%. Additionally, the maximum bank ownership 
and ownership by nonfinancial firms for the period are found to be 78.48% and 70.79% respectively. 
On average, families or individuals, banks and government owns quite low proportion of the firms’ 
shares in the sample. Moreover, as it is expected, state (national or local government) owns quite 
insignificant proportion of UK firms and their maximum share block is the lowest, 18.90%.  
Table 3.9 presents the state of ownership structure variables accounting for the differences in 
industry sectors. Insider owners have the highest share holding in the ITS sector and the lowest 
holdings in the financial institutions. In aggregate, outsider blockholders categories own less share 
stakes of the energy sector shares than the rest of the sectors and the highest holding in consultant 
firms. The share holding of institutional investors in the different sectors is around the mean of the 
pool sample even though their highest share holding is in ITS firms, and they own the highest stakes 
in all sectors. The nonfinancial firms and banks own their highest holding, which deviates a lot from 
the mean of the sample, in media and entertainment (MEDIA) sector. The highest holding of family 
or individual owners is in industrial (manufacturing) sector. State that own less than 1% in other 
sectors do not own any shares in media and entertaining (MEDIA) and energy sectors. Finally, there 
is higher ownership dispersion in financial institutions and energy sector than the rest of the sectors, 
and media and entertainment sector exhibits higher ownership concentration than the rest of the 
sectors.  
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Finally, table 3.10 presents the the state of blockholder ownership structure accounting for the 
differences in size and the regulatory effects on firms for the pooled sample during the whole period 
under review. The results show generally that (1) insiders hold more shares in non-FTSE100, 
nonregulated, and nonfinancials than in FTSE100, regulated and financial firms; (2) institutional 
investors hold less proportion of outstanding shares of FTSE100 than the rest of the categories, in 
which they hold almost the proportion that is almost around the mean of the pool (28.94%); (3) 
nonfinancial companies (NFO) hold higher proportion of shares in nonregulated firms and 
nonfinancial or industrial firms, and this might imply that the prefer nonregulated companies than 
the regulated firms; (4) family or individual owners are indifferent regarding the regulatory effects 
on firms and they hold higher shares in smaller firms than in very large firms (FTSE100); and (5) bank 
ownership is around the average of the pooled sample for all considered categories. So, the resulst 
indicate interesting evidence of investment behaviour and ownership pattern of different categories 
of blockholder categories for the UK listed firms in the sample.  
 
  
Table 3.9: Mean of block ownership structure variables accounting for difference in industry sectors, pool 
sample of 2003-2007  
Note: INDUSTS is the sector for goods production or manufacturing companies; CONSULTS is the sector for providing of 
consultancy and advisory or supportive services for clients; MEDIA is the category that include media, and the 
intertainments and leisure services; ITS is the category for the information technology firms; ENERGY is the sector for utility 
and energy, and FINANS is the sector for the financial industry (Institutional investors and banks).  
Variable INDUSTS CONSULTS MEDIA ITS ENERGY FINANS POOL 
ino 5.12 2.94 3.72 6.08 5.86 2.52 3.89 
insto 28.10 32.26 29.51 31.60 25.13 28.38 28.94 
nfo 2.99 2.46 6.24 1.71 3.37 1.76 2.59 
famo 2.31 0.97 1.71 1.22 0.94 1.73 1.73 
banko 2.02 2.15 3.23 1.59 1.89 2.41 2.22 
govo 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.26 0.15 
outo 36.03 38.18 41.79 36.78 31.58 34.89 36.07 
abho 41.12 41.19 45.82 42.89 37.46 37.44 39.99 
who 58.87 58.87 54.41 57.11 62.53 62.55 60.03 
N 792 312 177 216 134 1019 2656 
 
Table 3.10: Mean of block ownership structure variables accounting for difference in size and the regulatory 
effects on firms, for a pool sample during 2003-2007  
Note: FT100 is category of FTSE100 firms Index; NOFT100 is category for firms that are not in FTSE100 Index; REG is 
category of regulated firms (financial institutions and energy or utility sectors); NOREG is Category of nonregulated firms; 
FIN is category of financial firms (institutional investors and banks); and NONFIN is category of firms that are not financials. 
VARIABLE FT100 NOFT100 REG NOREG FIN NONFIN POOL
ino 1.83 4.29 2.91 4.63 2.53 4.73 3.89
insto 21.10 30.49 28.00 29.65 28.38 29.28 28.94
nfo 2.02 2.70 1.95 3.08 1.76 3.10 2.59
famo 0.86 1.90 1.64 1.80 1.73 1.73 1.73
banko 2.16 2.24 2.35 2.13 2.41 2.11 2.22
govo 0.00 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.15
outo 26.55 37.96 34.51 37.27 34.89 36.81 36.07
abho 28.40 42.29 37.44 41.95 37.44 41.58 39.99
who 71.59 57.73 62.55 58.09 62.55 58.45 60.03
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3.4.1.2 Evolution of Block Ownership 
Table 3.11 presents the evolution of the means of block ownership during the period of the study. It 
enables comparison between year’s average and the average of the pooled sample and the t-test 
statistics for mean difference between the years under review. It can be observed from the table 
that the ownership by institutional investors (INSTO) shows steady increases up to 2005 and then 
decline in 2006 followed by a sharp rise of 28.35% in 2007. However, the result shows that share 
holding of nonfinancial firms (NFO), family (FAMO), banks (BANKO) and GOVO exhibit volatility 
during the period.  
The result also shows that the share stakes held by non-financial firms (NFO) rose abruptly (212%) 
between 2005 and 2006 and dropped sharply (80,11%) between 2006 and 2007, while the holding of 
the directors (INO) shows a sharp rise by 23.64% between 2005 and 2006 and a slight drop (3.47%) 
between 2006 and 2007. The decrease in the holdings of INO and NFO between 2006 and 2007 
might be related to the current financial and/ economic crises. Hence, it might be argued that 
insiders (INO) and nonfinancial firms (NFO) might have sold their shares for capital gain and invested 
in other low risk assets foreseeing the oncoming trends in the economy between 2006 and 2007. 
This might also indicate that the insiders that manage nonfinancial firms might be as informed as the 
inside owners of the firm in which they invest or that they might have close relationship with INO in 
the firms they invest in.  
However, the table shows that the aggregate stakes of outside owner categories like INSTO, BANKO, 
FAMO and GOVO show decreases between 2005 and 2006, and increases between 2006 and 2007. 
The decreases in their holdings between 2005 and 2006 might be substituted by the rise in the 
ownership of insiders (INO) and non-financial firms (NFO) in the period. This might imply the 
potential increase in the incentives and ability for control of the firm by INO and NFO between 2005 
and 2006. On the other hand, the increases in the stakes of outsider owners categories (INSTO, 
BANKO, FAMO, and GOVO) between 2006 and 2007 might suggest that the outsider blockholder 
categories have increased their share holding due to overconfidence and optimism from the positive 
developments and health in the economy in the initial periods of the time under review. 
Table 3.11: Evolution of the average block ownership of the UK listed firms, at 3% threshold, for the period of 
2003-2007 and t-test for the mean difference between years 
 2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 POOL
variable mean t mean t mean t mean t mean Mean
ino 4.02 0.1115 3.946 0.9861 3.337 - 1.4178 4.126 0.2398 3.983 3.885
insto 26.46 - 1.2012 27.9 - 1.1143 29.22 2.2459* * *  26.56 - 6.4396* * *  34.09 28.94
nfo 1.944 0.2619 1.826 - 0.2592 1.942 - 6.4807* * *  5.848 8.5250* * *  1.163 2.587
famo 2.051 0.7325 1.746 - 0.4958 1.954 1.9733* *  1.233 - 1.5741* ( a)  1.727 1.73
banko 2.061 - 1.1498 2.408 - 1.2654 2.806 5.5882* * *  0.9125 - 6.2456* * *  2.964 2.223
govo 0.1603 - 0.0846 0.1656 0.1413 0.1563 0.4552 0.1281 - 0.3844 0.1523 0.1519
outo 32.83 - 0.8471 33.92 - 1.7051*  36.07 - 0.4689 36.66 - 2.8859* * *  40.18 36.07
abho 36.89 - 0.7713 37.98 - 1.1092 39.5 - 0.9738 40.8 - 2.4917* * *  44.08 39.99
who 63.11 0.7037 62.11 1.1774 60.5 0.9674 59.21 2.5108* * *  55.91 60.03
N 489   503   528   567   569 2656
* , * *  and * * *  Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. * ( a)  significant at 
11.57% 
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Additionally, the increases in the outsider ownership categories might imply that their incentive and 
ability for control of the firm has increased at the end of the period under review. 
However, the result indicates that blockholder ownership (ABHO) has steadily increased during the 
period from 36.89% in 2003 to 44.08% in 2007. Similarly, outside ownership (OUTO) also showed 
steady increases during the period. This indicates that the blockholders bought more shares and 
increased their stakes. In contrast and as it is expected, ownership dispersion or the percentage of 
shares held widely steadily decreased in the period from 63.11% in 2003 to 55.91% in 2007. Despite 
the use of low control threshold, which is expected to reveal more blockholders in terms of number, 
the study provides an interesting evidence of high ownership dispersion in the UK public firms. 
Additionally, the data of half a decade shows evidence of the process of more institutionalization of 
ownership (INSTO) during the period, namely a rise from 26.46% in 2003 to 34.09% in 2007. This is in 
contrast to the data of ONS presented in table 3.1, which shows the tendency of decreases in INSTO. 
The evidence of the increase in the holdings of INSTO can be due to, among other things, the 
aggregation of foreign institutional owners with the UK institutional investors.  
The results on the trends of ownership confirm the evidence of changes in stock ownership of some 
blockholders reported in the recent studies. Florackis and Ozkan (2009) report that non-executive 
directors hold 3.5% at 5% disclosure rule in the period of 1999 to 2005, and that executive 
ownership during the period decreased from 10.9% in 1999 to 6.79% in 2007 for their sample of 
firms. According to Marchica and Mura (2005) also executive ownership shows decreases from 
11.35% in 1993 to 7.57% in 2001, and the overall board ownership (INO) decreased from 13.68% in 
1993 to 10.69% in 2001 at 3% cut-off.  The result of this study is also in line with the general trend of 
the volatility of family or individual ownership (FAMO)  and the trend of institutional ownership 
(INSTO) reported by the ONS presented as table 3.1. Despite the differences in some trends, it might 
be suggestive that the results on our sample reflect some of the features (trends and evolutions) of 
share ownership from ONS data, which can be a population of all UK equities.  
As it can be noted from table 3.11, there is significant change between 2005 and 2006 and also 
between 2006 and 2007 in terms of trends of block ownerships. The t-tests for mean difference 
between 2002 and 2004 and also between 2004 and 2005 (except for OUTO) by assuming non-equal 
variances show result that the changes are insignificant for all blockholder types. However, there is 
strong evidence that changes in ownership pattern between 2005 and 2006 are found to be 
significant for the major outsider blockholder types (INSTO, NFO, FAMO, and BANKO), and they 
remained significant for the period between 2006 and 2007. Additionally, there is strong evidence 
that the changes in OUTO, ABHO, and WHO also show significance between the same periods.  
The rationale for the systematic significant changes between 2005 and 2006 as well as 2006 and 
2007 described above might be explained as follows. Firstly, it might imply that the healthy 
economic condition in the early years of the period under review might have created confidence in 
outsider ownership categories (except NFO between 2006 and 2007, and GOVO) to exhibit 
significant change in ownership between 2005 and 2007. The evidence suggests that there might be 
more monitoring by the outsider blockholder categories on the management, and this might 
mitigate the agency problem and reduce rent extraction, which in return might enhance firm 
performance. Secondly, the recent development in corporate governance of the UK, namely, the 
Higgs Report and the provision of the Combined Code in 2003 that recommended some changes in 
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the corporate board structure might influence the behaviour of investors to be manifested 
significantly between 2005 and 2007. It might be the case that firms were implementing the Code’s 
board structure recommendations and that the insiders and nonfinancial firms might have been 
sceptical in taking more risk by buying more shares in order to increase their stake in the initial 
period under review. Later, the INO and NFO might have generally increased their stakes between 
2005 and 2006 taking risk related to the compliance to the Code being sure that the change in board 
composition would not make any difference in the decision making function and process. And 
especially, since the board of directors deciding on the investment of the non-financial firms are also 
insiders who have the inside information regarding their firms, they could make informed decision to 
decrease their stakes steadily until 2005.  
On the other hand, unlike the inside owners, banks (BANKO), the public sector (GOVO) and 
institutional investors (INSTO) might have increased their stakes in the initial phase of the period 
expecting that the reform in the corporate governance system provided in the Combined Code 
might improve firm performance. However, the trend of family/ individual ownership (FAMO) that 
shows volatility over the period is difficult to explain. It might be the case that they might raise or 
reduce their holdings in firms so that they might diversify their portfolio or invest in other more 
profitable assets depending upon the opportunities arising.  
Moreover, it can be seen that the lowest proportion of the stakes of the firms in the sample that was 
widely held in the period is 55.91% (in 2007), and thus, the stake that is closely held (ABHO) is 
44.08%. The result also shows that the stake of the different blockholder types except INO and NFO 
show increases in 2007 after experiencing the decline in 2006. This might imply that all blockholder 
types except the insider owners (INO) and non-financial firms (NFO) increased their share ownership 
by buying more shares, thus increasing the concentration of ownership (ABHO) and decreasing 
percentage of shares blocks widely held (WHO).  
The interesting question that can be posed here is: why are insider owners (INO) and non-financial 
firms (NFO) so reluctant to buy more shares and to increase their stakes between 2006 and 2007? 
The reason might be explained in relation to the recent global economic crises, which started in July 
2007 with the loss of confidence by investors in the value of the securitized mortgaged in the United 
States resulting in liquidity crisis. The spill-over effect which started with a visible problem of the 
Northern Rock in the UK could have been a warning signal for those in custody of insider 
information. Insiders that are owners of their firms (INO) and the directors of non-financial firms 
(INO) that have inside and better information than outsiders are well equipped than other investors 
or outsiders to make expectations of the future financial or economic crisis and might have reduced 
their stakes beforehand rather than waiting for the decline of stock prices.  
Table 3.12 presents the trends and evolution of the pattern of the block ownership structure that 
accounts for the heterogeneity across different relevant categories of firms with respect to size and 
the regulatory effects on firms. The results of the yearly averages of ownership of different 
ownership categories generally indicate that the investor categories change their share holdings in 
firms across years even though the magnitudes of change are small or big for different investor 
categories. It is generally indicative that the ownership pattern of different blockholder categories 
shows volatility across the years. Besides, the result on the average share holdings of different 
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investor categories generally confirms the state of block ownership previously discussed in 
subsection 3.4.1.1 based on the results in table 3.10.  
From Panel A of table 3.12, it is observable that  insider ownership (INO) in the FTSE100 firms has 
been increasing up to the end of the period, whereas it showed decreasing trend in non-FTSE100 
firms up to 2005, after which INO showed volatility. The comparison of this with the decreasing 
trend of INO of the pooled sample shown in table 3.11 might suggest that insider investors might 
have been pulling their stakes in non-FTSE100 and pooling it into FTSE100 firms. The opposite trends 
of external block ownership (overall increases in non-FTSE100 firms and increasing in FTSE100 firms 
up to the end of the period) might imply that there might be substitution effect between insider 
Table 3.12: Evolutionary pattern of the average of block ownership of the UK listed firms accounting for 
difference in size, and regulatory effects on firms, at 3% threshold, pool sample of 2003-2007  
Note: FT100 is category of FTSE100 firms Index; NOFT100 is category for firms that are not in FTSE100 Index; REG is 
category of regulated firms (financial institutions and energy or utility sectors); NOREG is Category of nonregulated firms; 
FIN is category of financial firms (institutional investors and banks); and NONFIN is category of firms that are not financials. 
YEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 POOL
Panel A: Categories of Firms in FTSE100 and Non-FTSE100
Category FT100 NOFT100 FT100 NOFT100 FT100 NOFT100 FT100 NOFT100 FT100 NOFT100 FT100 NOFT100
ino 0.91 4.65 1.59 4.43 1.43 3.73 2.21 4.49 2.89 4.20 1.83 4.293
insto 19.32 27.90 21.16 29.27 22.28 30.64 17.16 28.34 25.28 35.81 21.10 30.49
nfo 1.09 2.12 1.01 1.99 1.20 2.10 5.74 5.87 0.98 1.20 2.02 2.699
famo 1.11 2.24 1.15 1.87 1.01 2.15 0.63 1.35 0.47 1.97 0.86 1.902
banko 2.16 2.04 1.65 2.56 3.13 2.74 1.39 0.82 2.46 3.06 2.16 2.235
govo 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.1821
outo 23.68 34.67 24.99 35.74 27.61 37.81 26.85 38.51 29.19 42.33 26.55 37.96
abho 24.68 39.35 26.57 40.30 29.05 41.64 29.06 43.02 32.08 46.42 28.40 42.29
who 75.32 60.65 73.41 59.82 70.91 58.36 70.93 57.00 67.92 53.57 71.59 57.73
Panel B: Categories of Regulated and Nonregulated Companies
YEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 POOL
Category REG NOREG REG NOREG REG NOREG REG NOREG REG NOREG REG NOREG
ino 2.81 4.91 2.86 4.76 2.63 3.89 3.33 4.75 2.88 4.84 2.91 4.63
insto 26.46 26.46 26.91 28.64 28.96 29.41 23.92 28.64 33.42 34.60 28.00 29.65
nfo 1.14 2.54 1.14 2.35 0.78 2.86 6.00 5.73 0.37 1.78 1.95 3.08
famo 1.93 2.14 1.61 1.85 1.93 1.97 1.31 1.18 1.49 1.92 1.64 1.80
banko 2.03 2.08 2.56 2.30 2.98 2.67 1.40 0.53 2.80 3.09 2.35 2.13
govo 0.30 0.06 0.28 0.08 0.24 0.09 0.16 0.10 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.09
outo 32.19 33.30 32.20 35.22 34.88 37.00 34.35 38.46 38.25 41.68 34.51 37.27
abho 35.05 38.24 35.06 40.18 37.56 41.01 37.69 43.24 41.13 46.37 37.44 41.95
who 64.95 61.76 64.92 60.00 62.46 58.97 62.30 56.79 58.85 53.62 62.55 58.09
Panel C: Categories of Financial instutut ions and nonfinancial companies
YEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Category FIN NONFIN FIN NONFIN FIN NONFIN FIN NONFIN FIN NONFIN FIN NONFIN
ino 2.51 4.93 2.50 4.83 2.06 4.14 3.06 4.81 2.45 4.95 2.53 4.73
insto 26.81 26.25 27.10 28.39 29.52 29.02 24.21 28.05 33.92 34.19 28.38 29.28
nfo 0.82 2.62 0.80 2.46 0.60 2.79 5.93 5.80 0.29 1.72 1.76 3.10
famo 2.05 2.05 1.63 1.82 2.03 1.91 1.41 1.12 1.61 1.80 1.73 1.73
banko 1.92 2.15 2.70 2.23 2.98 2.70 1.54 0.52 2.91 3.00 2.41 2.11
govo 0.34 0.05 0.31 0.07 0.27 0.08 0.19 0.09 0.20 0.12 0.26 0.09
outo 32.30 33.15 32.20 34.98 35.40 36.49 34.89 37.78 38.93 40.97 34.89 36.81
abho 34.86 38.11 34.70 39.99 37.52 40.74 37.95 42.61 41.39 45.77 37.44 41.58
who 65.14 61.89 65.28 60.18 62.50 59.24 62.04 57.41 58.60 54.22 62.55 58.45
 
67 
 
ownership and outsider ownership. This seems more convincing when we view (1) the increasing 
trend of the ownership of institutional investors (INSTO), which are the major external investors, in 
non-FTSE100 firms that countered the decreasing trend of insider ownership in non-FTSE100 firms, 
and (2) the decreasing trend of INO and the opposite increasing trend of INSTO (also BANKO) in non-
FTSE100 firms up to 2005, after which both exhibited volatility.  
However, the result of the sub-samples (categories) show that family ownership, bank ownership 
and government ownership experienced volatility and that INSTO showed trend of increases similar 
to the results on the pooled sample previously discussed (table 3.11). Furthermore, the decreasing 
trend of INO and the increasing trends of INSTO, NFO, and BANKO up to 2005 and the volatility 
thereafter might confirm the evidence of significant changes in the ownership pattern between 2005 
and 2007 evidenced previously from table 3.11.  
Panels B and C of table 3.12 present the trends or evolution of block ownership of the firms of the 
sample categorized into (1) regulated (REG) and non-regulated (NOREG) companies, and (2) 
financials (FIN) and nonfinancials (NONFIN) firms. The results show that inside ownership in both 
pairs of firm categories had been volatile in the period exhibiting high increases in 2006. The same 
trend is also exhibited by the ownership of nonfinancial companies (NFO) except that high increase 
is observed in both categories only in 2006. Hence, the results might confirm that INO and NFO 
might follow each other or that they have the same investment decision or strategy, and hence, the 
same characteristic features as shown previously.  
The outsider ownership (OUTO) has shown a trend of increases in REG and FIN (except high decrease 
in 2006 for REG and in 2004 for FIN) and in NOREG and NONFIN companies; and the increases are 
higher in NOREG firms than in REG firms. The results on the components of the outsider ownership 
that (1) INSTO and BANKO have shown exactly the same trend of general increase as outsider 
ownership; (2) INSTO, FAMO and BANKO exhibited high decreases in 2006 in both firm categories; 
(3) FAMO has been volatile for both firm categories during the period; (4) GOVO has shown general 
decrease in regulated and financial firm categories during the period (except in 2007 for regulated 
firms) and increases in non-regulated and non-financial firm categories; and (5) government or state 
own more shares in regulated and financial firms than in non-regulated and nonfinancial firms. 
Finally, it might be arguable that the volatility and the high increase of INO and NFO in 2006 (also in 
2007 for INO) and the high decrease in INSTO, FAMO and BANKO in 2006 for both firm categories 
might confirm the significant changes in ownership structure between 2005 and 2007 previously 
discussed on the results of the pooled sample.  
To sum up, firstly, the results show the detailed and peculiar investment behaviour of different 
blockholder categories regarding the type of firms they invest in. Secondly, the results also presents 
results that that confirms the general evidence on the pooled sample previously discussed, namely, 
(1) similar behaviour or characteristics of INO and NFO; (2) similar characteristics of the components 
of external blockholder category (especially INSTO, FAMO, BANKO); and (3) the significant changes in 
ownership structure patterns between 2005 and 2007.  
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3.4.2 Ownership Concentration 
3.4.2.1 Ownership Concentration Level 
Table 3.13 presents the descriptive statistics of ownership control and concentration variables for 
the pooled sample of the firms. The aggregate stakes of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth 
largest blockholder (C1-C5) hold, on average, 15.93%, 8.01%, 5.16%, 3.66%, and 2.55% of the equity 
of firms in the sample respectively. This implies that the first largest blockholders in the sample 
control about 16% of all equities of the firms in the sample and that the second largest blockholders 
of the sample control about half of that of the first largest blockholders. The result shows that the 
aggregate ownership of the first 5 largest blockholders is 35.31% of all shares outstanding of the 
listed firms. This implies that the first largest blockholders of the UK listed firms cannot attain 
absolute or majority control power. The same is true for the lower concentration ratios.  
On the other hand, the median ownership of the first largest blockholder and the first five largest 
blockholders are 12.07% and 32.86% respectively, implying that most of the observations are to the 
left of the mean value. However, the median of C4 and C5 are less than their mean value. This might 
imply that they have some extreme values on the left tail of the distribution and that does not affect 
approximation to normal distribution.  
Moreover, the median and the mean of equity controlled in the hands of the first largest blockholder 
(C1) are almost double of the stakes held by the first largest blockholders (C1). However, the median 
stakes held by the second, third, fourth and fifth largest blockholders vary from 3.16% to 6.93%, 
indicating that the difference between their median holdings are not very great. Hence, the 
indication is that the first blockholders (C1) have dominance position than others in terms of equity 
ownership in the sample during the period under review.  
Regarding the concentration ratios, the result shows that the average equity of firms owned by the 
first two, three, four and five blockholders (CC2-CC5) are 23.94%, 29.1%, 32.76% and 35.31% 
respectively. These are their voting powers concentration if we assume that there might be 
coalitions of blockholders. Considering the scenario in which the first 5 largest blockholders (CC5) 
form a coalition for control the concentration of equity ownership in their hands (35.31%) is lower 
than 50%, thus indicating dispersed ownership and that control in the UK listed firms is contested.  
Table 3.13: Descriptive statistics of ownership concentration of the pooled sample, at 3% threshold, for the 
period of 2003-2007 
                                                                          
         who        2656     62.22     60.03     22.25    -.3902      2.68
        abho        2656     37.84     39.99     22.25     .3868     2.684
         hi5        2656     289.3     721.9      1220     3.487     17.19
         hi3        2656     254.8     688.8      1218      3.53     17.46
         cc5        2656     32.86     35.31     19.44     .6479     3.447
         cc4        2656      29.6     32.76     18.58     .8386     3.801
         cc3        2656     25.16      29.1     17.54     1.078      4.25
         cc2        2656        20     23.94     16.04     1.399     5.076
          c5        2656      3.16     2.547     2.388     .3607     2.533
          c4        2656      3.92     3.661     2.729     .5436     4.873
          c3        2656      4.92      5.16     3.404     1.025      6.36
          c2        2656      6.93     8.006     5.497     1.953     10.09
          c1        2656     12.07     15.93     13.02     1.972     7.477
                                                                          
    variable           N       p50      mean        sd  skewness  kurtosis
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As for the data on aggregate ownership of all blockholders (ABHO) and widely held ownership 
(WHO), the result shows that all blockholders with substantial stakes (ABHO) hold, on average, 
39.99% of the firms’ outstanding shares, which is only 4.68% higher than the holdings of CC5 
(35.31%).  As shown in table 3.11 and 3.13 the equity shares concentrated in the hands of insiders 
ABHO is 3.89% while that outsiders is 36.07%. The indication is that all of the available significant 
blockholders in the sample aggregated together (40% on average) do not attain majority control 
(above 50%) in the firm in terms of the voting rights that emanate from the ownership rights. This 
might in turn confirm that the UK listed firms have dispersed ownership. Moreover, the result 
indicates that the remaining 60.03% of equities of firms in the sample are widely held. Hence, using 
our yardstick for ownership concentration in figure 3.3, we can suggest that the share ownership of 
the UK listed firms in the sample is moderately diffused (between 50% and 75% for WHO or 25% and 
50% for ABHO).  
Finally, ownership concentration measured in Herfindahl indices show, on average, that HI3 and HI5 
are 688.8 and 721.9 points respectively. Since the points are less than 1000, which is below the 
lower limit for moderate concentration according to the benchmark set in the Merger References4 of 
the Competition Commission of the UK and the Merger Guidance5 of the US for market or industry 
concentration level. Hence, this result also confirms the UK listed firms’ equity is diffused or 
dispersed. The median of the Herfindahl Index of the first 3 and 5 blockholders (254.8 and 289.3 
points respectively) are lower than their mean values and their skewness statistics show that they 
are right skewed. This implies that the higher values of the index lie to the left of the distribution, 
and the ownership of the firms in the sample is widely dispersed. The results of the average and 
median of the HI are in conformity with the results of the concentration ratios. However, it is 
difficult to theoretically fit it in corporate governance, except using it because HI is the most 
commonly used concentration measure. Nevertheless, it might not be possible to ascertain that the 
mergers guidance on competition for goods and services are really good and robust measures that 
provide good benchmark for shareholder ownership concentration.  
The only comparable empirical study showing evidence of ownership concentration, measured as 
the aggregate ownership of all investors (ABHO) excluding managers owning greater than 3% during 
the time period under review is from Florackis and Ozkan (2009). Their measurement differs from 
ours in that our study includes management (insider) ownership in ABHO. They report that the 
average ownership concentration, measured as the aggregate stakes of all blockholders excluding 
insiders (OUTO), is 35.79% for the period between 1999 and 2005. When we compute the averages 
in relation to our time period their average turns out to be 38.15%, whereas ours is 39.99% for 
ABHO and 36.11% if we exclude insider ownership. Hence, the result of this study is almost 
consistent with their results.  
  
                                                          
4 Merger References: Competition Commission Guidelines,  June 2003 CC2, Competition Commission, the UK,  April 2007 
5 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, issued April 
1992 and revised April 1997 
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Table 3.14 shows the state of ownership concentration variables accounting for the differences in 
industry sectors. It is observable that the concentration level varies among the different industry 
sectors. However, the voting power of the largest blockholder category (C1) is highest in the media 
and entertainment sector. It is also in the MEDIA that the coalitions of the first 2, 3, 4 and 5 largest 
blockholders attain the highest. This is consistent with the highest ownership concentration in the 
sector as can be observed from the result on ABHO for the sector.  
To sum up, the evidence from the aggregation of blockholder ownership and the use of 
concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices, even at the much lower threshold level, supports the 
long standing notion that the equity ownership in the UK public corporations is dispersed. The 
revelation of more blockholders by the use of smaller threshold of 3% has not changed the status 
quo in the notion of UK share ownership.  
Finally, from the data of ABHO and WHO in table 3.10, it can be observed that ownership dispersion 
is higher in FTSE100 than non-FTSE100 firm category. The average WHO for the pooled sample is 
60.03% and that of non-FTSE100 firms is 57.73%, whereas the figure is 71.6% for FTSE100 firms. This 
implies that ownership is less concentrated (highly diffused) in FTSE100 companies than in non-
FTSE100 firms. The comparison of the figures of ABHO for FTSE100, non-FTSE100 and the pooled 
sample reveals also the same evidence. However, the figures of ABHO and WHO for REG, NOREG, 
FIN and NONFIN firm categories are around the mean of the pooled sample.  
  
Table 3.14: Mean of ownership concentration variables accounting for difference in industry sectors, pool 
sample of 2003-2007  
 
Variable  INDUSTS CONSULTS MEDIA ITS ENERGY FINANS POOL 
c1 16.49 14.21 17.38 16.69 15.16 15.73 15.93 
c2 8.24 8.30 9.71 7.85 8.10 7.45 8.01 
c3 5.18 5.83 5.97 5.59 4.70 4.77 5.16 
c4 3.73 4.33 4.32 4.13 3.15 3.25 3.66 
c5 2.60 3.04 3.13 2.97 2.34 2.19 2.55 
cc2 24.73 22.51 27.09 24.54 23.26 23.18 23.94 
cc3 29.91 28.35 33.06 30.14 27.95 27.95 29.10 
cc4 33.64 32.68 37.37 34.27 31.11 31.20 32.76 
cc5 36.24 35.72 40.50 37.24 33.45 33.39 35.31 
hi3 794.17 479.59 764.08 745.15 834.32 628.16 688.85 
hi5 826.86 520.03 804.72 782.92 862.30 657.50 721.88 
abho 41.12 41.19 45.82 42.89 37.46 37.44 39.99 
who 58.87 58.87 54.41 57.11 62.53 62.55 60.03 
N 792  318  177 216 134 1019 2656 
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3.4.2.2 Evolution of Ownership Concentration 
Table 3.15 presents the evolution of ownership concentration of the UK listed firms. It can be seen 
that the means of the ownership control and concentration variables, namely the individual first to 
fifth largest blockholders except C2 and C5, generally show increases during the period. C2 and C5 
show trends of increases until they showed decreases only in 2007. Similarly, the results on the 
concentration ratios CC2, CC3, CC4, CC5 and ABHO show the trends of increase throughout the 
period under review. However, as it can be observed, WHO show some volatility, increasing initially 
and then decrease till the end of the period. Furthermore, HI3 and HI5 that are computed as the sum 
square of the first 3 and 5 largest blockholders respectively show volatility following their 
component parts. Their result that never exceeded 1000 indicates that share ownership is 
moderately diffuse.  
Moreover, the changes and trends show the same pattern as the block ownership structure 
discussed previously. As it can be observed from table 3.15, the changes are not significant according 
to the t-tests for the difference of the means of the initial periods. Again, significant changes are 
noted for the later part of the period – between 2006 and 2007 – for the variables C3, C4, C5, CC5, 
HI5, ABHO, and WHO. The two tailed t-test statistics for change in CC5 is also significant at 12.17% 
significance level between 2006 and 2007. This again confirms that there might be some shocks that 
might have induced significant changes of trends from 2006 to 2007.  This can be related to the 
economic interpretations given previously regarding the evolution of blockholder ownership.  
  
Table 3.15: Evolution of average ownership concentration of the UK listed firms, at 3% threshold, for the 
period of 2003-2007 and t-test for the mean difference between years 
  2003    2004   2005   2006   2007  POOL 
variable mean T mean t mean t mean t mean  Mean 
c1 15.4 - 0.0761 15.46 - 0.4713 15.83 - 0.5577 16.26 - 0.4003 16.58  15.93 
c2 7.486 - 0.8530 7.78 - 1.0961 8.163 - 0.3841 8.297 0.2558 8.216  8.006 
c3 4.668 - 1.2155 4.939 - 0.9391 5.143 - 0.8222 5.315 - 1.6851*  5.638  5.160 
c4 3.38 0.0050 3.379 - 1.3431 3.599 - 0.3997 3.664 - 3.3859* * *  4.208  3.661 
c5 2.193 - 0.5722 2.278 - 1.2247 2.457 - 0.5105 2.53 - 4.6218* * *  3.190  2.547 
cc2 22.88 - 0.3501 23.24 - 0.7585 24.00 - 0.5800 24.56 - 0.2447 24.79  23.94 
cc3 27.55 - 0.5611 28.18 - 0.8757 29.14 - 0.6885 29.87 - 0.5395 30.43  29.10 
cc4 30.93 - 0.5264 31.56 - 1.0186 32.74 - 0.7084 33.54 - 1.0117 34.64  32.76 
cc5 33.13 - 0.5709 33.84 - 1.1221 35.20 - 0.7406 36.07 - 1.5488* ( a)  37.83  35.31 
hi3 673.9 0.0278 671.8 0.1739 659 - 0.4601 691 - 0.6895 742.4  688.8 
hi5 703.9 0.0342 701.2 0.1540 689.9 - 0.5003 724.7 - 0.7748 782.5  721.9 
abho 36.89 - 0.7713 37.98 - 1.1092 39.5 - 0.9738 40.8 - 2.4917* *  44.08  39.99 
who 63.11 0.7037 62.11 1.1774 60.5 0.9674 59.21 2.5108* *  55.91  60.03 
N 489   503   528   567   569  2656 
* , * *  and * * *  Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  * ( a)  significant at 
12.17% 
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Overall, the trends of ownership concentration variables are the same as that of ownership patterns 
shown in section 3.4.1.2. This might not be surprising since the values of the ownership 
concentration variables are computed from the values of the ownership variables. It can be 
observed that the same pattern of notable concentration changes occurred between 2005 and 2007 
even though the significance of the t-test statistics is not observable between 2005 and 2006. Hence, 
it is suggestive that the change in ownership structure might trigger the change in ownership 
concentration or control structure of listed firms.   
Florackis and Ozkan (2009) find that ownership concentration at 3 % threshold for the UK firms in 
their sample range from 36.06% in 2003 to 40.86% in 2005, thus showing increases. Hence, this 
study confirms the findings of Florakis and Ozkan (2009) even though there are small differences in 
the figures due to the difference in the treatment of insiders’ ownership and difference in the 
sample.  
Finally, from table 3.12, the results indicate that ABHO exhibited a general trend of increases across 
the years under review, whereas WHO showed a general decrease across the years for FTSE100 and 
non-FTSE100, regulated (REG) and non-regulated (NOREG) categories. The result confirms the 
previously discussed evidence that ownership concentration has been increasing. The results are as 
expected and that the classification of firms by size and into regulated and non-regulated firms is 
appropriate when we investment behaviour of owner categories.  
However, the results shown in table 3.12 for the categories of FIN and NONFIN misleading results of 
decreases in ABHO for FT100, NOFT100, and NOREG categories and general increases in WHO for 
FIN category. This casts doubt on the classification of firms into financials and nonfinancials when we 
investigate the investment behaviour of owner categories. Hence, it might be suggestive that the 
size of the firm and the regulatory effect on firms matter for investment considerations by investors. 
Finally, the interesting evidence from the results shown in the table is that ownership concentration 
is significantly lower (more diffusion of ownership) in larger firms than in medium or smaller firms. 
This can be viewed from the high difference between ABHO and WHO figures for FT100 and 
NOFT100 categories. This might confirm the suggestion that ownership diffusion will increase as firm 
size, and hence, its operation increases. 
3.4.3 Blockholders Concentration  
In this subsection, the analysis of descriptive statistics has been made in order to view the average 
state of the number of major blockholders in the UK public firms. Table 3.16 presents the pooled 
statistics of the number of different blockholders categories, at 3% threshold, for the purpose of this 
study.  
The problem with this study, firstly, is that some of the variables have quite very few observations. 
These include the number of family or individual (NFAMO), nonfinancial firms (NNFO), and 
government (NGOVO) owners, which exhibit high positive skewness, as it is observable in the table. 
Secondly, the number of insider owners (NINO) takes the nominal value of 0 and 1 taking directors 
as a group or a unit for a firm, which might explain that the variable is not normally distributed.  
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Overall, the average number of all blockholders (NBH) having significant ownership in the UK public 
firms is 6 when we round to the next whole number. Out of these, the average number of 
institutional investors (NINSTO) that have block ownership is 5, which is the highest blockholder 
category. This implies that out of the different blockholder categories, the highest number is that of 
institutional investors’ category (around five-sixth of all blockholders), which is in conformity with 
the existing notion that they are the major block owners of UK shares. The next blockholder group is 
family or individual, and it is followed by insiders, banks and nonfinancial firms. Considering the 
median (P50) statistics, the median number of all blockholders (NBH) is 5, which is less than the 
mean. The median number of outside blockholders (NOUTO) is 5, which is equal to its mean. This 
implies that NOUTO is normally distributed. The fact that the median of NISTO, 4, is less than its 
mean (5) and the positive skewness imply that NINSTO is skewed in the right direction.   
The evolution of the number of blockholders, as shown in table 3.17, shows some pattern of stability 
between 2003 and 2004 as well as 2005 and 2006 (only 2 variables showed significant changes) 
relative to the other time intervals in the period according to the t-test of the difference of their 
means between years.  
 
The variables that showed more volatility throughout the period are NINSTO, and NINO. NGOVO 
shows increases at the beginning of the period and steady decreases thereafter. NFAMO show 
Table 4.16: Descriptive statistics of the number of blockholders of the pooled sample, at 3% threshold, for 
the period of 2003-2007 
                                                                                              
         nbh        2656         0         5     5.321         7        16     .4946     3.253
       nouto        2656         0         5     4.948         7        16      .625     3.447
       ngovo        2656         0         0     .0286         0         2     7.036     57.36
      nbanko        2656         0         0      .355         1         3     1.567     5.053
       nfamo        2656         0         0     .2334         0         7     4.125     22.66
        nnfo        2656         0         0     .1822         0         6     3.266     21.57
      ninsto        2656         0         4     4.039         6        15     .7387     3.406
        nino        2656         0         0     .2078         0         1      1.44     3.074
                                                                                              
    variable           N       min       p50      mean       p75       max  skewness  kurtosis
Table 3.17: Evolution of the average number of blockholders of the UK listed firms, at 3% threshold, for the 
period of 2003-2007 and t-test for the mean difference between years 
  2003    2004   2005   2006   2007  POOL
variable mean  t mean t mean t mean t mean  mean
nino 0.2147  - 0.0756 0.2167 0.7816 0.197 - 0.5295 0.2099 0.3234 0.2021  0.2078
ninsto 3.843  4.1034* * *  3.209 - 6.2919* * *  4.148 0.9457 4.000 - 5.6269* * *  4.88  4.039
nnfo 0.1554  0.2294 0.1491 0.2723 0.142 - 7.3131* * *  0.3616 9.9800* * *  0.0931  0.1822
nfamo 0.2658  0.8424 0.2247 - 0.3511 0.2405 0.9820 0.1993 - 1.0014 0.2408  0.2334
nbanko 0.3252  - 0.2019 0.332 - 4.5613* * *  0.500 14.4729* * *  0.067 - 15.2454* * *  0.5536  0.355
ngovo 0.0307  - 0.4349 0.0358 0.6010 0.0284 0.1626 0.0265 0.3446 0.0228  0.0286
nouto 4.630  4.0884* * *  3.950 - 6.9403* * *  5.059 - 0.6028 5.155 - 3.9565* * *  5.794  4.948
nbh 4.843  - 1.4556 5.091 - 1.0407 5.263 - 0.5808 5.358 - 3.6582* * *  5.953  5.321
N 489  503   528   567   569  2656
* , * *  and * * *  Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
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steady decreases and finally increases only between 2006 and 2007. However, NBH and NOUTO 
(though NOUTO shows decrease at the beginning of the period) show steady increases over the 
period of review. The volatility of the number of blockholders variables might indicate that the 
number of blockholders varies with the changes in the ownership stakes of owners’ categories.  
The most major significant changes in the mean of the variables happened between 2006 and 2007. 
Except NINO, NFAMO and NGOVO all the variables that show significant changes, namely NINSTO, 
NBANKO, NOUTO and NBH show increases. These significant changes coincide with the previous 
change in block ownership and ownership concentration for the period between 2006 and 2007, and 
hence, the same economic interpretation holds also for the changes of the number of different 
blockholders.  
3.4.4 Controlling Blockholders 
The first largest shareholder has the high probability for attaining control by influencing the decision 
process of a firm derived from the highest voting power. It might also resort to control the firm by 
forming a controlling coalition assuming that all voting powers on shares owned are used in voting. 
Therefore, it is important to analyse their position in the UK listed firms assuming that the first large 
shareholder is a controlling blockholder. However, the assumption is just theoretical, and the choice 
of this control factor as a variable for this study is just following the previous researchers (Faccio and 
Lang, 2002; Marchica and Mura, 2005). Tables 3.18 and 3.19 present the descriptive statistics of the 
blockholders and the evolution of their mean values during the period.  
From table 3.18, the presence of INSTO as the first (largest) blockholder category in 73.61% of the 
firms indicates that institutional investors are the predominant shareholders as the first largest 
blockholder (C1), and that they control 73.61% of the firms in the sample when we theoretically 
assume that the largest shareholder in a firm is the controlling blockholder. The insider owners (INC) 
that appear as the first largest blockholder (C1) in 10.62% of the firms in the sample is the next in 
control the UK listed firms. It is, however, surprising that banks control about 6.74% of FTSE firms in 
the sample, in contrast to the notion that banks do not play a role in the control of the firms in 
market oriented counties like the UK.  The rest of the blockholder types, namely nonfinancial firms 
(NFC) and family or individuals (FAMC) control around 4.03% and 2.67% respectively of the UK listed 
firms. As expected both nonfinancial firms and family or individual blockholders control very small 
percentage of the UK firms.  Finally, the result also shows that 1.4% of the UK listed firms in the FTSE 
all shares Index do not have a controlling shareholder.  
  
Table 3.18: Means of the presence of first largest blockholders in the pooled sample, at 3% threshold, for the 
period of 2003-2007 
                                                                                
    mean       .1062     .7361     .0403     .0267     .0674     .8716     .0139
       N        2656      2656      2656      2656      2656      2656      2656
                                                                                
   stats         inc     instc       nfc      famc     bankc      outc      none
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Table 3.19 presents the changes in the average of blockholder types that have the control potential 
on the UK firms in the sample. It is seen that there are some volatility in the changes. Hence, the 
percentages or number of firms controlled by any blockholder category shows some changes even 
though we do not have conclusively strong evidence due to insignificance of the t-test. The 
volatilities in the average percentage of firms controlled by the blockholders between 2005 and 
2006 as well as 2006 and 2007 are not significant enough to conform to the previous analyses on 
evolution in blockholder ownership, and ownership concentration. However, the persistent increase 
in the control of the listed firms by institutional investors might imply that the UK institutional 
investors follow long strategy in equity investment in contrast to short-termism investment 
behaviour in some literature.  
3.4.5 Board Structure 
From the descriptive statistics, presented as table 3.20, it is observable that the average board size is 
9, where approximately 5 of which are nonexecutive directors and 4 of them are executive directors. 
The maximum board size for the sample is 28, whereas the lowest is 2. The result shows also that, on 
average, 63.75% of the board of directors of the UK FTSE All Share index companies are 
nonexecutive directors. The median proportion of nonexecutive directors, however, is 61.54%, 
which is not very far from the mean. Regarding CEO-duality, the result shows that about 25.13% of 
the firms in the sample have CEO-duality, and almost three-quarter (75%) of the firms separate the 
roles of the CEO and the Chairman.  
Table 3.19: Descriptive statistics of the evolution of the average proportions of the firms controlled by the 
first largest blockholders, at 3% threshold, for the period of 2003-2007 and t-test for the mean difference 
between years 
  2003    2004   2005   2006   2007 POOL 
variable mean  t mean mean t mean t mean mean 
inc 0.1166  - 0.3242 0.1233 1.3701 0.0966 0.2762 0.0917 - 0.7761 0.1054 0.1062 
instc 0.6912  - 0.6367 0.7097 - 0.4213 0.7216 - 1.5246* ( b)  0.7619 - 0.9535 0.7856 0.7361 
nfc 0.0491  0.5542 0.0417 - 0.4349 0.0473 0.5475 0.0406 1.5154* ( a)  0.0246 0.0403 
famc 0.0245  - 0.6906 0.0318 0.8962 0.0227 - 0.9131 0.0317 0.9200 0.0228 0.0267 
bankc 0.0777  0.7388 0.0656 - 1.2980 0.0871 1.4845 0.0635 1.3203 0.0457 0.0674 
outc 0.8425  - 0.2775 0.8489 - 1.4000 0.8788 - 1.0904 0.8995 0.9302 0.8822 0.8716 
none 0.0204  1.0647 0.0119 - 1.1219 0.0208 1.9617 0.0071 - 0.6292 0.0105 0.0139 
N 489    503   528   567   569 2656 
* ( a)  Significant at 13%;     * ( b)  Significant at 12.76%  
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The result from the pool sample for all firm years stated above is for all firms in the sample. 
However, it has been necessary to see if there are differences between different types of industries. 
Table 3.21 shows the breakdown of the mean of board structure variables according to industry 
types. The result show that the media sector (MEDIA), on average, have more nonexecutive 
directors (5.56 = 6) than other industries and the the pool sample (5.075 = 5). Moreover, the 
financial sector (FINANS) has less and the smallest number of executive directors and board size 
(2.257 = 3 and 7.552 = 8 respectively) than the rest of the industries and that of the average pool 
sample (3.208 = 4 and 8.295 = 9 respectively). It can be observed from the table that except for 
financial institutions, the proportion of nonexecutive directors ranges between 55.54% in ENERGY 
and 57.5% in ITS. In financial institutions (that include institutional investors and banks), the 
proportion of NED is 75.2%. Hence, the results might imply that all industry sectors complied to the 
requirements in the recommendation of the Code on NED.  
 
Furthermore, table 3.22 presents the data of the average of board structure variables across 
different firm categories. It can be observed that FTSE100 firms have less board size and less 
nonexecutive directors’ representation than the other categories, and that there is more duality in 
FTSE100 firms than in non-FTSE100 firms. It is surprising to note that board size is lower in FTSE100 
firms than in non-FTSE100 firms since it seems that as firm size increases, more number of directors 
are needed to effectively manage the expanding intensity of the operations of the firm. It can also 
be seen that duality is more prevalent in regulated firms and financial categories than in non-
regulated and nonfinancial categories.  
  
Table 3.20: Descriptive statistics of the variables of board structures of the pooled sample for the period of 
2003-2007 
                                                      
        dual        2634         0     .2513         1
        pned        2632     .6154     .6375         1
       bsize        2633         8     8.295        28
          ed        2633         3     3.208        16
         ned        2633         5     5.075        15
                                                      
    variable           N       p50      mean       max
Table 3.21: The mean of board structure variables over different industry sectors for the pooled sample for 
the period of 2003-2007 
 Variable CONSULTS ENERGY FINANS INDUSTS ITS MEDIA POOL
Ned 4.468 5.462 5.310 4.950 4.948 5.199 5.075
Ed 3.368 4.273 2.257 3.880 3.571 4.116 3.208
Bsize 7.829 9.735 7.552 8.890 8.524 9.315 8.295
Pned 0.567 0.554 0.752 0.560 0.575 0.570 0.638
Dual 0.019 0.091 0.576 0.050 0.061 0.039 0.251
N 310 132 1010 789 212 181 2634
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Figure 3.4 and table 3.23 show the historical evolution and test of mean difference between years 
for the board of directors’ variables. It can be seen that the number of executive directors (ED) and 
board size (BSIZE) has been decreasing during the period. In contrast, what is interesting is that the 
number of nonexecutive directors (NED) and the proportion of nonexecutive directors (PNED) have 
shown steady increases from 2003 to 2007. From figure 3.4, it can be seen that NED has been 
increasing, whereas ED has been decreasing from 2003-2007. This might indicate that the decrease 
in the EDs has been substituted by the increase in the NEDs.  
 
The important question is whether the changes in the board structure are significant or not. Even 
though figure 3.4 shows sharp decline of ED and BSIZE between 2003 and 2004, the t-statistics in 
table 4.16 show insignificance. Moreover, even though all board structure variables show 
insignificant changes between 2003 and 2005, there is still evidence from their mean values that 
there are changes in the board structures.  
  
Table 3.22: The mean of board structure variables over different firm categories based on size and 
regulatory effects on firms for the pooled sample for the period of 2003-2007 
VARIABLE FT100 NOFT100 REG NOREG FIN NONFIN POOL
ned 4.71 6.91 5.33 4.88 5.31 4.93 5.08
ed 2.92 4.68 2.49 3.76 2.26 3.8 3.21
bsize 7.64 11.6 7.81 8.67 7.55 8.76 8.30
pned 0.64 0.6 0.73 0.57 0.75 0.57 0.64
dual 0.29 0.03 0.52 0.05 0.58 0.05 0.25
 
Figure 3.4: Evolution of board structure variables of the UK listed firms, at 3% threshold, 2003-2007 
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However, as it can be seen from table 3.23, there is strong evidence at 1 per cent significance level 
that the changes in ED, BSIZE and PNED are significant between 2005 and 2006 as well as between 
2006 and 2007. This result conforms to the significant changes in block ownership, and ownership 
concentration that show the same trend between 2005 and 2007. Hence, the interpretation used 
previously holds also for the change in the board of director variables. Additionally, it might be 
suggested that since the compliance to the recommendations of the Combined Code of 2003 is 
voluntary, some companies might have been slow to comply with it, and it might have taken them 
more time to evaluate the implications until the gradual change in the variables became significant 
between 2005 and 2007.   
 
  
Table 3.23: Evolution means for board structures variables of the pooled sample for the period of 2003-2007 
and t-test for the mean difference between years 
2003   2004   2005   2006   2007 POOL
Variable Mean t Mean t Mean t Mean t mean mean
ned 4.916 0.1499 4.949 - 0.3331 5.070 1.2016 5.124 - 0.7018 5.273 5.075
ed 4.418 0.8237 3.202 1.1904 3.029 - 9.3068* * *  2.892 6.7556* * *  2.674 3.208
bsize 9.370 0.8918 8.145 0.3794 8.112 - 6.3335* * *  8.009 4.8092* * *  7.972 8.295
pned 0.5643 - 1.1599 0.6215 - 1.1884 0.6419 7.6267* * *  0.6588 - 4.6440* * *  0.6875 0.6375
dual 0.2401 - 0.3939 0.2525 0.4224 0.2529 0.7334 0.2615 - 0.9425 0.2482 0.2513
N 479 495   526   566   568 2634
* , * *  and * * *  Indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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3.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The investigation of corporate ownership structure during the period of 2003-2007 confirms that 
insiders own about 4% while outsider blockholder categories own 36.07% of the outstanding shares 
of the UK listed firms. The result shows that the average ownership stakes of state, family or 
individual, banks and nonfinancials range from 0.15% to 2.59%. It also indicates that institutional 
investors own the highest proportion of the UK listed firms common shares (28.94%), thus 
confirming the evidence that the UK institutional ownership is still the most important ownership 
type in modern UK corporations. 
Moreover, the historical evolution of block ownership shows that there might be a substitution of 
ownership stakes between institutional investors and other blockholders, where the decreases in 
the stakes of others might be gained by the increases of institutional investors, which shows 
decrease only in 2006. This is in contrast to the data of ONS that shows the decrease and increase of 
the UK institutional investors’ holdings and the foreign ownership respectively. The trends of other 
owner types also vary from the data of ONS since the ONS (though 2005 and 2007 data are missing) 
has all the stakes of beneficial owners unlike ours with 3% or above. The difference in trend might be 
due to, among other things, the aggregation of foreign institutional owners with the UK institutional 
investors. The result also shows evidence that the trends of bank and state ownership is quite similar 
to that of institutional investors, while the trends of nonfinancial owners exhibit similarity with 
insider ownership.  
There are interesting patterns or trends in the distribution of ownership that can be noted from the 
results. Firstly, INSTO, BANKO, FAMO and GOVO show decrease between 2005 and 2006, whereas 
the holdings of insiders (INO) and nonfinancial firms (NFO) show increase in the period. Secondly, 
the stakes of the outsider blockholder categories (INSTO, BANKO, FAMO, and GOVO) show increases 
between 2006 and 2007, whereas that of INO and NFO show decline in the period. This evidence 
also confirms the substitution of ownership between outsider owner categories on the one hand and 
insider owner and nonfinancial owner categories on the other hand.  
The increase in the holdings of outsider blockholders categories, namely INSTO, BANKO, GOVO and 
FAMO between 2006 and 2007 might be due to the outsider investors’ overconfidence and 
optimism from the positive developments and health in the economy in the initial periods of the 
time under review. The insight from the evidence is that all owner categories that are institutions 
like INSTO, banks and state share might follow each other, or especially the institutional investors 
that are more informed than other outside owners.  
On the other hand, the decrease in the ownership stakes of INO and NFO between 2006 and 2007 
might indicate that the investor categories might have foreseen the looming financial crisis that 
showed up after a year and sold their stakes. The insights from this evidence are (1) that as the 
ownership of  insider owners that run the firms and nonfinancial firms that are also directed by their 
management exhibit similar trends, especially in times of foreseen crisis or shocks, (2) that 
management of nonfinancial owners that make investment decisions might have network of 
relationships with insider owners of the firm in which they invest and might follow each other in 
actions, and (3) that nonfinancial firms that are managed by their respective insiders might be as 
informed as the inside owners of the firm in which they invest.  
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Furthermore, there is strong evidence that significant changes in ownership pattern occurred 
between 2005 and 2006 as well as between 2006 and 2007, where the change in the major outsider 
blockholder types (INSTO, NFO, FAMO, and BANKO) and the aggregating of ownership blocks (OUTO, 
ABHO, and WHO) are found to be statistically significant. The rationale for the systematic changes 
between 2005 and 2007 might also be explained by the recent development in corporate 
governance of the UK, namely, the Higgs Report and the Combined Code in 2003 that recommended 
some changes in the corporate board structure. The evidence of the volatility in the trends of 
ownership of most outsider blockholder categories in the early years of the period under review 
(2003-2005) might suggest that due scepticism on the implementation and impacts of the Code, 
outside investors might have been reluctant in taking high risk by buying more shares, and hence, 
increase their stakes. It might be added that all outsider owners’ categories increased their stakes 
significantly between 2006 and 2007 after having observed the increase in insider ownership 
between 2005 and 2006 and due to overconfidence and optimism from the positive developments 
and health in the economy in the initial periods of the time under review.  
The sensitivity analysis of the state and evolution of block ownership structure using different 
categories of firms in the pooled sample show interesting results. The investors’ behaviours and the 
trends of different blockholder categories are consistent with the results of the pooled sample 
discussed above, namely, (1) similar behaviour or characteristics of INO and NFO; (2) similar 
characteristics of the components of external blockholder category (especially INSTO, FAMO, 
BANKO); (3) the significant changes reflected from the high rates of change in ownership structure 
patterns between 2005 and 2007; and (4) a general trend of increases of ABHO and decrease of 
WHO across the years for FTSE100, Non-FTSE100, Regulated and non-regulated firm categories, thus 
indicating the increase in ownership concentration during the period under review and that the 
classification of the sample by size and regulatory effects might be more appropriate than by 
financial respect (financials and nonfinancials) to reveal characteristic features of group 
homogeneity and heterogeneity in the patterns of ownership structure.  
However, there is also new evidence that: (1) insiders hold more shares in non-FTSE100, 
nonregulated, and nonfinancials than in FTSE100, regulated and financial firms; (2) institutional 
investors hold less proportion of shares of FTSE100 than the rest of the categories, in which they 
hold almost the proportion that is almost around the mean of the pool (28.94%); (3) nonfinancial 
companies (NFO) hold higher proportion of shares in nonregulated firms outstanding and 
nonfinancial or industrial firms, and this might imply that the prefer nonregulated companies than 
the regulated firms; (4) family or individual owners are indifferent regarding the regulatory effects 
on firms and they hold higher shares in smaller firms than in very large firms (FTSE100); and (5) bank 
ownership is around the average of the pooled sample for all considered categories; (6) insider 
investors might have been pulling their stakes in non-FTSE100 and pooling it into FTSE100 firms 
during the period under review; and (7) from the results on WHO and ABHO, ownership dispersion is 
higher in FTSE100 than non-FTSE100 firm category, whereas it is not sensitive to the categorization 
of the overall sample into regulated, non-regulated, financials and nonfinancials.  
The mean statistics of the variables for ranked largest blockholders and concentration ratios show 
also interesting results. Firstly, the average equity owned by the first largest shareholder is about 
16% of outstanding shares of firms in the sample. This shows that the first largest blockholder 
cannot attain control of the firm. Secondly, the concentration of equity ownership in the first 3 and 5 
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largest blockholders is 29.1% and 35.31% respectively and this confirms the fact that share 
ownership is dispersed in the UK listed firms. Hence, the evidence from the concentration ratios 
indicative that even if the first five largest blockholders, on average, form coalitions or voting pacts, 
they cannot attain absolute or majority control (more than 50% voting power derived from 
ownership rights), thus indicating that control of firms in the UK might be highly contested.  
Additionally, the result shows that about 40% of all firm’s common shares are held by all blockholder 
categories and that most of the outstanding common shares of FTSE All Share firms (60.3%) are 
widely held by dispersed shareholders, who own less than 3% in any one company they invest in. 
This results show evidence of the popular notion that ownership of the UK listed firms is dispersed 
since the voting power of the coalition of all blockholders does not attain absolute or majority 
control. Moreover, though the use of Herfindahl indices to measure share ownership concentration 
is criticized, the evidence also confirms that UK listed firms’ share exhibit dispersed ownership.  
The sensitivity analysis made on the different firm categories reveal that ownership concentration is 
significantly lower (there is more diffusion of ownership) in larger firms than in medium or smaller 
firms (as viewed from the high difference between ABHO and WHO figures for FTSE100 and non-
FTSE100 categories), thus confirming the suggestion that ownership diffusion will increase as firm 
size, and hence, its operation increases.  
Furthermore, there is evidence that ownership concentration (CC2, CC3, CC4, CC5, and ABHO) of the 
listed UK firms has been increasing during the period (2003-2007), and that ownership concentration 
remained moderately diffuse throughout the period. The evidence of significant changes in 
ownership concentration between 2006 and 2007 confirms that there might be some shocks that 
might have induced such trend that coincides with that of block ownership at the same time period.  
Regarding the number of blockholders, the average number of all blockholders in the UK public firms 
is 6 rounding to the next whole number. Its median is 5. The result shows that institutional investors 
are the largest blockholder in terms of number (5 out of the average 6 blockholders for mean, and 4 
out of 5 for median), and this is in conformity with the existing notion that they are the major block 
owners of UK shares. The result on the evolution of the number of blockholders show evidence of 
significant changes in the means of most of the variables between 2006 and 2007, and this coincides 
with the evidence on the block ownership and ownership concentration. Additionally, there is 
evidence of volatility of the number of blockholders throughout the period. This might indicate that 
the number of blockholders varies with the changes in the ownership stakes of owners’ categories.  
As for the controllers of firms assuming that the first largest shareholder category is in control of the 
firm theoretically, there is evidence that institutional investors are the predominant shareholders, 
controlling absolute majority (73.61%) of the firms in the sample. The next in the control position are 
ranked as follows: around 10.62% by insider owners (INC), 6.74% by banks, 4.03% by nonfinancial 
firms and 3% by family or individuals. The result also shows that 1.4% of the UK listed firms in the 
FTSE All Shares Index do not have a controlling shareholder. Moreover, the result on the evolution of 
the mean of the control by the blockholders types except institutional control show that there are 
some volatility in the average firms controlled by blockholder categories even though they are not 
statistically significant. The persistent increase in the control of the listed firms by institutional 
investors might imply that the UK institutional investors might follow long strategy in equity 
investment in contrast to short-termism investment behaviour in some literature.  
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Finally, the results on the board structure variables show evidence that (1) the UK listed firms on 
average have small number (average of about 9) of board member, (2) the majority of the board 
members (61.54%) are nonexecutive directors (NEDs), and (3) about three-quarters of the firms 
separate the roles of the CEO and the Chairman. There is also evidence that the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors for the nonfinancial industry sectors (ENERGY, INDUSTS, CONSULTS, MEDIA 
and ITS) ranges between 55.54% and 57.5%, while that of the financial institutions (FINANS) is 
75.2%. Furthermore, the evolution of all of the board variables shows evidence of significant steady 
increases of number of executive directors and proportion of nonexecutive directors and significant 
steady decreases in the board size. Hence, the evidence from the study show that more of the UK 
listed firms in the sample complied with the stated board characteristics variables of the Code and 
that there is difference in compliance to the Code regarding proportion of nonexecutive directors 
and CEO-Duality between nonfinancial sectors and financial institutions.  
The study has presented some evidence from the results discussed above. One of the main findings 
of the study of research interest is that the first largest blockholder might not be ultimate controller 
of the firm and that the coalition of the first 5 largest shareholders cannot even attain majority 
control in terms of their aggregate voting power. Hence, this study suggests that individual 
blockholder might not have the ability to control the firm solely and influence firm performance and 
that control might be contested in the UK listed firms. So, the study suggests further research into 
the impact of ownership and control structure and the contestability of control.  
Moreover, this study has its own delimitations. Firstly, we would like to note that this study is 
delimited in its use of the UK disclosure level of 3% threshold. Higher or lower cut-off levels are not 
used due to the reasons and rationale discussed in this report and knowing for sure the inevitability 
of different results as reported by researchers. Secondly, some of the ownership and control 
structure variables exhibit skewness, and this might question their normality. Thirdly, the study falls 
short of revealing the control configuration of the listed firms and how blockholder categories and 
ownership concentration influence firm performance. Finally, the research has not undertaken 
comparative study with at least another country.  
Nevertheless, the results show interesting recent evidence on the pattern and concentration of 
ownership, some control structures and board structure of the UK listed firms in the Index. The 
strength of the study is that (1) it involved several ownership and control structures in the analysis; 
(2) it has used both the pool sample analysis that reveals the overall state of ownership and control 
structure variables for the period under review, and the year-to-year analysis that reveals the 
evolution of ownership and control structure. One of the lessons that can be drawn from this study 
is that the corporate ownership and control structures show volatility and variance across years even 
though some of the changes are not significant.  
Even so, there is still a question on how the ownership and control structures affect firm 
performance. Hence, the important research issue is the implication of the ownership and control 
patterns to the firm performance and to the shareholders value, and how blockholders interact and 
share corporate control. Therefore, the study might suggest the undertaking of further research on 
the impact of the ownership and control variables on firm performance and the contestability of 
control hypothesis related to blockholders structure.  
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CHAPTER   FOUR 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
IN THE UK: EVIDENCE FROM THE AGENCY 
PERSPECTIVE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The property rights theory and the legal approach to finance affirm that shareholders are the 
residual claimants or the rightful owners of modern listed firms; and the agency theory posits that 
managers are agents of shareholders (principals) and they run the firm on behalf of the owners and 
that that there is a principal-agent relationship between the parties. Extensive literature indicates 
that there is conflict between shareholders and managers, where it is hypothesized that managers 
diverge from shareholders’ interest and reduce and/ or appropriate the shareholders’ wealth 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1985; La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, 
La Porta et al., 2000, 2002). In corporate governance, the issue of shareholder-manager conflict has 
triggered extensive research on the relationship between corporate ownership structure and firm 
performance.  
Since the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932), which states that ownership is separated from 
control and that managers are controlling US firms and hence there are dispersed shareholders that 
are powerless, literature shows that several researchers have analyzed the shareholders-managers 
conflict. In particular, the agency theory developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) has provided a 
framework or tool to explain the reduction of shareholder wealth in the settings of the principal-
agent relationship, where owners (principals) delegate managers (agents) to run the firm on their 
behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The settings would lead to agency problems or conflicts since 
both parties are utility maximizers and managers might diverge from maximizing shareholder 
returns.  
On the other hand, literature reveals that the second-type agency conflict arises between the 
controlling large shareholder and minority shareholders in countries or firms with concentrated 
ownership structures. There are two contradicting views regarding the controlling large shareholder-
minority shareholders relationship. One view is that the conflict of interest between controlling 
blockholders and minority shareholders might arise when the controlling large shareholders make 
decisions for the private benefits of control, whereby they appropriate the wealth of minority 
shareholders (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Barclay and Holderness, 1989; La Porta et al. 1998, 2000, 
2002; Dyck and Zingales 2004). In contrast to this divergence of interest and the expropriation 
hypothesis, Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997), argue that large and controlling shareholders 
contribute to the mitigation of the agency problems because they have the incentives and capacity 
to monitor the managers for the shared benefit of control. Moreover, relating to this, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) write that as ownership concentration increases, the degree to which benefits and costs 
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are borne by the same owner will increases. Hence, it might appear that large shareholders having 
larger stakes in the firm would not sit idle but raise their activism in corporate governance to 
monitor or control the firm in order to avoid the bigger risk they would bear in proportion of their 
stake.  
Therefore, based on the two agency perspectives stated above, namely, the manager-shareholder 
conflict and the large shareholder-minority shareholders conflict, the important questions that can 
be posed related to the assumption of the separation of ownership from control are:  Do 
shareholders have the incentive and ability to exert control if the managers diverge from value 
maximization and to enhance firm performance? What is the impact of different blockholders on firm 
performance? Do external blockholders benefit or exploit (appropriate) minority shareholders? These 
basic questions call for the investigation of the potential link between ownership structure and firm 
performance based on the assumption that shareholders with significant voting power might have 
the incentives and ability to control and enhance firm value (Leech and Leahy, 1991).  
Literature on the extensive study of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance shows that researchers (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Agrawal and Mandelker, 1990; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Weir et al., 
2002; Hillier and McColgan, 2006, and several others) use different (1) assumptions and models, (2) 
measures of performance and ownership structure, (3) control and/ instrumental variables and their 
measures or proxies, (4) block owner categories, (5) time horizon or periods for the sample data, and 
(6) data types (cross-sectional or panel), among other things. It might be arguable that the 
differences in the choices made might explain the mixed results and ambiguous conclusions in the 
existing empirical works. Hence, this research study considers the following important issues in 
order to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance.  
Firstly, many of the past studies try to analyze the effect of only one or few of the blockholder 
categories on firm performance. For instance, Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach (1988, 
1991), Cho (1998), and others made their studies on the impact of insider ownership. Grifith (1999) 
investigated the impact of CEO ownership in addition to managerial ownership on firm performance. 
Likewise, some of the studies focusing on ownership concentration (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Leech 
and Leahy, 1991; Holderness and Sheehan, 1989; Himmelberg et al., 1999) leave out the direct 
impact of individual blockholder categories. Nevertheless, the use of different measures of 
ownership structures and the omission of relevant ownership variables might contribute to the 
differences in the results and the ambiguity of conclusions.  Hence, considering this and following 
Seifert et al. (2005), the empirical analysis of this research will involve almost all major types of 
blockholders (table 4.2) in order to fill the exclusion bias. Nevertheless, this research is limited in 
that the insider ownership is still aggregate ownership of executives and non-executive directors. 
However, unlike the studies mentioned above, it will also analyze the association of the ownership 
of non-financial firms with performance since they might influence firm performance through the 
significant blocks of shares they hold, and or the use their network relationships with the firm in 
which they invest or the subsidiary they establish.  
Secondly, several related studies like McConnell and Servaes (1990), Himmelberg et al. (1999), 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Seifert et al. (2005) use none or few governance mechanisms as 
control variables. However, only few studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir et al, 2002; Hillier 
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and McColgan) controlled for most of the mechanisms. The failure to control for the mechanisms 
might (1) omit the suggestion of the agency theory, which states that governance mechanisms 
mitigate the agency conflict between owners and managers, and (2) exclude the relevant variable 
that might influence performance from the model thus leading to specification error. On the issue, 
Walsh and Seward (1990) assert that firm performance is crucially dependent on the efficient 
operation of the governance mechanisms. Hence, this research follows Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
Weir et al. (2002) and Walsh and Sward (1990) and investigates the impact of all mechanisms except 
managerial labor market. It extends the work of Weir et al. (2002) by using (1) panel data instead of 
cross-sectional data, (2) lagged performance variable in various non-OLS estimation methods; and 
(3) stock price volatility in the model in order account for the monitoring role of the capital market.  
Thirdly, literature survey shows that performance, ownership structure and board structure might 
be endogenously determined (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Helmalin and Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001). 
Demsetz (1983), argues that firm ownership structure is endogenously determined, influenced by 
several factors in the competitive environment and its own performance. This also suggests that 
performance also determines ownership structure, implying the reverse causality problem or 
nonrecursive relationship between ownership structure and performance.   
Moreover, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) suggest that almost all variables of board structure are 
endogenous variables and that are jointly determined. They also argue that the actions of the 
previous directors affect performance and that performance can itself influence the choice of 
subsequent directors. Hence, this implies the joint endogeneity of ownership structure and board 
structure and the dynamic endogeneity of board structure. They also suggest that firm performance, 
CEO turnover, and changes in ownership structure are important factors effecting the change in 
boards. So, there might also be the reciprocal or reversal causal (nonrecursive) relationship between 
goes from performance to the board of directors and the dynamic endogeneity relationship between 
firm performance and board structure. Hence, there is indication of joint determination of 
performance, ownership structure and internal governance mechanism or board structure (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1988; Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998).  
Another joint endogeneity problem to consider is the relationship between internal and external 
governance mechanisms, which is expressed as substitution and complementarity effects. Explaining 
an instance of substitution effect between capital market and the ineffective board structure, Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) state that the divergence of managers from shareholder value maximization 
will be constrained by market for the firm itself, the capital markets, where it might be possible to 
sell own shares and impact change in ownership structure. More broadly, Walsh and Seward (1990) 
suggest that all of the internal and external control mechanisms are inextricably linked and that they 
are different alternative responses to similar problems. Additionally, Rediker and Seth (1995) 
suggest the theoretical possibility that firm performance depends on (1) the efficiency of a bundle of 
corporate governance mechanisms, and (2) the substitution between different governance methods 
in controlling the agency problems. They provide empirical evidence of the existence of the 
substitution effects between monitoring by the board of directors and manager’s mutual 
monitoring, and between the monitoring potential of the boards and the alternative governance 
variables.  
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Moreover, the governance mechanisms are regarded as interrelated complementary ways to 
oversee the conduct of management. Agrawal and Knoeber (1995) suggest that higher insider 
ownerships, institutional ownerships, external block ownership and representation of outsiders on 
the board might have positive correlation with takeover markets due to lower transaction costs and 
the reduction of free-rider problem that might lead to the rejection of the tender offer by small 
shareholders. So, we assume that a bundle of governance mechanism might complement or 
substitute for each other in controlling the agency problems and enhancing firm performance 
following Walsh and Seward (1990, Rediker and Seth (1995), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), and Weir 
et al. (2002).   
Hence, the reverse causality, dynamic endogeneity and the joint determination problems between 
the involved variables might make the link between ownership structure and performance 
complicated. This study is limited in terms of applying appropriate and effective methodology to 
account for the reverse causality and joint determination problem, which might necessitate a 
structural modelling. Nevertheless, following Weir et al. (2002) our study accounts for dynamic 
endogeneity by including the lagged performance variable as independent variable and investigates 
whether there is a positive or negative association between ownership structure and performance. 
Moreover, it will extend the work of and Rediker and Seth (1995) and analyze the substitution and 
complementarity effects from the correlation among governance mechanisms. 
Fourthly, literature search shows different studies use different thresholds to measure ownership 
structure. La Port et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002); Franks and Mayer (1997); Claessens et al. 
(2000); Holderness and Sheehan (1988); Ghadoum et al. (2005) and others used 25%, 20% and/ or 
10% cut-offs for control. Other studies that use 5% cut-off are Shleifer and Vishny (1986), McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), Short and Keasey (1999), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Weir et al. (2002), 
Marchica and Mura (2005) Thomsen et al. (2006), Hillier and McColgan (2006) and others. 
Moreover, Franks et al. (2001), Crespi and Renneboog (2003) and Florackis and Ozkam (2009) use 5% 
and/ or 3% cut-offs in their investigation of the UK firms.  
Hence, taking into consideration the uncommon large shareholdings in the UK (Mayer, 2002) and 
the historical institutionalization of UK share ownership due to substitution effect between 
institutional investors and household investors (Rydqvist et al., 2008; Kahn, 2006), in line with the 
recent studies on the UK by Franks et al., 2001, Crespi and Renneboog (2003) and Florackis and 
Ozkam (2009), which used the thresholds of  and 3%; in conformity with the UK disclosure rule; and 
based on the provision of the UK Company Law and the London Stock Exchange listing rules, 3% 
threshold is used to compute different ownership structure variables.  
Finally, this study analyses uses several estimation procedures rather than relying on one or two 
methods in order to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Hence, the procedures to be used are (1) different types of robust regressions 
(White’s sandwich robust, cluster robust and iteratively weighted least squares robust regressions) 
for primary analyses besides the OLS, which is used for testing the Gaussian assumptions, and (2) 
median regression, fixed-effects regressions, and generalized estimation equations (GEE) for 
sensitivity analyses. This is sought to verify the consistency of the results or evidence and to handle 
some characteristics of the sample, for example, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, which 
violate the OLS assumptions and necessitates other appropriate estimation methods.  
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Hence, in undertaking the analyses, two regression equations or models are specified considering 
the influence of (1) blockholders, and (2) insider and outsider ownerships, where the rest of the 
independent variables (governance and observed firm specific characteristics) are controlled for. The 
results from the different appropriate non-NIID estimation methods for primary and sensitivity or 
consistency analyses generally show consistent evidence across different performance measures. 
The main findings of this research are summarized as follows: 
• Firstly, that there is a relationship between ownership structures, measured in proportion of 
shares held by blockholders categories, and firm performance measured in return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), market-to-book value (MTBV), and price earnings ratio (PER). 
Anyhow, the result reveals that there is a strong evidence of more consistent patterns of 
relationship between ownership structures and the accounting measures of firm 
performance (ROA and ROE) than with the valuation based measures (MTBV and PER).  
• Secondly, there is sufficient and strong evidence from the UK data to support the evidence 
revealing that the relationship between insider ownership (INO) and performance is 
nonlinear. INO, square of insider ownership (INO2) and cube of insider ownership (INO3) are 
found to have significant positive relation with performance, confirming nonlinearity of their 
relationship and the alignment of interest hypothesis of the agency perspective and in 
contrast to the alignment-entrenchment or alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis 
in literature.  
• Thirdly, the decreases in the coefficients of linear insider ownership, square of insider 
ownership and cube of insider ownership might suggest evidence of the rise in the 
alignment of interest at a decreasing rate, thus exhibiting the diminishing marginal 
productivity of the firm as managerial ownership increases. It might also be argued that the 
reduced rate of performance with the different roots of the polynomial might indicate the 
potential for both an incentive and an entrenchment effect, which are supposed to happen 
at the same time with one outweighing the other after a certain degree of ownership level. 
Hence, it might be suggestive that the reduced rate of performance could be due to the 
increasing impact of the entrenchment effect which reduces the positive benefits from the 
incentive alignment effect. 
• Fourthly, nonfinancial firms’ ownership (NFO) also shows same but linear relation, thus 
suggesting that INO and management of nonfinancial firms’ stakes that make investment 
decisions in other firms enhance firm performance. 
• Fifthly, there is consistent evidence that institutional investors, nonfinancial firms, family 
investors, state and the aggregate holding of external blockholders (OUTO) are negatively 
associated with firm performance, and this might support second-order agency theory and 
the appropriation hypothesis.  
• Sixthly, the lagged performance variables used as explanatory variables in order to account 
for dynamic endogeneity are found to be strongly and consistently positively associated with 
firm performance. Even the few studies that attempted to account for dynamic endogeneity 
such as Weir et al. (2002) and Hillier and McColgan (2005) are different from this research. 
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This study confirms Weir et al. (2002) that used only OLS estimation and cross-sectional data 
unlike this research that uses several estimation methods for panel data. It is to be noted 
that the research is also different from Hillier and McColgan (2005) that uses lagged ROA and 
change in assets (for growth prospects) as independent variable in assessing the influence of 
board structures.  
• Finally, there is strong evidence that board structures (proportion of nonexecutives, duality 
and board size) are associated with firm performance; and that the evidence of negative 
impact of CEO-duality and board size confirm the agency theory perspective and the 
rationale behind the recommendations of the UK Codes of Best Practice regarding CEO-
duality and board size.  
To sum up, this research fills the gaps discussed previously regarding our research area by 
accounting for some of the sources of differences in results or evidence about the investigation. 
These sources are: (1) the use of different and relevant blockholders or ownership measures; (2) the 
use of lower threshold level that would accommodate the potential players (blockholders) in 
corporate governance, (3) the control of major governance mechanisms, (4) the endogeneity of 
ownership structure, (5) the substitution and complementarity effects between governance 
mechanisms, and (6) the use of different estimation procedures for primary analyses and for 
sensitivity or consistency analyses.  
Hence, the contribution of this research to knowledge is that it provides (1) some comprehensive 
evidence using procedures that incorporate some of the main gaps regarding the sources of 
differences in the research literature on the impact of ownership structure on firm performance, (2) 
the recent and updated evidence on the relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance in major UK public firms, (3) the evidence on the prevalence of multiple blockholders 
and their negative impact on performance might con firm the existence of the second-type of 
agency conflicts in the UK listed firms that have dispersed ownership, and (4) consistent evidence 
that confirm more of the agency perspectives and some of the premises behind the 
recommendation in the UK Codes concerning some board characteristics that influence firm 
performance.  
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 deals with the brief discussion of 
theoretical frameworks relevant to this research. Then hypotheses formulation is undertaken in 
section 4.3. The section that follows introduces the methodological issues of the sample, data 
analyses, description of variables, model specifications and the implied estimation methods for the 
study. Section 4.5 presents and interprets the empirical results of the primary analyses. Section 4.6 
presents the sensitivity or consistency analyses. Finally, section 4.7 deals with discussion and 
conclusion.  
89 
 
4.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A survey of literature suggests that some theories that have been used to explain the shareholders-
managers conflict are mainly the property rights theory, the agency theory, the transaction costs 
theory, and the stewardship theory. The most popular of these theories that have wide applicability 
to the conflict is the agency theory. The popular view of the agency theory is that conflicts of interest 
arise in the relationship due to the divergence of managers’ (assumed rational but opportunistic) 
from the shareholders’ interest. The theory provides a powerful theoretical basis for explaining the 
relationships and suggesting solutions for the agency problems between shareholders and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
The core assumptions of the agency theory are that: (1) managers may maximize their own utility 
instead of enhancing shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz, 1983); (2) contracts 
are not costless when writing and enforcing (Fama and Jensen, 1983); and (3) information are 
distributed asymmetrically between principals and agents, and (4) the parties have limited or 
bounded rationality. The premise of the theory is that due to the asymmetric information in the 
managers-shareholders relationships, where principals cannot correctly measure the efforts of 
managers who know the details of the operations of the firm, both parties might incur some costs.  
The total agency costs include monitoring costs, bonding costs and residual losses (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Monitoring costs are the costs incurred by shareholders for monitoring the conduct 
of managers. And the bondng costs are financial or non finanacial costs of setting up systems or 
structures that would make the managers seen as acting in the best interests of the shareholders or 
compensate them accordingly if they do not (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, residual loss is 
the loss that occurs due to the mismatch of the actions that would promote the self-interest of the 
principal and that of the agent, despite monitoring and bonding activities. Putting in another way, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that it is the value of profit lost because the contract’s full 
enforcement costs exceed its benefits.  
The agency theory’s analogy to the shareholder-manager conflict is the classical prinicipal-agent 
relationship. In the relationship the owner hires a manager, who runs the firm in the best interest of 
the owner and get reward for the efforts in return (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Sappington, 1991; 
Hart, 1995). The performance or outcome depends on the extent of the agent’s efforts and the risks 
available. However, agent’s effort are not fully observable to the principal and thus the information 
asymmetry makes it difficult for the principal to measure the efforts made and set reward for the 
risk-averse agent (Sappington, 1991). In this incentive-risk puzzle (Hart, 1995) of agency relationship, 
the relevant issue is how to determine the optimal balance between efficiency and risk-bearing. The 
principal might thus employ other monitoring schemes in order to control the desired action of the 
agent and incur monitoring costs (Sappington, 1991; Arnorld and De Lange, 2004). The problem of 
information asymmetry is related to the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Principals 
face adverse selection problem because they cannot correctly verify the skills or abilities the agent 
claimed to have at the time of hiring. So, they might not be able to select the best applicant or to 
know whether the agent is performing the duties properly or not (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The moral hazard agency problems, first proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), arise when 
managers might not make the required managerial efforts in the best interest of the principal. Since 
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the principal might not know this fully, they need information to monitor the effort level and 
measure it in order to reward it correctly. According to literature, the sources of such problems are 
related, for instance, to managers’ investment decisions - underinvestments or over-investments, 
free cash flow, earning retentions, shirking – that diverge from the positive net present value rule 
(Jensen, 1986, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Dhumale, 1998).  
Moreover, the agency perspective provides testable hypotheses or explanations and suggestive 
solutions to agency conflicts. Some of the important hypotheses are the incentive alignment (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993), alignment-entrenchment-alignment (Stulz, 1988), free cash flow 
(Jensen, 1986), large shareholder monitoring (Vishny and Shliefer, 1986, 1997), private benefit of 
control, and shared benefit of control. The theoretical or conceptual frameworks also suggest that 
different corporate governance mechanisms or arrangements (takeover markets, debt financing, 
stock markets, managerial labour markets, etc.) would mitigate the agency costs and enhance 
shareholder returns (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). These theoretical issues 
will be discussed in more detail and used in hypotheses development in section 4.3.  
However, the shortcoming of the agency theory is that it does not by itself provide a role for 
governance structure (or asset ownership) due to the fact that the principal-agent contracts are not 
optimal because they might not specify the fully observable and verifiable obligations of all parties in 
all future states of the world (Hart, 1995). Hence, like other related theories, the theory does not 
provide a complete contract that can provide the best and appropriate decisions on incentive 
schemes among other things. The incentive is not entirely and directly based on the current efforts 
of managers but also on future performance, where managers might be penalized when external 
shocks that are outside their control affect performance. Nevertheless, the agency theory is still a 
powerful tool equipped with logical framework that provides testable hypotheses.  
Furthermore, the other conflict difficult to explain in the principal-agent setting is the large 
shareholders-minority shareholders conflict, which is termed as the second-order agency problem. 
The principal-agent relationships might not be extended to explain large shareholder-minority 
shareholders conflict since the controlling large shareholders might not be literally referred to as 
agents, whereas minority shareholders are principals. Nevertheless, the law and finance researchers 
provide explanations to the exploitation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders.  
An alternative theory that explains the conflicts is the property rights theory (PRT), which 
approaches the issue in terms of institutional and circumstances inhibiting the failures to reach 
satisfactory contractual agreements, and discusses the problems in assigning property rights that 
would lead to efficient contractual agreements and outcomes (Libecap, 1989; Eggertsson, 1999; 
North, 1990; Kim and Mahoney, 2005). Hence, the theory might be used to explain the need of 
optimal contractual arrangements between the parties to the conflicts.  
In conclusion, a short review of the relevant theories is made above. Incorporating the views of the 
property rights theory, bounded rationality, incomplete contracts approach in its endeavour to find 
the ex ante and ex post contractual relationships, the agency theory is empowered to gain a superior 
position in giving explanations and solutions to the principal-agent relationships than the rest of the 
theories. So, this research would use it as the basic theoretical tool even though it might employ 
other theories as alternative or complementary tools, where appropriate. 
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4.3. HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
4.3.1 Managerial/ Insider Ownership and Firm Performance 
Explaining the agency problem in relation to managerial ownership, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
state that the more the share ownership of manager falls, the more is the reduction of manager’s 
residual claims, thus encouraging the appropriation of firm resources in the form of perquisites and 
demanding more resources for monitoring by minority shareholders. Hence, given the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders, the important question of corporate governance is 
how to align the interests of both parties properly. Referring to the alignment of interest from the 
incentive theory point of view, Sappington (1991) suggests that it is necessary to create incentives 
for the agent in order to align her interest properly to shareholder value maximization. The 
incentives are expected to motivate managers to make efficient efforts to create total surplus 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Theoretically there are two major hypotheses on the impact of managerial ownership to firm value. 
The convergence of interest hypothesis, which links the role of managerial ownership with firm 
performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993), proposes that the share ownership of 
managers would help in aligning the interests of shareholders and managers. However the 
entrenchment hypothesis states that the firm value decreases when management holds a substantial 
stake in their firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stulz , 1988; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Stulz (1988) 
suggests that the value of the firm is positively related managerial ownership for lower fractions of 
voting rights, and it is negatively related to managerial ownership as the fraction becomes large. 
Denis et al. (1997) also extends this line of reasoning on nonlinearity. The implication is that the 
more shares the managers hold, the more is their entrenchment that enables them expropriate the 
firm’s resources to their own benefits, and the more is the reduction in firm performance (Morck et 
al., 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988).  
The empirical evidence of the studies that investigated the theoretical explanations of the 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance (Table 4.1) show mixed results. 
Using piecewise linear regression, Morck et al. (1988) found that Tobin’s Q increases until insider 
ownership is 5%, then decreases in the range of 5-25%, and then increase beyond 25%. Additionally, 
Short and Keasey (1999) also report similar alignment-entrenchment pattern for the UK firms using 
ROE and market value of equity. Moreover, the study on CEO stock ownership by Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) reports similar pattern where Tobin’s Q increases between 0 to 1%, decreases in 
the range of 1%-5%, increases in the range 5%-20%, finally decreases after 20% of CEO ownership.  
Furthermore, using quadratic regression model on cross-sectional data, McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) found that there is a curvilinear relationship between firm performance, measured by Tobin’s 
Q, and insider ownership that is positive until insider ownership reaches 40% and 50%, and negative 
relation beyond that for both periods. In their piecewise regression, they find significant positive 
relationship between performance and insider ownership in the range of 0% and 5% only, though 
they are unable to repeat or confirm Morck et al. (1988) beyond 5% insider ownership. To sum up, 
the non-monotonous relationship reported support the alignment-entrenchment-alignment 
hypothesis. However, recent studies of Davis et al. (2005) and Florackis et al. (2009) find that there 
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are more than 2 turning points in the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance for the UK firms.  
Some studies that use simultaneous equation specifications (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Himmelberg 
et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) show no systematic effect of insider ownership on firm 
performance. Accounting for endogeneity and using OLS and simultaneous regression models, 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) also find no systematic relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance. Additionally, even not accounting for endogeneity, Mork et al. (1988) that use 
linear regression show no significant relation between ownership and performance like Demsetz and 
Table 4.1: Summary of some empirical studies on the relation between ownership structure and firm 
performance 
Notes: INO is insiders’ ownership or managerial ownership; MajINO is majority ownership by insiders; CEO-O is CEO 
ownership; CEO-HIR is ownership of hired CEO; CEO-FNDR is ownership of founder CEO; INO-FAM is family that is 
insider owner; TopMO is top manager’s ownership; CEO-DEAD is death of CEO; CEO_LIV is CEO alive; MajO is 
majority ownership; CTRL_O is controlling ownership; OUTO is outsiders’ ownership; FINO is financial institutions’ 
ownership; INSTO is institutional investors’ ownership; FAMO is family or individual ownership; NFO is 
nonfinancial firm ownership; BANKO is bank ownership; GOVO is state or government ownership; C1 is stake the 
first largest shareholder; CC2 is concentration ratio of the first 2 largest shareholders; CC5 is concentration ratio 
of the first 5 largest shareholders; CC10 is concentration ratio of the first 10 largest shareholders; CC20 is 
concentration ratio of the first 20 largest shareholders; HI is Herfindahl index concentration; INST_HI is 
Herfindahl index of institutional investors; ROA is return on assets; ROE is return on equity; ROS is return on sales; 
QT is Tobins Q; MTBV is market-to-book value; and CAR is cumulative average returns.  
Study Data Type & Methodology Performance Ownership 
A. Non-monotonic Relationship    
Morck et al. (1988) Single eq.; piecewise. QT INO 
Hermalin & Weisbach (1988) Panel data  QT  INO 
McConnell & Servaes (1990) Single eq.; piecewise QT, ROA INO;INSTO; OUTO; 
Hermalin & Weisbach (1991) Panel data; piecewise OLS QT INO 
Short & Keasey (1999) OLS QT, ROA INO;OUTO;INSTO 
Holderness et al. (1999) Piecewise  QT INO; CEO_O 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) Simultaneous eq. QT; ROA INO-FAM;CEO-HIR;CEO_FNDR;FAMO 
B. No Systematic Relationship       
Demsetz and Lehn (1988) Single eq.;Cross-sect. Data ROE CC5, CC10, CC20, HI 
Denis and Denis (1994) Single eq.; Cross-sec data QT;ROA MajO; INSTO 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) OLS and 2SLS;  QT INO;BHO;INSTO 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) Simultaneous; Panel data QT; ROA TopMO 
Cho (1998) Simultaneous equation QT INO 
Mehran (1995) Single equation QT INO; OUTO 
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) Simultaneous equation ROA;QT CC5; INO 
Thomsen et al. (2006) Simultaneous eq. QT;ROA BHO 
Loderer and Martin (1997) Simultaneous eq. QT INO;INSTO;OUTO 
C. Positive Relationship       
Weir et al. (2002) OLS; Logistic regr. QT CEO_O;OUTO 
Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) OLS MTBV;ROA FAMO;GOVO;NFO; INSTO;BANKO 
Holderness & Sheehan (1989) Single eq. QT MajINO 
Agrawal & Mandelker (1990) Event study CAR INSTO;INST_HI5; INO; BHO; CC2 
Leech and Leahy (1991) Simultaneous eq. ROE;ROS CC1, CC5, CC10, CC20, etc. 
Bethel et al. (1998) Event study ROA INO 
D. Negative Relationship    
Cronqvist & Nilsson (2003) Panel data QT FAM;CNTRL_O;FINO 
Slovin and Sushka (1993) Event study CAR CEO_DEAD;CEO_LIV; INO;INSTO 
Source: Literature survey 
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Lehn (1985), who assume endogeneity of ownership structure. Moreover, Himmelberg et al. (1999) 
even by accounting for endogeneity and making attempts to mitigate the unobserved heterogeneity 
problem in analyzing the panel data of 1982-1992 find no systematic effect of insider ownership on 
firm value complicates the comprehension of the clue for reasons of the mixed results more. 
However, Weir et al. (2002), including lagged performance as explanatory variable to account for 
endogeneity, show evidence of alignment of interest hypothesis or the positive link between CEO 
ownership and firm performance.  
In this research, managerial ownership is defined as the percentage of share ownership of both 
executive directors that run the operation of the firm, and non-executive directors in line with 
Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999). Recognizing that 
nonexecutive directors are not managers involved in the day-to-day management activities of the 
firm and the delimitation of the failure to separate them, this research assumes that they are part of 
the management body in the boardroom of the one-tier system, and hence, all directors have the 
incentives to exert control because directors are also blockholders or their representatives 
(Holderness, 2003; 2007).  
Finally, though the alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis suggested by Stulz (1988) says 
that there is nonlinear relationship between insider ownership and performance, we test the 
following basic hypothesis considering the alignment of interest hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance.  
4.3.2 Outsider Ownership and Firm Performance  
Literature shows that outsider shareholders, namely institutional investors, non-financial 
corporations, individuals (family), banks and state might have the incentive and ability for 
monitoring or controlling management or insiders and influence firm performance. It is 
hypothesized that the large shareholders might undertake monitoring or might exert control 
pressure on management motivated by shared or private benefits of control (Holderness, 2003).  
The shared benefits of control hypothesis are the unintended beneficial consequences of the self-
interested behaviour by blockholders. Motivated by shared benefits of control, external 
blockholders might have the ability to appoint (independent) directors or the advisory vote on 
executive pay packages. Regarding their monitoring role, Grossman and Hart (1988) suggests that 
the external large shareholders monitor their firm by bearing the monitoring costs, whereby their 
share of benefits will be proportionate to their cash flow rights (dividends or capital gains). That 
means the benefits of the monitoring accrue to all shareholders equally proportional to the cash 
flow rights. Holderness (2003, p.54) notes that with the rise in blockholder stake, other factors kept 
constant, their incentive to increase firm value increases due to the superior management and 
monitoring motivated by the shared benefits of control. Counter argument to the view of the shared 
benefits of control is the free-rider hypothesis, which asserts that small shareholders free-ride by not 
bearing the monitoring costs and that the proportionate benefits of monitoring might discourage 
large shareholders to bear the monitoring costs alone. Hence, the free-rider problem might suggest 
either positive or negative relationship between external blockholders and firm performance 
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depending on the discretion of the blockholders to bear the costs in order to exert control or 
monitoring pressure on the management.    
On the other hand, the private benefits of control hypothesis, developed from the modelling device 
used by Grossman and Hart (1980), suggests that external blockholders are motivated by the private 
benefits of control that do not accrue to small shareholders (Holderness, 2003). Holderness (2003) 
suggests that blockholders assemble large blocks of shares in order to enjoy private pecuniary 
benefits among other things. Hence, it is arguable that private benefits of control might not harm 
minority shareholders. Another viewpoint regarding the relationship between large shareholders 
and minority shareholders which is related to the private benefits of control is the expropriation 
hypothesis. The hypothesis suggests that large shareholders may even induce another type of 
agency costs driven by the private benefits of control at the expense of other shareholders or 
stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). This might suggest the negative 
impact of large shareholders on firm performance. Hence, the expropriation hypothesis has a large 
overlap with the private benefits of control in this case. However, the diversity of interests among 
large shareholders, and the characteristics and behaviours of different large blockholders might 
mean the possibility of both positive and negative relations between them (Pound, 1988). Moreover, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that potential takeover threat that can be exerted by large 
blockholders may work as an effective device to monitor management and affect firm value 
positively. However, it is also arguable that the minority shareholder protection and the fiduciary 
duties of directors are important factors that might influence the ability of outsider blockholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders.   
However, there are two arguments worth to mention regarding the value and welfare effect of the 
monitoring costs by large shareholders. Holderness (2003) argues that the monitoring costs borne by 
large shareholders for private benefits of control might not have any impact on the wealth of 
minority shareholders. Though the control may give some benefits, it is argued that there are also 
costs of non-diversification of the controlling blockholders, for instance, risk-diversion and over-
diversification to minority shareholders (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Regarding the costs of 
monitoring, Holderness (2003) suggests that sometimes the net private benefits of control are 
negative in some firms.  
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the external (outsider) ownership categories, 
namely institutional investors’ ownership (INSTO), nonfinancial firms’ ownership (NFO), family or 
individual ownership (FAMO), bank ownership (BANKO), state or government ownership (GOVO) 
and firm performance. We also analyze the association of the aggregate ownership of all external 
block ownership (OUTO) and firm performance. It is also worthwhile to note that we are not 
investigating the role of a single blockholder but the aggregate of single blockholders that are in the 
same category assuming that it might be easier for similar blockholders with common characteristic 
features and behaviour to form coalitions in order to gain the ability to exert control pressure. The 
role of all external block ownership is also considered in the analysis assuming that there might be a 
possibility that the external blockholders from different categories might form coalition to exert 
control pressure.  
The empirical evidence shows that the results on the impact of external blockholders and firm 
performance are rather mixed. Relating to the theoretical frameworks stated above, McConnell and 
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Servaes (1990), and Weir et al. (2002), report evidence that external blockholders have negative 
impact on firm performance. There are also empirical sources that support the existence of shared 
benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Leech and Leahy, 1991); and suggest that blockholders 
or their representatives usually serve as directors or officers. It follows therefore that blockholders 
are in a position to influence decisions directly and boost profitability, which is shared by all 
shareholders. There is also evidence that the formation of share blocks is associated with abnormal 
stock price increases (Mikkelson and Ruback, 1991). Furthermore, Barclay and Holderness (1991) 
show evidence that trades of large blocks are associated with abnormal stock price increases. 
Study on the US by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and on the UK by Leech and Leahy (1991) show that 
there is a positive relationship between outsider ownership and performance. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) also show evidence of significantly positive relationship between institutional 
ownership and firm performance even after adjusting for industry differences. Relating to the 
differences of interests among different categories of external shareholders, Barclay and Holderness 
(1991) suggest that the strength of the positive link depends upon the behaviour of each 
blockholder. Regarding bank ownership, Gorton and Schmid (2000) find that bank influence 
enhances firm performance. However, Yafeh and Yosha (2003) show that banks holding a large 
equity stake in Japan do not limit management private benefits, which reduce profitability. 
Supportive to this evidence, Chirinko and Elston (2003) provide evidence that bank control has 
insignificant negative effect on firm profitability for Germany.  
On the other hand, the study of US firms by Denis and Denis (1994), Mehran (1995), and Loderer and 
Martin (1997), and UK firms by Short and Keasey (1999) and Weir et al. (2002) show evidence of no 
significant or systematic relationship. Additionally, Kaplan (1994) and Frank and Mayer (2001) find 
that there is no significant effect of outside owners’ control on firm performance for German listed 
firms. Moreover, recently Thomsen et al. (2006) find no significant relation for the US-UK firms and 
negative association for firms in Continental Europe between external blockholders and firm value. 
Using simultaneous regression, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find also no systematic relation 
between outsider ownership and institutional ownership and performance.  
However, literature shows that there are few studies that show negative relationships. Edwards and 
Weichenrieder (1999) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) provide evidence of private benefit of control of 
external shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders. This might suggest that they might 
indulge in maximizing their own utility, thus raising the question of the agency problem: Who 
monitors the controlling external shareholders (the monitors)?  
Hence, though we bear in mind that the expropriation hypothesis suggests otherwise, we test the 
following basic hypothesis based on the monitoring hypothesis related to the shared benefits of 
control.  
Hypothesis 2: A positive relationship exists between external ownership categories or their 
aggregate ownership and firm performance.  
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4.3.3 Board Structure 
The board of directors is the ‘apex’ of a corporation’s control systems with the primary role of 
monitoring management on behalf of shareholders, the power to hire, fire and compensate top-
level managers, to ratify and monitor important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gillan, 2006) and 
ensuring whether the executive directors are pursuing the interests of shareholders or not. 
According to Fama (1980), it is viewed as a market-induced institution with the ultimate power to 
monitor the firm and the role to scrutinize the firm’s highest decision makers. From the agency 
theory perspectives, the role of the board is to provide a lower cost device than other governance 
mechanisms like takeover market for solving agency problems like replacing or reordering top 
managers (Fama, 1980). The property rights theory, however, suggest insightfully that the inside and 
outside markets of managers have roles in disciplining management (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
Furthermore, the resource dependency theory sees the board of directors as co-optative 
mechanisms with the role of matching the firm with the environmental demands (Aguilera, 2005).  
Theory suggests that board independence, where the nonexecutive directors are generally expected 
to be independent from the top management led by the CEO, is important (Monks and Minow, 
2004). As a solution to the conflict between the CEO and the board in general, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggest that the majority of the boards should be non-executive directors (NEDs), who are 
assumed as independent and can act as arbiters in disagreements among top executives and search 
for the replacements of the internal managers. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest that as board 
independence increases the directors’ willingness to monitor the CEO increases. Hence, the directors 
should maintain their independence in order to be able to effectively monitor and to replace poorly 
performing top management. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) propose the board model as the 
bargaining framework, where board structure is the outcome of the bargaining process between 
managers and outside directors. They suggest that the major conflict within the boardroom is 
between the directors and the CEO since the CEO has the incentives to control the board in order to 
keep her job and increase the benefits of being the CEO.   
Nevertheless, in a setting, where the boardroom is composed of executives to run the day-to-day 
operation of the firm and nonexecutives to monitor executives, the important research issue 
regarding the board would be: how to attain the effectiveness of the board as an internal monitoring 
control device. Affirming the importance of this issue, the Combined Code (2003) in the UK provides 
recommendations that most of the board member should be nonexecutive directors (NEDs), that 
the board should not be so large but sufficient size with the balance of skills and experience, and 
that roles of the CEO and the Chair should be separated (splitting CEO-duality) as elements of 
corporate governance reforms. Hence, the proportion of nonexecutive directors (PNED), board size 
(BSIZE) and CEO-duality (DUAL) are chosen as variables for board structure.  
However, the problem with this is that all NEDs might not be independent but they might be 
classified as inside nonexecutive directors and independent (outside) nonexecutive directors. Since 
only outside independent (not affiliated) NEDs might be independent of the CEO, the NED 
representation in the boardroom, measured by the proportion of nonexecutive director members, 
cannot be the perfect measure of board independence. Hence, the Code of Best Practice (2006) 
stresses the independence of NEDs by recommending some test criteria for ensuring true 
independence. Therefore, this research is delimited in incorporating some other provisions of the 
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Code like board independence and subcommittees because only objectively and directly 
measureable board variables are sought so as to avoid measures that involve subjective discretions 
on the independence test criteria which might be a source of bias. Hence, it is vital to note that the 
research study is not exclusively on the compliance to the Codes of Best Practice.   
4.3.3.1 NED Representation 
Hence, according to the agency theory, the NEDs are assumed to be important monitors that 
supervise and control the executives. The popular perspective on the monitoring role of the board 
structure is that non-executive directors (NEDs) are better positioned than executive directors to 
carry out the monitoring function since they are presumably independent and more concerned for 
their reputation in the labour market (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983) suggest that NEDs in the board add firm value by providing expert knowledge and monitoring 
services. Based on the resource dependency theory, it can be argued that the NEDs might contribute 
to the profitability of firm performance in terms of their expertise by giving advice the management 
on strategic plans and investments, and in terms of their reputational integrity by enabling the firm 
to have network relationships with the community and other stakeholders. From these perspectives 
we expect a positive causal relationship between board independence and firm performance.  
On the contrary, there is an alternative perspective suggesting that insider directors are better 
equipped to undertake monitoring function than the nonexecutive directors since they possess 
superior information that enables them evaluate top managers (Baysinger and Hoskinsson, 1990). 
Contrast to this argument is that the NEDs are usually part-timers and this limits the extent of their 
monitoring, and that they lack all the complete information necessary for making decision (Bozec, 
2005). From this perspective, the NEDs representation would have a negative impact on firm 
performance.  
Though the theory suggests that nonexecutive directors’ representation enhances firm performance, 
the empirical evidence shows mixed results. Baysinger and Butler (1985) provide some evidence of 
better performance of firms with more representation of outside directors by using ten years lags of 
the variables. Additionally, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) provide 
evidence of the argument that non-executive directors are effective monitors and a disciplining 
device for managers. Referring to the ways of playing the monitoring role, Weisbach (1988) finds 
that outsider directors may enhance firm value through their role in dismissing inefficient and poorly 
performing management. Other strong support for the positive relationship comes from the event 
study of Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), which show evidence of 
increases in firm value with the appointment of non-executive directors. Moreover, the cross-
country study of Dahya et al. (2008) shows evidence of significant positive relation between firm 
value and the percentage of directors not affiliated with the dominant shareholders in countries 
with weaker legal shareholder protection.  
On the contrary, for the US firms Yermack (1996) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), and for the UK 
firms Weir and Liang (1999) provide evidence of negative relationship between the representation 
of independent directors and some performance measures. Recently, Bozec (2005) also provides 
evidence of negative relation between board independence, proxied by PNED, and firm profitability 
and productivity for state owned firms exposed to market discipline.  
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Moreover, empirical evidence on same year data analysis from Baysinger and Hoskinsson (1990) and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) show results of no relationship between board composition and 
performance. Additionally, Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998) also provide a weak evidence of a 
curvilinear relation between the proportion of outside directors and firm performance.  
The first explanation for the ambiguous empirical results of the relationship between board 
independence and firm performance shown above is that it might be influenced by the presence of 
endogeneity of board structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Another explanation might be the 
substitution effect of internal or external control structures like proportion of insiders, insider 
ownership, leverage, and/ or takeover market (Walsh and Seward, 1990; Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996; Bozec, 2005), and dominant shareholders (Dahya et al., 2008). Finally, the ambiguity of the 
results may be attributed also to the fact that board structure evolves and develops dynamically 
over time (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Hillier and McColgan, 2006) and it may be difficult to 
identify the insignificant effect of a particular time.  
However, considering the monitoring hypothesis of the agency theory that outsider directors’ 
representation gives strong position for the boards to monitor executive managers and the resource 
dependency theory, the hypothesis this research would test is:  
Hypothesis 3: The proportion of NEDs is positively associated with firm performance. 
4.3.3.2 CEO-Duality 
According to the agency theory, it is difficult to control the boards dominated by executive directors 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). One way of domination of the board by the EDs is when the CEO assumes 
also the role of chairman, which is termed as CEO-duality. With CEO-duality the CEO has the ability 
to become entrenched because the Chair has the role of setting the board’s agenda and facilitating 
access to information. Hence, duality will lead to the entrenchment of the CEO or executives and 
curbs the independent directors’ ability to monitor. This suggests that a negative relationship 
between duality and firm performance is expected. So, in order to ensure board independence split 
of duality is recommended. Separation of the roles of CEO and chairmanship demarcates the 
boundaries between the monitoring function of the outside directors and management’s decision 
control function (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In contrast, duality can be an advantage to the firm since 
it may provide a unified leadership of the firm that facilitates greater understanding and knowledge 
of firms operations and better decisions. This may impacts positive effect on firm performance.  
However, research has not yet produced enough supportive evidence on the two views. Boyd (1995) 
provides evidence that duality leads to better performance. Contrast to this, the negative impact of 
duality on performance is not supported empirically. Studies on US by Dalton et al. (1998) and on UK 
by Weir and Liang (1999) show evidence that duality does not harm nor improve performance.  
Anyhow, considering the agency model perspective on duality and the recommendation given in the 
Code of Best Practice on separation of the CEO and Chairmanship roles, this research would test the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: There is an inverse association between CEO-duality and firm performance.  
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4.3.3.3. Board Size 
The notion regarding board size is that the problems of poor communication and decision-making 
overwhelm the effectiveness and the performance of large boards (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 
1993). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue about the dysfunctional behaviour of large boardroom, where 
directors rarely criticize policies of top managers or discuss candidly on firm performance. They 
recommend lower board size in contrast to the view that board capacity to monitor increase with its 
size. Jensen (1993) suggests that it is more costly for large boards to monitor growth firms and that 
large boardroom is less likely to have effective functioning when its size is beyond 7 or 8 people. The 
agency model suggests that as board size becomes bulk, the agency problem related to director free-
riding increases and “the board becomes more symbolic and less a part of the management process” 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003, p13). The bulk size might have the negative impact on performance 
by reducing the monitoring and control role of the board and letting managers loose to pursue their 
own interests not aligned to that of shareholders.  
Yermack (1995) found a negative relation between board size and firm value measured in Tobin’s Q. 
The convex shape suggests that the largest fraction of lost value (high incremental costs) occurs as 
boards grow from small to medium size. Eisenberg et al. (1998) also provide similar evidence. 
However, this is contested partially by Faccio and Lasfer (1999) who show evidence that UK firms 
above the median board size level exhibit higher firm value.  
Nevertheless, the trend of board size is that it has been decreasing with time, indicating the 
acceptance of better performance of small boards in the perception of market participants 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). So, considering the free-rider view related to the agency problem of 
board size and the evolution of board size over time, this research would test the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between board size and firm performance.  
4.3.4 Debt Financing 
The agency perspective about debt financing is that it is one of the governance mechanisms that 
mitigate the agency costs and aligns the interests of managers with that of shareholders. Regarding 
this, Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986, 1993) argue that higher leverage is used as a 
bonding device, and the fixed repayment of committed debt constrains management’s access to free 
cash flow that tempts them to invest on projects that have a negative net present value. This 
mitigates the agency conflict since it curbs managerial shirking and raises their effort and it reduces 
management’s discretion to consume excessive perquisites, thus leading to increase in firm value 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Grossman and Hart, 1982). Hence, the view on the effect of leverage in 
aligning the interest of management with that of shareholders due to the risk of bankruptcy costs in 
case the firm defaults on its debts and limiting the misuse of company assets due to lack of free cash 
flow suggests that leverage has positive impact on firm performance. 
The counter argument to the monitoring role and value enhancing effect of debt is that most firms 
can still easily meet their interest payments and principal repayments on their debt obligations and 
that they rely on internal financing (Allen and Gale, 2000). This may tempt managers to be engaged 
in shirking or enjoying perquisites, thus reducing firm value. Additionally, excessive use of debt may 
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increase risk and thus have negative impact on value beyond the optimal capital structure level 
(where marginal cost of debt is equal to its marginal benefits) due to the agency costs of debt 
including underinvestment and financial distress (bankruptcy costs). Stulz (1990) argues that as it 
may reduce the risk of overinvesting, debt has also a danger if it leads to underinvestment due to 
the cost of raising new finance. So, the financial distress related to debt would explain the negative 
relationship between debt and firm value. However, the empirical evidence on the positive impact 
of leverage on firm value is not conclusive.  
Using simultaneous model, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide 
significant negative effect of debt financing on performance for US firms. Seifert et al. (2005) find 
also significantly negative relationship between leverage and performance for US, UK and German 
(insignificantly negative for Japan) firms. Weir et al. (2002) find negative relationship between 
leverage and firm performance on UK firms. However, using lagged dependent variable in the OLS 
regression, leverage retains negative effect but significant only at 10% level. In contrast to these 
findings, Short and Keasey (1999) find significant positive relationship between leverage and 
performance, measured in market value of equity, for UK firms. In conclusion, the empirical 
evidence in support of the agency perspective of positive relationship between leverage and 
performance is not enough. Moreover, the negative relationship is not backed with strong 
theoretical explanation.  
However, considering the theoretical framework on creditor monitoring even though the theory of 
financial distress suggests the opposite, this research would test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: Debt finance is positively associated with firm performance.  
4.3.5 Takeover Market 
The takeover market is a special part of the secondary market of shares (stock markets). It is also 
called market for corporate control, which provides a conduit or means for effective internal (firm’s 
shareholders) or external control that results in takeovers via large acquisitions of company stocks 
that leads to change in control or mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Moreover, the competition for 
control inherent on the market might induce hostile takeover, where rival management teams to try 
to win control over the management of the target shareholders or firms.   
The popular view on takeovers, which is in line with the agency perspective, suggests that 
motivation of takeovers is to discipline the target firm, where the inefficient management team is 
replaced by efficient managers pursuing shareholders benefit (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Jensen, 
1988, Morck et al., 1989). Takeover market, which is described as a disciplining mechanism of the 
last resort (Jensen, 1986), plays the external monitoring role either by the tender offer or the proxy 
fight in order to control the decision process of the poorly performing firm and circumvent the 
existing top managers and the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The other motives of takeover are: 
(1) to exploit synergy in production (economies of scale and scope), and (2) to control another 
company (Powell, 1997; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007; Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008).  
The market has the impact of initiating actual or potential investors to pay a premium on the share 
prices for the current owners and seek the opportunity to improve the performance of the firm by 
improving the quality of the management. It is suggestive that takeover market might influence firm 
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performance by posing threat to dismissals or replacement of the underperforming management 
team with a more active one. The threat of takeover might create incentives on managers to put 
more efforts to increase profitability of the firm. It is arguable that the threat takeover intensity in 
the industry might put pressure on the incumbent management to high performance level in order 
to avoid hostile takeover from the rival management team of the competitors in the industry. 
Hence, takeover intensity in the industry is chosen as the proxy for takeover market. Takeover 
intensity or likelihood is used as a control variable because in industries in which there are 
comparatively many (hostile or friendly) takeovers, mounting a hostile takeover is likely to be easier 
than in industries in which any type of takeover is rare. We would like to note that takeover intensity 
can be a proxy for (1) stock market in general when we refer to internal friendly takeover resulting 
from large acquisitions of company stocks in the stock market or internal proxy offer, and (2) hostile 
takeover both of which result in the takeover of the control of the firm. Hence, according to the 
argument, it is expected that takeover intensity has positive association with firm performance.  
The empirical evidence on the direct relationship between takeovers and performance are mixed. 
Weir et al. (2002) report positive relationship between the likelihood of takeovers and firm 
performance, thus supporting the agency perspective of the monitoring role of takeover market. 
However, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find that greater corporate control activity is inversely 
associated with performance. Their interpretation is that the result may be influenced by other 
governance mechanisms. Moreover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that greater institutional 
ownership, non-executive directors’ representation, and greater insider ownership (who may gain 
from stock price appreciation) might facilitate takeovers, thus indicating the substitution effects 
among governance mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, given the suggestion of the agency perspectives that the motive of takeover is to 
discipline poorly performing managers, there is the takeover intense (a proxy for takeover market) 
that creates incentives in the managers to work hard so as to improve firm performance. Therefore, 
the hypothesis tested in this research is states as follows. 
Hypothesis 7: There is a positive relationship between the takeover intensity and firm 
performance.  
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4.4 METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1 Sample and Data 
The research uses a sample made from UK listed companies that are in the FTSE ALL SHARE Index, 
which is a fitting sample for the UK listed firms because it is the broadest index that includes smaller 
and largest listed firms and represents about 98% of the UK market capitalization (FTSE Factsheet, 
2008). The ownership, directors, and accounting or financial data on the firms in the Index is 
collected for period 2003-2007. The period is chosen because it begins with the year the Higgs 
Report (2003) and Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2003) were published and the UK 
economy showed recovery after the financial crisis and corporate scandals of the beginning of the 
millennium, and it ends with eve of the recent global financial crisis. Hence, it is sought to provide 
recent empirical evidence on the link between ownership structure and firm performance during the 
period.  
The ownership and directors’ data are collected manually from the Waterlow Stock Exchange 
Yearbook based on the list of 665 firms in the FTSE ALL SHARE Index provided electronically from 
DataStream in April 2008, which is found to give the same lists of active and inactive firms for 2003-
2008 and assuming end of the UK firm year as 31 March. For each firm in the Index and for every 
year, the data is constructed by registering the blockholders owning at least 3% share and their 
stakes, the number of nonexecutive directors, board size and CEO-duality. Even though, it is 
inevitable the results might be different if higher thresholds are used as shown by La Porta et al. 
(1999), Franks et al. (2001) and Marchica and Mura (2005), we use 3% cut-off following the recent 
works of Short and Keasey (1999), Weir et al. (2002), Dahya and McConnell (2002), and Florackis and 
Ozkhan (2009) who used the same blockholder ownership criteria. Furthermore, the financial or 
accounting data are collected electronically from DataStream. However, the inputs to the calculation 
of takeover intensity, which is the proxy for takeover market, are collected from Thomson One 
Banker. The accounting data are finally merged with the separate ownership and directors’ data.  
Initially, the data of ownership for significant owners holding at least 3% is and the board structure 
variables are collected for the active firms. The ownership data is checked twice during collection in 
order to avoid significant errors. Then the blockholder category for each significant shareholder is 
identified and the aggregate ownership of each blockholder category is calculated for each firm. 
Since only those members of the Index whose ownership data is available on the Waterlow Stock 
Exchange Yearbook are collected for the period 2003-2007. This provided the potential omissions of 
observations for inactive firms for each year due to missing data. In the exclusion process, firstly, the 
companies in the Index that lack both the ownership data and all of the performance variables are 
removed. Secondly, those lacking data mainly on ROA, ROE and at least one of the other valuation 
based performance variables (that have less missing values than ROA and ROE) are removed from 
the data set. This is done to allow for the ownership variables missing values for few firms also as 
there are missing values for performance or other explanatory variables.  
Finally, the final unbalanced panel data retained has a total of 2883 firm-year observations. This is 
sought to retain the real contents of the information as much as possible since further deletions 
would distort the information and might create artificial data that might be far from reality. The 
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financial and regulated companies are retained in the sample because econometrical tools provide 
ways of controlling their effects.  
4.4.2 Description of Variables 
Performance variables: The most extensively used performance measures in empirical studies 
are Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE. The popular Tobin’s Q is left out because the raw data for calculating 
the replacement cost (RC) of assets for UK is difficult to find since it is not reported in most of 
European countries (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001). However, since the performance of a firm can 
be manifested in the market value of the firm, the quasi Tobin’ Q or market/book value (MTBV) and 
price/ earnings ratio (PER) are used as the valuation measures of performance. This is sought to 
enable the research to find out the difference between the accounting (financial) and value based 
measures. Table 4.2 presents the performance variables that are used as dependent variables and 
their lags (corresponding values in the previous year) that are used as control (explanatory) 
variables.  
Table 4.2: Performance variables and their descriptions 
 
It is arguable that accounting and market data have some things in common (related) and have 
difference. The accounting data are just the raw data as disclosed by firms to be available to users, 
especially investors, or that are computed from other raw accounting data. The two data are related 
because the investors use the accounting data and additionally other information in their valuation 
of the firm by making expectations of the future and this yields market data. Hence, market data is 
influenced, for example, by investors’ perception about growth prospects, the quality of corporate 
governance and management but also the reliability of accounting data published by the firm. 
Hence, it might be suspected that the there might be a low correlation between the dependent 
market based performance and accounting explanatory variables due to the non-accounting 
information used in making expectations of market data.  
  
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
Performance variables : Dependent variables 
ROA Return on assets Net income over total assets 
ROE Return on equity Net income over shareholders’ equity 
MTBV Market/Book value The ratio of market value to the book value of the firm 
PER Price/Earnings ratio The ratio of stock prices to earnings per share 
Lagged  performance variables: Control (explanatory) variables 
ROAt1 Previous ROA (ROAt-1) Return on assets in the previous year 
ROEt1 Previous ROE (ROEt-1) Return on equity in the previous year 
MTBVt1 Previous MTBV (MTBVt-1) Market to book value in the previous year 
PERt1 Previous PER (PERt-1) Price earnings ratio in the previous year 
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Ownership structure variables:  The potential blockholder categories that are aggregates of 
single or identifiable block owners at 3% definition criteria and included as ownership variables are 
(1) insider ownership (INO), (2) institutional ownership (INSTO), (3) nonfinancial firms’ ownership 
(NFO), (4) family or individual ownership (FAMO), (5) Bank ownership (BANKO), (6) state 
(government) ownership (GOVO), (7) outsider ownership (OUTO), and (6) all blockholders’ 
ownership (ABHO). Table 4.3 presents the symbols and the definition of the ownership structure 
variables. The blockholder categories to which each substantial shareholder belong to could be 
known since they are institutions, banks, individuals, trust, trustees, governments (national or local) 
and families that are identifiable from the FTSE industrial sector and the descriptions of ‘activity’ in 
the Yearbook. This is double-checked by using the London Stock Exchange listings of member 
companies that reveal some owner types and from Internet search on the websites of Companies 
House and UK Data.  
Table 4.3: Summary of the definition and descriptions of ownership structure variables 
Governance Mechanism and Control Variables:  The governance mechanism variables 
used are proportion of NEDs, duality, board size, takeover intensity (TOINTENS) as a proxy for 
takeover market and leverage ratio (TDTA) as a proxy for debt financing (table 4.4). The firm specific 
attributes are controlled using PVOL (stock price volatility), TA (total assets for firm size), AGE (firm 
age), RNDTS (R&D to sales ratio), SGATS (Sales, General and Administration Expense, which includes 
advertisement expenses and marketing and promotion costs, to sales ratio), FATS (fixed assets to 
sales ratio), and industry dummies.   
Following Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Denis and Denis (1994), Keasey et al. 
(1994), Mehran (1995), Kole (1995), Short and Keasey (1999), Holderness et al. (1999), and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001), we control for debt ratio, which is measured as ratio of the book value of long-
term liabilities to total assets. It is expected that debt financing disciplines managers by limiting the 
free cash flow and reducing profit diversion, hence increasing firm value. It can also be argued that 
the increase in debt ratio has a negative effect increasing the risk of financial distress and 
Symbol  Descriptions and measures 
INO Insider ownership; the sum of ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors 
INO2 Insider ownership squared; the sum of ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors 
squared 
INO3 Insider ownership cubed; the sum of ownership of executive and nonexecutive directors 
cubed 
INSTO Institutional ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by all institutional investors. 
NFO Nonfinancial firms’ ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by non-financial corporations. 
FAMO Family or individual ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by family, individuals or related. 
BANKO Bank ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s outstanding 
shares held by deposit accepting banks. 
GOVO State (national or local government) ownership; Proportion of aggregate blocks of at least 
3% of the firm’s outstanding shares held by state or governments. 
OUTO Outsider ownership; Proportion of the aggregate blocks of at least 3% of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by institutional investors, non-financial firms, family or individual, 
banks and government . 
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bankruptcy (Maury and Pajuste, 2005). Hence, there is no clear prediction of association between 
debt ratio and firm performance.  
Table 4.4: Governance mechanism and control variables 
Additionally, in the regime of high minority investor protection right in the UK, we control takeover 
intensity (TOINTENS) as a proxy for the limit of a blockholder’s ability to exploit minority 
shareholders and monitoring role in limiting the behaviour of management diversion from 
shareholders’ interests. TOINTENS is calculated as ratio of the number of firms in the firm’s industry 
acquired during the previous period over the number of firms in that industry sector. It is expected 
that firm performance increases with the increase TOINTENS since the monitoring effect of takeover 
might induce the incentives to make more effort to the profitability of the firm by management to 
avoid the risk of replacement.  
  
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
Panel A: Governance Mechanism Variables 
BSIZE Board size The sum of executives and non-executive directors. 
PNED NED representation Board independence proxy, which is measured as the number of non-
executive directors over the number executive directors. 
DUAL CEO-Duality Duality takes the value 1 if the CEO sits on the board as Chairperson, 
0 otherwise 
TOINTENS Takeover intensity The number of firms in the firm’s industry acquired during the 
previous period over the number of firms in that industry sector. 
TDTA Debt ratio Debt financing (leverage ratio), measured as the ratio total debt to 
total assets of the firm. 
Panel B: Control variables 
PVOL Stock price volatility Stock price volatility, proxied by volatility rating. It is calculated on 
standard deviation of the price divided mean price and the whole 
multiplied by 40 to make it in scale 1-20. 
TA Firm size The book value of total assets. 
AGE Firm age The age of the firm since incorporation. 
RNDTS R&D intensity or ratio Research and development intensity (R&D ratio), which is measured 
as the ratio of annual R&D expenditure to total assets. 
SGATS Advertisement intensity or 
ratio 
Advertisement ratio (AD ratio), which is proxied by the ratio of 
Selling, General and Administration Expenditures (SGA) less R&D 
expenditure to total sales. 
FATS Fixed asset ratio Fixed assets intensity (FA ratio), which is measured as the ratio of 
total annual expenditures on fixed assets to total sales. 
INDUSTRY Industry dummies (0) Firm is Finans, which takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
financial and real estate or property services sector, or 0 otherwise; 
  
(1) Firm is Energy,  which takes the value 1 if the firm is in energy or 
utility sector, or 0 otherwise; 
(2) Firm is Medias, which takes the value 1 if the firm is in the media, 
entertainment, hotels or leisure sector or 0 otherwise; 
(3) Firm is ITS, which takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the high 
technology and communication sector, or 0 otherwise; 
(4) Firm is Consults, which takes the value of 1 if the firm is in the 
consultancy services sector, or 0 otherwise; 
(5) Firm is Industs, which takes the value 1 if the firm is in the 
industrial, manufacturing and related sectors or 0 otherwise; 
 
106 
 
Moreover, the control variable related the firm’s equity pricing and its price movement in the stock 
market is price volatility (PVOL). PVOL is the proxy for corporate risk in the market. The data comes 
directly from DataStream database, and it is calculated on standard deviation of the price divided by 
mean price and the whole multiplied by 40 to make it in scale 1-20. It is expected that firm 
performance decreases as PVOL increases.  
Following other researchers (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Holderness et al., 1999; Demsetz and 
Villalonga, 2001), we control for firm size, which is measured as the total assets. It is expected to 
have negative association with firm performance since the more matured firms are, the less their 
profitability is because larger firms will gradually be in a more mature stage of their life cycle (Maury 
and Pajuste, 2005). The same argument applies to firm age because older firms have less dynamism 
(Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009).  
Furthermore, R&D to sales is the ratio of R&D expense to sales. Since the increase in the expense has 
the effect on reducing the profits, it is expected that R&D to sales has a negative association with 
firm accounting performance (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Denis and Denis, 1994). However, it might 
have a positive impact on market based performance since investors might use the R&D expense as 
the information for future growth prospect of the firm.  
Additionally, SGATS is a proxy to accommodate the advertisement intensity since its appropriate 
measure, advertisement expense to sales ratio or advertising expense is not available on 
DataStream. It is also considered as the agency cost for firms (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009) because it 
includes the administrative costs that might consist of managements’ consumption of perquisites. 
SGATS does not include R&D expenses, and it can be considered as a good proxy for advertisement 
ratio since it includes marketing and promotion expenses, while also serving as the source of the 
agency costs to the firm. Since the expenses increase costs to the firm, SGATS is expected to have a 
negative impact on firm performance (Singh and Davidson, 2004; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009).  
Finally, this research also uses fixed assets ratio, measures of asset tangibility, which is measured as 
the total expenditure on fixed assets (plant, property and equipment) divided by total sales instead 
of total assets as another control variable. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelbjerg et al. 
(1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), we chose this variable considering that the expenses on 
the current costs on fixed assets might have negative impact on current firm ROA.  
The industry dummies are: energy and utility (ENERGY); media, leisure and entertainments 
(MEDIAS); high technology and telecommunication (ITS); consultancy and non-product industry 
services (CONSULTS); banks and institutional investors (FINANS); and manufacturing, industrials, 
staples, consumer products, etc (INDUSTS). The industrial classification is first collected from 
Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook together with the ownership and directors’ data. The industry 
sectors of the FTSE, which is coded in numbers and described in words, could clearly provide to 
which industry a firm belongs, and cross checks are made for some especially in the services in order 
to ensure their placements based on the main business undertakings. Even though there are about 
nine industry sectors according to FTSE classification, they are regrouped into six categories in order 
to avoid many dummy variables that would inflate the number of explanatory variables that are 
already considerably high and hence to have lower degrees of freedom in our estimation and tests.  
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4.4.3 Data Analyses and Model Specification 
4.4.3.1 Data Analyses and Management 
After careful examinations of possible problems related to data features, the following data 
management decisions are taken concerning data levels, missing values (MVs), unbalanced or non-
rectangular framework, outliers, and normality.  
Firstly, as for the data levels, since most of the variables in the data are measured as percentage and 
proportions (continuous), and few are in discrete nominal and binary scale of 0 and 1, the use of 
parametric methods of analyses can still be ideal to ensure the actual standard errors and 
significance. It is decided to avoid any transformation of the data in order to adjust to parametric 
methods.  
Secondly, regarding the missing value, it is decided not to use imputation or deletion since they 
occur completely at random (MCAR) and they are more than 5% of the original sample. This is 
chosen because imputation or deletion is believed to greatly affect the ideal or proper sample size 
severely and change the nature of information on the state of things, thus creating artificial data, 
which leads to incorrect interpretations regarding the population. The retention of the MVs would 
also help us to retain more firms and thus a representative sample.  
Thirdly, the unbalanced nature of the panel data arises from allowance of missing variables and the 
use of different dependent performance variables. The data is retained to preserve the actual 
information since the problems arising from unbalanced nature of the data, mainly 
heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, can be handled by appropriate estimation methods such as 
robust regressions, fixed-effects regressions, median regression, and generalized linear model 
estimation like general estimation equations (GEE).  
Fourthly, the outliers, which are extreme or infrequent values, defined as at least 3 standard 
deviations above or below the mean and result in extremely high residuals, will (1) inflate the error 
variance, the standard errors, (2) stretch the confidence interval, and (3) bias parameter estimates. 
Hence, this calls for the removal of the outliers or the use of appropriate estimation methods. 
Deletion is not chosen as a course of action since (1) it is unnecessary because it is established that 
our data does not come from a different population, (2) new outliers might emerge after the 
removal of initially identified outliers, and (3) it is arguable that the outlying values contain very 
important information and the removal of the values might be the imposition of new information. 
Hence, it is chosen to retain them and employ estimation methods that fit them like the robust 
regressions and quantile regressions.  
Fifthly and finally, different techniques are used to check for the normality of the distribution of the 
observations of the variables in our data. The histogram of frequencies, the normal probability plot, 
and the descriptive statistics (table 4.5), especially skewness and kurtosis indicate that several of the 
variables are non-normal. The histograms of frequencies of the observations with the charts option 
of normal curve constructed for each variable indicate that most of them show non-normality. 
Additionally, the examination of the skewness indicates the same fact. Notably, ownership variables 
like INO, INO2, INO3, FAMO, BANKO and GOVO; and the performance variables (ROE, PER, MTBV) 
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except ROA are positively or right skewed, showing that most cases are to the left of the distribution. 
Unlike others PER, which comes from DataStream, has not negative observations. This is strange 
since earnings might be negative unless adjustments is made for PER.  
The table also shows that ROA and WHO are negatively (left) skewed, thus indicating that most of 
the observations fall to the right of the distribution. Comparison of the median and the mean 
statistics also reveal the same nature of the study. Anyhow, taking the modest rule-of-thumb for 
normality, those falling in the range of skewness statistics of -2 and +2 (INSTO, OUTO, ABHO, WHO, 
PNED, DUAL, BSIZE, TDTA, PVOL, and AGE) are approximately normally distributed.  
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
The ownership variables INO, INO2, INO3, NFO, FAMO, BANKO and GOVO exhibit highly skewed 
distribution in the range of 5-9 skewness. Moreover, ROE, MTBV, and PER have higher positive 
skewness than the ownership variables. It might be suspected that these variables might not yield 
good results if they are used without transformation, which changes the information content or 
reality of the state. The same is true with the use of other variables like RNDTS, FATS, and SGATS. 
However, since other estimation methods that are handy to estimate when variables are not 
normally distributed exist, it is decided to retain and use them. It must be noted that examination of 
kurtosis also shows that many of the variables are not normally distributed.  
However, the normal Q-Q plot for most of the variables shows that the observations line up evenly 
along the diagonal 45-degree line, which is the tendency to normality. Nevertheless, this would not 
be reliable alone unless supported by other method. So, finally, the Shapiro-Wilk test for variable 
normality shows that the w values are significantly less than 1, thus indicating that the assumption 
of normality is met. Since the data is large (N is more than 2000), Kolmogorv-Smirnov test is also 
shows that the variables are not normally distributed. Hence, based on most of the checks made it is 
generally indicative that the variables are not normally distributed and the panel sample lacks the 
normality assumption for parametric methods.  
Finally, the alternatives are (1) to perform data transformation in order to adjust to parametric 
procedures by normalizing the data artificially, for instance to correct for skewness and kurtosis, or, 
                                                                          
       sgats        2825     14.02     32.73     348.7     47.47      2399
        fats        2825      1.27     15.68     127.1     31.18      1261
       rndts        2826      .005     95.83      4509     53.01      2815
         age        2803     20.82      37.1     34.99     1.094      2.92
          ta        2825   4.7e+05   1.3e+07   1.0e+08     15.15     278.5
        pvol        2447     26.55     28.34     10.16     1.018     4.197
        tdta        2824      14.7        19     18.48     1.471     6.943
    tointens        2653     .0568     .0688     .0516     2.157     9.029
       bsize        2633         8     8.295     3.129     1.353     5.896
        dual        2634         0     .2513     .4339     1.147     2.315
        pned        2632     .6154     .6375     .1996     .1138     2.827
         who        2656     62.22     60.03     22.25    -.3902      2.68
        abho        2656     37.84     39.99     22.25     .3868     2.684
        outo        2656     33.59     36.07     20.59     .4759     2.841
        govo        2656         0     .1519     1.043     8.463     90.61
       banko        2656         0     2.223     5.194     6.175     67.72
        famo        2656         0      1.73     6.228     5.701     47.62
         nfo        2656         0     2.587     8.325     4.448     25.23
       insto        2656     26.24     28.94     19.48     .6716     3.098
         ino        2656         0     3.885     10.11     3.433     15.91
         per        2508      18.6        52     294.4     30.04      1152
        mtbv        2800      1.82     2.864     104.1     20.92      1497
         roe        2731     11.37     17.26     54.98     13.16     292.5
         roa        2793      5.35     6.014     10.28    -1.306     28.52
                                                                          
    variable           N       p50      mean        sd  skewness  kurtosis
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(2) to employ estimation methods that are robust to non-normality of variables. Even though the 
unbalanced panel data has several missing values and few outliers and four dependent variables, it is 
believed that the imposition of artificial values might (1) completely change the nature or content of 
the information, (2) change the true nature of mutual association if the dependent variable and the 
independent variables are transformed by different methods, and (3) lead to the wrong 
interpretations and conclusions relative to the content of information of the original raw data.  
Nevertheless, the checks made to find out the difference in regression results between raw and 
transformed data of BSIZE, TA, AGE and especially RNDTS and SGATS that contribute a lot to the 
variances according to VIF indicates that there is no change of their effect on the dependent 
variables. Hence, it is chosen to avoid the transformation of the raw data that leads to wrong 
interpretations of the results and the conclusions, when there is a fitting estimation methods for 
non-normal variables or samples like robust regressions, quartile regressions, and the GEE.  
4.4.3.2. Diagnostic Analyses of OLS Assumptions 
The data analysis gives a clue that there some of the variables are not normally distributed and that 
the semi parametric might not be estimated using OLS regression. Before we rule out that a 
diagnostic analysis of OLS assumptions of NIID are made and presented as Appendix A. This enables 
us to choose appropriate estimation methods depending on the violations of the NIID assumptions.  
4.4.3.3 Model Specification 
The general relationship to be investigated can be stated as: firm performance is a function of 
ownership structure, governance mechanisms and control variables. This can be shown simply as:  
Performance ~ f (ownership structure, governance mechanisms, control variables)  
The general linear specification can be written as: 
Prfmit = β0   +   β1iOwnit + ∑β2iBrdit +∑ β3iExtGMit   + ∑ β4iCtrlit + β5iPrfmt-1 +   єit       
The two basic specific regression equations or models used are:  
 
In order to account for the nonlinearity assumption of the form of association of managerial 
ownership with firm performance proposed by Stulz (1988), firstly, we include INOit, INOit
2 and INOit
3 
in the same basic equation or model following the previous studies. Ssecondly, we substitute the 
square and cube of INOit (INOit
2 and INOit
3) in place of INOit in the basic model unlike the previous 
studies that include three of them in the same equation because we are sure that INOit
2 and INOit
3 
are function of INO and each other, and the analysis by including them in the same equation might 
lead to spurious interpretation and conclusion.  
Prfmit   = β0 + β1INOit + β2INSTOit + β3NFOit + β4FAMOit + β5BANKOit 
+ β6GOVOit + ∑β7iBrdit +   ∑β8iExtGMit    +   ∑β9iCtrlit   + β10iPrfmt-1 + єit   (1) 
Prfmit = β0 + β1INOit + β2OUTOit + ∑β3iBrdit + ∑β4iExtGMit  
+ ∑β5iCtrlit   + β6iPrfmt-1 +   єit            (2) 
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4.4.4 Estimation Methods 
The diagnostic analyses show that most of the OLS or Gaussian assumptions are not met. However, 
our regression models are tested to be correctly specified. OLS estimation, which would provide 
consistent estimates especially if the errors are identically and independently normally distributed 
(IID), cannot be appropriate estimation method for our sample. Hence the identity or constancy of 
variances (homoscedasticity) of residuals and independence of residuals (no autocorrelation) would 
call for other estimation procedures. The alternative estimation procedures are presented below as 
(1) primary analyses methods, and (2) sensitivity or consistency analyses methods.  
4.4.4.1 Methods for Primary Analyses 
One of the possible estimation alternatives is to use least squares estimation by controlling for the 
heteroscedasticity and/ or autocorrelation. The control for heteroscedasticity involves the variance 
component estimation (VCE) or robust estimation procedures. Robust regressions are considered 
when (1) heteroscedastic errors exist or suspected, (2) there are outliers, and (3) nonlinearity exists. 
Some of such robust estimation methods worth to mention are (1) Huber-White’s sandwich 
estimation, (2) clustering robust estimation, (3) iteratively reweighted least squares estimation 
(IWLS), and (4) quantile, especially median regression. The important feature about the robust 
standard errors estimations except IWLS is that they produce exactly the same coefficient estimates 
as the OLS. However, the computation of robust standard errors affects the standard errors, t-value, 
significance and the confidence intervals. In contrast to the other robust VCEs, the IWLS estimation 
produce coefficient estimates different from that of the OLS.  
Huber-White’s sandwich estimation:  The Huber-White variance estimator is one of the robust 
estimation methods, which are consistent and efficient amidst heteroscedastic residuals, produce 
robust standard errors that can deal with some violations of identity of variances. This procedure is 
called the White sandwich estimation (Huber, 1967; White, 1980). It uses the finite-sample 
correction of n/ (n-k) to multiply the residual square of the observation in order to estimate the 
residuals variance. However, even though there is an alternative stricter bias correction term (1/ ((1-
h) ^2) that modifies the White’s variance estimators, this research uses White’s robust estimation so 
as to avoid more complications.  
Clustering robust estimation:  This is the robust estimation method that allows the violation of 
independent errors or residuals assumption. When the residuals are independent, there is no 
significant correlation between the errors of the observations. Clustering the observations into 
groups might create a situation in which the observations might be correlated within the groups 
(cluster) but independent between the groups. The within-cluster correlation allows the matrix of 
sum of squares of the residuals to be block-diagonal, with nonzero elements within the block on the 
diagonal. The block-diagonal structure allows the disturbances within each cluster to be correlated 
with each other but requires that the disturbances from differences in cluster be uncorrelated. The 
standard errors take into account that the observations within groups are non-independent. They 
are computed based on the aggregate scores for the number of elements in the groups since the 
group-level scores should be independent. In this research, clustering robust estimation is used to 
account for autocorrelation or non-independence.  
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Iteratively reweighted least squares (IWLS) estimation:  In this robust regression, the least 
squares are reweighted using Huber’s and biweight iterations. Both iteration methods are used 
together because they have problems when used alone – Huber weights can work poorly with 
extreme outliers, and biweight iteration do not always converge. The Huber’s iteration reweighs the 
residuals assigning smaller weights to larger residuals. This is done by computing case weights from 
scaled residuals. The scale is the median absolute deviation about the median residual divided by a 
constant (Huber, 1983). If a residual is small the case of it would be assigned the case weight 1, but if 
larger the case weight is equal to tuning constant divided by the absolute value of the scale. The 
weights are used until they are nearly unchanged from iteration to iteration. A number of such 
Huber iterations converges the model. Then the biweight iteration procedure continues. The 
biweight iteration is the procedure that weights the converged model using biweights. With 
biweighting, all cases with residuals are downweighted so that all cases with larger residuals are 
assigned zero weights, thereby eliminating their influence. The procedure will continue until the 
biweights are nearly unchanged from iteration to iteration, and hence, final converged model is 
achieved.  
4.4.4.2 Methods for Sensitivity or Consistency Analyses 
Quantile (median) estimation:  Since most of the variables are positively skewed and with 
outliers it can be argued that the median is the better central tendency measure than the mean. 
Hence, the median regression might be better and more robust in response to large outliers than the 
OLS regression that uses the deviation from the mean to calculate variances and the parameter 
estimates that predict the median. The median regression estimates the median of the dependent 
variable by taking the raw sum of absolute deviation around unconditional median and finds the 
regression coefficient that minimizes function (the least median estimates). The computation of the 
standard errors derives from the estimation of the weighted variance-covariance matrix for the 
regression coefficients. The weights are estimated by dividing quantile (median) with the true 
density of the residual. The drawback of this method is that it is sensitive to the distortions created 
by serious outliers, in which case it is inferior to robust regression, which down-weights the 
influence of the influential outliers. For heteroscedastic errors, the median regression works well 
since it underestimates their standard errors.  
Fixed-effects regressions:  The panel data of our sample has identified groups like industry and 
identifying groups like time (year) for which there are repetitive measuring of values. The groups 
might have their own peculiar characteristics that can be sources of difference or heterogeneity. This 
between-group variation could be the sources of differences in variances or heteroscedasticity of the 
errors, which violates the IID assumptions. Our data is a construct with six industry dummies, 
including financial firms and utility and energy companies.  
It is obvious that the inclusion of the regulated firms, financial institutions and utility firms, in the 
sample seems surprising for a reader. However, there are some reasons for it. They are retained in 
the sample following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) that used dummies and retained them as separate sectors, and Holderness (2009) 
that excluded no type of firms and did not use dummies to classify into industries. Additionally, the 
means of different blockholder ownership categories show that financial institutions (including 
banks) and utility firms exhibit almost similar patterns of variations as the differences among the 
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remaining 4 industry sectors. Moreover, time has changed and financial firms alone are the 
significant proportion of the sample of the listed firms and exclusion might question the 
representativeness of FTSE All Share Index companies, in which case it might be difficult to make 
inferences of the major UK listed firms from a sample with a selection bias.  It can be added that 
constructing a sample of industrial sectors (excluding financial institutions and utility firms) should 
not be taken as a standard method or practice when they are significant proportion of listed firms, 
market capitalization of the UK stock market, and the dominant shareholders in the UK.  
One might argue against their inclusion by reasoning that the government interferes in the regulated 
firms and change management if the management is destroying the value of the firm. However, this 
is very rare in the UK and change of management also might happen in the other sectors initiated by 
the shareholders, especially large blockholders or the threat from hostile takeover from the 
competitors in the same industry if they are engaged in value destroying activities. This is facilitated 
by high investors’ protection and networks of relationship among institutional investors, whom 
other shareholders might follow.   
Hence, it has not been necessary to omit financial firms and energy and utility companies from the 
sample since the differences among all sectors can be controlled by within fixed-effect estimation. It 
is possible to make fixed effect models with or without dummy variables. In this research, the 
estimation without employing the dummy variables is chosen for both industry fixed-effects or for 
time (year) fixed-effects within estimations in order to avoid the dummy variable trap and ending up 
with very low degrees of freedom.  
The fixed-effects regression is the technique that estimates the fixed effects of independent 
variables on the dependent variable by controlling for the differences arising from unobserved 
heterogeneity between groups, omitted variables, between groups even without measuring the 
differences as long as they are constant or fixed within group overtime. The assumption is that the 
individual specific effect is correlated with the independent variable. The method eliminates much of 
the error variances created by the distortions due to the between-individual variations arising from 
the unmeasured personal characteristics or unobserved heterogeneity that are correlated to the 
independent variables.  
The fixed-effect regression procedure first computes the group means of the dependent and 
independent variables. Then the variables are transformed to get the deviations from the group 
means. Thereafter, the least squares regression is run on the transformed variables. The estimation 
gives correct standard errors and F-test and p-value for the null hypothesis that coefficients of all 
groupings are zero.  Since the fixed effect estimators depend only on deviations from their group 
means, they are referred to as within-groups estimators (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). However, 
the intercept (constant term) varies across the groups and or times and it consists of the overtime 
stable group specific variation.  
Nevertheless, heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation that plagues estimation arises from group 
specific or time-specific variations, whose individual specific effects might be uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. In such case, one way to handle error is by assuming that the intercept is a 
random outcome of variables (Greene, 2003).  The random outcome is a function of a mean value 
plus a random error. Models with such assumptions are called random effect models.  
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In a panel data, even though fixed effect estimation is always the reasonable thing to do since they 
always give consistent results that might not be the most efficient. However, random effect is a 
more efficient estimator that gives better p-values. So, in the Hausman test made in order to test 
and choose between the two models, the chi-square test shows significance, hence, there is 
evidence that fixed-effect modelling is justified for use.  
Generalized estimation equation (GEE):  GEE is the estimation method that is the extension of 
the generalized linear model, devised to handle the violations of some IID assumptions, especially 
autocorrelation. The GEE method, which is proposed by Liang and Zeger (1986), is a population-
averaged model, which is widely used in panel data analyses, even when the response variable is not 
Gaussian in distribution. It is a form of iterated generalized least squares that allows the correlations 
among the repeated observations for each individual. The method allows for the specification of the 
within-group correlation structure for the panels, which are also known as population-averaged 
panel-data models.  
GEE is equivalent to the generalized least squares (GLS) for linear models. However, we suspect 
nonlinearity in our model, especially theoretically asserted managerial ownership impact on firm 
performance. Hence, GLS might not be a proper estimation method to use. Anyhow, GEE produces 
more efficient estimates of the coefficients by taking the over-time correlations into account.  
Its parameter estimates are consistent and their asymptotic variances are efficient. The method can 
take into account the correlation between observations by also using the option that produce 
empirical (sandwich/robust) variance estimator. Additionally, GEE has the ability to handle the 
missing data on the response variables and the unbalanced panels assuming that the missing 
observations are missing completely at random (MCAR), which is the attribute of our data. 
Therefore, the robust option is not used here since the use or the assumption that the correlation 
between dependent variables at different times are all the same is enough.  
In conclusion, in the empirical analyses of the models first by the methods described under the 
primary analyses described above. Then, the methods described for sensitivity or consistency 
analyses will be used in order to report and interpret the results or evidence.  
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4.5. PRIMARY RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
4.5.1 Overall Presentation 
The results of the primary analysis on the investigation of positive or negative association between 
blockholders on firm performance are presented. These include the pooled OLS estimation and the 
robust estimations that are variance estimation procedures used to model the relationships with the 
violation of IID. The results and the analyses are presented separately for the two models previously 
stated in the methodology. The same set of explanatory variables generally have different results 
across the performance variables (ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER). Nevertheless, only the accounting 
performance measures (ROA and ROE) are found to show interesting patterns of relationships 
between ownership variables and/ or corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance. The 
regression of market-to-book value (MTBV) and the price-earnings ratio (PER) on the independent 
variables resulted mostly in insignificant influence of independent variables on performance. These 
facts raise an important issue regarding the choice between accounting measures or market 
measures in investigating the relationship between ownership structure and performance.  
Different types of robust estimation methods – White sandwich estimation (RobWhite), iteratively 
weighted least squares (RobIWLS, commonly called robust regression), and clustering robust 
estimation (RobCluster) - are used in order to achieve robust estimates allowing for the violations of 
the IID of residuals. As it can be seen from tables 5.11 – 5.13 and 5.17-5.18, the coefficients are the 
same with that of pooled OLS estimation (except in IWLS) since what are dealt with is the estimation 
of the variance components that changes the t-test statistics and the confidence intervals, which 
impacts change in the coefficient estimates.  
Moreover, it can be noted the IWLS robust regression has more power than the White’s robust 
(RobWhite) and Cluster robust (RobCluster) regressions by not only improving the standard errors 
and t-statistics but also improving the magnitude of the coefficients and the significance of t-test. 
This might be from the impact of the iteration and reweighting that might penalize the residuals too 
much when compared to White’s estimation, thus resulting in lower coefficients. For instance, even 
after accounting for autocorrelation, the clustering robust estimation showed significant positive 
association of insiders’ ownership (INO) for ROA, ROE and MTBV, though not so for PER (tables 5.11 
and 5.12). Hence, it might be suggested that IWLS robust estimates are more reliable than others to 
provide evidence and we have included the results of IWLS estimators.  
Furthermore, it must be noted that the reported statistics in the regressions used in this analysis are 
the coefficients with the significance level of their t-statistics. For interpretations of the results, 
mainly the significance level of the relationships is used. Even though the magnitudes of effect that 
can be observed from the coefficients are also useful for economical interpretation, focus is made 
on the significance of the positive or negative relationships and the very small values of the 
coefficients observed in the results should not cast doubts on the relationships.  
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4.5.2 Insider Ownership and Firm Performance 
4.5.2.1 Linearity Assumption 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 presents the regressions that assume linearity of insider ownership. The F-tests 
show that the overall fit of the model is good for all estimation methods. However, the R2 and the 
adjusted R2 for IWLS is very low. This does not create any problem as in other similar variables that 
come from economic data since we are using non-OLS estimation methods and since we are not 
concerned with the magnitude of the coefficients but the positive or negative relationships.  
 
From tables 4.11 and 4.12, it is observable that INO show consistent significant positive relationship 
with ROA, ROE, and MTBV with White robust, cluster robust and IWLS estimations. This result of 
consistent positive relationship of INO and ROA, MTBV and PER confirms the alignment of interest 
hypothesis regarding the aggregate ownership of insiders.  
Table 4.11: Linear regressions on ROA and ROE using OLS, White’s sandwich, clustering robust, and IWLS 
estimations on the first model 
 
Note: As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
OLS_A is ordinary least squares estimation where linear assumption of INO is used; RobWhite is White’s sandwich 
robust estimation; RobCluster is cluster robust estimation that uses industry as a factor; and RobIWLS is the robust 
regression that uses iterated weighted least squares method. 
R2 0.1388 0.1388 0.1388 - 
 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons      9.1716***      9.1716***      9.1716***      8.4178***  
       roat1      0.2647***      0.2647***      0.2647***      0.3234***  
       sgats     -0.0166***     -0.0166***     -0.0166        -0.0055**   
        fats     -0.0025        -0.0025        -0.0025        -0.0027     
       rndts      0.0013***      0.0013***      0.0013        -0.0136***  
         age      0.0046         0.0046         0.0046         0.0034     
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000**      -0.0000**      -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.0891***     -0.0891***     -0.0891        -0.0370***  
        tdta     -0.0206*       -0.0206*       -0.0206        -0.0034     
    tointens      7.7429**       7.7429**       7.7429*        2.7429     
       bsize      0.0084         0.0084         0.0084        -0.0665*    
        dual     -2.5464***     -2.5464***     -2.5464***     -2.4507***  
        pned     -2.5061**      -2.5061**      -2.5061        -2.9748***  
        govo      0.0230         0.0230         0.0230        -0.0519     
       banko      0.0142         0.0142         0.0142        -0.0487***  
        famo     -0.0265        -0.0265        -0.0265        -0.0166     
         nfo     -0.0050        -0.0050        -0.0050         0.0192*    
       insto     -0.0032        -0.0032        -0.0032        -0.0154***  
         ino      0.0607***      0.0607***      0.0607**       0.0166*    
                                                                          
    Variable      OLS_A         RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS and Robust Estimates on ROA
R2 0.0848 0.0848 0.0848 - 
 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     28.1373***     28.1373***     28.1373***     20.9764***  
       roet1      0.1692***      0.1692***      0.1692***      0.2256***  
       sgats     -0.0239        -0.0239**      -0.0239        -0.0143***  
        fats     -0.0428**      -0.0428***     -0.0428**      -0.0103*    
       rndts      0.0022         0.0022***      0.0022*       -0.0194***  
         age     -0.0313        -0.0313*       -0.0313        -0.0076     
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000**      -0.0000         0.0000     
        pvol     -0.3108***     -0.3108***     -0.3108*       -0.0850***  
        tdta      0.0289         0.0289         0.0289        -0.0247*    
    tointens      0.9413         0.9413         0.9413        -5.5804     
       bsize      0.7652**       0.7652         0.7652         0.0615     
        dual     -7.7884***     -7.7884***     -7.7884***     -7.7687***  
        pned    -11.5162*      -11.5162***    -11.5162*       -7.0907***  
        govo      0.5179         0.5179         0.5179        -0.2244     
       banko      0.0976         0.0976         0.0976        -0.0468     
        famo     -0.1535        -0.1535**      -0.1535        -0.0549     
         nfo      0.2702**       0.2702         0.2702         0.0072     
       insto     -0.0902*       -0.0902**      -0.0902        -0.0486***  
         ino      0.0928         0.0928         0.0928         0.0184     
                                                                          
    Variable      OLS_A         RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS and Robust Estimates on ROE
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From the statistical comparison of different estimation methods employed, it might be suggestive 
that cluster robust regression, which corrects for heteroscedasticity and produce efficient estimators 
by also handling autocorrelation when industry differences are accounted for, and the more strict 
IWLS methods are appropriate for interpretations. We note that most of the interpretations of the 
results of the primary analysis are based on IWLS. 
  
Table 4.12: Linear regressions on MTBV and PER using OLS, White’s sandwich, clustering robust, and IWLS 
estimations on the first model 
Note: As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
OLS_A is ordinary least squares estimation where linear assumption of INO is used; RobWhite is White’s sandwich 
robust estimation; RobCluster is cluster robust estimation that uses industry as a factor; and RobIWLS is the robust 
regression that uses iterated weighted least squares method.  
R2 0.0254 0.0254 0.0254 - 
 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     14.7662        14.7662        14.7662         2.2282***  
      mtbvt1      0.0098         0.0098         0.0098         0.0064***  
       sgats     -0.0132        -0.0132        -0.0132        -0.0004     
        fats      0.0061         0.0061         0.0061        -0.0022***  
       rndts      0.0029         0.0029***      0.0029*        0.0008***  
         age     -0.0088        -0.0088        -0.0088         0.0005     
          ta      0.0000         0.0000         0.0000        -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.2623*       -0.2623        -0.2623         0.0110***  
        tdta     -0.1487*       -0.1487        -0.1487         0.0006     
    tointens     15.6038        15.6038        15.6038        -0.2703     
       bsize     -0.0548        -0.0548        -0.0548         0.0224**   
        dual      0.1743         0.1743         0.1743        -0.9173***  
        pned     -8.7724        -8.7724        -8.7724        -0.6902***  
        govo     -0.1106        -0.1106        -0.1106        -0.0216     
       banko     -0.0234        -0.0234        -0.0234        -0.0005     
        famo      0.0252         0.0252         0.0252        -0.0128***  
         nfo      0.0749         0.0749         0.0749         0.0040     
       insto      0.0492         0.0492         0.0492        -0.0030**   
         ino      0.0656         0.0656         0.0656         0.0074***  
                                                                          
    Variable      OLS_A         RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS and Robust Estimates on MTBV
R2 0.0532 0.0532 0.0532 - 
 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons    -20.2902       -20.2902       -20.2902         7.3808***  
       pert1      0.2674***      0.2674**       0.2674*        0.7474***  
       sgats      0.4586*        0.4586         0.4586***      0.0271***  
        fats     -0.0188        -0.0188        -0.0188         0.0130***  
       rndts     -0.7373        -0.7373        -0.7373        -0.0924**   
         age     -0.2589        -0.2589        -0.2589         0.0013     
          ta     -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000     
        pvol      0.3672         0.3672         0.3672        -0.0752***  
        tdta      0.0281         0.0281         0.0281        -0.0087     
    tointens    -76.3636       -76.3636*      -76.3636***      0.7510     
       bsize     -0.7625        -0.7625        -0.7625        -0.0385     
        dual     47.0923**      47.0923***     47.0923***      4.3751***  
        pned     83.8838*       83.8838*       83.8838**      -0.1296     
        govo     -0.8423        -0.8423        -0.8423         1.0134***  
       banko     -0.1861        -0.1861        -0.1861        -0.0023     
        famo      0.1191         0.1191         0.1191        -0.0310     
         nfo     -0.6919        -0.6919        -0.6919        -0.0283     
       insto     -0.0774        -0.0774        -0.0774        -0.0132     
         ino     -0.2675        -0.2675        -0.2675*        0.0091     
                                                                          
    Variable      OLS_A         RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS and Robust Estimates on PER
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4.5.2.2 Nonlinearity Assumption 
Table 4.13 presents the IWLS regression assuming nonlinearity of INO, where INO, INO2, and INO3 
are included in one-equation or model.  
It can be viewed that results of the robust regressions show that INO exhibit positive relation with 
firm performance, ROA, and this result supports the alignment of interest hypothesis. However, the 
results show that INO2 and INO3 have no systematic relation with firm performance at all. It should 
be noted here that even though there are negative and positive very low magnitude of effects of 
INO2 and INO3 respectively, we do not have enough confidence to conclude that there is alignment-
entrenchment-alignment hypothesis of Stulz (1988).  
The results of the regression of the independent variables on other performance or value variables 
(which are not presented here) also show the same evidence and that even the linear INO loses its 
significance when INO2 and INO3 are also used in the same equation in some estimation methods 
(see RobIWLS result in table 4.13). Hence, it is suggestive that the inclusion of INO, INO2 and INO3 
that are the definitely a function of each other, and hence have high multicollinearity, in the same 
model or equation leads to spurious relationships, where it is difficult to exactly know the 
contribution of each of the variables in predicting the dependent variable.  
The pairwise correlation (table 4.14) shows that INO and INO2 have a correlation of 0.9217 on the 
one side, INO2 and INO3 are with a correlation of 0.9699 on the other side, and finally INO and INO3 
(that have a correlation of 0.8138) are almost perfectly collinear. Hence, it might be suggestive that 
the inclusion of any of the variables together in the same equation is a procedural error statistically, 
and the exclusion of two of them when one of them used in the equation might be statistically 
 
R-squared 0.1395 0.1395 0.1395 - 
Note: As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.  
Table 4.13: Regression with nonlinear assumption of insider ownership in one-equation setting on ROA using 
OLS, White’s sandwich, clustering robust, and IWLS estimations on the first model 
                                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons      9.0171***      9.0171***      9.0171***      8.5300***  
       roat1      0.2636***      0.2636***      0.2636***      0.3209***  
       sgats     -0.0165***     -0.0165***     -0.0165        -0.0055**   
        fats     -0.0024        -0.0024        -0.0024        -0.0026     
       rndts      0.0013***      0.0013***      0.0013        -0.0137***  
         age      0.0047         0.0047         0.0047         0.0034     
          ta     -0.0000        -0.0000**      -0.0000*       -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.0919***     -0.0919***     -0.0919        -0.0366***  
        tdta     -0.0204*       -0.0204*       -0.0204        -0.0037     
    tointens      7.8394**       7.8394**       7.8394*        2.7288     
       bsize      0.0160         0.0160         0.0160        -0.0725**   
        dual     -2.5257***     -2.5257***     -2.5257***     -2.4995***  
        pned     -2.3879*       -2.3879**      -2.3879        -3.0044***  
        govo      0.0257         0.0257         0.0257        -0.0523     
       banko      0.0160         0.0160         0.0160        -0.0492***  
        famo     -0.0305        -0.0305        -0.0305        -0.0152     
         nfo     -0.0047        -0.0047        -0.0047         0.0198*    
       insto     -0.0032        -0.0032        -0.0032        -0.0154***  
        ino3      0.0000         0.0000         0.0000         0.0000     
        ino2     -0.0047        -0.0047        -0.0047        -0.0000     
         ino      0.1705*        0.1705*        0.1705*        0.0001     
                                                                          
    Variable       OLS          RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS-Robust Estimates on ROA
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appropriate. Hence, this study uses stepwise regression of INO, INO2 and INO3 in order to check for 
the nonlinear relationship between insider ownership and firm performance.  
Tables 4.15 and 4.16 present the comparative investigation of nonlinearity assumption regarding 
managerial ownership using IWLS regression on ROA, ROE, MTBV and PER using INO, INO2 and INO3 
separately in the model. The stepwise regression results show that there is a strong evidence to 
believe that INO has significant positive relationship with performance (ROA and MTBV). But they 
have insignificant positive association with ROE and PER. The result is surprising since it is in contrast 
to alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis as suggested by Stulz (1988) and as reported by 
Morck et al. (1988) for the US firms, and Short and Keasey (1999) and Faccio and Lasfer(1999) for the 
UK firms, and the alignment-entrenchment finding of McConnell and Servaes (1990).  
The surprising result of not showing negative and positive relationships of INO2 and INO3 
respectively might be ascribed to some differences with related studies in terms of the methodology 
or data used. Firstly, the difference might arise from the differences in empirical modelling, in which 
we estimated INO, INO2 and INO3 in separate equations instead of including them in the same 
model. As already noted, this is done in order to avoid the imposition of more multicollinearity into 
the model. It might be arguable that the previous studies that report positive and negative relation 
of INO2 and INO3 respectively with performance disregard the strong multicollinearity between the 
three forms of insider ownership that leads to spurious relationship that might make it difficult to 
exactly tell the contribution of a variable in the change of the dependent variable.  
Secondly, there might be difference of the components of insider ownership (executives’ ownership 
and nonexecutive’s ownership), where our data on the variable is made up of the aggregate of 
executives and nonexecutive directors as provided in the Waterlow Stock Exchange Yearbook. The 
positive relation of INO with firm performance might be consistent with the finding of Florackis et al. 
(2009) for the UK firms, which considers linear assumptions of NEDs’ ownership in the model. Even 
though our data is not checked, it might be arguable the NEDs might own a larger part of the 
aggregate insider ownership than the executives, who have the incentive to diversify their portfolio 
in order to avoid idiosyncratic component of corporate risk (Garvey and Milbourn, 2003; Jin, 2002; 
Florackis et al., 2009). Hence, it might be the case that a great part of the ownership stakes of 
executives might be less than 3%, even though our data is not checked on this due to the package of 
its source. Hence, the difference in insider ownership association with performance might be 
because our data lacks managerial ownership in the range of 0.5%, the UK disclosure level for 
management, and 3%. So, it might be suggestive that the alignment-entrenchment-alignment 
hypothesis might be proper with the ownership of executives as in Florackis et al. (2009). 
  
Table 4.14: Pairwise correlation between INO, INO2 and INO3 
 
        ino3     0.8138   0.9699   1.0000 
        ino2     0.9217   1.0000 
         ino     1.0000 
                                         
                    ino     ino2     ino3
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Thirdly, the data type might be a source of difference in results. According to Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) managerial ownership level is determined endogenously in the equilibrium. It might be 
suggested that the equilibrium is dynamic that takes some years to attain the optimal level. Hence, it 
might be arguable that a panel data is more proper to take this into account than cross-sectional 
data. Hence, it is difficult to compare the results from this panel data with the cross-sectional data.  
Fourthly, many of the classical studies (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1991) and Short and Keasey (1999) that report nonlinear relationship between 
managerial ownership and performance do not assume endogeneity of ownership structure and 
reverse causality between ownership and performance. Later studies (Cho, 1998; Himmelbjerg et al., 
1999) accounted for endogeneity and unobservable firm characteristics in their analysis have shed 
some doubt about nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership structure and firm 
performance. Moreover, the recent studies on the UK firms by Davis et al. (2005) that accounted for 
endogeneity and Florackis et al. (2009) in their parametric analysis report that there might be more 
Table 4.15: Nonlinear regressions on ROA and ROE using IWLS estimations on the first model 
Table 4.16: Nonlinear regressions on MTBV and PER using IWLS estimations on the first model 
Note:    As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
IWLS does not give R2 statistics. 
INO is linear assumption of managerial ownership; INO2 is quadratic assumption of managerial ownership (INO2); 
and INO3 is cubic assumption of managerial ownership for the first model (INO3).  
 
                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                           
       _cons      8.4178***      8.5019***      8.5276***  
        ino3                                    0.0000*    
        ino2                     0.0004*                   
       roat1      0.3234***      0.3203***      0.3210***  
       sgats     -0.0055**      -0.0055**      -0.0055**   
        fats     -0.0027        -0.0027        -0.0026     
       rndts     -0.0136***     -0.0136***     -0.0137***  
         age      0.0034         0.0034         0.0034     
          ta     -0.0000***     -0.0000***     -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.0370***     -0.0370***     -0.0366***  
        tdta     -0.0034        -0.0035        -0.0037     
    tointens      2.7429         2.7253         2.7289     
       bsize     -0.0665*       -0.0705**      -0.0725**   
        dual     -2.4507***     -2.4883***     -2.4988***  
        pned     -2.9748***     -2.9927***     -3.0038***  
        govo     -0.0519        -0.0522        -0.0523     
       banko     -0.0487***     -0.0489***     -0.0492***  
        famo     -0.0166        -0.0161        -0.0153     
         nfo      0.0192*        0.0195*        0.0198*    
       insto     -0.0154***     -0.0153***     -0.0154***  
         ino      0.0166*                                  
                                                           
    Variable       INO            INO2           INO3      
                                                           
RobIWLS on ROA
                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                           
       _cons     20.9764***     20.9591***     20.9978***  
        ino3                                    0.0000     
        ino2                     0.0006                    
       roet1      0.2256***      0.2256***      0.2256***  
       sgats     -0.0143***     -0.0143***     -0.0143***  
        fats     -0.0103*       -0.0103*       -0.0103*    
       rndts     -0.0194***     -0.0194***     -0.0194***  
         age     -0.0076        -0.0074        -0.0073     
          ta      0.0000         0.0000         0.0000     
        pvol     -0.0850***     -0.0848***     -0.0844***  
        tdta     -0.0247*       -0.0247*       -0.0249*    
    tointens     -5.5804        -5.6878        -5.7032     
       bsize      0.0615         0.0587         0.0558     
        dual     -7.7687***     -7.7880***     -7.8039***  
        pned     -7.0907***     -7.0865***     -7.1037***  
        govo     -0.2244        -0.2264        -0.2269     
       banko     -0.0468        -0.0454        -0.0456     
        famo     -0.0549        -0.0557        -0.0548     
         nfo      0.0072         0.0073         0.0075     
       insto     -0.0486***     -0.0477***     -0.0476***  
         ino      0.0184                                   
                                                           
    Variable       INO            INO2           INO3      
                                                           
RobIWLS on ROE
 
                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                           
       _cons      2.2282***      2.2525***      2.2693***  
        ino3                                    0.0000**   
        ino2                     0.0001***                 
      mtbvt1      0.0064***      0.0064***      0.0064***  
       sgats     -0.0004        -0.0004        -0.0004     
        fats     -0.0022***     -0.0022***     -0.0022***  
       rndts      0.0008***      0.0007***      0.0007***  
         age      0.0005         0.0004         0.0004     
          ta     -0.0000***     -0.0000***     -0.0000***  
        pvol      0.0110***      0.0115***      0.0117***  
        tdta      0.0006         0.0005         0.0004     
    tointens     -0.2703        -0.2675        -0.2577     
       bsize      0.0224**       0.0212**       0.0205**   
        dual     -0.9173***     -0.9185***     -0.9212***  
        pned     -0.6902***     -0.7093***     -0.7186***  
        govo     -0.0216        -0.0217        -0.0219     
       banko     -0.0005        -0.0008        -0.0010     
        famo     -0.0128***     -0.0122***     -0.0119***  
         nfo      0.0040         0.0040         0.0040     
       insto     -0.0030**      -0.0031**      -0.0033**   
         ino      0.0074***                                
                                                           
    Variable       INO            INO2           INO3      
                                                           
RobIWLS on MTBV
                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                           
       _cons      7.3808***      7.4332***      7.4615***  
        ino3                                    0.0000     
        ino2                     0.0001                    
       pert1      0.7474***      0.7473***      0.7470***  
       sgats      0.0271***      0.0272***      0.0273***  
        fats      0.0130***      0.0132***      0.0132***  
       rndts     -0.0924**      -0.0925**      -0.0925**   
         age      0.0013         0.0012         0.0011     
          ta     -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000     
        pvol     -0.0752***     -0.0742***     -0.0740***  
        tdta     -0.0087        -0.0088        -0.0089     
    tointens      0.7510         0.8031         0.8323     
       bsize     -0.0385        -0.0406        -0.0412     
        dual      4.3751***      4.3863***      4.3947***  
        pned     -0.1296        -0.1746        -0.1929     
        govo      1.0134***      1.0131***      1.0138***  
       banko     -0.0023        -0.0035        -0.0040     
        famo     -0.0310        -0.0297        -0.0293     
         nfo     -0.0283        -0.0285        -0.0286     
       insto     -0.0132        -0.0136        -0.0138     
         ino      0.0091                                   
                                                           
    Variable       INO            INO2           INO3      
                                                           
RobIWLS on PER
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than two turning points in the non-linear relationship between them. Even controlling for 
endogeneity Davis et al. (2005) find evidence that there is the reverse causality (nonrecursive 
relationship) between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, using parametric 
method Florackis et al. (2009) find that there are more than 2 turning points in which not only 
curvilinear and cubic but quintic relationships are observed. Furthermore, evidence on the results of 
nonparametric analysis of nonlinear relationship by Florachis et al. (2009) show strong alignment of 
interest for executive ownership lower than 15% (not beyond that) and no support for nonlinear 
relationship between executive ownership and firm performance in contrast to the results from 
Short and Keasey (1999) and Davis et al. (2005) on the UK firms. Hence, the two findings cast doubt 
on the previous reports that support the alignment-entrenchment or alignment-entrenchment-
alignment hypothesis.  
To sum up, the result of this study implies that as the aggregate insider ownership increases firm 
performance rises, thus supporting the alignment of interest hypothesis (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1993). The inference of the positive nonlinear relationship between directors’ ownership 
(INO) and performance is that there might be a special nature of the behaviours of the management 
in the UK, namely working in the best interest of the shareholders to maximize firm performance. 
This is in line with Kren and Kerr (1997) who suggest that board shareholdings provide incentives to 
directors to act like owners diverging from their monitoring efforts. So, as INO increases the agency 
costs will be reduced (McKnight and Weir, 2009) and this might enhance firm performance.  
Moreover, the insight regarding the decreases in the coefficients of INO when nonlinear 
assumptions are accounted for might be that there is the alignment of interest increases at a 
decreasing rate thus exhibiting the law of diminishing marginal productivity as managerial ownership 
increases. It might also be argued that the reduced rate of performance with the different roots of 
the polynomial might indicate the potential for both an incentive and an entrenchment effect, which 
are supposed to happen at the same time with one outweighing the other after a certain degree of 
ownership level. Hence, it might be suggestive that the reduced rate of performance could be due to 
the increasing impact of the entrenchment effect which reduces the positive benefits from the 
incentive alignment effect. 
Finally, it might arguably be wise to consider the conclusion of Florackis et al. (2009) that the high-
order polynomials specification employed in parametric analysis might seemingly capture local 
stationary points in the curves, and the significant coefficient estimates of the higher-order terms 
are not useful to draw strong inferences regarding the impact of executive ownership and firm 
performance.  
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4.5.3 External Blockholder Ownerships and Firm Performance 
Table 4.11 and 4.12 also show the relationship between different categories of blockholder 
categories and firm performance, mainly using IWLS robust estimation. The result show that 
nonfinancial firms share ownership (NFO) has positive relationship with ROA, MTBV, and ROE 
(though insignificant with ROE) but negative significant relationship with PER. The result is almost 
similar to that of INO. This might suggest that INO and NFO that own about 6% and 2.6% of the 
commons shares of the firms in the sample respectively might enhance firm performance because 
the decisions or actions of the nonfinancial owners are also undertaken by the directors. The 
evidence of positive association might confirm the alignment of interest hypothesis. It might be 
arguable that nonfinancial firm’ owners might enhance firm performance of the firm in which they 
own shares as their ownership stake increases, and this might also be through some network 
relationship between managers across firms.  
On the other hand, the result shows that institutional ownership (INSTO) that control about 29% of 
the shares of the firms in the sample exhibits statistically significant negative relationship with firm 
performance measured in ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER. This in line with the evidence of Faccio and 
Lasfer (2000) on the UK pension funds (the largest shareholder category in the UK). The results might 
support the conflict-of interest hypothesis and the strategic-alignment hypothesis of Pound (1988). 
Institutional investors’ category might not undertake monitoring for control purpose. The category 
might rather have profitable business relationship with the management of the investee firm that 
might coerce them to vote with management. Additionally, it might suggest that institutional 
investors’ category and their investee company might cooperate on mutually advantageous strategic 
issues. The unexpected result is in contrast to the findings of Short and Keasey (1999) on the UK 
firms and Chiganti and Damanpour (1991). Similarly family ownership (FAMO), bank ownership 
(BANKO) and state (GOVO) that own less (1.73%, 2.22% and 0.15% respectively) of the sample’s 
outstanding shares also are found to have negative association with ROA, ROE, and MTBV even 
though GOVO show insignificant relation with ROA and positive significant association with PER, and 
BANKO is insignificant with MTBV and PER.  
Overall, the results show that outsider blockholder ownership categories (INSTO, FAMO, BANKO and 
GOVO) have negative influence of firm performance. The evidence might suggest the conflict-of 
interest hypothesis and the appropriation hypothesis on external blockholders (family or individual 
household, bank and state ownership) in general, and the strategic-alignment hypothesis on 
institutional owners. Hence, the evidence might indicate that there is the second type of agency 
problem, where the behaviour of large outsider shareholders with the incentives and ability to exert 
control pressure could cause agency costs and expropriation of minority shareholders driven by the 
private benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000).  
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4.5.4 Aggregate Outsider Ownership and Firm Performance 
The analyses of the second model presented in table 4.17 and 4.18 in Appendix B that focuses on the 
relation of INO and aggregate external blockholders’ ownership (OUTO) on firm performance also 
show consistent results similar to that of the first model presented as table 4.11-4.12 and 4.15-4.16. 
Considering the consistent results on ROA using the IWLS robust estimation method, aggregate 
ownership of insiders (INO) still shows positive relationship with firm performance (though not 
significant with ROE and PER) consistent with the results of the first model analyzed in section 4.5.3. 
The evidence confirms the alignment of interest hypothesis.  
Consistent to the result on its components (INSTO, NFO, FAMO, BANKO, and GOVO) discussed 
previously, the aggregate outsider block ownership (OUTO) shows negative relationship with firm 
performance measured in ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER though the negative relation is not significant 
with PER. This evidence supports the appropriation hypothesis with respect to the external 
blockholders in case they form coalition for collective actions in order to control the firm and it 
suggests the relevance of the second-order agency conflicts between large blockholders and 
minority shareholders.  
It can be observed from table 4.19 in Appendix B that presents IWLS robust estimation results that 
the aggregate outsider ownership (OUTO) is significantly negatively associated with firm 
performance measured in ROA, ROE, and MTBV, and that OUTO has insignificant negative impact on 
PER. The result is consistent with the finding of Weir et al. (2002) for the UK firms. The evidence 
from the result of this study is in contrast to the monitoring hypothesis. However, the evidence on 
the aggregate ownership of external blockholders supports the second-order agency perspective 
and it might suggest that large external blockholders might appropriate minority shareholders. The 
insight is that the aggregate blockholdership control of the firm might influence the firm 
performance negatively due to the private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart, 1980; 
Holderness, 2003).  
4.5.5 Dynamic Endogeneity and Reverse-Causality 
One important assumption or consideration accounted for in this research is the endogeneity of 
ownership structure. Thus, the two models are framed in such a way that the previous performance 
variable, which is a dependent variable, is one of the explanatory variables. All the different 
estimation methods used show that the lagged dependent (performance) variables (ROAt-1, ROEt-1, 
MTBVt-1, PERt-1) significantly determine the current performance, consistent with evidence from 
Weir et al. (2002). There is a very strong evidence (mostly at 1% significance level) to believe that 
they have positive correlation with ROA, ROE, MTBV and PER in all robust estimations (4.11-4.12 and 
4.15-4.19).  
The dynamic endogeneity explains the potential for reverse-causality relationship between 
managerial (insider) ownership and firm performance. It might be the case that the current 
managerial ownership is correlated to the errors of the dependent variable, and that the outcome of 
the managerial ownership also depends on the state of the lagged dependent variables. The insight 
is that depending on the previous performance of the firm, insider investors might be influenced to 
increase or decrease their ownership stake in the company that might affect their incentives and 
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ability to control the firm and influence current firm performance. However, it is worthwhile to note 
that the methodology is not robust enough to fully account of the other sources of endogeneity that 
arise in the two models, and hence, it has its limitation to fully solve the problem that arises.  
4.5.6 Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance 
4.5.6.1 Board of Directors  
Nonexecutive Directors:  The results on the three board characteristics variables in 4.11-4.12 
and 4.15-4.16, namely, the proportion of nonexecutive directors (PNED), duality (DUAL) and board 
size (BSIZE) are quite interesting. There is strong evidence that PNED and DUAL show consistent 
negative association with ROA, ROE, and MTBV according to IWLS robust estimation methods. The 
result is consistent with the findings of Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bhagat and 
Black (1998), and Weir and Laing (2003). The premise is that firms with higher proportions of NEDs 
tend to experience lower performance, which is inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis of the 
agency theory. The result is also in contrast to the no relationship results of Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) and Laing and Weir (1999) for the UK firms and Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) and Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991).  
The theoretical reasons for no support for the expected positive relation of PNED with performance 
might be (1) NEDs are only part-timers and might have other commitments that affect their devotion 
to undertake effective monitoring, (2) they might lack the necessary expertise and knowledge of the 
technical business issues, (3) NEDs might lack access to sufficient information required when making 
key decisions (Weir and Laing, 2001; Bozec, 2005), and (4) PNED might be an endogenous variable 
that might not be properly handled by the methodology employed in this study.  
However, Weir et al. (2002) find positive insignificant impact of PNEDs on firm performance and find 
that independent directors have positive significant relation with firm performance measured in 
Tobin’s Q. Anyhow, since all NEDs cannot qualify independence characteristics required by the codes 
in order to effectively and responsibly monitor the management the interpretation of this result that 
uses external directors should be with caution. Hence, we would like to present some of the 
tentative comments on the surprising result regarding NEDs as follows: 
• Firstly, the negative association of PNED with performance does not necessarily imply that 
the increase in PNED will necessarily reduce firm performance and that the 
recommendations of the UK Code of Best Practices on directors’ independence and the 
number of NEDs are wrong.  
• Secondly, it can rather be argued that the NEDs are part of the management (one-tier 
system) and they could be utility maximizers (private benefits, higher compensation, re-
nomination, etc.) and might cooperate with the executive managers which might lead to 
reduce performance. It might tempt us to think that the current economic and corporate 
crisis might be the cumulative effect of corporate scandals related to this even though it is 
difficult to substantiate and generalize behavioural aspects of the NEDs of the UK firms.  
• Thirdly, there might also be some other attributes that the model of the board of directors is 
lacking and PNED cannot alone determine firm performance in the UK. For instance, it is yet 
difficult to substantiate that the absence of the two-tier board system in the UK has problem 
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whereas there are board problems in the two-tier systems like Germany and other 
Continental European countries, where the supervisory function is distinct from the 
management function.  
• Finally, it might be argued that NEDs are necessary but not sufficient requirement in 
determining firm performance in the UK corporate system since other factors, high investors 
protection and contestability of control in the UK listed firms, have the substitution effect on 
NEDs in determining firm performance. It might also be suggestive that other external 
governance mechanisms might have a complementary or substitution effects on NEDs to 
enhance firm performance. It can be added that the endogenous relationship between 
board of directors and firm performance, where current board characteristics is affected by 
past performance might also affect the result.  
CEO-Duality:  The interesting evidence from the result is the expected negative correlation 
between CEO-duality and firm performance. In other words, the split of duality enhances firm 
performance. The evidence supports the report on event study of Dahya et al. (1996) that show 
positive impact of stock prices on the announcement of the split of duality for the UK firms, and that 
of Rechner and Dalton (1991), which reports negative impact of CEO-duality on firm performance for 
US firms. The result is inconsistent with the findings of Weir and Laing (2003) on UK firms, and Boyd 
(1995), Donaldson and Davis (1991) on US firms that firms with duality have better performance 
than those with separate leadership. It is also in contrast to the result of O’Sullivan and Wong (1999) 
that non dual board leadership is more common in underperforming firms that are subject to hostile 
takeover bid in the UK than those with CEO-duality and the result of no effect by Weir et al. (2002) 
for the UK, and Brickley et al. (1997) and Dalton et al. (1998) for the US firms.  
Nevertheless, the evidence of the negative relation of CEO-duality and performance from this study 
supports the agency perspective of board leadership on the entrenchment of the CEO or executives 
to curb the monitoring of the directors. It is also consistent with the Code of Best Practice that 
recommends the split of the roles of the CEO and chairmanship of the board. The result is interesting 
because it is shows a unique and consistent evidence of negative relations where such empirical 
evidence are lacking in literature.  
Board Size:  The result from different models and the treatment of INO linearity or nonlinearity 
assumptions show mixed results on the association of board size (BSIZE) with different firm 
performance variables. Even the more appropriate IWLS estimation method shows mixed results 
regarding BSIZE, namely, significant negative relationship with ROA at 10% significance level, and 
significant positive relations with MTBV at 1% significance level. IWLS robust estimation also shows 
positive significant association with ROE and negative insignificant relationship with PER.  
Nevertheless, it might be conclusive from the results in tables 4.11, 4.12, 4.18 and 4.19 that there is 
negative association between board size and firm performance. Hence, there is yet some evidence 
to believe that as board size increases firm performance decreases as reported by Yermack (1995) 
and Eisenberg et al. (1998). The evidence supports that as board size gets larger and larger, decision 
takings would be slower and cumbersome (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). It is also in conformity with the rationale behind the recommendation of the UK 
Code regarding board size.  
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4.5.6.2 External Governance Mechanisms 
Debt Financing:  The results (4.11-4.12 and 4.15-4.19) of the relationship between debt ratio 
(TDTA) and firm performance using the two different models used for primary analyses show that 
there is negative association between debt ratio and firm performance, measured in ROA, ROE, and 
MTBV even though there is a problem of significance and consistency across performance variables 
and estimation methods. Nevertheless, the interesting result from tables 4.11 and 4.12 is that TDTA 
has negative relation with ROA, ROE, and MTBV. This is supported by the results in table.17 and 
4.18.  
However, the result of negative association between leverage and firm performance is consistent 
with the findings of Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), Short and Keasey (1999), and Weir et al. (2002) 
for the UK firms and Dowen (1995), Agrwal and Knoeber (1996), and McConnell and Servaes (1999) 
for the US firms, The result is not as expected since it is inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis 
of the agency perspective of debt financing, where positive relation with firm performance is 
expected. Nevertheless, the evidence supports the theory of financial distress related to debt 
financing, which suggests the negative influence of the increase in debt financing on the firm.  
Takeover Intensity:  The different regressions presented as tables 4.11-4.12 and 4.15-4.19 
show mixed results on the relation between takeover intensity (TOINTENS) and different firm 
performance measures. The only consistent result is the positive significant impact of TOINTENS on 
ROA. When we assume linearity of insider ownership, it is found that TOINTENS has positive 
relationship with ROA, MTBV, and ROE (even though not significant with ROE) for the two versions 
of the model. The very counterintuitive result that is very difficult to interpret is the negative 
significant influence of TOINTENS when linearity of INO is assumed. However, when nonlinearity of 
INO is assumed in one-equation setup, TOINTENS is found to be positively related only to ROA, even 
though it loses its significance when we use stepwise consideration of the forms of INO in the 
regressions. Nevertheless, despite the mixed results, considering the consistent positive relation of 
TOINTENS on ROA with linear and nonlinear assumptions of INO, we generally conclude and suggest 
that as takeover intensity increases firm performance will increase. This evidence is consistent with 
the study of Weir et al. (2002) on the UK firms.  
Therefore, there is evidence to believe that, for the UK public firms, the higher the takeover intensity 
the higher is firm performance. The theoretical rationale of the positive association is that as 
takeover intensity increases firm performance goes up since management works hard so that they 
would retain their job if the firm is taken over. So, the evidence is in line with the disciplining effect 
of takeover market, and its monitoring role of the agency perspective. Regarding the threat of 
takeover (takeover intensity) to the firm and the job of CEOs, Shivdasani (1993) and O’sullivan and 
Wong (1999) report that the quality of NEDs significantly affects the likelihood of acquisition and 
Martin and McConnell (1991) and Kennedy and Limmack (1996) suggest that CEOs are likely to lose 
their job following hostile takeover.  
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4.5.7 Complementarity or Substitution Effects Analyses 
The complementarity or substitution effects between governance mechanisms in monitoring the 
board of directors is analysed using pair-wise correlation analyses. Table 5.10 presents the pair-wise 
correlation of some ownership structure and corporate governance mechanism variables used in this 
research. Even though, it can be observed that there are not any variables that are perfectly 
collinear, the significant collinearity deserves intuitive analysis of the possible interactions. This 
would reveal the pairwise substitution effects and complementarity effects between the governance 
mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 1995).  
 
From the correlation matrix in table 4.20 and its summary in table 4.21, it can be seen that external 
blockholder ownerships like NFO, INSTO, NFO, FAMO and BANKO are significantly negatively 
correlated with TOINTENS and board structure (DUAL, BSIZE, and PNED). This might imply that the 
external governance mechanisms and the board structure might have the substitution effect on 
external blockholders ownership in enhancing firm performance. Regarding the correlation with 
takeover, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggests that greater institutional ownership and bigger 
blocks held by outsiders might facilitate takeovers.  
As in Rediker and Seth (1995), the correlation matrix shows negative and significant association 
between the monitoring potential of the board of directors and the incentive effects of managerial 
ownership (INO). This might make sense since control of the firm might also be in the hand of the 
management that are also part of the board structure. The correlation results might be in line with 
results of the regressions shown previously, which show that external blockholders ownership has 
significant negative association with firm performance, whereas INO has positive relation with firm 
performance. Furthermore, as shown from table 4.21, the external governance mechanisms 
(TOINTENS and TDTA) might have the substitution effects on board structure variables (DUAL and 
PNED), thus confirming Rediker and Seth (1995).   
  
Table 4.20: Pair-wise correlation of ownership and corporate governance mechanism variables 
 
* Indicates significance at 5% level.  
  ino outo insto      nfo famo banko govo pned dual bsize  tointens tdta 
ino 1 
outo -0.065* 1 
          insto -0.105* 0.842* 1 
         nfo 0.003 0.238* -0.151* 1 
        famo 0.174* 0.195* -0.089* -0.015 1 
banko -0.093* 0.138* -0.069* -0.071* -0.047* 1 
govo -0.047* 0.155* 0.125*  -0.023 -0.019 0.043* 1 
pned -0.155* -0.007 0.013 -0.003 -0.121* 0.042* 0.125* 1 
dual -0.072* -0.018 -0.006 -0.008 -0.032 -0.012 0.132* 0.603* 1 
bsize -0.054* -0.126* -0.157* 0.094* -0.037 -0.000 -0.087* -0.335* -0.440* 1 
  tointens 0.113* 0.040* 0.004* 0.072* 0.072* -0.044* -0.059* -0.261* -0.242* 0.159*  1 
 tdta -0.024 0.004 0.008 -0.013 0.003 0.006 -0.088* -0.139* -0.247* 0.179*   0.149* 1 
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Additionally, TOINTENS is complement to NFO and FAMO. The positive correlation between the 
proportion of nonexecutive directors and CEO-duality (PNED and DUAL) might imply that they might 
be complements to each other for the UK listed firms. On the other hand, table 4.21 also shows that 
the takeover intense (TOINTENS) is a complement to debt financing (TDTA). The correlation pattern 
reveals that greater institutional ownership (INSTO) might facilitate takeover, confirming the 
suggestion of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). NFO, FAMO and INO might also facilitate takeovers in 
the UK listed firms debt financing problems give signals.  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the pair-wise correlation analysis can only serve as a first step 
in the examination of complementarity and substitution effect between pairs of governance 
mechanisms. It cannot provide the optimal or efficient combinations of governance mechanisms 
that should be chosen by firms in mitigating the agency problems in listed corporations. The analysis 
show sounding rationale on the interdependence of governance mechanisms and indication that 
joint hypothesis of governance mechanism effects in contrast to independence across mechanisms.  
However, the deduced effects from the observed correlations would not be enough to draw a 
conclusive statement unless they are supported by other analytical tools. It might be the case that 
the single equation modelling used in our primary or sensitivity analyses might not be enough to 
fully explain the interrelation between governance mechanisms and their effects on firm 
performance. From these facts, it is suggestive that other investigation using structural equations 
modelling that is estimated by 2SLS (as in Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) or 3SLS estimation method, 
which is beyond the scope of this empirical study, is required to account for (1) the substitution and 
complementarity effects, and (2) other different sources of endogeneity problems.   
  
Table 4.21: Pattern of significant correlation of ownership and corporate governance variables 
CORRELATION VARIABLES SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS 
Negative Correlation INO INSTO, BANKO, GOVO, PNED, DUAL, BSIZE 
 INSTO NFO, FAMO, BANKO, BSIZE 
 NFO INSTO, BANKO, BSIZE 
 FAMO INSTO, BANKO, TOINTENS, PNED 
 PNED INO, FAMO; BANKO, BSIZE, TOINTENS, TDTA 
 DUAL INO, GOVO, BSIZE, TOINTENS, TDTA 
Positive Correlation INO FAMO 
 INSTO GOVO 
 NFO TOINTENS 
 FAMO TOINTENS  
 PNED INSTO, BANKO, DUAL  
 TOINTENS INO, INSTO, NFO, FAMO, TDTA 
 
 
Source: Constructed from table 4.20.  
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4.5.8 Firm-Specific Control Variables and Firm Performance  
Most of the control variables show consistent significant relationship with firm performance, 
measured in ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER, and the results are as expected (tables 4.11-4.12 and 4.15-
4.19). From the results it is shown that firm size (TA) is negatively associated with firm performance 
measured in almost all measures. This confirms that life-cycle perspective of firms, which suggests 
that as firms’ size increases, firm performance declines. Except for ROA, the result also shows that 
firm age (AGE) has a negative association with firm performance. Nevertheless, the positive 
association of AGE with ROA might be due to high asset tangibility and learning curve that might 
result in economies of scale and scope attained as firms grow and mature.  
As expected, the results show the risk measure, stock price volatility (PVOL), is negatively associated 
with firm performance measured in ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER. As it can be observed from tables 
4.11-4.12 and 4.15-4.19, the results are consistent for all estimation methods. Hence, there is a 
strong evidence (mostly at 1% significance) to believe that PVOL influences firm performance 
negatively. As PVOL increases, firm performance goes down due to the fall in the expectations of 
investors which may induce fall in prices. Hence, the research provides empirical evidence that stock 
market price volatility is the important determinant of firm performance.  
Another consistent result provided in the study is that research and development expenses to total 
assets (RNDTS) has a positive influence (consistent with McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Short and 
Keasey, 1999) on firm performance, measured both in ROA, ROE, and MTBV, even though it shows 
negative relation with PER (tables 4.11 and 4.12). The evidence of positive association at 1% 
significance level is very strong to suggest that it is consistent with the view that the R&D progress or 
break-through announcements cause the rise in the prices of the stocks and that with new products 
developments; and hence, firm’s profits or performance in the market might increase thus raising 
the ROA, ROE and MTBV.  
Moreover, most of the estimation methods generally and IWLS especially show results of negative 
relation between fixed assets ratio (FATS) and firm performance. From the negative impact of FATS 
on ROA, ROE and MTBV, it might be arguable that the boosting of sales, however, would not 
necessarily ensure the enhancement of profitability, because the expenses can increase the costs of 
the firm and might also lead to the decrease mainly in the accounting figures of performance (ROA 
and ROE) in the short-run. However, the expense in fixed assets might have positive effect on long-
run firm performance.  
Finally, the result provides evidence that and sales, general and administration (SGATS, which 
includes advertisement expenditure) has negative association with firm performance measured in 
ROA, ROE, and MTBV, and positive relationship with PER. Overall, it might be conclusive that SGATS 
is negatively associated with firm performance. The result of negative association is as expected 
because SGATS is the expense at the discretion of the management and it might be a source of 
agency costs that would reduce firm performance (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009).  
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4.6. SENSITIVITY OR CONSISTENCY ANALYSES 
4.6.1 Estimation Methods for the Analyses 
In order to check for the consistency of the results or evidence presented in the primary analyses, 
other four estimation methods are used in order to estimate the parameters for the two models. 
The median regression is used as a counterpart, even though not equivalent, to OLS regression. It is 
already noted that the median (quantile) estimation is more accurate and stronger method than the 
OLS in handling the data type with the problem of non-normality and outliers. The median 
regression, which uses the absolute value of deviation from the median (rather than the mean), thus 
called the least absolute deviation (sometimes called least absolute value, LAV), reveals that most of 
the predictors are strongly significant.  
However, the outstanding issue after median regression eases our problem of non-normality and 
outliers to some extent is the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems that might be 
prevalent. Therefore, the fixed-effects regressions (within the YEAR, YearFE; and within INDUSTRY, 
IndustFE) are used in order to account for differences across time and industry groups, and thus the 
omitted variables that would contribute to unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, the GEE, where YEAR 
is regarded as the categorizing variable, is used to account for the problem of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation simultaneously and allow for the violation of the IID assumption on residuals in our 
modelling. However, it has not been possible to account for the INDUSTRY differences with GEE due 
to the limitations of matrix computation capacity of the STATA 10 software being used.  
Finally, it is to be noted that median regression method is used as the benchmark of the sensitivity 
analysis and complemented by YearFE, IndustFE and YearGEE estimation methods. The results of the 
four regressions on ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER are presented as tables 6.1 to 6.4.  Even thought the 
estimations give some pattern of relationships between the predictors and firm performance, based 
on autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity the non-normality that violate the OLS assumptions, the GEE 
and the median regression methods are used as evidences of the patterns.  
4.6.2 Sensitivity/ Consistency of the Results 
Tables 4.22-4.26 show the regressions for the sensitivity and consistency of the results on the two 
models. We would like to note that even thought the F-test and Wald test statistics show a good fit 
of the model as a whole, the R2 and adjusted R2 are found to be still low. In general, it is interesting 
to note that almost all of the explanatory variables (predictors) that are significant in the robust 
estimation methods are found to be significant in almost the same manner or pattern in the 
methods used for sensitivity analysis. So, rather than going into the details of the story of the results 
it is chosen to present summary notes in order to avoid repetitions. The theoretical and real world 
situation interpretations of the results of the methods are also the same and need not be repeated. 
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Insider Ownership: Table 4.22 in Appendix C presents results of different estimation methods 
assuming nonlinearity of INO in one-equation setting. As it can be observed from the table, generally 
INO and other ownership variables do not have significant relation with ROA. This might be from the 
spurious relationships that result from the inclusion of INO, INO2 and INO3 that have the problem of 
multicollinearity as previously discussed. The linear INO has significant relation with ROA only when 
within industry fixed-effects (IndustFE) estimation is used.  
Table 4.23 presents the results of median stepwise regression with nonlinearity assumption of INO. 
The evidence on insider ownership observed from the table confirms that that INO, INO2 and INO3 
are strongly (at 1% significance level) positively associated with ROA. Consistent with the primary 
analysis, this evidence confirms (1) the nonlinearity assumption of the association of managerial 
ownership to firm performance, (2) the alignment of interest hypothesis of the agency theory on 
insider ownership, and (3) the diminishing marginal productivity as INO increases, which can be 
observed from the magnitude of the coefficients of INO with the orders of the polynomials.  
Moreover, tables 4.24-4.26 (table 4.26 is in Appendix C) present results of different estimation 
methods with the assumption of linearity of INO. From the tables it can be observed that the results 
of the median and GEE estimation methods, which is a reliable estimation method since it accounts 
for both IID problems, show evidence that INO is positively related to ROA, ROE and MTBV (though 
not significant with MTBV when GEE is used). It can be noted that the results of the fixed-effects 
estimation methods indicate that INO has positive relation with ROA, ROE and MTBV (though 
insignificant with ROE and MTBV). Consistent with the analysis in the previous section, it is to be 
noted that (1) the relationship between INO and performance might not be linear, and (2) the 
positive relation of INO confirms the alignment of interest hypothesis.  
Table 4.23: Regression with nonlinear assumption of insider ownership in stepwise setting on ROA using 
median estimation methods the first and second models  
                                                                  Model 1                                                                            Model 2 
 
Pseudo R2 0.1525 0.1525 0.1525 0.1520 0.1520 0.1520 
 
 
Note: As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
INO is linear assumption of managerial ownership; INO2 is quadratic assumption of managerial ownership; and INO3 
is cubic assumption of managerial ownership for the first model. INO_A is the linear assumption of managerial 
ownership; INO2_B is quadratic assumption of managerial ownership; and INO3_C is cubic assumption of managerial 
ownership for the second model.  
                                                                     legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                                                        
       _cons      7.0745***      7.1508***      7.1619***      6.9153***      7.1006***      7.1082***  
        outo                                                  -0.0090***     -0.0087**      -0.0087**   
        ino3                                    0.0000*                                      0.0000**   
        ino2                     0.0004**                                     0.0004**                  
       roat1      0.3479***      0.3484***      0.3485***      0.3527***      0.3521***      0.3521***  
       sgats     -0.0097***     -0.0094***     -0.0093***     -0.0094***     -0.0093***     -0.0092***  
        fats     -0.0022        -0.0023        -0.0023        -0.0022        -0.0023        -0.0023     
       rndts      0.0008***      0.0008***      0.0008***      0.0008***      0.0008***      0.0008***  
         age      0.0045**       0.0044*        0.0044**       0.0044**       0.0045**       0.0046**   
          ta     -0.0000***     -0.0000***     -0.0000***     -0.0000***     -0.0000***     -0.0000***  
        tdta     -0.0049        -0.0048        -0.0048        -0.0042        -0.0047        -0.0047     
    tointens      4.4922***      4.6933***      4.7247***      4.6627***      4.6925***      4.6972***  
       bsize     -0.1137***     -0.1195***     -0.1203***     -0.1067***     -0.1175***     -0.1182***  
        dual     -2.7296***     -2.7269***     -2.7269***     -2.6812***     -2.7326***     -2.7314***  
        pned     -2.3873***     -2.4403***     -2.4450***     -2.3839***     -2.4691***     -2.4764***  
        govo     -0.0173        -0.0184        -0.0187                                                  
       banko     -0.0309**      -0.0305**      -0.0304**                                                
        famo     -0.0074        -0.0078        -0.0078                                                  
         nfo      0.0028         0.0011         0.0010                                                  
       insto     -0.0092**      -0.0092**      -0.0093**                                                
         ino      0.0196**                                     0.0198***                                
                                                                                                        
    Variable       INO            INO2           INO3          INO_A          INO2_B         INO3_C     
                                                                                                        
Median regression on ROA
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Table 4.24: Regressions on ROA and ROE using YearFE, IndustFE, Quant50, and YearGEE estimations of the 
first model 
R2 0.1396 0.1049 0.1631 - 
 
R2 0.0841 0.0682   0.1591 - 
 
Note:    As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
YearFE is fixed effect regression for time differences; IndustFE is fixed regression for industry differences; Quant50 
is median regression; and YearGEE is general equations estimation regression taking year as categorizing factor. 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons      8.2434***      9.6621***      8.0825***      8.3895**   
       roat1      0.2647***      0.2470***      0.3397***      0.2648*    
       sgats     -0.0171***     -0.0150***     -0.0091***     -0.0170***  
        fats     -0.0030         0.0030        -0.0034**      -0.0029     
       rndts      0.0014***      0.0012***      0.0008***      0.0014***  
         age      0.0055         0.0018         0.0040**       0.0054*    
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000        -0.0000***     -0.0000*    
        pvol     -0.0810***     -0.1255***     -0.0426***     -0.0825     
        tdta     -0.0198*       -0.0265**      -0.0066*       -0.0199     
    tointens      9.4610**       2.8972         3.7449***      9.1225     
       bsize      0.0375         0.0157        -0.0982***      0.0318     
        dual     -2.3738***     -1.0513        -3.1175***     -2.4087***  
        pned     -2.3376*       -1.6189        -2.1548***     -2.3620**   
        govo      0.0034        -0.0048        -0.0271         0.0069     
       banko      0.0351         0.0231        -0.0310**       0.0312     
        famo     -0.0220        -0.0110        -0.0090        -0.0229     
         nfo     -0.0258        -0.0116         0.0053        -0.0219     
       insto      0.0023        -0.0008        -0.0062*        0.0013     
         ino      0.0595***      0.0563***      0.0218***      0.0597***  
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
ROA
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     27.1955***     27.2640***     19.9919***     28.0318***  
       roet1      0.1662***      0.1614***      0.2225***      0.1689     
       sgats     -0.0230        -0.0198        -0.0175***     -0.0238***  
        fats     -0.0441**      -0.0247        -0.0277***     -0.0429     
       rndts      0.0021         0.0018         0.0016***      0.0022***  
         age     -0.0283        -0.0448*       -0.0034        -0.0310***  
          ta     -0.0000**      -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.2805***     -0.4307***     -0.0989***     -0.3074***  
        tdta      0.0258         0.0297        -0.0234***      0.0285     
    tointens      8.7999        -7.1442        -4.5544*        1.7812     
       bsize      0.9020**       0.9000***      0.0747         0.7799**   
        dual     -6.3309**      -1.9620        -9.1774***     -7.6283**   
        pned    -14.1574**      -7.9797        -6.1584***    -11.8088***  
        govo      0.5780         0.4243        -0.0798         0.5246     
       banko      0.1192         0.1414        -0.0258         0.1002     
        famo     -0.1432        -0.1092        -0.0186        -0.1523     
         nfo      0.2141*        0.2553**       0.0042         0.2638**   
       insto     -0.0974*       -0.0846        -0.0259***     -0.0910**   
         ino      0.0817         0.0728         0.0418***      0.0916**   
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
ROE
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External Block Ownership:  The median regression results presented as table 6.24 and 6.26 reveal 
evidence of negative association of INSTO and negative relation of BANKO on ROA. Additionally, the 
tables show that INO has negative relationship with ROA, ROE, MTBV and PER (though not 
significant with PER). It is also confirmed that NFO has positive significant relationship with ROE 
according to fixed-effects and GEE estimations, even though it is surprising to observe the GEE result 
showing negative significant relation of NFO with PER. The result of the median regression confirms 
also that family ownership (FAMO) has negative significant relationship with MTBV and PER. 
Furthermore, the median regression result shows that BANKO has negative significant relation with 
ROA.  
Table 4.25: Regressions on MTBV and PER using YearFE, IndustFE, Quant50, and YearGEE estimations of the 
first model 
R2 0.0256 0.0259 0.1017 - 
 
R2 0.0526   0.0420 0.1388 - 
 
Note:    As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
YearFE is fixed effect regression for time differences; IndustFE is fixed regression for industry differences; Quant50 
is median regression; and YearGEE is general equations estimation regression taking year as categorizing factor. 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     12.8451        17.4091         2.2068***     15.3770     
      mtbvt1      0.0098         0.0077         0.0062***      0.0098     
       sgats     -0.0117        -0.0084        -0.0000        -0.0135     
        fats      0.0057         0.0049        -0.0035***      0.0061     
       rndts      0.0028         0.0026         0.0019***      0.0029***  
         age     -0.0058        -0.0127        -0.0001        -0.0096     
          ta      0.0000         0.0000        -0.0000***      0.0000     
        pvol     -0.2250        -0.2734*        0.0051***     -0.2723     
        tdta     -0.1526*       -0.1476*       -0.0005        -0.1478     
    tointens     28.2036         7.0915        -0.0521        12.1624     
       bsize      0.1424        -0.1989         0.0223***     -0.1082     
        dual      2.0222        -0.7640        -1.1764***     -0.3121     
        pned    -11.6178        -9.2375        -0.3673***     -8.0623     
        govo     -0.0490        -0.1863        -0.0119        -0.1254**   
       banko     -0.0232        -0.0254        -0.0002        -0.0231     
        famo      0.0264         0.0192        -0.0077***      0.0252     
         nfo      0.0349         0.0775         0.0022         0.0853     
       insto      0.0414         0.0530        -0.0007         0.0510     
         ino      0.0521         0.0480         0.0076***      0.0691     
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
MTBV
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons    -15.5738       -19.2772         8.7579***    -33.7117*    
       pert1      0.2668***      0.2672***      0.3938***      0.2688*    
       sgats      0.4748*        0.4560*        0.0472***      0.4220     
        fats     -0.0072        -0.0553         0.0219***     -0.0750*    
       rndts     -0.7530        -0.3331         0.0109        -0.7768     
         age     -0.2599        -0.2622        -0.0002        -0.2422     
          ta     -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000**      -0.0000     
        pvol      0.3833         0.5277        -0.0064         0.3497     
        tdta      0.0203         0.0742        -0.0244***      0.0420     
    tointens    -76.7915       -63.4125        -4.1122       -58.8519     
       bsize     -0.7026        -1.0753        -0.0241        -0.7202     
        dual     48.9373**      39.7223*       12.0219***     44.4356***  
        pned     77.1855*       80.2494*        3.3690***     96.4108***  
        govo     -0.6987        -0.8305         1.5644***     -0.9254     
       banko     -0.3457        -0.2080        -0.0039         0.3722     
        famo      0.0682         0.0413        -0.0490**       0.3326     
         nfo     -0.6355        -0.6617        -0.0162        -0.9709*    
       insto     -0.1376        -0.0788         0.0035         0.0720     
         ino     -0.2753        -0.2638        -0.0037        -0.2922     
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
PER
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Finally, as it can be seen from table 4.26, the median regression results show that OUTO (the 
aggregate ownership all external blockholders) is found to exhibit consistent negative significant 
relationship with ROA, ROE, and MTBV. Hence, the evidence on external blockholders ownership 
(OUTO) and its components (INSTO, FAMO, and BANKO) confirms the previous result on the second-
order agency problem and the expropriation hypothesis regarding control by external blockholders.  
Board Structure and External Governance Mechanisms:  More interesting evidence is that the 
board variables, PNED and DUAL, still have similar strong consistent negative influence on ROA, ROE, 
and MTBV (tables 4.22-4.26). In contrast to the primary analyses, BSIZE now show strong negative 
relations with ROA for median regression estimation methods as shown from table 6.3. Contrary to 
this, BSIZE has positive relationship with ROE according to the results the two fixed-effects and GEE 
estimations and with MTBV according to the result of median regression. These results are 
confirmed in table 4.26, and this indicates the consistency across the two models, which is 
interesting.  
The external governance mechanism variables – TOINTENS and TDTA – also generally show results 
similar to the primary analyses even though there are differences across estimation methods. 
Furthermore, the firm specific control variables and the lagged performance variables also show the 
consistent pattern of relationship across the two models and similar evidence as in the primary 
analyses.  
Fixed Effects:  The fixed-effects regressions results indicate that most of the predictors have 
significant relation with firm performance. They show the effects of the predictors based on the 
differences in factors (year and industry differences) that are economically remarkable. In fixed-
effects regression, it is supposed that separate regressions for each factor are made, and then the 
coefficients are averaged across the factors. Each individual or factor serves as its own control. Even 
though FE methods reduce bias, the consequence is that the standard errors tend to be larger than 
random effect or GEE. 
The within-year FE (YearFE) regression shows that INO, PNED, DUAL, TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL, TA, 
RNDTS, SGATS, and ROAt-1 that are significant according to median regression still retain significant 
relation with ROA, thus implying there are no year difference effects regarding the predictors. INSTO, 
BANKO, BSIZE, AGE, and FATS that are significant with median regression, however, show 
insignificant relationship with ROA according to YearFE estimation and this indicates that there is 
fixed effects from the differences in years for the indicated variables.  
Finally, the industry FE estimation show that the variables like INO, TDTA, PVOL, RNDTS, SGATS, and 
lagged ROA that are significant in median regression retained their significant relation with ROA 
there are no industry effects regarding the variables. INSTO, BANKO, PNED, DUAL, BSIZE, TOINTENS, 
TA, AGE, and FATS that are significant according to median regression have no significant relation 
with ROA, thus indicating that there is fixed effects from the differences in industry.  
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4.7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this empirical study we investigated and analysed whether there is positive or negative 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance by controlling for the governance 
mechanisms and other environmental factors using a panel data. Its main finding is that there is a 
positive or negative relationship between ownership structures, measured in proportion of shares 
held by blockholder categories (insider ownership, and external ownership and its component 
categories) and firm performance, measured in ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER.  
Moreover, from the observed few differences in the results of the regressions on different 
performance variables, it might be also suggestive that the accounting measures of firm 
performance (ROA and ROE) give more systematic pattern than valuation based measures (MTBV 
and PER), especially when many of the explanatory variables come from accounting data of 
variables. Even though there is some similarity of the patterns of the relationship of ownership 
variables with both types of performance measures. The differences in results between accounting 
and market based performance measures might also arise from the possible manipulations of 
accounting values and the intended signalling announcements by the management. Hence, it might 
be suggested that the influence of the values of the market measures coming from the combination 
of the accounting information and other corporate public information might lead to some 
unsystematic pattern of effect on MTBV and PER. Thus, contrary to the suggestions of the market 
efficiency theory, the market values might differ from the expected value of the reported accounting 
earnings or income.  
The consistent evidence of this research is that there is positive nonlinear relationship between 
insider ownership (INO, INO^2 and INO^3) and firm performance, thus supporting the alignment of 
interest hypothesis. The evidence does not support theoretical reasoning of interest alignment-
entrenchment or alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypotheses suggested by Stulz (1988), which is 
supported empirically by Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey 
(1999). However, caution is required in the interpretations since (1) the positive results might 
arguably be the resultant average outcome of positive and negative relations, hence incentive  and 
entrenchment that might work at the same time at higher ownership level, and (2) the methodology 
used has accounted for multicollinearity of insider ownership in nonlinearity assumption, even 
though it has not accounted for the piece-wise estimation for some ranges of managerial ownership 
and for different sources of endogeneity, and (3) the panel data and the aggregate of ownership of 
executive and non executive directors used in this research cannot be compared with the studies 
that used cross-sectional data and only executive ownership respectively.  
To sum up, the insight from the study is that the decreases in the positive coefficients of the linear 
insider ownership, square of insider ownership and cube of insider ownership might suggest 
evidence of the rise in the alignment of interest at a decreasing rate, thus exhibiting the diminishing 
marginal productivity of the firm as managerial ownership increases. It might also be argued that the 
reduced rate of performance with the different roots of the polynomial might indicate the potential 
for both an incentive and an entrenchment effect, which are supposed to happen at the same time 
with one outweighing the other after a certain degree of ownership level. Hence, it might be 
suggestive that the reduced rate of performance could be due to the increasing impact of the 
entrenchment effect which reduces the positive benefits from the incentive alignment effect. 
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Moreover, NFO also has positive relation with firm performance. This might suggest that both INO 
and NFO, which are also directed by management, enhance firm performance. It is arguable that INO 
and NFO might enhance firm performance because the decisions or actions of the nonfinancial 
owners are also undertaken by the directors. The evidence supports the similarity of behaviour of 
INO and NFO regarding the trends of ownership overtime as investigated in Part One of this 
Research Thesis, which show that they follow the same pattern generally and particularly during the 
eve of the current global financial crisis (2006-2007).  
Furthermore, there is also evidence that ownership of the components of aggregate external 
blockholders also influence firm performance. There is negative association between INSTO, FAMO, 
and BANKO and firm performance. Their aggregate outsider ownership (OUTO) is found also to have 
a negative influence on firm performance. The interpretation of this might be that individual external 
blockholders categories (INSTO, FAMO, BANKO, and GOVO) or their aggregate (OUTO) tend to 
decrease firm value due to the private benefits of control when they are controllers in terms of their 
voting rights or when they form collusion for control, thus leading to the second-type of agency 
problem, and necessitating investor protection (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 2000). The 
evidence might suggest the conflict-of interest hypothesis and the strategic-alignment hypothesis on 
institutional owners and the appropriation hypothesis on family or individual household, and bank, 
thus confirming the second-type agency conflicts. 
Moreover, regarding the assumption of endogeneity, the results show consistent evidence as in 
Weir et al. (2002) that the lagged performance variables significantly influence the current 
performance. The insight is that depending on the previous performance of the firm, investors might 
be influenced to increase or decrease their ownership stake in the company. This might be also 
related to the positive relation between inside block ownership and firm performance, where it 
might be arguable that block ownership might also be driven by firm performance.  
Interestingly, the board variables, PNED, DUAL and BSIZE, have consistent negative relation with 
ROA and ROE. The result on PNED is inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis of the agency 
theory. However, it supports the argument that NEDs might have negative association with firm 
performance since they are part-timers, sit on multiple boards and lack complete information for 
decisions when compared to EDs (Bozec, 2005). It can also be argued that the NEDs, which are part 
of the management, could be utility maximizers and cooperate with the executive managers for 
private benefits of control which might lead to negative performance and that not all NEDs are 
independent directors. Moreover, it might also be suggestive that other external governance 
mechanisms might have a complementary or substitution effects on NEDs to enhance firm 
performance. Finally, it can be added that the endogenous relationship between board of directors 
and firm performance, where current board characteristics is affected by past performance might 
also affect the result. Hence, the negative influence of PNED on performance does not necessarily 
imply that the recommendations of the UK Code of Best Practices on directors’ independence and 
the number of NEDs are wrong. Therefore, it is suggestive that a further research with a better 
methodology that accounts for endogeneity problems might reveal reliable evidence on the effect of 
PNED on firm performance.  
Moreover, consistent with the agency perspective regarding the board leadership on the 
entrenchment of the CEO or executives that are with the ability to curb the monitoring role of the 
directors and the rationale behind the UK Code of Best Practice that recommends the split of the 
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roles of the CEO and chairmanship of the board, the results shows strong evidence of negative 
influence of duality (DUAL) on performance. This finding fills the empirical gap by providing evidence 
that supports the rationale behind the Code’s recommendations on the separation of the roles of 
the CEO and the Chairman. Finally, board size is found to have a negative relation with performance 
consistent with the reports of Yermack (1995) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) and confirming the 
viewpoint of effective functional boardroom size and the rationale behind the recommendation of 
the UK Code.  
As for other governance mechanisms, all of the variables selected show significant relationship with 
performance. The evidence show that debt financing (TDTA) is negatively related to ROA, ROE, and 
MTBV as observed in the primary analyses and confirmed in the sensitivity analyses. The evidence is 
in contrast to the monitoring hypothesis of the agency perspective of debt financing, where positive 
relation with firm performance is expected. However, it supports the theory of financial distress 
related to debt financing, which suggests the negative influence of the increase in debt financing on 
the firm.  
Finally, there is positive influence of takeover intensity on ROA consistently, and on ROE and MTBV 
inconsistently. This is consistent with the results of the study of Weir et al. (2002) on the UK firms. 
The theoretical rationale of the positive association is that as takeover intensity increases firm 
performance goes up since management works hard to avoid takeover or so that they would retain 
their job if the firm is taken over. So, the evidence is in line with the disciplining effect of takeover 
market, and its monitoring role per se the agency perspectives. 
The discussions above assessed the evidence on the impact of individual predictor (independent) 
variables on firm performance, taking others constant. Nevertheless, drawing conclusion on the way 
the system of corporate governance works being based on the individual estimates provided by the 
empirical analyses might be misleading. Since corporate governance is a system of different 
governance arrangements, it would be wise to consider that alternative mechanisms always exist 
working together or in different direction in mitigating the agency problems between managers and 
shareholders. The use of one governance mechanism might depend on the use of other alternatives 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Hence, the following insights are derived from the correlation analysis 
of pairs of governance mechanisms, which is used as an elementary procedure to shed light into the 
complementarity and substitution effects between the governance mechanisms.  
The external blockholder ownerships like NFO, INSTO, NFO, FAMO and BANKO are significantly 
negatively correlated with TOINTENS, DUAL, BSIZE, and PNED might imply that the external 
governance mechanisms and the board structure might have the substitution effect on external 
blockholders ownership in enhancing firm performance by exerting their monitoring role.  
The correlation analysis shows that TOINTENS is complement to NFO and FAMO, suggesting that 
NFO and FAMO might facilitate takeover to mitigate the agency problems and enhance firm 
performance. The positive correlation between nonexecutive directors and CEO-duality (PNED and 
DUAL) might imply that they are complements to each other. Additionally, the pair-wise correlation 
shows that takeover intensity (TOINTENS) is a complement to debt financing (TDTA). However, the 
pair-wise correlation analysis cannot be a reliable procedure that is robust enough to arrive at 
conclusive statements regarding the complementary or the substitutive effects between the 
governance mechanisms.  
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Nevertheless, the study has its limitations. Firstly, one might argue that there might be specification 
error or omitted variables due to the lower R2. Since (1) the overall model fit is good, (2) one test 
indicated that there is no such a problem though the other shows the opposite, (3) literature show 
that researchers in economics live up with lower R2, (4) we are concerned with the significance of 
the relationship rather than the magnitude of the coefficients, and (5) we use non-OLS methods for 
estimation, we believe that the results are still acceptable.  
Secondly, the methodology falls short of undertaking the appropriate handling of endogeneity of 
non-ownership variables like board of directors (pairwise correlation analysis used is not robust). We 
suggest the further research with the structural system of equations or structural equations 
modelling, where 2SLS or 3SLS or other estimations methods of instrumental variables are utilized.  
Thirdly, the model has limitation in that it has not accounted for the possible reverse causality 
between ownership structure and board structure on the one hand and firm performance on the 
other hand; and this can appropriately be accounted for by using structural equation modelling.  
Fourthly, the financial analysts that have the monitoring role on the management of firms is not 
accounted for in the analysis due to the lack of proper data on it.  
Finally, since the results are based only on the use of 3% threshold, it must be noted that the results 
would definitely be different with higher thresholds that produce different blockholder ownership 
levels for different owner categories as previous studies on the UK listed firms have shown (Franks et 
al., 2001; Marchica and Mura, 2005; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Finally, since this study suggests 
that there is the second-order agency problem in the listed UK firms, it is recommended to 
undertake further research on the association of blockholder structures with firm performance in 
the control dominance and contestability perspectives.  
To sum up, the research has its contribution to knowledge since it provides (1) the most updated 
evidence on the relationship between ownership structure measured in several ways and firm 
performance in the major UK public companies, and (2) consistent evidence on the development 
and influence of some of the UK board structures on firm performance since the Higgs Report of 
2003. It also provides a clue into the direction of further research about the control structure in 
corporations.  
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CHAPTER   FIVE 
CORPORATE CONTROL STRUCTURES AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE ON CONTROL 
DOMINANCE-CONTESTABLITY PERSPECTIVES FROM 
THE UK 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Most listed firms, in reality, have multiple blockholders and share ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of a small number of large shareholders in the UK, the US and Continental Europe (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; La Porta et al., 1999; Zwiebel, 1995; Becht and Roel, 1999; Barca and Becht, 2001; 
Becht and Mayer, 2001; and Holderness, 2007). Even so, the common notion characterizing 
ownership of modern listed firms is that they are widely distributed in market-oriented countries like 
the UK and the US. For the UK, the prevalence of a number of significantly large blockholders has 
been reported (Marchica and Mura, 2005).  
The evidence of the prevalence of multiple blockholders questions the universality of the Berle and 
Means (1932) separation of ownership and control hypothesis and the applicability of the principal-
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) to closely held firms with several blockholders. It has 
shifted the focus from the traditional conflict of interest between shareholders and managers to 
another agency conflict between large controlling blockholders and minority shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Holderness 2003), referred to as the second-order agency conflict. Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) were the first to establish the second-order agency problem in listed corporations. 
We define large controlling blockholders as shareholders that have the potential ability to exert 
control pressure in terms of voting power that derives from their cash flow right in their firm relative 
to the remaining firm’s blockholders. It is assumed that multiple large shareholders might have more 
chance to be elected or represented in the board of directors or exert their monitoring role as 
external blockholders in order to influence firm’s decision process and strategy formulation.  
The existing viewpoint on the impact of large controlling blockholders is variable. On the one hand, it 
is stated in literature that they can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, it is suggested that large controlling blockholders can 
be harmful if they pursue their own private benefits or goals that diverges from shareholder value 
maximization or if they reduce the valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Burkart et al., 1997).  
Previous studies approached the impact of blockholders considering mainly the dominant 
shareholder concept. The work on the impact and role of multiple large blockholders is scant and 
new. Yet, little is known about blockholders structures, namely, the way controlling blockholders 
interact with each other and how they share power among themselves in controlling the firm or 
contesting the controlling large blockholders. This paper will try to address both by giving more 
focus on the impact of multiple blockholders assuming that control might always be dominated and/ 
139 
 
or contested by a single blockholder or coalitions of blockholders. Our premise is that the presence 
of multiple large blockholders concentrates corporate share ownership and hence voting power that 
enables to exert pressure to dominate the firm’s decisions and/ or to contest the incumbent 
dominant force controlling the firm; it also increases the number of blockholders that might play in 
the control contest in the firm. Moreover, the formation of coalitions of blockholders also leads to 
ownership or voting concentration that gives the potential ability and incentives to exert control 
pressure.  
Hence, the important questions for this research are: What are the effects of the ownership 
concentration and the control rights and power attached to ownership stakes of a large blockholder 
or coalitions of blockholders on firm performance? How do large and multiple blockholders interact 
or how do they share power among themselves? What forms of blockholders’ structure enhance firm 
performance?  
The motivating background of this research is the UK corporate governance reform and regulatory 
framework that encourages shareholders to exercise their responsibilities as owners at annual 
meetings of shareholders mainly since the Cadbury Report of 1992 following financial crises of 1990s 
that raised public concerns and led to criticisms on managerial greed. The report encourages 
shareholders to exercise their vote and to change their passive approach of exiting the firm by selling 
their stakes to monitoring management (Chakravarty and Hodgkinson, 2001). Similarly, the Hampel 
Report (1998) encouraged shareholders to make judgments and to vote. The series of such 
corporate governance reforms in the UK, including Greenbury Report (1995) and the Myners Report 
(1995), encouraged shareholders, particularly institutional investors, to seek long term strategy 
rather than short term exit, thus calling for more activism. They emphasized that blockholders use or 
cast their voting power effectively. However, despite the call for activism, even though there had 
been an increase in vote casting by institutional investors up to the end of 1990s (Mallin, 1996, 
1999), the proportion of votes casted remained under 40% (Hampel Report, 1998).  
The recent relevant corporate governance reform undertakings, the Higgs Report (2003), 
reemphasized the split of CEO-duality; made radical suggestion that at least half of the directors 
should be NEDs; over-emphasized the earlier Code’s suggestion of the monitoring role of the NEDs; 
encouraged the relationship of the board with shareholders, thus linking the role of NEDs and the 
role of institutional investors; included the definition of ‘independence’ of directors; and expanded 
the role of the senior independent director to provide an alternative channel to shareholders and 
lead evaluations of the chairman’s performance. The cumulative developments in the governance 
initiatives that culminated in the Higgs Report (2003) and the Smith Report (2003), which lays 
guidance on audit committees, led to the changes in the Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
published in July 2003. Hence, the Higgs Report and the Combined Code of 2003, which incorporated 
the principles of the Higgs Report, Smith Report and previous Codes, have the motivating impact on 
controlling for the internal governance mechanism in this research.  The Code also provides that 
they should apply the principles set by the Institutional Shareholders’ Committees (ISC) in “The 
Responsibility of Institutional Shareholders and Agents – Statement of Principles” published in 1991. 
Agents of institutional investors (trustees) are investment managers or voting services that are 
appointed by the institutional shareholders to act on their behalf. A research made on the 
institutional investors that led to the publishing of The Myners Principles (2001), and the Myners 
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Reviews (2004, 2007) on the Principles show the greater progress in activism and engagement of 
institutional investors.  
Shareholder activism might be defined as the actions of intervention by shareholders to influence 
corporate management and boards. The actions of active investors might be: to vote for or against 
management, or threatening the sale of shares and exiting or put pressure on management to take 
or refrain from various actions (force the spin-off of business, block takeovers, limit directors pay or 
fire directors, force a change of strategy, and impose corporate social responsibility policies) as a 
way of dealing with agency problems (Gillan and Starks, 1998; Becht et al., 2008). In some cases, 
shareholder activism might also be directed against external large shareholders; and it can be 
collaborative when it is conducted in private or disruptive when it is in public. Of all forms, the 
exercise of voting power attached to the ownership rights of blockholders is an important form of 
activism considered for the purpose of this research.  
Hence, it is vital to make the conceptual definition of ownership concentration and blockholders 
structure from the perspective of firm control. In defining ownership concentration and blockholders 
structure in terms of control perspectives, we might need to make distinctions between significant 
blockholders, controlling blockholders, dominant blockholders or contesting blockholders for the 
purpose of this research. We define ownership concentration in terms of the size of ownership 
stakes held by all significant blockholders (ABHO) and the number of all investors that have more or 
less large blocks of stake in the firm (blockholder concentration, NBH). Wruck (1989) writes that 
ownership concentration is based on the share ownership of managers and beneficial owners at the 
disclosure level. Ownership concentration is important factor affecting relations between large 
blockholders and management of the firm (Leech, 1988).  
Hence, the identification of significant blockholders that are defined as those that own identifiable 
blocks of shares above the UK disclosures rule might be used as a basis in measuring ownership 
concentration. Since the magnitude of blocks of shares held by significant blockholders varies, all of 
them might not be able to exert enough control pressure equally; and all significant blockholders 
cannot be controlling or dominant blockholders equally. Controlling blockholders are significant 
shareholders that own highly significant blocks of shares that might give the ability to assume and 
exert effective control pressure that influence firm’s decision-making than others. They are 
shareholders that might dominate votes taken at company meetings where ownership is highly 
concentrated (Leech, 1988). In the UK, a blockholder or group of blockholders owning at least 30% of 
the outstanding shares of a firm in the UK are bound to mandatory takeover rule that gives 
influencing control over the firm. Where ownership concentration is low, dominance by the major 
controlling blockholders is absent (Leech, 1988) and control of the firm contested. In the UK, where 
ownership is diffuse, the blockholders that have the control potential might either be dominant 
blockholders, which have voting rights that might dominate firm’s decision making, or contesting 
blockholders, which might exert the monitoring control on the behaviour and actions of dominant or 
controlling blockholders or the management.  
Regarding corporate control and blockholders structure, the existing few theoretical models or 
frameworks that explain the relationship among large multiple blockholders that have potential 
power of control could not underpin the possible arts of control games in the coalition for control 
and the contestability of control (Zwiebel, 1995; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). Hence, the 
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research uses the existing scant and few theoretical frameworks in order to analyze the 
contestability of control in the presence of controlling blockholders by taking into account the costs 
and benefits of control. Hence, it investigates the different possible forms of blockholder structures 
and their impact on firm performance using a panel data coming from the UK FTSE All Share Index 
companies between 2003 and 2007. It considers contestability of control following Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2009). However, it differs from the studies in that it (1) 
simultaneously analyses control contestability and control dominance believing that analyzing only 
control contestability would mean not accounting for the opposing factor that has impact on both 
contestability and performance, (2) considers collective action and coalitions of blockholders, (3) 
includes board structure, and (4) uses structural equations modelling in order to determine several 
control factors and firm performance in order to account for the different forms of endogeneity 
problems within the framework.  
Hence, in addressing the issue of corporate control, we use mainly two concepts in this research, 
namely control dominance (and monopolizability) and control contestability. Control dominance is a 
control setting in which the corporate control is dominantly controlled by a single blockholder or 
coalitions of blockholders that have enough voting rights to exert effective control pressure and 
dictate their proposals in decision-making process. Monopolizability of control might be defined as 
the extent to which control might be monopolized by a coalition of groups of blockholders. It is 
assumed that attempts of monopolizing might arise as a counter to the undertaking of contests to 
the power of the incumbent dominating control force. Control contestability is a control set up in 
which a large blockholder or coalitions of blockholders contest the incumbent controller by exerting 
monitoring pressure or pose pressure to gather enough voting rights to make threats to take a 
dominant position. The research assumes these two opposing control forces arise, co-exist, change 
and disappear together in the control configuration of the firm.  
The empirical findings of this research are of two folds. Firstly, the evidences support the existing 
agency theory and hypotheses on the determinants of firm performance. The evidence of positive 
impact of takeover, and of consistent negative impact of PNED on current return on assets (ROA) 
confirms the empirical validity of (a) the agency theory on the role of takeover market as a 
monitoring and disciplining role of external governance mechanism, and (b) the hypothesis that 
takeover is a substitute for internal governance mechanism. The result that debt financing reduce 
firm performance empirically supports the theory of financial distress. There is also evidence that 
debt financing and stock markets have complementarity effect with CEO-duality. Moreover, the 
result confirms dynamic endogeneity hypothesis showing that lagged ROA has positive impact on 
current ROA and negative impact on CEO-duality. Furthermore, the negative consistent impact of 
takeover intensity on both the proportion of non-executive directors (PNED) and CEO-duality while 
having positive impact on ROA might suggest evidence for the substitution effects of takeover on the 
board of directors.  
Secondly, there is the evidence that supports the empirical validity of control dominance and 
contestability hypothesis on blockholders’ structure and the monitoring role of contestability of 
control for UK listed firms. The results show evidence that contestability factors dominate over their 
corresponding dominant factors and they enhance firm performance (ROA); and this provides the 
empirical validity of control contestability hypothesis for the UK listed firms. Moreover, the evidence 
shows that contestability variables enhance the proportion of nonexecutives in the board and 
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diminish CEO-duality, which is found to reduce firm performance, thus, confirming the empirical 
validity of the rationale behind (1) the monitoring hypothesis of the agency perspectives on board 
structure, and (2) the recommendations in the UK Code of Best Practice on board structure. The 
opposite impact of dominance factors (positive impact) and contestability factors (negative impact) 
on CEO-Duality is another evidence of control dominance and contestability perspectives. 
Hence, the research contributes to the existing debate on the how large blockholders interact and 
share power among themselves. It expands the existing theoretical models of control contestability 
into the model of control dominance (including monopolizability) and contestability, by considering 
the interaction of dominance and contestability in the equilibrium in a wider system of structural 
equations model. It confirms that a framework of structural equations model (SEM) that 
incorporates the internal governance mechanisms (board structure), control dominance and 
contestability factors and external governance mechanisms is a suggestible methodology required to 
analyze how control of listed firms is determined and their impact on firm performance. The 
simultaneous consideration of control dominance and contestability framework together with other 
control factors empirically sheds light into the blockholders structure and the way they interact and 
share power in controlling and monitoring firms and determining performance of widely held 
corporations. The other contribution to knowledge of the research is that it provides evidence from 
the UK listed firms confirming the dominance and contestability of control hypothesis, namely that 
control is contestable and that dominance and contestability of control structure determines board 
structure and performance.  
Finally, the rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 shades light into the background 
of the research issue with respect to the UK case and literature review relevant to the issue of 
dominance and contestability of control. Section 5.3 deals with the theoretical frameworks or 
models regarding control dominance and contestability and the empirical implication of the model. 
Following that section 4 deals with hypotheses development and formulation that ensue from the 
theoretical and empirical models and finance literature. In section 5.5 presents the methodology 
which identifies the sample and data, variables used in the analysis, model specifications, and 
estimation methods. Section 5.6 presents the results and the analyses. Finally, section 5.7 provides 
the conclusion ensuing from the study.  
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5.2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
5.2.1 Review of the Background of the UK Case 
The issue of blockholders’ structure, as already mentioned, is important in the UK corporate control 
because the share ownership in listed firms is dispersed in small parcels amongst large number of 
shareholders and there are several significant blockholders with shareholdings that are close to each 
other. We assume that all shareholders holding more than the disclosure level (3%) of the UK listed 
firm’s outstanding shares are significant blockholders since they carry the voting power that can 
make changes in the balance of power or decision-making process when voting coalitions (blocks) 
are formed. The provisions in the UK allow minority shareholders protection, in which even lower 
voting-blocks matter a lot. The UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers requires that 15% or more 
votes of a firm must declare own intentions about making a takeover move. Those acquiring 30% 
must offer to purchase all remaining shares at a higher price ever offered over the previous 12 
months. Additionally, a shareholder with 25% stake can block particular forms of new equity issues 
and mergers (Franks and Mayer, 2002; Crespi and Renneboog, 2003).  
Moreover, the stock market in the UK is very liquid and it might tempt an individual investor to 
express own reservations about management by exiting (short-termism) - selling up to invest 
elsewhere. However, Chakravarty and Hodgkinson (2001, 2004) argue that resorting to the sale of a 
small block of shares in a liquid market is unlikely to depress the price of stocks. Based on this, large 
shareholders might, arguably, know that the fall in share prices with the rise in the supply of stocks 
to the secondary markets might affect their wealth. This might creative the incentives in the 
shareholders to exert control pressure instead of exit strategy by resorting to shareholder activism 
and collective actions in order to dominate or contest in firm control. Hence, related to block 
ownership, an important issue is whether ownership concentration or dispersion and large 
blockholders in the UK listed firms (if they are active) can enhance firm performance or not.  
The other important issue related to control of corporations is the role of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms, the board of directors. Franks and Mayer (2002) report that the directors 
play weak role in corporate governance and the non-executive directors do not perform a 
disciplinary function, even though separation of Chairman and CEO position plays the function. 
Moreover, considering the legal rules and regulations, Franks and Mayer (2002) argue that the 
powers to enforce directors’ fiduciary responsibilities are weak in the UK. This is based on Stapledon 
(1996) argument that actions to enforce the duties in listed firms had been almost non-existent then 
even though the directors owe their firms fiduciary responsibilities. This is debatable since the 
absence or rareness of taking directors to court might not necessarily indicate the existence of weak 
enforcement of directors’ fiduciary duties and since there is high investor protection in the UK. They 
also suggest that directors of UK companies perform more of an advisory role than a monitoring role 
(Franks and Mayer, 2002, p.19). It is thus essential to find out empirically whether this is the case or 
whether the UK board of directors’ impact control dominance and firm performance or not.  
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Regarding blockholder, Franks and Mayer (2002) find strong evidence of managerial entrenchment 
that leads to poor performance, and they conclude that large blockholders do not seem to discipline 
poorly performing UK listed companies, except in industrial firms. They report that the single most 
important of large blocks are directors who might use their stakes to resist outside intervention. 
Moreover, literature show that institutional investors are the dominant shareholders in the UK listed 
firms. However, empirical results show no strong evidence that link institutional investors’ activism 
(disciplining or monitoring role) to firm performance for the UK firms (Black and Coffee, 1994; Faccio 
and Lasfer, 2000; McKnight and Weir, 2009).  
One possible explanation regarding the nature of UK large shareholders activism might be related to 
the national level of governance system. It is stated that the UK national level of corporate 
governance system is outsider system, where most large firms are directly controlled by their 
managers, but indirectly controlled through actions of outsider blockholders, especially by 
institutional investors (Franks and Mayer, 1994; Short et al., 1998). It is not as in the insider system 
of corporate governance, like in Germany, where most companies are controlled by one or more 
major blockholder categories such as families, other firms and banks. It is suggested that 
institutional blockholders, that characterize the UK outsider system, might have substantial influence 
over the company directors (Solomon and Solomon, 1999). Hence, the form of direct or indirect 
control of outside blockholders in the UK, which is not empirically established, is an important 
research issue.  
Due to the financial crises and corporate failures of the beginning of 1990s and 2000s, series of UK 
corporate governance reforms have been encouraging in increase the activism of shareholders in 
general and institutional investors in particular. The Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel 
(1998) corporate governance commissions (Crespi and Renneboog, 2002) published reports that 
included recommendations on shareholder activism among other things.  
One form of activism encouraged in the governance reforms is the use of voting rights. The Cadbury 
Report (1992) provides that institutional investors should use their voting rights in order to carry on 
their responsibility to be active on behalf of their clients and to use vote in order to effect change 
instead of resorting to short-termism and recommends that they should disclose their voting 
policies. The Hampel Report (1998) also encouraged the increase activism by using voting rights. In 
line with this, the largest group of UK institutional investors, the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF) also encourages that all institutional investors should devise voting policies and to cast 
their votes regularly at the annual General Meetings of their investee companies (NAPF, 1995). 
Surveying institutional voting behaviour of investment funds Mallin (1996, 1997, 1999) show the fast 
growth in vote castings by intuitional investors, though many are not voting at all. Likewise, the 
Hampel Report (1998) assured reforming impact of the Cadbury Committee recommendations by 
stating that several institutional investors announced their voting policy on all resolutions at 
investee company meetings. However, it disclosed that there had not been significant increase since 
the proportion of shares voted remained under 40%. The Pension & Investment Research 
Consultants Ltd (PIRC, 1999) survey on institutional investors voting trends show that overall proxy 
voting levels have increased to 50%. Hence, given that proportion of votes casted by blockholders is 
reported to be low, the interesting question that remains is: how do institutional investors exert their 
influences on the directors? What other form is the UK shareholder activism practically taking?  
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Moreover, researching the roles and responsibilities of trustees, the Myners (2001) makes alarming 
reports, among other things, that 62% of them had no professional qualifications in finance or 
investment; 77% of them had no in-house investment professionals to assist them; and 49% of them 
spent 3 hours or less preparing for pension investment matters. In its conclusions, the Myners 
Review (2001) suggests that (1) trustees are in a responsible position and have the ultimate decision-
making power for the strategy of institutional investors, and (2) trustees are required to be prepared 
more to take on their important role. Furthermore, the Myners Reviews of 2004 and 2007 show 
progress in trustees improving knowledge and understanding, strategic investment decisions, 
transparency and reporting, and activism and engagement etc. and recommending more 
shareholder activism and the adoption of the Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) Principles 
(2007) that provides voluntary disclosure of votes to encourage activism (Financial Reporting 
Council, FRC, 2010).   
The more recent corporate governance initiatives the UK relevant to this research, the Combined 
Code (2006), in contrast to the previous Code allows that the Chairman to serve on remuneration 
committee if considered independent on appointment, and recommends that the Chairman should 
not chair the committee. It also provides an additional option, ‘vote withheld’ to proxy voting by 
shareholders in addition to the options of ‘for’ and ‘against’ resolution. This enables shareholders to 
indicate if they have reservations on a resolution, even though ‘vote withheld’ is not a vote and is 
not counted to determine the proportion of votes for or against the resolution. Finally, the Code 
provides that the details of the proxy vote including ‘votes withheld’ and the terms of reference of 
the three board subcommittees should be made available to shareholders on company website.  
Moreover, two recent Reports have been published initiated by the recent financial crisis – the 
Turner Report (2009) and the Walker Report (2009). The Turner Report (2009) makes 
recommendations on exerting more regulation on banks and other financial institutions, and on 
remuneration policies. It provides that remuneration policies should be designed to avoid incentives 
for undue risk-taking and that risk management considerations should be closely integrated into 
remuneration decision to be developed and enforced by UK and global codes. Lately, the Walker 
Report (2009) makes recommendations that strengthen the position of the chairman as the leader 
of the board, and that non-executive directors (NEDs) should have required business experience and 
commit more time to the business entity. 
The other form of activism encouraged by the UK governance reforms is communication of 
strategies to and entering dialogue (engagement) with investee companies. From the concerns 
about short-termism, the Cadbury Report (1992) suggest that companies should communicate their 
strategies to their major shareholders and that their shareholders should understand them if long-
term relationship is to be developed. More explicitly, the Hampel Report (1998) formalized the link 
between decision and communication by stating that institutional investors should enter into 
dialogue with firms. It is reported that institutional investors have traditionally been communicating 
with their investee companies mainly for trade information rather than for monitoring their firms.  
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Regarding entering dialogue, literature shows that the UK blockholders’ activism has developed from 
monitoring for trade information to engagement. Solomon and Solomon (1999, p.290) suggest that 
there is a further indication of activism, which shows that institutional investors form coalitions if 
companies are seen to be in a crisis, thereby seeking to solve problems rather than selling their 
shares. Holland (1998) and Jackson (2001) suggest also that some UK investors used meetings with 
senior executives for dialogue, and that the dialogue were primarily used as a basis for their buying 
and selling decisions. Moreover, later reports suggest that the UK mainstream institutions have 
transformed themselves from the traditional non-interventionist policy and monitoring only for 
trade formation to activism to control (Hendry et al, 2004). Hendry et al. (2004) write that the UK 
institutions have significantly increased both the resources they devote to corporate governance 
related activities (having senior managers responsible for corporate governance, and dedicating 
teams of experts on corporate governance) and their active engagements with companies. The 
evidenced engagement approach is the rapid growth in opposing against company resolutions 
through voting (PIRC 2002, 2003) and publicly through the press. For instance, the growing tensions 
between the increasingly vocal institutions and the boards of firms in which they invest related to 
the series of highly publicized interventions in the UK led to the reported meetings between 
representatives of the two sides called by the companies in an attempt to make peace (Lewis, 2004). 
Buchanan et al., (2009) find that the success rate of the UK shareholder activism through proxy 
practices between 2000 and 2006 is higher than that of the US.  
Another form of activism witnessed in the UK is related to the use of the right to call Extraordinary 
General Meeting (EGM) with a 10% or more voting power, as provided in UK law. One good example 
is the Hermes U.K. Focus Fund use of strategy to increase its shares in the company it has already 
stakes and the use of the threat of calling EGM to internalize the benefits of activism. The 
internalized benefits of activism are manifested in the improvement of firm performance or 
shareholder values. As evidence to this fact, Becht et al. (2008) report the success of Hermes fund’s 
activism (activities of using letters, memos, other communications via telephones) in generating 
returns to its investors (measured in annual raw returns net of fees of 8.2% and abnormal returns 
net of fees of 4.9%) against the FTSE All Share Index during 1998-2004.  
The last form of activism in the UK we consider is collective actions.  UK institutions are well 
organized and they frequently make engagements of collective actions through the formation of 
coalitions or associations like, the Association of British Insurers and the National Association of 
Pension Funds (Becht et al., 2008). Such associations and their collective actions of UK institutional 
investors might be a power tool of shareholder monitoring or control. Moreover, we suggest that 
there might be blockholders’ coalition that might be formed for temporary or permanent collective 
action. The UK regulatory authorities consider coalitions of shareholders formed for a longer period 
of time an investor group that is liable to all disclosure requirements, reporting and governance 
regulations that apply to large blockholders (15% stake to disclose strategic intent, 30% stake to 
comply to mandatory takeover rule) (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001; Stapledon, 1996). Hence, the 
existence of long-term blockholders coalition agreements are rarely made public and are only forged 
on ad hoc basis for specific purposes like removing management, takeover contest, etc. Hence, 
coalitions are commonly kept confidential. However, there can be explicit voting contracts that are 
drawn up (Van Hulle, 1998). The confidential nature of voting contracts makes it difficult to directly 
evidence blockholder coalitions in the UK (Crespi and Renneboog, 2003). Since it might be possible 
to forge coalitions for institutions via meeting at national association forums and other categories of 
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blockholders can also forge voting coalitions based on their similarities and common private benefits 
of control, we argue that it is valid to think about control coalitions in the UK.  
Moreover, it is arguable that the UK corporate system is favourable and conducive for shareholder 
activism because of shareholder protection provided in the mandatory rules and regulations. Firstly, 
the UK Company Law provides that it is mandatory that shareholders can change the articles and 
memorandum, whereas the US state law states that it is mandatory that the shareholders cannot 
initiate a change in the company Charter (Bebchuk, 2005). Hence, shareholders in the UK can change 
the company regulation without the approval or agreement of the board, whereas the approval of 
the board is mandatory if shareholders initiate the amendment of the original Charter in some US 
states.  
Secondly, investor protection in the UK can be noted from the regulatory framework that requires 
cumulative majority voting for each director, where ‘yes’ vote count for every director must be a 
majority excluding abstentions. Any director that stands for election or re-election can be removed 
from the board by the vote rule without alternative director being proposed or appointed in the UK. 
In contrast, in some US states, where state law applies, for instance, Delware, majority of votes cast 
is not needed for a director to be elected, nor is it possible to cast votes against candidates. This 
indicates that the legislation in the US is more in favour of the incumbent management (Bebchuk, 
2007).  
Finally, another indicator of the shareholder protection in the UK law is that shareholders can call 
Extraordinary General Meeting with a 10% or more voting power, and make proposals to remove 
any or all of the directors and casting simple majority vote. Hence, staggered boards cannot 
constrain the power of shareholders to dismiss directors in the UK. In contrast, shareholders cannot 
call such a meeting unless it is provided in the corporate charters in Delware, the US, where the 
removal of the directors, particularly of staggered boards is difficult.  
To sum up, it is shown from the background issues related to the UK corporate system that there 
have been conducive situations and factors for blockholders activism provided by corporate 
governance reforms, associations of shareholders and the communication and engagements 
between blockholders and investee companies provided by the outsider system of governance 
system in the UK that traditionally create relationship atmosphere between investors and 
companies. Even though there are several forms of activism of shareholders in the UK, it is difficult 
to know which one effectively is being undertaken to control or monitor firms. The most viable and 
effective form to assume control is coalition of blockholders, which is still confidential and difficult to 
detect and measure. Despite this, the research will make its own assumptions of the presence of 
coalitions of blockholders and collective actions for dominating and contesting control in order to 
investigate which blockholder structures, including coalitions, are determinants of firm performance 
and board structure. The following section will make review of the literature in order to show the 
theoretical and methodological issues of blockholders and firm control in priori studies related to 
the theme.  
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5.2.2 Reviews on Blockholders and Firm Control 
On the prevalence of blockholders owning significant blocks of share stakes in listed corporations 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) document that the combined stakes of the top five and top twenty 
shareholders averaged 25% and nearly 40% respectively for a sample of 511 large US firms in 1980. 
Additionally, the comprehensive study by La Porta et al. (1999) established that ownership is highly 
concentrated around the world, confirming the prevalence of large blockholders.  
Regarding Western Europe, Becht and Mayer (2001) find high level of ownership concentration for 
most of the European countries. According to the European Corporate Governance Network (ECGN), 
in eight out of the nine largest stock markets of the European Union, including the UK, the median 
size of the second largest voting bloc in large listed firms exceeds 5%. The only exception according 
to ECGN in the list are Austria and Germany, whose second largest voting blocs are less than 5% 
(2.5% and 0 respectively) (Becht and Mayer, 2001). In Germany, between 25 and 40% of the listed 
firms were found to have 2 or more large blockholders (Becht and Boehmer, 2001; Lehmann and 
Weigand, 2000). Becht and Mayer (2001) reported that the third median voting blocs of UK non-
financial listed companies is 5.2%, where they are less than 5% for the Continent. Beyond the tenth 
largest blockholding, they find that the mean voting bloc is greater than 3%. These facts indicate that 
the UK has higher ownership dispersion than on the Continent and the prevalence of more number 
of blockholders in the UK. More recently, Holderness (2007) finds that the US ownership 
concentration is similar to that of elsewhere.  
Despite the evidence on the prevalence of large blockholders that are common around the world 
and even in the relatively widely dispersed ownership structure countries of the UK and the US, 
there is still a lack of strong theoretical framework on the controlling and monitoring role of large 
blockholders, whose voting power is very important in determining corporate control. Hence, the 
theoretical framework regarding the second-order agency problem and the role of large 
blockholders in corporate control might be of significant practical importance for researchers as well 
as policy makers. Hence, this research devotes a part to the theoretical framework, which is still 
scant.  
According to the neoclassical theory of the firm, the dispersed share ownership means that the risk 
is shared efficiently across a multitude of individual shareholders that have control rights to the firm 
in proportion of their share stake in a one-share-one-vote rule. This is depicted in the private 
property rights theory and the resource-based perspectives. The resource-based approach, which 
studies power in terms of the basic resources from which it derives, suggests that ownership control 
of listed firms is related to the shares stakes of different shareholders and the voting rules provided 
in the Articles of Association of the firms (Leech, 2004). However, considering the wide dispersion of 
corporate share ownership, the separation of ownership from control hypothesis and the principal-
agent theory established the view that the source of conflict in modern corporations is between 
shareholders and managers (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Even though the fact about the principal-agent relationship and conflict cannot be denied, 
theoretical framework on significant blockholders having significant voting powers that determines 
the corporate control factors in the firm is also required to explain or model a complete picture of 
corporate control. Hence, since the existing empirical evidence on the share ownership pattern 
shows that the reality of the modern public corporation is much different from the neoclassical 
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theoretical setting, the second-order agency theory on the conflict of interest between large 
blockholders and minority shareholders needs more attention.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) lay the theoretical base of several blockholders, when they formulated 
the principal-agent relationship, describing the problems that arise between the owner-manager 
and minority blockholders as the owner-manager or entrepreneur sells part of the stakes. They 
suggest that as entrepreneur’s proportion of equity stakes fall, the owner-manager tends to 
appropriate larger amounts of the corporate resources in the form of perquisites, which induces 
minority shareholders to expend more resources in monitoring the owner-manager. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976, p9-10) devise a simple formal analysis of agency problems by making, among 
others, the following permanent simplifying assumptions: (1) all outside equity shares are non-
voting, (2) no outside owner gains utility from ownership in a firm in any way other than through its 
effect on his wealth or cash flows, and (3) there exists a single manager (the peak coordinator) with 
ownership interest in the firm.  
However, it can be argued that the reality of modern listed corporations with widely dispersed share 
ownership is different, and the three assumptions are not valid for the situation where several 
blockholders with voting power attached to their cash flow rights exist. Firstly, in the UK where there 
is predominantly one-share-one-vote, almost all outside equity have voting rights. Secondly, the 
voting rights and power gives the significant blockholders the incentive and ability to control or 
monitor the firm and to gain utility from the ownership. Finally, there are multiple managers with 
ownership interest in the firm. The analysis of the principal-agent relationship by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and the analysis of the separation of ownership and control relevant to agency 
problem by Fama and Jensen (1983) perfectly works with the absolutely concentrated share 
ownership where the owner manager holds almost all or absolute majority of the equity of the firm 
and where the managers are professionals owning none or insignificant proportion of the company 
outstanding equity. Some of the simplifying assumptions of the model leave out the role of other 
significant blockholders, which might also have the ability and incentives to exert their control 
pressure directly or indirectly even without being elected or represented in the board of directors, 
does not explicitly remarkably explain the second-order agency conflict.  
In fact, the second-order (second-type) agency conflict, which was first suggested by Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), is specifically about the conflict of interest between the controlling large blockholders 
and widely dispersed minority shareholders. The source of conflict and the agency costs inherent in 
the relationship between large blockholders and minority shareholders (the disagreement between 
shareholders themselves) has been explored in literature lately. It is obvious that different 
shareholders or blockholders have different interests. For instance, DeMarzo (1993) argues that   
shareholders may not agree on some investment policies, even though they individually agree on 
the objective to maximize profit, and this can be a source of conflict of interest between large 
controlling blockholders and minority shareholders.  
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Furthermore, DeMarzo (1993) argues that the possibility of disagreement between large controlling 
blockholders and minority shareholders is anticipated since it is embedded in the incorporating 
Charter of a corporation, whereby some mechanism of majority voting is installed to resolve 
potential disputes. The common mechanism to resolve the disputes include proxy battles and other 
control schemes in the company regulations (DeMarzo, 1993). Additionally, Maug (1998) argues that 
some investors, most likely large blockholders, can intervene in a company via hostile takeover.  
It is obvious that the size of the voting power of large blockholders is important in determining the 
corporate control structure. Large blockholders with more than 50% voting power might dominate 
the control of the firm unilaterally (Leech, 1988), even though it might still be possible that the 
remaining blockholders might exert monitoring control by bearing monitoring costs as contestants. 
In the reality of dispersed ownership like the UK listed firms, however, attaining a single-handed 
majority voting right is very rare. The requirement of the UK Takeover Code, which provides that 
owners with at least 30% of shares should make a takeover offer of the remaining equity, might 
possibly support this fact. Regarding the situation where ownership is dispersed and multiple 
blockholders are prevalent, it is suggested that there is a competition among blockholders for votes 
of other shareholders in order to attain a majority vote or any required level of provisions for actions 
and to influence or attain control over the strategy and decision-making of the companies; and this 
might result in controls by coalitions (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). 
Hence, it might be suggestive to think of the potential for the undertakings of control coalitions and 
collective actions by multiple blockholders when ownership is dispersed. Our modelling that also 
assumes coalitions of blockholders stems from this perspective, and the different versions of the 
model will be discussed in details in hypothesis development section. However, we present brief 
introductory review of some models that show how different multiple blockholders compete for 
corporate control as follows.  
The first model worth of mentioning assumes that the first largest blockholder is the ultimate 
controller of the firm. It provides a framework on the possible way in which multiple blockholders 
monitor the controlling shareholder (Winton, 1993; Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bolton and Von Thaden, 
1998). For the purpose of this research, it is also assumed that the second largest blockholder might 
be considered to be the most capable contestant to the control dominance exerted by the largest 
blockholder, especially when there is little difference in their ownership stake. It might be argued 
that the second largest blockholder might be motivated by the shared benefits of control and the 
incentives of cash flow, and hence, exert control pressure bearing the monitoring costs. Even though 
this research delimited to account for it, there might also be the possibility of contesting the control 
power of the largest blockholder by a group of large blockholders. Regarding this, Pagano and Roell 
(1998) suggest that all or some blockholders form a group to monitor a controlling manager that is a 
large blockholder. This assumes that all might bear the monitoring costs, in contrast to the argument 
of free-riding hypothesis, which states that multiple blockholders might not be willing to bear the 
monitoring costs and this discourages monitoring of the controllers or management.  
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Another model considered assumes contestability within a coalition as suggested by Bloch and 
Hedge (2001), which presents a coalition of two large blockholders having difference in the capacity 
to define strategy and to monitor the manager, and competing for winning the votes of minority 
blockholders in order gain control. In the simple model, the winning blockholder defines firm’s 
strategy, and both parties playing a monitoring role and bear the costs. They suggest that the 
competition for others’ vote induces them to reduce their private benefits and this might enhance 
firm value. However, since the assumption of contestability within the coalition in the model is 
important for the purpose of this study, it is suggestive to assume that other blockholders outside 
the coalition of the two first largest blockholders might also exert a contesting pressure on the 
dominant coalition, and this might also enhance firm performance. Our theoretical and empirical 
model, which entails a more detailed discussion on this the model, incorporates this element.  
The third model worth to mention assumes that all of the blockholders form controlling coalition. 
There are theoretical works that suggest how multiple blockholders form controlling coalitions to 
share private benefits of control (Leech, 1988; Zwiebel, 1995; Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bennedsen 
and Wolfenszon, 2000; Gomes and Novaes, 2001). Especially Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and 
Gomes and Novaes (2001) suggest a model in which a controlling coalition of a group of all 
blockholders is formed in order to control the firm. Gomes and Novaes (2001) argue that all large 
shareholders form a control group whose effect depends on the viability of the shared benefits of 
control, resulting in the bargaining effect or the disagreement effect, when deciding on the positive 
NPV projects. Additionally, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) suggest that in a control setting in 
which several blockholders compete for control, a coalition of blockholders is needed in order to 
gain control, where the consent of the members of the group is required to decide on the diversion 
of funds or appropriation of minority shareholders. They argue that such coalition formation has the 
coalition formation effect and the alignment of interest effect.  
In the coalition model of all blockholders, the power of all blockholders can be measured by their 
voting power concentration, which can be a proxy for ownership concentration; hence, the model 
can be tested empirically. However, it excludes the contestability of control within the coalition that 
might also have the wrecking effect on the coalition, and hence, questions the stability and durability 
of such a coalition. It also excludes the possibility of the formation of a separate contesting coalition 
by blockholders motivated by common interest and the private as well as shared benefits of control. 
The other questionable issue we might raise is the viability of coalitions formed by all blockholders in 
the legal environment like in the UK that provides higher investor protection. It is arguable that the 
requirement to disclose strategic intent of voting pact or group (at 15% stake), the takeover 
mandatory rule (at 30% stake), and the clandestine nature of such coalitions (Crespi and Renneboog, 
2003) make it difficult to consider a model of coalition of all blockholders in the UK. Hence, our 
model in this research is limited to dominant coalitions of two blockholders, two contestant 
blockholders or multiple contestant blockholders, in the framework we refer to in this study as 
control dominance-contestability model, which will be discussed in details in the hypotheses 
development section.  
Finally, the few recent literature like La Porta et al. (2002) and Maury and Pajuste (2005) and 
Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) provide models of control contestability in multiple blockholders 
structure and their impact to the firm performance. The baseline model of La Porta et al. (2002) 
presents the impact of investor protection and the decrease or rise in the proportion of share 
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ownership of the sole controlling owner-manager on firm value. However, this simplifying 
assumption might not be enough to embrace the reality of interaction between multiple 
blockholders in listed firms. Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) extended 
the baseline model in order to account for contestability of control. According to their model, 
contestability of control among multiple blockholders might enhance firm value and that the rent 
extraction by the controlling coalition has the opposite effect. In contrast to their model, this 
research extends their contestability of control model to the simultaneous application of dominance 
and contestability of control model.  
Empirically, the existing literature shows that the evidence on the effects of large blockholders on 
firm performance is mixed. Even in countries where there is high ownership concentration, 
Continental Europe, the monitoring role of blockholders is not supported by empirical evidence. 
Banerjee et al. (1997) for France, Renneboog (2000) for Belgium and Bianco and Casavola (1999) for 
Italy show evidence that blockholders do not actively play a monitoring role, as reflected in 
disciplining managers and enhancing the performance of their firms. In contrast, for German and 
Spanish listed firms, there is limited evidence on the positive monitoring impact of blockholders on 
performance (Kaplan, 1994; Crespi and Garcia, 1999).  
On the other hand, Thomsen et al. (2006) find the negative association between aggregate 
blockholder ownership and firm performance and value for Continental Europe. However, studies 
that differentiate between blockholder categories find that blockholders are associated with firm 
performance. For a sample of German firms, 37.5% of which are family businesses, Andres (2008) 
find that family businesses outperform firms with other types of blockholders as well as widely held 
firms, using multivariate analysis, and that family block ownership show positive significant 
association with firm performance using panel regression analysis. Additionally, Hartzell et al. (2003), 
Barber (2006) and Chen et al. (2007) find that the presence of institutional blockholders enhances 
firm performance.  
In Anglo-Saxon countries, where share distribution is widely dispersed and institutional investors are 
the predominant blockholders, and especially where there is an outsider system of control, where 
outsiders indirectly control the firm, it might be expected that the institutional investors play a great 
monitoring role and in corporate control (Black 1998; Gilson and Kraakman, 1991). For, for US firms, 
Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1991) and Bethel et al. (1998) show 
evidence of substantial management disciplining (reflected in management turnover), which is 
associated with majority blocks trade. Interestingly, Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Mikkelson and 
Ruback (1985), and Choi (1991) provide evidence of the similar impact of the acquisition of more 
than 5% ownership block. As previously mentioned, there is weak evidence of the role of large 
blockholders in disciplining poorly performing UK firms generally (Franks et al., 2001; Faccio and 
Lasfer, 2000), and that blockholder participation in control reflected in voting and corporate 
governance has been reported to be low, even though there is reportedly a trend of the rise in vote 
casting by institutional investors (Mallin, 1999).  
Most studies that provide empirical evidence above focus on the impact of largest blockholders or 
individual blockholder categories or aggregates of blockholders.  The trend of argument in very few 
studies is diverging from this to the contestability of control.  For instance, Lehman and Weigand 
(2000) report that the presence of second largest blockholder enhances profitability of German 
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listed firms. Additionally, Volpin (2002) show evidence of higher firm value when control is contested 
(when voting syndicates control the firm). Studying the effect of multiple blockholders on dividends, 
Faccio et al. (2001) find that the presence of multiple large blockholders lowers expropriation in 
Europe. Nevertheless, these studies simply focus on the impact of the presence of multiple 
blockholders on firm performance, not the characteristic of individual blockholders and the forms of 
the possible blockholders’ control structures, namely voting blocs, dominant coalitions and 
contesting coalitions that this research account for.  
Moreover, there are recent studies that addressed the coalition and contestability of control 
hypothesis. Accounting for contestability, Laeven and Levine (2008) find for Western European 
widely held firms that those with the second blockholder have the highest value measured in Tobin’s 
Q than firms with only one large blockholder. Additionally, Volpin (2002) report on Italian listed firms 
that firm’s market value is higher when blockholders form coalitions or syndicates than when there 
is a single blockholder. Furthermore, Gutierrez and Tribo (2004) show that the number of 
blockholders is positively associated with better performance of private firms in Spain. For Swedish 
listed firms, Maury and Pajuste (2005) show evidence of contestability, reporting that when there 
are two blockholders of similar interest, the existence of a third blockholder enhances firm value.  
Hence, in its attempt to investigate contestability, this research has identified two key papers - 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2009). On Finnish listed firms, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) report that Herfindahl Index concentration difference, Herfindahl index concentration, 
Shapley values, and vote-to-cash flow right ratio have negative association with firm value measured 
in Tobin’s Q. Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) provide evidence on Colombian listed firms that the 
contestability variables Herfindahl Index concentration difference and Shapley values show strong 
and significant negative association with firm performance (this is for Tobin’s Q, ROA, market-to-
sales ratio, and ROE), consistent with the finding of Maury and Pajuste (2005). However, they find 
that the aggregate voting power of the four blockholders and Herfindahl Index concentration have 
negative effect on market-to-sales ratio and ROE only in their sensitivity analysis. However, the two 
studies did not find any significant impact of stakes of ultimate or largest blockholder, and third 
largest blockholder, aggregate voting power of the four blockholders, or the presence of multiple 
blockholders on firm performance. However, the finding of Maury and Pajuste (2005) on Finnish 
listed firms that the positive effect of the voting power (attached to the ownership stake) of the 
second largest blockholder on firm value confirms the contestability of the control dominated by the 
first largest blockholder, thus supporting Lehman and Weigand (2000) evidence for German listed 
firms.   
To sum up, this research would not attempt to formulate a new theory to fill the gap. From the 
review of the theoretical models made above, it extends the contestability of control hypothesis to 
the simultaneous consideration of control dominance-contestability, on which it develops the 
theoretical and empirical models so as to formulate different testable hypotheses. Hence, the 
following section presents the theoretical framework for control dominance-contestability model as 
a prelude to hypotheses formulation.   
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5.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
5.3.1 La Porta et al. (2002) Baseline Model 
La Porta et al. (2002) present the baseline model of control dominance and monitoring by the 
controlling largest blockholder in the perspective of minority shareholder protection. Their 
assumptions are: (1) there is one controlling shareholder in the firm, (2) the cash flow right of the 
controlling shareholder in the firm is equal, (3) the entrepreneur is a manager, and (4) the 
proportion of share ownership, α, is exogenously determined by the history and the life cycle of the 
firm, not the sale of equity by the entrepreneur. They consider investment in a new project, I, which 
has a gross return rate, R. Hence, in the fair and zero agency cost world: 
 The total profit (П) for the firm: 
П = IR  
The benefits of the owner-manager or controlling shareholder (Uc) will be: 
Uc = α (IR)  
The benefits for the minority shareholders (Um) will be: 
 Um  = IR - α (IR) = (1- α) IR 
Hence total benefit (UT = П): 
However, the owner-manager has the tendency to extract a share of the realized profits (П), s, as 
tunnelling (misuse of firm assets via consumption of perquisite and shirking and other form of rent 
extraction) in order to maximize own utility. This implies only what remains of the profits after 
tunnelling goes to the minority blockholders in the form of dividends. However, tunnelling might 
take the form of salary, transfer pricing transactions, subsidized personal loans, discounted (non 
arms-length) asset transactions, excessive compensations, and in some cases, outright theft (La 
Porta et al., 2002). La Porta et al. (2002) bring in the cost incurred by the controlling blockholder, 
which is associated to the legal expropriation, whereby the controlling blockholder, C1, also bears 
costs. Hence, C1 enjoys benefits that comes from the cash flow rights in the firm (Us ) and the 
benefits after incurring costs of expropriation of minority shareholders (Uc). Hence: 
 Us  = α (1-s) IR,   and 
Uc  = sIR – C (k,s)IR  where C(k, s) is the share of profits that C1 wastes 
    when s is diverted; 
     Where C is the cost of expropriation function; 
 Where k is the quality of shareholder protection; 
and as k increases C to divert profit (П) increases. 
UT  = Uc + Um  = α (IR) + (1- α) IR = IR (1) 
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La Porta et al. (2002) assume that k>0, s>0, marginal costs of expropriation (Css)>0, and Cks >0. 
Hence, after expropriation, the benefit-cost function (utility), hereafter referred to as U (=Us + Uc) 
that the entrepreneur maximizes is given by: 
Total utility   = C1’s share of cash flow (Us) + C1’s profits after costs (Uc)
The optimal solution of the equation (2) is independent of IR, which is common to all coefficients 
and hence the scale of the firm (La Porta et al, 2002). Hence, C1 maximizes the utility function: 
The first order condition of U in equation (3) is given by: 
 
Proposition 1: From equation (4), it is implied that the consumption of perquisites by C1 depends on 
the level of α, the cash flow right of C1. As proposed by La Porta et al. (2002) and consistent with 
suggestion of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that says high cash flow ownership reduces minority 
expropriation: 
The higher α, the greater will is the incentive of C1 to distribute the profit without 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Hence, in the equilibrium, there is the lower level of 
expropriation for a given investor protection level, k.  
The model is so basic given its assumptions. It is a baseline model for later development of control 
contestability model developed by Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2009). The 
divergence is marked by omitting the use of k, which is the quality of shareholder protection. The 
following section will discuss the contestability model.  
5.3.2 Control Contestability Model 
Marury and Pajuste (2005) extended the baseline model of dominance of the owner-manager of La 
Porta et al. (2002), which accounts for the level of investor protection, to a model that reveals 
contestability behaviour among large blockholders. The main assumptions they made are: (1) the 
largest shareholder is the manager, which is always in the controlling coalition; (2) the largest 
blockholder has the power to influence managerial decision-making even in the presence of 
professional managers and in possession of tools to extract private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders; and (3) other issues related to contestability.  
The control contestability model of Maury and Pajuste (2005) diverge from the baseline model by 
substituting the contestability factor, represented by a heavy dot (.), in place of minority shareholder 
protection (k). We use ¢ as a contestability factor instead of their heavy dot (.) in this study. 
Assuming that the diversion of profit is inefficient, they suggest the following relation:   
U   = α (1-s) IR + s IR – C (k,s)IR   (2) 
U  = α (1-s)  + s  - C (k,s)   (3) 
∂U/∂s =    0 è - α    + 1  –  Cs (k,s)       =       0 
 
è           (4) 
Cs (k,s)  =  1- α  
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The total profit (П):   
П = IR 
The portion of the profit that contesting coalition (Пc) receives: 
Пc = sIR – C(s, ¢) IR   
I is investment; R is gross rate of return on investment; s is share of profit extracted, 
and ¢ is contestability factor; and C(s, ¢) is the cost of profit diversion (the share of 
profit wasted when s is diverted); and C is the cost of expropriation function.  
Assuming that the cost of profit extraction (Cs) and the marginal cost profit diversion (Css) are 
positive, and C(s, ¢) is an increasing function of s and since sIR is lost or diverted due to rent 
extraction; the firm value is given by:  
 П = (1-s) IR   
Considering the assumptions made above, the benefits to the controlling coalition depends on the 
aggregate cash flow rights that gives voting power (αn) and the level of contestability posed by the 
contenders for control (¢), as clearly put by Gutierrez and Pombo (2009). The utility function of the 
dominant blockholder or coalition of blockholders comprise of two elements, namely the total cash 
flow benefit after expropriation and the benefits from expropriation. 
The dominant coalition’s cash flow benefits after profit diversion (Ud1) is given as: 
The benefits of expropriation of the dominant coalition (Ud2) are given as the difference of the 
diverted profit (sIR) and the cost of profit extraction (C(s, ¢) IR): 
The cost function C(s, ¢) depends on the contestability variable, ¢, is defined by Gutierrez and 
Pombo (2009) as the probability to recover the diverted profits and that can be proxied by the voting 
power of the contesting blockholder or coalition of blockholders. As the voting power of contestants 
increase, the contestants have more incentives to bear monitoring costs in order to recover diverted 
costs. The value ¢ increases with the voting power of the blockholders outside the dominant 
coalition. Hence, the dominant blockholder or blockholders coalition’s benefits including rent 
extraction (UD) are given as the sum of the benefit from the diverted cash flows of the firm’s projects 
(Ud1) and the benefits of the rent extraction (Ud2). 
Taking into account for the cost of expropriation (C(s, ¢) IR), the utility function of the controlling 
coalition in equation (7) accounting for the level of contestants’ monitoring effort (1-¢) can be 
rewritten as:  
UD = [αn IR   -   αn (1-¢) (1-s) IR]   +   [(1-¢)s (IR)    -    C(s, ¢) IR] 
Ud1 = αn IR - αn(1-s)IR = αn IR[(1-(1-s))]  (5) 
Ud2 = sIR - C(s, ¢) IR     (6) 
UD = [αn IR - αn(1-s)IR] + [s (IR) - C(s, ¢) IR] (7) 
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The dominant force has the incentives to maximize own utility function. Since the optimal solution of 
the equation (8) is independent of IR, which is common to all coefficients or the scale of the firm, 
equation (8) can be rewritten as: 
UD = [αn (1-(1-¢)) s] + [(1-¢) s  - C(s, ¢)]    (9) 
 
Hence, the first order condition of equation (9) is give as:  
  
Proposition 2: It can be suggested from equation (10) that:  
1. The cost of diverting rents for private benefits by the controller(s) will fall with the rise in 
their cash flow rights, keeping others constant. 
2. The higher the contestability factor (¢) by the contestant(s), the higher will be the costs 
of diverting rents, keeping others constant. 
3. The final outcome in the equilibrium depends on the trade-off between the states of ¢ 
and αn and the trade-off between the marginal costs and marginal benefits of rent 
diversion.  
4. Hence, the higher the cost of diverting rents for private benefits by the controller(s) and 
the higher the contestability factor (¢) by the contestant(s) and their monitoring costs 
and hence their power, the less will be the diversion of rents and hence the lower 
appropriation of minority shareholders, whereby the controller(s) might decrease their 
costs of rent diversion finding it less worthy to bear higher costs of diverting rents. This 
might have the impact increasing firm performance.  
UD = [αn (1-(1-¢)) s] IR + [(1-¢) s (IR) - C(s, ¢) IR] (8) 
∂UD /∂s = 0  
è -(1-¢) αn   +  (1-¢)  - Cs (s, ¢)      = 0 
è -(1-¢) αn  +   (1-¢)  = Cs (s, ¢) 
è Cs (s, ¢)  =   - (1-¢) αn +   (1-¢)           
è Cs (s, ¢)   =   (1-¢)   -   (1-¢)αn  
è Cs (s, ¢)   =   1-¢-αn+¢αn  
 
            (10) Cs (s, ¢)  = (1-¢)(1-αn) = 1-¢-αn+¢αn 
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5. Finally, it can be proposed from (1) - (4) that the higher will be the incentive of the 
controller(s) to distribute profits and the less will be the appropriation of minority 
shareholders as contestability increases. This might be the case since controller(s) are 
willing to bear the costs of rent diversion only to the extent that the marginal costs of 
rent diversion is less than or equal to the marginal benefits from diverted rents. 
Considering the dominant controller perspective, the dominant controller(s) will try to minimize the 
cost function give in equation (10). The optimal s* can be determined from the equation such that 
its value is between 0 and the maximum fraction of profits that can be diverted, ś. The monitoring 
from the contestants is assumed to bar the controllers to divert the rent beyond the maximum ś 
(Maury and Pajuste, 2005). The monitoring by the contesting force will counter and reduce the 
optimal rent extraction by increasing ¢.  
5.3.3 Control Dominance-Contestability Model 
So far, the baseline and the contestability models explained above consider the utility of the 
dominant blockholder or coalition of blockholders. Following them, this research extends the model 
so that it also accounts for the utility function from the control contestability perspective, which can 
be referred to as control dominance-contestability model. This leads us to the use of structural 
modelling in order to investigate the control of listed firms.  
5.3.3.1 Control Dominance Perspective  
In this framework, considering that the optimal solution for equation (7) above is independent of the 
common coefficient IR, which can be taken as a constant scale of the firm (La Porta et al, 2002; 
Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009), and as one equation of our structural model 
referring to the dominant blockholder perspective (UD), we arrive at equation (11).  
UD = [αn IR - αn(1-s)IR] + [s (IR) - C(s, ¢) IR] (7) 
è = αn  - αn(1-s)  + s - C(s, ¢)   (11) 
Hence, the first order condition of equation (11) is give as: 
UD  = αn  - αn(1-s) + s - C(s, ¢) 
∂UD/∂s =0 è 0  -αn  + 1 - Cs (s, ¢) = 0 
è -αn + 1 = Cs (s, ¢)   
è Cs (s, ¢)  = (1-αn) 
          (12) 
Proposition 3: Consisting with the existing theoretical explanations (Maury and Pajuste, 2005 and 
Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009), it can be suggested from equation (12) that:  
• The cost of diverting rents by the dominant controller(s) might decrease as the 
proportion of their cash flow rights increases.  
Cs (s, ¢)  =  1-αn
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• The costs of rents diversion in the presence of contestability factor (¢) might increase due 
to the required high secrecy in the presence of the contesting coalition (Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2002).  
• Hence, the controller(s) will have higher incentives to distribute profits the less the 
appropriation of minority shareholders as their cash flow rights increase.  
Furthermore, the first-order condition of equation (11) with respect to ¢ can be given as: 
UD  =  αn  - αn(1-s) + s - C(s, ¢) 
∂UD/∂¢  =0 è o  -sαn  + s - C¢ (s, ¢) = 0 
      è   s - sαn = C¢ (s, ¢) 
      è   C¢ (s, ¢)  = s(1-αn ) 
           (13) 
Proposition 4: It can be proposed from equation (13) that: 
1. As the share of the diverted rents (s) increases, the costs of contestability to recover the 
diverted rents will increase depending upon the voting power of the controller(s) or will 
decrease based upon the marginal benefits from the share of rent diverted.  
2. As the cash flow rights of the dominant controller(s) decreases given that there is the rise 
in diverted rents (s), the costs of contestability to prevent rent diversion will increase.  
3. The final outcome of contestability costs in the equilibrium depends on the trade-off 
between the states of s and αn and the trade-off between the marginal costs and 
marginal benefits from recovered rents. 
4. From (1) - (3), it might be suggested that the contestant(s) are only willing to bear the 
costs of recovering diverted rents only to the extent that the marginal costs to prevent 
rents diversion is less than or equal to the marginal benefits from diverted rents (s).  
5.3.3.2 Control Contestability Perspective  
The other equation in the structural framework arises from the control contestability perspective 
where the utility function of the contestant(s) (UC) is taken into account. We assume that contesting 
blockholder(s) that have their own utility function might counteract the actions or behaviours of 
dominant blockholders(s) taking the Newton’s scientific law that ‘for every action there is an 
opposite and equal reaction.’ The utility function of the blockholder or coalition of blockholders that 
monitors the controller(s) depends on the voting power of the contestants (άn), and the pressure the 
contesting blockholder(s) pose in order to make it difficult for the controllers to extract rents (¢), 
namely, the ability to recover the rents that could have been diverted by the dominant force . Let us 
denote the utility function of the contesting force as UC. Hence, the net benefit of the contestant 
C¢ (s, ¢)  = s – sαn = s(1-αn ) 
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comes from two sources, namely, the net benefit from cash flow rights (UC1)) and the benefits from 
monitoring (UC2). Hence: 
The contestant(s) net benefit that comes from the cash flow right of the contestant is given 
by: 
UC1 = άn (IR)  - άn (1-¢)s IR     (14) 
The contestant(s) net benefit that comes from monitoring costs incurred to recover the rent 
that could have been lost due to expropriation (UC2) is given as the difference of the benefit 
from monitoring effort to recover the diverted profit ((1-¢)s IR) and the cost of profit 
extraction given the level of the share of diverted rent (C(s,¢) IR): 
UC2  = (1-¢)s IR  - C(s, ¢) IR    (15) 
Hence, the total net benefit (UC    =   UC1   +   UC2) and its optimal value after removing the scalar 
common to the right hand side will be given as:  
 UC = [άn (IR)    - άn (1-¢)s IR]  + [(1-¢)s IR     - C(s, ¢) IR] (16) 
 UC = άn     - άn (1-¢)s   + (1-¢)s           - C(s, ¢)  (17) 
The first order condition of the optimal value of utility of contestant(s), equation (17), with respect 
to s is give as: 
UC = άn     - άn (1-¢)s   + (1-¢)s           - C(s, ¢) 
∂UC/∂s = 0   
è 0  - άn(1-¢)  + (1-¢) - Cs(s, ¢) = 0 
è -άn(1-¢) + (1-¢) - Cs(s, ¢) = 0 
è -άn(1-¢) + (1-¢) = Cs(s, ¢)   
è Cs(s, ¢) =  -άn (1-¢) +  (1-¢)  
è Cs(s, ¢) = (1-¢)(1- άn)  
   (18) 
Proposition 5: From equation (18), consistent with the theoretical explanations of Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2009) it can be suggested that given the s level of 
expropriation: 
1. The costs to divert rent by the dominant controller(s) will decrease as the monitoring 
costs of the contestant(s) increase, others kept constant.  
2. The costs to divert rent by the controller(s) will decrease as the cash flow rights of the 
contestant(s) increase, others kept constant.  
Cs(s, ¢) = (1-¢) (1-άn) = 1-¢-άn+¢άn
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3. The final outcome in the equilibrium depends on the trade-off between the states of ¢ 
and άn and the trade-off between the marginal costs and marginal benefits of rent 
diversion.  
4. Hence, the higher the voting power of the contestant(s) and the higher their monitoring 
costs and hence their control power, the less will be the diversion of rents and hence the 
appropriation of minority shareholders, whereby the controller(s) might decrease their 
costs of rent diversion finding it less worthy to bear higher costs of diverting rents. This 
might have the impact increasing firm performance.  
5. Finally, it can be proposed from (1) - (4) that the higher will be the incentive of the 
controller(s) to distribute profits and the less will be the appropriation of minority 
shareholders as contestability increases. This might be the case since controller(s) are 
willing to bear the costs of rent diversion only to the extent that the marginal costs of 
rent diversion is less than or equal to the marginal benefits from diverted rents. 
Moreover, the first order condition of equation (17) with respect to ¢ can be given as the following:  
UC = άn     - άn (1-¢)s   + (1-¢)s           - C(s, ¢) 
∂UC/∂¢ = 0   
è0 - -1(άns)  + (-1)s - C¢(s, ¢)  = 0 
èάns - s - C¢(s, ¢)  = 0 
èάns - s = C¢(s, ¢) 
           (19) 
Proposition 6: Consistent with the theoretical explanations (Maury and Pajuste, 2005 and Gutierrez 
and Pombo, 2009), equation (19) suggests that the monitoring costs incurred by the contestant(s) 
are directly proportional to share of the rent that is diverted (s) and the cash flow rights of the 
contestant(s) (άn). Hence:  
1. As the share of rents diverted (s) increases, the monitoring costs (¢) incurred by 
contestant(s) to recover the rents to be diverted will increase depending on άn or 
decrease depending on the benefits from share of rent diverted, others kept constant.  
2. As the voting power of contestant(s) (άn) increases, the monitoring costs or the 
contestability (¢) to recover the rent to be diverted will increases, others kept constant. 
3. The final outcome of (¢) in the equilibrium depends on the trade-off between the states 
of s and άn and the trade-off between the marginal costs of monitoring and marginal 
benefits from recovered rents. 
4. Hence, from (1) - (3) it might be suggestive that with the increase in their cash flow rights 
and the increase in the share of diverted rents, contestant(s) might have the incentives 
and ability to bear the monitoring costs to recover rents to be diverted only to the extent 
C¢(s, ¢)  = s(άn-1)  = sάn -s 
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that the marginal costs of monitoring is less than or equal to the marginal benefits from 
the recovered rents.  
Conclusion: Propositions 3-6 depict the control dominance-contestability model of blockholders’ 
structure. They provide a theoretical framework for the way large blockholders interact and share 
control power based on the benefits and costs of both parties to dominate or to contest corporate 
control power. Even though, the insight of the impact of the costs of rent extraction and the 
monitoring costs of contestants on firm performance or value have been shown in the propositions, 
it would be necessary to lay down the theoretical framework of the implication of control 
dominance-contestability model to firm value in the following subsection.  
5.3.4 Implication of the Model to Firm Valuation 
We now consider the implication of the models discussed above to the valuation of the firm. As we 
mentioned previously, the firm’s value depends on the available investment opportunities. Let V be 
the actual value of the firm. The value of the firm at any given time when there is no agency costs or 
diversion of rents is given by:  
V = IR         (20) 
In the presence of agency problems, hence, agency costs of the diversion of rents by management, 
the value of the firm cannot be equal to one given in equation (20). Hence, when there is diversion 
of rents by the controlling blockholder(s), in the presence of monitoring by the contestant 
blockholder(s), the optimal or equilibrium rent that could be diverted or that can be agency costs is 
denoted s*. Hence, the firm value from the perspective of a minority outside shareholders that do 
not enjoy any benefits of control is given by: 
VS*  = (1-s*) IR        (21) 
However, when there is contestability of control posed by monitoring by non-controlling 
blockholders is taken into account, both the dominant(s) and the contestant(s) benefit from their 
interaction. Hence, the effective firm value is given by the summation of UD and UC given in 
equations (11) and (17), substituting s by s* and ¢ by ¢*.   
V  = ПD    +    ПC  = UD    +    UC    
èVS* =[αn IR - αn (1-s*) IR] + [s* (IR)  - C(s*, ¢*) IR] + 
  [άn (IR) - άn (1-¢*)s* IR] + [(1-¢*)s* IR - C(s*,¢*)IR] (22) 
In the equilibrium, the optimal s* is attained at the level where the trade-offs of the benefits and 
costs for dominant controller(s) and for the contestant(s) will be equal, namely, when: 
[s* (IR)  - C(s*, ¢*) IR] = [(1-¢) s* IR - C(s*, ¢*) IR] 
In equation (22), these benefits and costs cancel each other assuming that for every action of the 
dominant controller(s) there is an equal opposite reaction of the contestants in the game for control. 
Hence, the effective value of the firm is given as: 
VS* =   αn IR - αn (1-s*) IR] + [άn (IR) - άn (1-¢*) s* IR] 
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èVS* =   IR[αn - αn (1-s*) + άn  - άn (1-¢*)s*]  (23) 
At the optimal level, firm value depends on the income, R, generated from the investments, I, 
undertaken. Hence, removing the scalar I that is a common coefficient with the value that is derived 
from the company assets, the final model for effective firm value  can be given by:  
 
            (24) 
 
In the equilibrium, this equation shows the value of the firm that is maximized. Let us assess the first 
order condition of equation (24). The comparative statics that result from the first order conditions 
of equation (24) will enable us to investigate the implication of the model to the firm value.  
The first order condition of equation (24) will be:  
∂V S*/∂s* = αn R - άn (1-¢*) R     (25) 
The comparative statics resulting by differentiating the first-order condition in equation (25) with 
respect to the parameters ¢*, αn, άn, and R would be the followings:  
1. ∂V S* S*/∂¢ = R - -άnR   
= R(1-(-άn)) 
  = R (1+άn) > 0 è  (positive) (26) 
Proposition 7: Equation (26) suggests that:  
• Firms with more monitoring costs incurred by the contestant(s) would have higher 
value.  
The proposition suggests that firm value increases as the monitoring costs of contestant(s) 
increase. This is in line with proposition 3 and 5. The fact might imply that as monitoring and 
hence their monitoring costs of the contesting large blockholder(s) increase, the costs of 
rent extraction by dominant blockholder(s) increases, thus lowering the amount minority 
shareholders’ expropriation. The proposition confirms the suggestion of Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986) suggestion that large blockholder(s) mitigate the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers.  
2. ∂V S*S*/∂ αn  = R - (1-¢*) R  
= R(1-(1-¢*))   
  = R¢* > 0   è  (positive) (27) 
Proposition 8: From equation (27), it might be suggested that: 
• Firms with controller(s) having higher cash flow rights and hence higher voting 
power would have higher value.  
VS* = R[αn - αn (1-s*) + άn  - άn (1-¢*)s*] 
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This is in line with the alignment of interest hypothesis and propositions 1, 2, and 3. This also 
confirms the alignment of interest hypothesis of the agency theory regarding managerial 
ownership and the suggestion of Jensen and Meckling (1976) that higher ownership or cash 
flow rights by controllers reduces minority expropriation.  
3. ∂V S*S*/∂ άn = R - (1-¢*) R  
= R(1-(1-¢*)) 
  = R¢* > 0  è  (positive) (28) 
Proposition 9: Equation (28) might suggest that: 
• Firms with contestant(s) having higher cash flow rights and hence higher voting 
power would have higher value.  
This supports the control contestability hypothesis and propositions 3 and 5. 
4. ∂V S*S*/∂R = αn - άn (1-¢*) 
  = αn (1-(1- ¢*)  
= αn ¢*  > 0   (Positive) (29) 
Proposition 10: Equation (29) indicates that: 
• Firms with better investment opportunities (with higher rates of return, R) would 
have higher value.  
As already noted, it might be suggestive to consider both control dominance and contestability at 
the same time in assessing the control situation in corporations. This necessitates the structural 
equation modelling. Based on the two models analyzed in sub-sections 3.2 and 3.3 the basic 
theoretical structural equations model from the firm value equation (24) for performance, and the 
control dominance and contestability, equations (11) for dominance and (17) for contestability, are 
given as the following three theoretical structural equations when we remove the scalar IR (La Porta 
et al, 2002; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009).  
 
  
VS* = [αn - αn (1-s*) + άn  - άn (1-¢*) s*] 
 
UD = [αn  - αn (1-s)] + [s  - C(s, ¢)]  (30) 
 
UC = [άn  - άn (1-¢) s] + [(1-¢) s  - C(s, ¢)] 
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5.3.5 Structural Framework of Control Dominance-Contestability 
5.3.5.1 The Structural Framework 
The theoretical models presented, particularly the control dominance-contestability model, provide 
bases for the specification of a broader theoretical model that incorporates other control factors. 
The theoretical frameworks in turn guides to the structural modelling of control dominance-
contestability and the formulation of hypotheses to be tested and analyzed. The interpretations of 
different relationships and comparative statics would be used in the following section together with 
the suggestions and theories in literature in order to develop specific empirical models that account 
for the other variables such as the internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.  
We consider that the costs and benefits of control dominance and control contestability are 
endogenously determined in the interaction with other factors in determining firm performance. 
Hence, before developing testable empirical equations model we depart from the direct use of 
equation (30) and refine it to a broader theoretical structural equations model in order to explore 
the determinants of the left hand side of the equations retaining the elements of control dominance 
and contestability. Moreover, in the structural framework, it might be suggestive that there is 
interaction between control dominance and control contestability that might lead to the optimal 
control system of corporations and this should also be accounted for in the system. Additionally, the 
consideration of different control factors involved in corporate control and their relationships is 
required to arrive at the theoretical model.  
5.3.5.2 Control Factors and their Network Relationships 
Research in corporate finance in general, and in corporate governance in particular, reveals that 
there is endogenous relationship between the control forces operating on the corporation and 
influencing its financial decisions (Wintoki et al., 2009). These corporate control forces are broadly 
classified by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993) as internal governance (board structure), 
capital markets, product and factor markets (mainly takeover markets, debt financing markets and 
managerial labor markets), and the regulatory framework. In a broader context, the popular 
assumption is that different governance mechanisms like the stock market, the takeover market, 
and expert boards (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and others like debt and managerial labour market 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Weir et al. 2002; and Gillan, 2006) exist in the corporate environment 
and influence corporate control. These internal and external governance mechanisms that make up 
a whole system of corporate control form network-type relationships with each other.  
Hence, it is important to control for board structure, external governance mechanisms (takeover 
markets, debt financing, and capital markets) in the structural framework in the analysis of the 
interaction between control dominance and contestability in corporations and their impact on firm 
performance. In determining the performance of corporations (PRFM), we assume that there is a 
network relationship between different factors that should be considered in the structural 
modelling. These factors, which are discussed in details later, are mainly control dominance 
(DOMIN), control contestability (CONTST), board characteristics (BRD), and external governance 
mechanisms (EXTGM, namely, takeover market and debt financing) (table 5.1).  
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Hence, the structural equations model assumes that PRFM, BRD, DOMIN, and CONTST are 
endogenous variables within the model, whereas EXTGM and other stock market factors are 
considered as exogenous. One important assumption is that firm performance and governance 
mechanisms are jointly determined as some researchers like Barnhart and Rosenstein (1998), and 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest. So, the path model of the framework for the structural 
system is presented as figure 5.1 below.  
 
Having identified the main control factors that interact and impact each other in the structural 
system and the simple path model, it is vital to assess their relationships and the endogeneity or 
reverse causality perspective. This will be discussed in the following subsections.  
5.3.5.3 Endogenous Relationships 
According to the agency theory, the board of directors, especially the non-executive members of the 
board, plays a monitoring role in disciplining the behaviour of managers as an internal corporate 
governance mechanism (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The recommendations of the UK corporate 
governance Codes supports this principle. Hence, the board mitigates the agency problem and 
Table 5.1: Symbols or abbreviations and description of performance and some control factors  
 
Symbol   Descriptions  
PRFM   Firm performance 
BRD   Board of directors 
DOMIN   Control dominance 
CONTST   Control contestability 
CEO   Chief executive director 
DUAL   CEO-duality 
PNED   Representation of non-executive directors 
EXTGM   External governance mechanisms 
TOINT or TOINTENS   Takeover intensity 
TDTA   Debt financing; total debt to total assets 
PVOL   Stock price volatility 
EQTO   Equity turnover 
 
Fig.5. 1: A simple path model of the structural equations model of corporate control and firm performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own construction. 
BRD DOMIN 
EXTGM CONTST 
PRFM 
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reduces the agency cost, and thus, enhancing firm performance. Walsh and Sward (1990) suggest 
that since the board of directors is responsible for developing and implementing the internal 
governance mechanisms and to scrutinize the highest decision makers in the firm, the decisions and 
the actions of the board also compromises firm performance. This suggests that the path of causality 
is from board structure to firm performance.  
Moreover, research literature suggests that firm performance and board structure are endogenous 
variables that are jointly or simultaneously determined. Regarding this, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003) suggest that firm performance is a result of both the actions of previous directors and itself 
and also a factor that potentially influences the choice of subsequent directors. They also suggest 
that firm performance and changes in ownership structure are important factors effecting the 
change in boards. Thus, it is suggestive that there is a reverse causality between board structure and 
performance on the one hand and between board structure and ownership structure (figure 5.1).  
However, since the current firm performance is within a short time horizon to induce dynamism in 
changes in ownership structure, and we assume that the current performance might have very little 
effect on ownership structure, only previous firm performance is assumed to affect the board of 
directors. Regarding this, Wintoki et al. (2009) argue that there is endogeneity inherent in the board 
structure-performance relation and that the past performance induces a positive bias when 
measuring the effect of board structure on the current firm performance and a negative bias when 
measuring the effect of, for example, board size on firm performance with a static fixed-effect 
regression. Putting in other words, they suggest that past performance can affect current board 
structure indirectly, whereby board structure is related to past performance through the effect of 
performance on other firm characteristics that also determine the board structure. More broadly, 
they suggest that performance has a strong, immediate and persistent effect on governance 
(including board structure). So this suggests that the causality path also goes from firm performance 
to the board of directors and that board structure is dynamically endogenous with respect to 
performance. Hence, the endogeneity between performance and board structure is usually 
highlighted as a reverse causality problem, which complicates empirical modelling and methodology 
in research.  
The dominant and contestant control forces that play decisive control and monitoring role 
respectively in the firm’s decision making and strategy and regulatory formulation arise from two 
forces: (1) the control forces within the board, and (2) the control forces of blockholders (insider 
owners and external blockholders). Firstly, the sources of control forces within the board that are of 
research interest to this study are CEO-Duality (DUAL), which is assumed to be the dominance 
control force of the board, and the proportion of nonexecutive directors (PNED), which is assumed 
to be the contesting force to the CEO domination. This implies that DUAL proxies DOMIN, whereas 
PNED proxies CONTST within the board. The presence of these dominance and contestant control 
forces within the board complicates the relationship between the board structure and firm 
performance since the two parties that always coexist might arguably have the moderating or the 
substitution effects on the control actions and decisions of the board that might influence firm 
performance. Besides impacting performance, it is also suggestive that there might be relationship 
between the two board control forces. The nonexecutive directors are nominated by the 
management (CEO), which question their independence; and they elected at the General Meeting by 
shareholders. This might suggest that there a causal relationship that goes from the CEO to 
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nonexecutive directors. On the other hand, the nonexecutive directors have the power to hire or 
dismiss the CEO and the executive directors. This fact might be suggestive that there is a causal 
relationship that goes from nonexecutive directors to the CEO. Hence, we have the reverse causal 
relationship between the CEO and nonexecutive directors.  
Secondly, the dominance and contestability control forces might also arise from large blockholders 
(insiders and outsiders) that influence strategy and regulatory formulation. These forces are 
represented in our model as DOMIN and CONTST that are found between BRD and PRFM. This 
complicates the relationship between board structure and firm performance further. Assuming that 
their control power is dependent on their voting power, we measure the DOMIN and CONTST forces 
by cash flow rights of the blockholders or coalitions of blockholders in the firm. The pattern of 
dominance and contestability control forces that are derived from the multiple blockholders in the 
firm and that interact and share control power in the firm is referred to as blockholders structure.  
One issue to account for in this setting is the endogeneity of ownership structure reported in 
research literature (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Kole, 
1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Weir et al, 2002). Regarding this, 
Demsetz (1983) suggests that ownership structure is endogenously determined, whereby it is 
influenced by several factors in the competitive environment and firm performance. It follows that 
the past performance can have correlation with the current disturbances in ownership structure 
variables. This suggests a backward looking dynamic endogenous relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance, and thus, the reciprocal relationship between ownership structure 
(DOMIN and CONTST) and PRFM as designed in our path model. Supporting this fact, research 
literature suggests that as ownership structure impacts firm performance, firm performance also 
influences ownership structure (Kole, 1996). On the other hand, although it is arguable that the 
expected performance can also cause change in current ownership structure when management 
varies their share holdings (Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), thus suggesting backward looking 
dynamic endogeneity that might show up when we use panel data, this research is delimited to 
account for it in order to avoid further complication of the structural framework.  
Last but not least, we also assume that the board (BRD) and control dominance and contestability 
factors are also affected by external governance mechanisms. The main external governance 
mechanisms (EXTGM) we consider in the structural system are: takeover market (proxied by 
takeover intensity, TOINTENS) and debt financing (proxied by debt ratio, TDTA). The additional stock 
markets variables used are stock price volatility (PVOL) and equity turnover EQTO). In figure 3.1, it is 
shown that the variables impact the board, dominance and contestability factors. Since all the 
external control forces are outside the firm, the board might not be able to induce change in 
external governance mechanisms. Hence the causation path is only from EXTGM to the board, 
DOMIN and CONTST. Finally, the other joint endogeneity relationship to be considered and 
discussed in the following section is the substitution or complementarity effects between EXTGM 
and the internal governance mechanisms.  
Moreover, research literature reveals that the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms might be explained by the substitution and or complementarity effects. Walsh and 
Seward (1990, Rediker and Seth (1995), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), and Weir et al. (2002) assumes 
that a bundle of the mechanisms may work together, depending on each other or substituting for 
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each other in controlling the agency problems and enhancing firm performance. Regarding this, 
Rediker and Seth (1995, p.87) suggests the theoretical perspective that “it is likely that firm 
performance depends on the efficiency of a bundle of governance mechanisms in controlling the 
agency problem, rather than the efficiency of any single mechanism’’. The implication is the 
substitution hypothesis which suggests that (1) the impact of a single governance mechanism might 
be insufficient to achieve the efficient aligning the manager-shareholder interests and (2) different 
governance mechanisms may substitute for each other.   
Hence, another way of explaining the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms is 
that: the way they are arranged and interact might result into the substitution or complementarity 
effects. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested the substitution hypothesis when they state that the 
divergence of managers from shareholder value will also be constrained by market for the firm itself, 
the capital markets, which gives, not only insider owners, but also other owners a means of selling 
their shares and will impact change in ownership structure. This explains an instance of 
substitutability effect between the capital markets and the ineffective internal governance 
mechanisms (the board structure). Similar effects might exist between concentrated ownership and 
the takeover market. Walsh and Seward (1990) suggest that all of the internal and external control 
mechanisms are inextricably linked and that they are different alternative responses to similar 
problems, thus implying the substitution hypothesis.  
Moreover, the governance mechanisms are regarded as interrelated complementary ways to 
oversee the conduct of management in making discretions on the company affairs. For example, the 
managerial labour market may be complementary to the takeover markets, and the external large 
shareholders monitoring might be complement to takeover markets in the removal of inefficient 
managers. Agrawal and Knoeber (1995) suggest that higher insider ownerships, higher institutional 
ownerships, higher external blockholdership and higher representation of outsiders on the board 
might have positive correlation, and hence, might facilitate takeover markets due to lower 
transaction costs and the reduction of free-rider problem that might lead to the small shareholders’ 
rejection of the tender offer. Likewise, the gain from stock price appreciation during contests might 
tempt insider ownership with high stakes to assist the takeover market by making insiders less 
resistant to takeover.  
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5.4 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
5.4.1 Ownership/ Control Concentration and Firm Performance  
The impact of the increase or decrease of ownership concentration on firm performance has been a 
theme of research and debate for decades now. The principal-agent theory suggested by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) makes the baseline assumption that starts with the dilution of share ownership by 
the owner-manager who sells part of the stakes to outsider shareholders. According to the 
suggestion, this will gradually lead to the formation of significant blockholders that try to monitor 
the behaviour of the initial owner-manager’s consumption of perquisites and diversion of firm’s 
wealth. Hence, it might be suggestive that this is the root for contestability of control in corporations 
and hence contestability of control is inherent in the agency theory.  
The theoretical explanation of ownership concentration can also be related to the incentive 
alignment and the entrenchment hypotheses of the agency theory. It is arguable that ownership 
concentration fundamentally constrains managerial diversion from shareholder interests by 
determining the distribution of voting power and the control among shareholders (Leech and Leahy, 
1991). Since ownership concentration can measure the power of shareholders to influence 
managers, it is arguable that concentrated ownership, which concentrates the voting power, might 
counteract corporate diversification and increase shareholder value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000) 
due to the alignment of interest and the private or shared benefits from control. Moreover, Denis 
and McConnell (2003) write that concentrated ownership most often has a positive relationship with 
firm value. Moreover, it is suggested that the greater the diffuseness of ownership (decrease in 
ownership concentration) the greater is the incentive for shirking by owners; and the cost of owner-
manager’s shirking that will be shared by all owners in proportion of the stakes (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). Hence, these facts regarding the incentives for shirking by owner-manager or large owners 
with the decrease in ownership concentration might imply that ownership concentration has a 
positive association with firm performance.  
The contrasting view is that the increase in ownership concentration has the danger of entrenched 
block shareholders that may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders and decrease in firm 
value. It is arguable that concentration of ownership in the hands of large blockholders and hence 
the capacity of blockholders to influence corporate decisions might have its drawbacks because 
according to the second-order agency theory they might pursue their own goals and extract private 
benefits at the expense of minority shareholders (Burkart et al., 2000) and hence might reduce firm 
performance.  
However, there are arguments stating that the relationship is not uniform and systematic. Fama and 
Jensen (1983), Morck et al. (1988), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that the relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance need not be uniform. The view is that the 
relationship might vary with firm-specific, owner-specific, and governance mechanisms set in place. 
On the other hand, Demsetz (1983) provides a theoretical argument of no systematic relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance, stating that ownership concentration is an 
endogenous outcome of the balance of the costs and benefits of ownership and other 
environmental factors. Hence, the different views show that the issue is still open for further debate 
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and research. In order to investigate the effect on firm performance, this research treats ownership 
concentration from control dominance and contestability approach.  
Gomes and Novaes (2001) consider the control setting in which the control group is formed by all 
large shareholders. Such a controlling group that might require unanimity in decision-making will 
only approve an investment project if it benefits all members of the group (Bennedsen and 
Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2001). The effectiveness of unanimity might depend on the 
number of blockholders in the group or coalition. Moreover, discussing the legal determinants of 
multiple blockholders, Bloch and Hege (2001) postulate that the high level of investor protection 
leads to more frequent presence of multiple blockholders. Hence, the number of all blockholder 
(NBH) can be a proxy to measure control related to ownership or blockholder concentration. In 
investigating the relation between the number of blockholders and firm performance, this research 
uses the aggregate number of all blockholders (ABH). It might be arguable that the 3% cut-off level 
that is based on the UK disclosure level is too low for the ability to exert enough control pressure. 
However, it might be suggestive that 3% voting power can be very decisive in determining outcome 
of voting, decision and of coalition formation, which is the basis for our SEM model in investigating 
control dominance and contestability.  
We use the theory of collective action to discuss the role of the number of blockholders in the 
control of corporations. The theory says that the group size (blockholder size in our case) is 
important in facilitating a non-free-riding collective group for collective action (Olson, 1965). Rock 
(1991, p. 454) writes that the collective action problem emerges as soon as there is more than one 
owner and disciplining management becomes necessary. Olson (1965) and Rock (1991) argue that in 
the presence of more than one large blockholder, the small privileged group benefits from the 
collective good, namely monitoring, when the benefit of collective good is more than zero; and 
when there is no single large blockholder with the incentive to monitor management, the benefit 
from the collective good is less than zero, the group benefiting from the good constitutes a latent 
group. When the group is small, or privileged, each member in the group, or at least some of them 
have the incentives to ensure that monitoring is provided even if it has to bear the full cost alone 
(Olson, 1965; Udehn, 1993). It is not only private or individual incentives driven from interests but 
also a number of social incentives like friendship, social status, prestige, etc. that works in favour of 
collective monitoring (Olson, 1965; Udehn, 1993). Hence, this indicates that free-riding is not a 
problem if the group is small, or privileged.  
However, as size of the group increases, there is a decrease both in the relative importance of each 
member’s contribution to monitoring and in each member’s share stake (Udehn, 1993). With 
moderate and large size of the group, the problem of free-riding will be worse and dominates the 
corporation (Udehn, 1993). Hence, the number of blockholders in the control or monitoring group is 
important in the effectiveness of the control of the firm, barring or enabling managers to pursue 
their own interests at the expense of shareholders. Hence, based on the theory of collective action 
negative association between the number of blockholders and firm performance is expected.  
However, Gomes and Novaes (2001) suggest that due to the requirement of unanimity, increasing 
the number of blockholders in the group has two effects on each member of the controlling group. 
The first is the bargaining effect, which is dominant as the number of controlling blockholders 
decrease, might result in less likelihood of private benefits driven rent extraction. Hence, the 
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bargaining effect implies that positive relation between the number of blockholders and firm 
performance is expected (Gomes and Novaes, 2001). Empirical evidence from Gutierrez and Tribo 
(2004) confirm this positive association for Spanish firms. On the other hand, the disagreement 
effect that impacts the difficulty in approving positive net present value (NPV) projects is dominant 
when the number of controlling blockholders increases. Gomes and Novaes (2001) also state the 
increase in the total ownership stake will make both effects stronger, if the number of blockholders 
in the controlling group is kept constant. This also implies that a negative relation between the 
number of blockholders and firm performance is expected.  
In order to define or measure ownership concentration we assume that the ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of few significant blockholders owning significant proportion of the firm’s 
outstanding equity and that it is related to the stakes of large or controlling blockholders. Hence, we 
define ownership concentration as the proportion of outstanding shares cumulatively held by all 
blockholders owning at least the disclosure level in the UK, following Wruck (1989), who defines 
ownership concentration on the basis of share ownership of managers, directors, and 5% or greater 
beneficial owners (aggregate of blockholdership) reported. Hence, the computation of ownership 
concentration considers the cash flow rights of the significant blockholders as a base (Wruck, 1989). 
Hence, assuming that all significant blockholders might have the incentive to influence control 
through efforts of monitoring and willing to bear the costs of monitoring, the aggregate blockholder 
ownership stake (ABHO) will be used as a proxy to measure ownership concentration variable in the 
analysis of the impact of shared control on firm value.  
To sum up, even though there are the appropriation hypothesis and the proposition of Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) of no systematic relationship due to endogeneity of ownership concentration, we 
hypothesize the following using the alighnment of interest hypothesis and the argument for the 
bargaining effects in the theory of collective action.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between ownership concentration and firm 
performance.  
5.4.2 The First-Two Competing Blockholders and Firm Performance 
The Model of First-Two Competing Blockholders: VPC1-VPC2 Model:  Much of 
the views of the existing agency theory deal with the agency problems that arise from two extreme 
ownership structures: (1) the baseline assumption of owner-manager or 100 percent dispersed 
ownership or (2) one large, controlling owner combined with small, diffuse shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1986, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Harris and Raviv, 
1988; Stulz, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1990; and Burkart et al., 1997, 1998). It is stated that control is 
optimal when a firm is 100% owned by a shareholder, which is an ultimate controller (Leech, 1988, 
2004). However Leech (1988) argues that even control dominance amounting to practical control 
can arise from substantial minority ownership. Hence, in the context of one large controlling 
blockholder, even though the legal control by the first largest blockholder requires a majority 
holding (Leech, 1988), the control power might still be contested by the second largest blockholder 
that might have the incentives to monitor the dominant controller. This suggests the contestability 
of control hypothesis regarding the interaction and competition for control between the first and the 
second largest blockholders (C1 and C2).  
173 
 
The resource-based approaches suggests that the power to control is determined in terms of the 
resources from which it derives – in the context of the ownership control of different shareholders, 
and in terms of the voting rules defined in the firms regulations (Leech, 2004). Hence, it can be 
argued that the way in which shares are distributed among shareholders determines the power of 
each blockholder, especially the largest shareholder; and that the largest blockholder might exert 
control pressure if the remaining shares are widely dispersed (Burkart et al, 2000; Laeven and 
Levine, 2008). However, the view that assumes the first largest blockholder as sole ultimate firm 
controller is just a theoretical assumption which ignores the contest of contestability of control that 
might affect the behaviour of the ultimate controller. This study deviates from this assumption.  
On the other hand, Bloch and Hege (2001) present a simplified model of the scenario in which there 
are two large blockholders that compete for control. Since they are the two most contending forces 
for control power, it might be expected that they monitor each other’s action while controlling or 
monitoring the management of the firm. Bloch and Hege (2001) argue in their two competing 
blockholders model that control is more contestable between the two largest blockholders, and 
hence minority expropriation will be lower. This might be more viable in firms where there are 
smaller differences in stakes of the two blockholders and the ability of the blockholders to define 
strategy of the firm (Zwiebel, 1995).  
Moreover, the two competing large blockholders might have different capacity to define the 
company strategy and their ability to monitor manager. In order to win control the two blockholders 
compete for the votes of minority blockholders by reducing their private benefits. Bloch and Hege 
(2001) suggest that the presence of two large blockholders might have a positive impact for the firm 
since it acts to limit the extraction of private rent and to attract the votes of the minority 
blockholders when proposals are contested. The winner blockholder in the competition defines the 
strategy though both parties play a monitoring role bearing monitoring costs. So, the high 
competition arising from their incentives to control and their ability related to small difference in 
their ownership rights between the two blockholders contending for control has a positive impact on 
firm performance. In contrast, when their relative ownership size has big difference, contestability 
between them might be reduced, and the largest blockholder might attempt to define strategy that 
favours its own interest and divert rent, hence leading to reduction of firm performance.  
This research follows Block and Hege (2001) in assuming that the first two largest blockholders 
compete for control. However, deviates from the model assuming that C1 with voting power VPC1 is 
ultimate controller, and C2 with voting power of VPC2 is ultimate contester in the competition for 
control. From hereof, we refer the two contenders as the ‘First-Two’ and that control by the first 
largest blockholder is contested by the second largest blockholder. This first version of our control 
dominance-contestability model is referred to as the model of the first-two competing blockholders 
or VPC1-VPC2 Model in short. Below, the first and the second largest blockholders are discussed 
briefly from the theoretical perspectives and the rationale behind their potentiality as dominant 
controllers and contestants respectively.  
The First Largest Blockholder (Ultimate Controller):  Studies on ownership and 
control structures in corporations have followed different approaches to identify and measure 
dominant and contesting controllers or coalitions of the firm. The first methodology is that of La 
Porta et al. (1999), which defines firm’s ultimate controller as the blockholder having direct and 
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indirect voting rights that exceed a 20% threshold. Other researchers Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio 
and Lange (2002) and others followed this methodology. However, we do not use the presence of 
such ultimate blockholders at a certain threshold since we seek to attain a measurement that has 
ratio or interval scales and since we are interested in the voting rights that gives the ability to exert 
control pressure in firms. Moreover, we have attempted and found it unwise to use the 10% or 20% 
for the presence of ultimate control for the UK firms since (1) we assume that there are two 
blockholders that are large enough to compete for control in terms of their block size or voting 
power following Bloch and Hege (2001) model, and (2) the use of the presence of the blockholders at 
the thresholds results in the dummy values that leads not only to the exclusion of large blockholders 
with control potential but also to the exclusion of significant number of firms that are without 
blockholders below the thresholds from the sample of the panel data, thus making the sample 
unrepresentative.  
Hence, in this research we define ultimate controller as the first largest shareholder in the firm 
whose control power is measured by the voting power attached to its blocks of shares in the firm at 
the 3% threshold level, since the blockholders are known for all firms in the sample and might 
therefore more easily identifiable and might attract attention to their views. So, we use the voting 
power or stakes of such blockholders hold, VPC1, as proxy for ultimate controller. This variable has 
observations for all firms in the sample and much better than dummy variables; and it might be a 
proxy that might reveal the impact of ultimate controller on firm performance. Nevertheless, the 
attempted use of insider owners as ultimate controllers to differentiate from outsider owners is 
dropped because of the rare cases or observations of insider ownership (only about 119 out of 2883 
firm years) in UK firms in our panel data. Additionally, the option to investigate the impact of 
institutional investors as ultimate controllers is also dropped since (1) we have to be selective in the 
SEM in choosing pairs of control factor variables that are dominants and contestants, (2) the 
corresponding possible control dominance variable – insider owners – is not viable for use due to the 
reason mentioned above, and (3) checks made show that they generally show no significant effect 
on firm performance.   
Regarding the first largest blockholder, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as the ownership 
stake of the owner-manager decreases, the tendency of the first controlling largest blockholder to 
expropriate minority shareholders increases, thus leading to reduction of firm value. Moreover, in 
model of two competing largest shareholders, the largest controlling blockholder winning in the vote 
might define strategy or makes decisions that might maximize own utility at the expense of other 
shareholders engaging in rent extraction, thus decreasing firm value or performance (Bloch and 
Hege, 2001). Hence, negative relationship between the voting power of the first largest shareholder 
and firm performance is expected. In contrast, based on the premise of the incentive alignment 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1993), as the stake of the largest blockholder increases, the rent extraction by 
the largest blockholder decreases since the benefits they get is in proportion of their cash flow right. 
Additionally, in the UK case, minority shareholder protection might limit also exploitation. Therefore, 
we expect a positive relationship between the stake of the first largest blockholder and firm 
performance.  
The Second Largest Blockholder (Ultimate Contester):  The control contestability 
hypothesis posits that the dominant controller or controlling coalition always faces contesting 
blockholder or coalition of blockholders that is in work to counter-balance its actions (Leech, 1988). 
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Regarding this, Pagano and Roell (1998) argue that large shareholders beyond the largest 
shareholder will monitor the controlling blockholder and reduce the diversion of resources for 
private benefits. More specifically, Bloch and Hege (2001) emphasize that the larger owner contest 
control and reduce rent extraction only when the second largest blockholder is sufficiently large 
relative to the largest blockholder. These arguments might lead to the insight that control with the 
ultimate blockholder is contestable and that the second largest blockholder is the contestant to the 
incumbent first largest blockholder in the first version of our model.  
Literature search reveals that the contesting power and role of the second largest blockholder lacks 
theoretical underpinning and empirical investigation. However, the presence of the second largest 
blockholder is well documented in literature. Bloch and Hege (2001) report that the median of the 
second largest voting bloc in large public listed firms in 9 largest stock markets in the European 
Union exceeds 5% (ECGN result). This significant position and the fact that the second largest 
blockholders are present almost always in every firm make the use of VPC2 as a contestant in the 
control power structure of the firm.  
Empirical evidence regarding the relation between the second largest blockholder and firm 
performance is quiet few, and they exhibit the same evidence. Lehman and Weigand (2000) provide 
empirical evidence that the presence of a strong second largest blockholder improves the 
profitability of German listed firms. Laeven and Levine (2008) also find that Western European firms 
with large blockholders have higher Tobin’s Q than firms with only one big shareholder, and that 
widely held firms have the highest Tobin Q. These evidences reveal that control contestability where 
the second largest blockholder enhances firm profitability.  Even more stringently, Maury and 
Pajuste (2005) find evidence that the existence of the third largest blockholder enhances firm value 
when 2 blockholders with similar interests exist.  
To sum up, we argue that the second largest blockholder has the incentive to monitor the 
incumbent ultimate controller and reduce rent extraction in order to attain benefits in proportion to 
the cash flow right.  Hence, as the voting power of the second largest blockholder increases, we 
expect that the dominance position of the ultimate blockholder (the first largest blockholder) 
declines and firm performance will increase. Finally, since there might be interaction to dominate 
and to contest between the opposing parties, it is also arguable that there is inverse relationship 
between the first and the second largest blockholders.  So, based on the theoretical arguments 
above and propositions (2-6) of the theoretical model in the previous section, the possible 
hypotheses tested are summarized as follows: 
Hypothesis 2a: The increase in the voting power of (or the concentration of power in the 
hand of) the first largest blockholder will increase rent diversion and hence decrease firm 
performance.  
Hypothesis 2b: The increase in the voting power of the first largest blockholder will neutralize 
the interest of rent diversion due to alignment of interest and hence will enhance firm 
performance.  
Hypothesis 2c: Due to the presence of minority shareholder protection in the UK that might 
reduce expropriation, the voting power of the first largest blockholder as a controller has a 
positive or no systematic association with firm performance in the UK listed firms.  
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Hypothesis 2d: The control dominance power of the first largest blockholder is contested by 
the second largest blockholder in which the second blockholder exerts its voting power and 
or monitoring role in order to scan the behaviour and action of the first largest blockholder 
and to recover the rents to be diverted and hence will enhance firm performance.   
Hypothesis 2e: The dominance of the first largest blockholder has a negative association 
with the contests of second largest blockholder or vice versa.  
5.4.3 Dominant and Contestant Coalitions and Firm Performance 
5.4.3.1 Introduction: Collective Actions in Control 
In the presence of other large blockholder (minority blockholders) that have large weight in voting 
power in a firm, the power of the largest blockholder might be too low to exert direct and effective 
control. In this case the first largest blockholder control power position would be contested (Leech, 
2004). Moreover, with the reduction in the size of the ownership stake of the unique large 
shareholder, there might be reduction in its incentives to control (to monitor, or preserving 
managerial initiative) the firm (Burkart et al., 1997, 2000), and the possible increase in the number 
of blockholders competing for control with their voting power and the contestability of control. 
Hence, this might create the need to form coalitions in order to exert effective control to dominate 
or to monitor the firm. This section will deal with the second alternative in which there are dominant 
coalition and a contesting coalition.  
Moreover, regarding minority blockholders, Zwiebel (1995) argues that the ability of smaller 
blockholders to share the private benefits from control is reduced if one of the blocks in the group is 
much larger than the others. Furthermore, he shows that at a certain threshold, due to the 
difference in size of the voting rights of different minority blockholders, the largest blockholder 
might not be challenged by other smaller blockholders. Hence, as the stake of the largest 
blockholder increase, the probability of control as a group will decrease. Hence, in the equilibrium 
state, it might be possible that the control of the firms can be either by (1) only one large 
blockholder with blocks above a certain cut-off, and (2) a group of several blockholders of medium 
size blocks below the threshold (Gutierrez and Tribo, 2004).  
Furthermore, it is arguable that minority blockholders holding lower stakes than the larger or largest 
blockholders do not wield or exert their control power. On the other hand, it might also be arguable 
that minority blockholders can increase their ownership stake a bit and might wield control so as to 
discipline management. Regarding this, Butz (1994) states that one way in which such a minority 
blockholder can wield control is by exercising the voting rights so as to favourably change the 
composition of corporate boards. Hence, it might follow that the votes of minority blockholders is 
important for larger blockholders competing to ensuring control or for posing control contests by 
forming coalitions for collective actions. So, two forms of coalitions might arise in a firm, namely 
dominant coalition that colludes for collective actions of maintaining control and contesting coalition 
that colludes for collective actions of monitoring the incumbent controller(s).  
The problem related to the formation of a group of some or all blockholders for collective action is 
the heterogeneity of the members in the group. The traditional theory of groups asserts that group 
of individuals having common interests will cooperate in order to pursue the shared benefits of 
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interests. This implies that group formation for collective action in order to seek collective good is an 
easy matter, and heterogeneity does not matter a lot. In contrast, the theory of collective action of 
Olson (1965) suggests that rational, self interested individuals will not act in large groups to further 
their common or shared interests unless they are induced to do so by coercion or by some separate 
and selective incentives that make them act. From this it might be suggestive that fewer 
blockholders might be engaged in collective action in smaller groups in order to pursue common 
interest. Regarding this view related to corporate control Andres (2008) argues that it is much easier 
for large blockholders to coordinate their actions and put pressure on managers. Based on this 
argument, it might also be suggestive that large shareholders in the dominant and contesting 
coalition coordinate their voting power in their decisions to control and contest respectively.   
One important aspect of a coalition is that group members might differ substantially in their 
interests and resources that might affect the level of collective action expected from the group 
(Olsen, 1965; Oliver and Marwell, 1985). However, it might be the case that group heterogeneity is 
favourable for collective action (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982; Oliver et al., 1985; Oliver and Marwal, 
1988), and that there might be difference in the participation or contribution of each member in the 
group based on the level of interest (ownership stake in our case). Even so, it is suggested that those 
with small interest would exploit (by not contributing/ participating) those with big interest; and 
those having a very large interest in the collective good (monitoring or control in our case) might 
provide the good themselves regardless of the actions of those with small ownership interests 
(Olsen, 1965; Oliver et al., 1985). By extension, it is arguable that even though the significant 
blockholders are heterogeneous, they might be coerced by their relatively larger interests in firms 
that induce them to care about their cash flow rights and to participate in the collective action or to 
contribute to the collective interests by affording the costs associated with control. This is consistent 
with the suggestion of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that large investors provide a solution to the free-
riding problem since it pays for them to spend private resources to monitor management due to 
their large stake.  
Nevertheless, the willingness to contribute towards a public good depends on the size of the 
participants (Olsen, 1965). If the size of blockholders is large, the members of the group would never 
contribute towards the provision of a public good (Olson, 1965) due to the problem of free-riders. 
The free-rider hypothesis extensively suggested in literature presupposes that not participating or 
contributing to the collective good will discourage the actions of those participating or may lead to 
the diversion of the benefits coming from the action to themselves (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Hart, 
1995). Hence, in the UK case, where ownership of listed firms is widely dispersed, the number of 
blockholders is not low and it might be difficult for a single blockholder to exert absolute control. It is 
arguable that passivity might bring more harm than the monitoring cost, and the vested interest in 
the firm might motivate or even compel fewer blockholders to form a blockholder coalition that 
bears the costs associated with collective action. Moreover, since the cost of monitoring good is 
shared among the members of the coalition, it might be affordable for individual group member to 
contribute to it; and as the group member increases the level of cost borne by individual member 
might decline.  
Finally, based on the fact that (1) few rational and self-interested blockholders might be coerced to 
act together in a small group derived by common interests according to the theory of collective 
action, (2) both the dominant controlling coalition and the contesting coalition of large blockholders 
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might have the ability to bear the costs of controlling only until the marginal utility of its benefit is 
equal to its marginal cost, and (3) the tight regulation in the UK on overt coalitions or voting pacts 
might not ensure the viability of a coalition many blockholders, we assume that only fewer numbers 
of blockholders can collude to form dominant coalitions. So, as it will be discussed in details below, 
the structural equations model will incorporate the following group control models:  
(1) C1C2-‘Ocean’ or TDPI-SHAPV model: The power index of the coalition of the first and 
second largest blockholders (C1C2), measured by total dominant power index (TDPI), 
and the contesting coalition of the ‘ocean’ (the rest of blockholders excluding C1C2), 
measured by Shapley values (SHAPV);  
(2) C1C4-C2C3 model: The voting power of the monopolizing coalition of the first and fourth 
largest blockholders (C1C4) and the contesting coalition of the second and third largest 
blockholders (C2C3); and  
(3) MONR-CONTR model: The ratio the power of the monopolizing coalition of the first and 
fourth largest blockholders to ABHO (MONR), and the contesting coalition of the second 
and third largest blockholders to ABHO (CONTR).  
5.4.3.2 Coalition of the First Two Largest Blockholders versus the ‘Ocean’: 
C1C2-‘Ocean’ or TDPI-SHAPV Model:   
Theoretical literature by researchers like Leech (1987), Zwiebel (1995), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 
(2000), and Gomes and Novaes (2001) consider a setting in which a group of large blockholders 
together hold the majority of the voting rights and control the firm. In the setting, the control 
benefits, which are in proportion of the respective blocks of shares the blockholders own, might be 
the driving forces that might unify or initiate the unanimity of the group decisions.  
In the formation coalition of few blockholders for control, it might not be ruled out that the first and 
the second largest blockholders might form a voting pact or coalition in order to control a firm. In 
contrast to the model of Bloch and Hege (2001) that assumes the first and the second largest 
blockholders as competing forces, we assume they form a coalition of the first two largest 
blockholders (C1C2) as dominant blockholder. Moreover, following Shapley and Shubik (1967) and 
Milnor and Shapley (1978) model we assume that the first two largest blockholders (the First-Two) 
are controlling coalition while ‘ocean’ are the contestants to the power of the coalition. The ‘ocean’ 
or the ‘free float’ is a group of the rest of significant blockholders (excluding the first two largest 
blockholders that form dominant coalition) that might have a cumulative power to contest the 
colluding power of the first two largest blockholders. So, we assume that some or all of the 
blockholders in the ‘ocean’, might undertake the monitoring role to reduce rent extraction.  
The power of the coalition of the first two dominant largest blockholders (C1C2) is measured by a 
proxy called total dominant power index (TDPI), which is derived from the voting power of the first 
and second largest blockholders, while the power of the ‘ocean’ is proxied by Shapley values 
(SHAPV), which is derived from the voting power of the ‘ocean’. SHAPV is used as the proxy for the 
power to contest the dominant blockholders’ coalition because it measures the probability that 
blockholder or group of blockholders form part of the winning coalition (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; 
Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009).  
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In order to calculate the TDPI, we follow Milnor and Shapley (1978) computational procedure of 
Oceanic games in coalition formation. TDPI is the aggregate of the power indices of the first largest 
blockholder (PI1) and the second largest blockholder (PI2). Hence, in computing TDPI, the power 
indices of the first and the second largest blockholders should be computed as below. Let w1 and w2 
be the proportion (weight) of the voting power of the first largest blockholder and the second 
largest blockholder in the outstanding shares of the firm respectively. The proportion of firm 
ownership that gives majority or absolute control power of the firm is assumed to be at least half or 
0.05. Let PI1 and PI2 represent the power index of the first largest blockholder and that of the 
second largest blockholder respectively. Hence, following Milnor and Shapley (1978) the power 
indices of the controlling first two largest blockholders and the power index (TDPI) of the coalition of 
the first two largest blockholders are calculated as:  
 
Moreover, let OHP be the ‘ocean’ holding power, and OPI be the ‘ocean’ power index. OHP is 1 
minus the aggregate proportion (weight) of voting power of the first two largest blockholders, 
whereas OPI is 1 minus TDPI. We calculate Shapley values (SHAPV), the contestability variable, as the 
ratio of the ‘ocean’ power index to ‘ocean’ holding power (ratio of the OPI to OHP). Hence, the 
formulas used in the computation are as follows:  
 
We expect that contestability of the power of the dominant coalition increases as Shapley values 
decrease. Put it in another way, it is expected that as Shapley values decreases, contestability 
increases the power to monitor and reduce rent extraction by the coalition or firm performance 
increases (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Gutierrez and Pombo, 2009).  
Hence, based upon the arguments above on the theory of collective action, propositions 2-9 in the 
theoretical frameworks section, and the contestability of control hypothesis, the hypothesis tested 
is:  
     w1/ (1-(w1+w2)) – (w1w2)/ (1-(w1+w2)) ^2, Where (1-(w1+w2)) >= ½ 
 PI1   =    (1-2w2) ^2) / 4(1-(w1+w2) ^2, where w1 <= ½; w2 <=1/2; 1-(w1+w2) <= ½ 
     1,    where w1 >= ½ 
     0,    where w2>= ½ 
 
     W2 (1-(w1+w2) – (w1w2)/ (1-(w1+w2)) ^2, Where (1-(w1+w2)) >= ½ 
 PI1   =    (1-2w1) ^2) / 4(1-w1+w2) ^2, where w1 <= ½; w2 <=1/2; 1-(w1+w2) <= ½ 
     1,    where w2 >= ½ 
     0,    where w1>= ½ 
 
TDPI   = (PI1 + PI2)  (Total dominant power index) 
 
       OHP  =  1 – (w1+w2)              (‘Ocean’ holding power) 
       OPI                =  1-TDPI                (‘Ocean’ power index) 
       SHAPV          =  OPI / OPH = OPI/ (1-(w1+w2))  
                             = (1-TDPI)/ (1-(w1+w2))             (Shapley values) 
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Hypothesis 3a: The collusion of hence the rise in aggregate voting power of the first two 
largest blockholders might reduce contestability of control by the ‘ocean’ and thereby reduce 
firm performance since the coalition of the first two largest blockholders might pursue its 
own interest and divert rents. 
Hypothesis 3b: As the contesting power of the ‘ocean’ increases, the power of the dominant 
coalition and its rent extraction or diversion declines and hence firm performance increase 
due to effective monitoring by the ‘ocean’.  
5.4.3.3 Model of ‘Monopolizability’ and Contestability of Control  
The more extreme form of control dominance concept to be introduced is the monopolizability of 
control. It is arguable that presence of contestability of control might tempt the dominating 
controller to attain absolute control through monopolization of power in firm decision-making. This 
motivates us to consider the monopolizability-contestability model in this research. Hence, for the 
purpose of this study, monopolization of control is defined as the absolute domination of the firm 
decision-making process via the accumulation of voting blocs that might bar other blockholders from 
the ability to change the decisions that the dominant favours. Moreover, the extent to which control 
might be monopolized by a coalition of groups of blockholders is referred to as monopolizability of 
control.  
In this version of our model, we assume that this monopolizability of control might also lead to the 
contestability of control where the second largest blockholder might form coalition with another 
blockholder in order to at least exert control pressure in the form of monitoring. As in other forms of 
competitions the contending forces in the firm are in constant games in which the significant players 
watch each other’s action very closely. In the game, the dominating coalition is always the best 
choice every player aspires for, and it is only if outsmarted that any player or group resorts to 
accepting the second best solution. This exactly holds also in corporate control games. Hence, the 
interaction between blockholders derived from their behaviour related to their incentives and 
interests and the existing level of competition determine the way control coalitions might be 
formed. When the largest blockholder has not sufficient voting power to attain majority and there 
are other blockholders with stakes closer in size to that of the largest shareholder, the alternative 
means of maintaining control position or attaining dominancy or monopoly power is the formation 
of coalition aimed at blocking the way of contesting group. As in politics or other competitions, the 
worst foes ever in the control structure are the first and the second largest blockholders if the 
difference between their voting powers is smaller. So, it is assumed that it might be very difficult for 
them to form a smoothly functioning coalition since they have voting power generally almost close 
to each other.  
Hence, in such a corporate control setting, the alternative game that the first largest blockholder 
might play is monopolization game. And knowing this move the game played by the second largest 
blockholder will be to form a coalition that might check the potential control power of the C1 and to 
induce C1 to accept at least equal footing or fair game.  Having these facts in mind, we consider a 
more difficult and complex coalition structure. We assume that the first largest blockholder (C1) 
might always be suspicious of the second largest blockholders (C2) because the later might have the 
incentive and ability to make coalition with the third largest blockholder (C3) or to make tender offer 
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by accumulating more blocks of shares in order to attain the monopolizing (absolute) control power. 
On the other hand, the second largest blockholder, C2, might think that the C1 dominates the 
control and would block the way of C1 making collusion with C3. It would, however, be easier for 
them to form coalition with those that readily admit their inferiority in terms of voting power. One 
final note is that it is rather easier for the opposition forces, even between C2 and C3, to form 
coalition together since it is a contesting coalition against the dominant (C1). In such instance, in 
order to sustain the dominance or monopolization of power it is assumed that the first largest 
blockholder might form coalition with the fourth largest blockholder (C4) and the second largest 
blockholder might form coalition with the third largest blockholder. Hence, the game of power 
struggle might be between the coalition of C1 and C4 (C1C4) as a monopolizing coalition on the one 
hand, and that of C2 and C3 (C2C3) as a contesting coalition on the other. This research uses two 
versions of the monopolizability-contestability model, C1C4-C2C3 and MONR-CONTR models.  
C1C4-C2C3 model is the version of monopolizability-contestability model that uses the aggregate 
voting power of the first and the fourth largest blockholder to measure monopolizability of control 
(C1C4), and the aggregate voting power of the second and the third largest blockholder to measure 
contestability of control (C2C3). On the other hand, MONR-CONTR model is another version of 
monopolizability-contestability model where we measure the coalition for monopolization and 
contestability differently using ratios in order to observe the sensitivity of the results on the 
measures used above. We still assume that coalitions of C1C4 and C2C3 are the monopoly and 
contesting powers respectively. In order to transform them into ratios we divide them by the 
aggregate voting power of all significant blockholders (ABHO). Hence, we get monopolizability ratio 
(MONR) and contestability ratio (CONTR).  
To sum up, if the coalitions are formed so that they might check each other; and they both might 
negatively impact each other and lead to firm performance. Hence, it is expected that as 
monopolizability increases, contestability declines and vice versa. If the coalitions are not formed 
with great disparities in their power, monopolization of power might diminish contestability and 
increase rent extraction that might lead to decline in firm performance. Hence, based upon 
propositions 2-9 in the theoretical frameworks section, especially proposition 7-9, and the theory of 
collective actions the hypotheses tested are:  
Hypothesis 4a: As the voting power of the monopolizing coalition or monopolizability ratio 
increases, due to the alignment of interests in which the private benefits of control are 
divisible among the members will increases, firm performance is enhanced.  
Hypothesis 4b: The increase in the voting power of contesting coalition or contestability ratio 
increases firm performance by serving as a monitoring force against rent extraction of the 
dominant or monopolizing blockholder coalition.  
  
MONR  = C1C4)/ABHO  Proxy for monopolizability of control 
CONTR  = C2C3/ABHO  Proxy for contestability of control 
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5.5. METHODOLOGY 
5.5.1 Sample and Data 
The process in the selection of the the sample and collection of the data on for this study is already 
explained in Chapter Four, section 4.4.1. However, we would note that new variables for the sample 
are collected or computed and included in the original dataset.  
5.5.2 Empirical Model 
5.5.2.1 Determinants of Firm Performance  
Firm performance (PRFM) might be determined by several internal or external environmental 
factors. The agency theory posits that it is determined by the board structure and other external 
governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Hence, BRD and 
EXTGM are among the determinants of firm performance in our structural model. The causal path of 
the relationship between the two factors and firm performance has been discussed previously in 
section 3. However, since BRD and EXTGM are related to firm performance through control 
dominance and contestability (DOMIN and CONTST) and thus have an indirect path to PRFM, we 
include DOMIN and CONTST as determinants of firm performance in the equation. Moreover, other 
two stock market factors, namely stock price volatility (PVOL) and equity turnover (EQTO) that are 
external to the firm are also included in the framework since they might impact firm performance 
through board of directors and the blockholders control factors.  
The traditional price theory predicts that profitability is influenced by various elements of the 
market structure and conducts such as concentration ratio, industry entry barriers, industry 
advertising intensity, leverage, etc. (Weiss, 1971; Vernon, 1972; Gupta, 1983). Based on the agency 
perspective suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983), parts of the market structure, namely capital 
markets that pose the external control pressure on firms are EXTGMs that might determine control 
forces and indirectly influence firm performance. Since several market and macroeconomic factors 
that might influence firm performance are common for all firms or at least for those in the same 
industry, it is not chosen to include them. 
However, we need to focus on the firm-specific characteristics that determine firm performance. 
Diverse research literature provides a long list of such firm-specific factors such as research and 
development expenditure, tangibility of assets, firm advertising and marketing expenditure, firm 
size, firm age, liquidity, export intensity, growth in sales, product diversification, and etc. In order to 
avoid the impact of variable proliferation that would complicate the estimation by exerting pressure 
on the degree of freedom, only firm size (SIZE), firm age (AGE), R&D to sales (RNDTS), fixed asset to 
sales (FATS), Sales-General-and-Administration expenditure to sales (SGATS) that includes 
advertising and marketing costs are chosen as control variables (CTRL) following the previous 
research works (Demsetz and Lehn, 1983; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Leech and Leahy, 1991; 
Short and Keasey, 1999; Weir et al., 2002). Additionally, it is assumed that the firm past performance 
determines its current performance and hence the lag of the performance variable (PRFMt-1) 
following Weir et al., (2002). Hence, the performance equation in the structural model is: 
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5.5.2.2 Determinants of Board Structure  
It is noted that board structure is endogenous and that performance affects board structure as 
board structure affects firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Following the argument of 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) on the problem of endogeneity, which makes the interpretation of 
empirical results on board-performance relationship ambiguous, Coles et al., (2003) suggest that the 
endogeneity problem cannot be corrected with simple econometric methods and hence that the 
estimation of the complete structural model is rather required. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also 
consider managerial bargaining power and how it affects board performance, whereas Raheja (2005) 
considers how managerial succession affects board performance.  
The UK Code of Best Practice recommends that the proportion of the nonexecutive directors should 
make at least the majority of the board of directors and that there should be the separation of the 
roles of the Chairman and the CEO in the board of directors. Based on this and following the study of 
Weir et al. (2002) and Weir and Liang (2001) on the UK firms, this research will consider proportion 
of non-executive directors (PNED) and CEO-duality (DUAL) as proxies for measuring the control factor 
measures of the board of directors. The choice of PNED and DUAL is based the duties and 
responsibilities of the internal control of the firm defined in the corporate Charter and practiced in 
the UK. The board of directors is comprised of two types of unitary bodies (1) the executive directors 
headed by the CEO, which are responsible for the day-to-day management of the company, 
formulate and implement corporate strategy, and thus have the actual control over the firm; and (2) 
the non-executive directors that are assumed to play the role of effective monitoring and whose 
effectiveness would increase in line with their board representation (Weir and Liang, 2001). Even 
though it is questionable, it is assumed that the presence of more non-executive directors in the 
board might ensure independence of the board from the influence of the CEO who actually runs the 
daily operations of the firm. In terms of the leadership of the board, CEO-duality is assumed to lead 
to dominance control of the firm by the CEO who also assumes the chairmanship of the board by 
reducing the possibility of monitoring or counter-checking in the behaviour of the CEO or 
management and turning the board into a rubber stamp.  
Hillier and McColgan (2006) write that corporate board structure is determined by (1) firm-specific 
characteristics and (2) owner-specific characteristics. We also include market-specific characteristics 
that are related to governance mechanisms. They note that firm-specific characteristics include the 
size and scope of operations, firm age, cash flows, the noisiness of operating environments, etc. In 
this research, firm size, age, research and development expenditure to sales, fixed assets 
expenditure to sales, and the Sales-General-and-Administration expenses to sales are firm-specific 
factors that are used as control variables (CTRL) in our analysis.  Regarding firm size and age, Raheja 
(2005) proposes that, all else kept constant, larger and older and more complex firms will require 
larger boards with a greater number of non-executive directors due to the greater skill and 
informational requirements required in running such companies. At the same time, increases in firm 
size and complexity are also expected to correlate with further increases in board size and non-
executive director representation in order to add experts in the new fields (Hillier and McColgan, 
2006). It is expected that firm size has positive relation with board size and NEDs’ representation.  
PRFM = BRD + DOMIN + CONTST + EXTGM  + CTRL + PRFMt-1 + ε1 (Eq. 1) 
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The owner-specific characteristics arise as a result of the bargaining process between the firm’s top 
management and outside monitors (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The owner-specific 
characteristics include control dominance (DOMIN) and contestability (CONTST) variables, which are 
related to ownership structure. Moreover, based on the structural equation model developed 
previously, we add the market-specific characteristics in to the picture. The market-specific 
characteristics determining the board structure are the external governance mechanisms (EXTGM, 
namely Debt financing and takeover intensity) and other relevant stock market factors, PVOL and 
EQTO. It is expected that takeover intensity (TOINTENS) and EQTO have a positive, whereas debt 
ratio (DEBTR) and price volatility (PVOL) have a negative influence on board structure (Hillier and 
McColgan, 2006). Finally, based on the existence of endogenous relationship between past firm 
performance and board structure previously explained, we include lagged performance variable 
(PRFMt-1) as determinant of the board. Hence, the two board equations in the structural model are:  
5.5.2.3 Determinants of Control Dominance and Contestability 
Literature shows that there are no theoretical or empirical frameworks that suggest the 
determinants of control dominance and contestability in the internal control structure of 
corporations. Based on the propositions of our theoretical model discussed previously, both internal 
control factors, namely dominance (DOMIN) and contestability (CONTST) have the reciprocal 
relationships with each other. Hence, we suggest that the two factors determine each other. The 
model depicts also that the board structure (BRD) has reciprocal influence with them. Since there is 
a reciprocal or reversal causal relationship between DOMIN and CONTST and between BRD and the 
two factors (DOMIN and CONTST), it is difficult to suggest the sign of their relationships now.  
Moreover, the causal path relationship goes only from the external corporate governance 
mechanisms (EXTGM) and other two stock market factors (PVOL and EQTO) to DOMIN and CONTST, 
implying that EXTGM determines dominance and contestability of control in firms and that DOMIN 
and CONTST might not determine EXTGM. Considering takeover intensity (TOINTENS), we might 
expect that as it increases, dominance decreases and contestability to control the firm might 
increase. According to the capital structure theory the rise in the debt financing (TDTA) might induce 
financial distress and hence triggers the contesters to monitor the firm, and hence, we suggest that 
it enhances contestability and reduces dominance in the control of the firm. In contrast, it might also 
trigger antitakeover contest moves taken by the dominant blockholders that try to keep their control 
position. Finally, it is expected that price volatility (PVOL) might influence dominance negatively and 
contestability positively since volatility might induce the strength of the contestant(s) against the 
dominant(s), and that equity turnover (EQTO) might strengthen or weaken the contestants against 
the dominant controller(s) depending which party acquires and accumulates blocks of shares.  
Furthermore, since board structure is endogenously determined and the internal control dominance 
and contestability are also endogenously determined with the board structure by firm-specific 
characteristics, we should consider relevant firm-specific control variables (CTRL) as determinants of 
DOMIN and CONTST. These relevant firm-specific control variables to be used are already discussed 
PNED = DOMIN + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 +   ε2  (Eq. 2) 
DUAL = DOMIN + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 +   ε2  (Eq. 3) 
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above. Finally, based on the argument made previously that past firm performance impacts board 
structure, we suggest that lagged performance variables (PRFMt-1) is also among the determinants of 
control dominance and contestability. Hence, the two board equations in the structural model are:  
To sum up, from the theoretical analysis of the control structure of corporations based on the 
benefits and costs of control perspective five equations of the empirical SEM are designed. This in 
turn has necessitated the specification of the implied testable version of the empirical models in the 
SEM assessing the determinants of the independent endogenous variables. In the following 
subsection we discuss the choice of instrumental variables of the SEM since the estimation method 
used to estimate the nonrecursive SEM requires the inclusion of instrumental variables.   
5.5.2.4 Identification and Instrumental Variables of the SEM 
One of the issues to be handled regarding nonrecursive SEM is the problems of identification. For a 
nonrecursive model, it is required that the model is identified or overidentified. Underidentification 
shows specification error. Hence, the models should be uniquely solvable even in the instances when 
the degrees of freedom suggest overidentification. The parameters of the SEM (the structural 
coefficients and the moments of exogenous variables and disturbances) are identified when they are 
uniquely determined by population moments of observable variables. When the structural 
parameter (or combination of parameters) is identified by more than one function of observable 
population moments, the structural model imposes constraints (overidentifying restrictions) on 
those moments. In this case the parameter (or combination of parameters) is overidentified, and the 
overidentifying restrictions must hold in the population when the specified model is correct.  
Therefore, the bad signal of SEM is when the parameter is underidentified. It is when a parameter is 
not uniquely determined by population moments, that is, when more than one value of the 
parameter is consistent with a given set of population moments. One cautioning note is that it is 
more important to ensure the identification of parameters and functions of parameters are 
identified than that of the SEM. This is because for a given model some parameters may be 
overidentified while others may be underidentified (Joreskog, 1970; Duncan, 1975).  
In our model specification, we have to avoid underidentification of each equation in the SEM. The 
condition to ensure identification for an equation with an endogenous dependent variable is: there 
must be at least one predetermined (exogenous) variable, called instrumental variable, which 
directly affects another explanatory variable but have indirect path to the endogenous dependent 
variable. Hence, we strive to find instrumental variables (IVs) that would ensure the identification of 
the model and of each equation in the SEM, especially when we use 2SLS and 3SLS estimation 
methods that require the specification of IVs. The IVs chosen for our SEM are presented in figure 5.2.  
We might assume that the decision on and the level of the free cash flow in the firm and the 
investment in the firm are the factors that create the incentives for private benefits of control in the 
board of structure thus lead to interaction of the control forces and determine the control power 
position of the board – DOMIN and CONTST. Hence, in our SEM, we treated free cash flow per share 
DOMIN   =BRD + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 + ε3     (Eq. 4) 
CONTST =BRD + DOMIN   + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 + ε4       (Eq. 5) 
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(FCFPS) and investment increase (INVINC) as instrumental variables for performance (PRFM) 
equation. FCFPS is measured as the ratio of cash earnings (fund from operation) net of capital 
expenditure and total dividends paid out of the firm to outstanding share at the beginning of a 
period. It is treated as IV for performance because (1) the availability of FCFPS is driven by the 
amount of free cash at the disposal of the management, which might in turn be driven by the 
incentives to dominate or contest control, and (2) the OLS regression of ROA on FCFPS included 
show insignificant relation and very low coefficient (less than 1). Moreover, INVINC is used as IV for 
performance equation since (1) it is a relative value, the result of the difference between the 
previous value and the present divided by the number of outstanding shares of the firm and it can 
be assumed that it has no relation with the current firm performance, and (2) the OLS regression of 
ROA on FCFPS included show insignificant relation and very low coefficient (less than 1).  
 
Moreover, it is assumed that the level of both FCFPS and INVINC, which is within the discretion of 
the BRD or management, determine the dominance and contestability of control (DOMIN and 
CONTST) of the firm directly and board of directors indirectly. The level of FCFPS and INVINC does 
not drive or determine the set up of the board directly but the dominance and contestability of 
control within the board. Hence, we also treat FCFPS and INVINC as instrumental variables for board 
On the other hand the aggregate ownership of all blockholders (ABHO), number of blockholders 
(NBH) and dividend DIVPS directly impact BRD but indirectly influence DOMIN and CONTST. It can be 
argued that ABHO and NBH in the firm directly determine the formation of the board of directors 
but do not affect the dominance and contestability of control within the firm once the BRD is set in 
place by election at the General Meeting. Additionally, DIVPS, which is the ratio of dividend payment 
to number of outstanding shares of the firm at the beginning of the year, is also the accounting 
measure that takes place every six months and/ or year. Hence, DIVPS might directly impact the 
Fig 5.2: A detailed non-recursive path model of the SEM and the instrumental variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Note: Here, EXTGM also includes other stock market factors, namely stock price volatility (PVOL) and 
equity turnover (EQTO) that are control variables just for convenience.  
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formation of the BRD but not DOMIN and CONTST once the BRD is set in place. Hence, they ABHO, 
NBH and DIVPS are treated as instrumental variables for the DOMIN equation and CONTST equation.  
Moreover, it is arguable that the voting power of blockholders determines firm performance, 
whereas NBH might not determine PRFM.  Hence, we assume that NBH, which directly impacts 
board structure, indirectly drives PRFM. Additionally, DIVPS might not directly determine firm 
performances because it is the ratio to number of shares in the firm that might not have any impact 
of firm performance. Hence, NBH and DIVPS have indirect path to PRFM. Hence, they can serve as 
instrumental variables to PRFM equation.  
Moreover, external corporate governance mechanisms (EXTGM) that are proxied TOINT and DEBTR, 
and the other stock market factors (PVOL and EQTO) have direct path only to BRD, DOMIN and 
CONTST and indirect path to PRFM. Hence, they can be IVs only for PRFM equation. They are 
assumed as predetermined exogenous variables that can serve as instrumental variables in 3SLS. 
Nevertheless, we use EQTO only in DOMIN and CONTST equations because it is assumed that EQTO 
is very important factor in the determination of DOMIN and CONTST to the blockholder or their 
coalitions by giving the option to either accumulating block of shares by purchasing more shares to 
attain dominance and contestability or to sell own share and exit the firm. Hence, the detailed 
specification of the SEM, where the endogenous variables are underlined, is as follows.  
 
Since one condition of identification is that the IVs should at least be equal to the number of the 
endogenous variables and in our detailed SEM above we have more than one instrumental variable 
for each dependent variable. Finally, the firm-specific control variables (CTRL) – TA, AGE, RNDTS, 
FATS and SGATS - are strictly exogenous variables, are assumed to be instrumental variables for the 
following four different versions of the following SEMs, which have five equations each.  
1. VPC1-VPC2 Model: (SEM with the voting power of C1 (VPC1) and C2 (VPC2) as dominants 
and contestants respectively)  
2. TDPI-SHAPV Model: (The power index of the coalition of the C1C2 (TDPI) and the ‘ocean’ 
(SHAPV) as dominants and contestants respectively)  
3. C1C4-C2C3 Model: (Dominant and contestant coalition – C1C4 and C2C3 respectively).  
4. MONR-CONTR Model: (Ratios for the monopoly and the contestant coalitions – MONR and 
CONTST respectively).  
  
ROA   =   PNED + DUAL +  DOMIN  +  CONTEST  +  PRFM t-1  + ABHO + FCFPS   
+ INVINC + TOINTENS + TDTA + PVOL + ε1  
PNED = DUAL + DOMIN + CONTEST + NHB + DIVPS +  ABHO + TOINTENS  
+ TDTA + PVOL  + PRFM t-1 + FCFPS + DUAL + INVINC + ε2  
DUAL = PNED + DOMIN + CONTEST + NHB + DIVPS + ABHO + TOINTENS  
+ TDTA + PVOL   + PRFM t-1 + FCFPS + DUAL + INVINC + ε2  
DOMIN =   PNED + DUAL + CONTEST + FCFPS + INVINC + TOINTENS  
+ TDTA + PVOL + EQTO + DIVPS + NBH + PRFM t-1 + ε3  
CONTST =   PNED + DUAL + DOMIN + FCFPS + INVINC + TOINTENS + TDTA 
+ PVOL + EQTO + DIVPS + NBH + PRFM t-1 + ε4  
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5.5.3 Description of Variables 
5.5.3.1 Performance variable  
The only accounting measure of performance used in the investigation is return on assets (ROA) 
following Denis and Denis (1994), Maury and Pajuste (2005) and Gutierrez and Pombo (2009). Even 
though it is cautioned that accounting figures might be manipulated so as to look good when 
reported, and that the accounting figures are based on historical costs, since they are taken into 
expectation when investors calculate the price of share values, we still believe that the use of 
accounting performance variables is useful. The performance variable used as dependent variable 
and its lag (corresponding values in the previous year), which is used as explanatory variable due to 
dynamic endogeneity, are presented in table 5.2 below.  
Nevertheless, this research is delimited in its confinement to the use of only ROA. The use of other 
performance (value) variables such as return on equity (ROE), market-to-book value (MTBV), and 
price per share (PER) is omitted because of the complexity of the estimation the structural equations 
that already involved the estimation of 20 equations. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
lagged performance variable (ROAt1) are not used as dependent variable but as independent or 
predictor variable because it usually controls for the reverse causality (Weir et al., 2001) and it can 
be used to control for persistence in the performance data in terms of accounting data.  
 
5.5.3.2 Ownership Concentration and Control Variables 
There are several ownership concentration variables that measure the dispersion of ownership, the 
dominant blockholder, the number of all blockholders, controlling coalition and contesting 
coalitions. Based on the hypotheses development, we have chosen to use only ABHO and NBH to 
measure ownership concentration. Based on the rationale behind control dominance and 
contestability factors and their relevant variables used to measure or proxy them discussed in 
hypothesis formulation, table 5.3 presents ownership concentration and coalition variables.  
As already mentioned, the control variables used in this research include (1) governance 
mechanisms, including board structures, and (2) firm-specific accounting variables (see table 5.4 for 
symbols and descriptions; and Chapter Three and Four of this Thesis for explanations). The board of 
directors’ variables (discussed in section 5.3) includes PNED and DUAL, where as the external 
governance mechanism and stock market variables include TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL, and EQTO. 
Finally, the firm specific variables that have impact on firm performance included in the analysis are 
firm size (total assets, TA); firm age (AGE); R&D to sales ratio (RNDTS); sales, general and 
administration expense (includes advertisement expenses) to sales ratio (SGATS); and fixed assets to 
sales ratio (FATS).  
Table 5.2: Symbol and description of performance variables and lagged performance variable 
 
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
Performance variables : dependent variables and lagged performance variables 
ROA Return on assets (ROAt) Net income over total assets in the current year 
ROAt1 Previous ROA (ROAt-1) Return on assets in the previous year 
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Table 5.3: Definition and descriptions of ownership concentration and possible key coalitions 
Symbol Descriptions and measures 
Panel A Ownership concentration , number of blockholders, and the first four largest blockholders 
ABHO Aggregate of all blockholders’ ownership. 
NBH The number of blockholders. 
C1 Control or voting rights of the first largest blockholder.  
C2 Control or voting rights of the second largest blockholder.  
C3 Control or voting rights of the third largest blockholder. 
C4 Control or voting rights of the fourth largest blockholder. 
Panel B Control dominance variables 
VPC1  Voting power of the first largest blockholder in the firm. 
C1C4 The voting power of the coalition of the first and fourth largest blockholders. 
MONR Monopolizability ratio, it is computed as the ratio of the aggregate voting power of C1 and C4 
to the aggregate voting power of all blockholders (= (C1+C4)/ABH)). 
TDPI Total dominant power index of the first two largest blockholders, i.e., TDPI = PI1 + PI2.  
Panel C Contestability of Control Variables 
VPC2 Voting power of the second largest blockholder in the firm. 
C2C3 The voting power of the coalition of the second and the third largest blockholders. 
CONTR Contestability ratio; the ratio of the contesting coalition of C2 and C3; calculated as the voting 
power of C1+C2 to the voting power of all blockholders (ABHO).  
SHAPV Shapley values; 1-TDPI/ OPH = TPI/ (1-(w1+w2)).  
 
Table 5.4: Summary of the definition and descriptions of control variables 
  
Symbol Variable name Descriptions and measures 
PNED NED Representation Board independence proxy, which is measured as the number of non-
executive directors over the number executive directors. 
DUAL CEO-duality Duality takes the value 1 if the CEO sits on the board as Chairperson, 0 
otherwise 
TOINTENS Takeover intensity The number of firms in the firm’s industry acquired during the 
previous period over the number of firms in that industry sector 
TDTA Debt ratio Debt financing (leverage ratio), measured as the ratio total debt to 
total assets of the firm. 
PVOL Price volatility Stock price volatility, proxied by volatility rating. It is calculated on 
standard deviation of the price divided mean price and the whole 
multiplied by 40 to make it in scale 1-20. 
EQTO Equity turnover The turnover rate of equity of the firm in the capital markets. It is 
calculated as the ratio of the number of shares transactions annually 
to the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the 
period.  
TA Firm size The book value of total assets. 
AGE Firm age The age of the firm since incorporation. 
RNDTS R&D ratio Research and development intensity (R&D ratio), which is measured 
as the ratio of annual R&D expenditure to total assets. 
SGATS Advertisement ratio Advertisement ratio (AD ratio), which is proxied by the ratio of Selling, 
General and Administration Expenditures (SGA) less R&D expenditure 
to total sales. 
FATS Fixed asset ratio Fixed assets intensity (FA ratio), which is measured as the ratio of total 
annual expenditures on fixed assets to total sales. 
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5.5.4 Data Analyses  
Analysis of the data regarding data levels, missing values, outliers and normality carried out show 
similar information as in section 4.3.3.1. For further analysis of normality the descriptive statistics 
with (shown in table 5.5) is used.  It is indicative that the mean of the voting power of the first 
largest blockholders, the second largest blockholder, coalition of C1 and C4, coalition of C2 and C3 in 
UK listed firms are around 16%, 8%, 20%, and 13% on average respectively. However, their median 
values (p50) are 12%, 7%, 16%, and 12% respectively. This indicates that the voting powers of the 
blockholders and blockholder coalitions are important control potential variables confirming that 
they are proper candidates for analysis.  
As it can be observed in the table, the other indication is that the means of each variable are greater 
than 1 standard deviation indicating low variances. The skewness and kurtosis statistics show that 
some of the variables are not normally distributed. The values of skewness and kurtosis are not 
equal to zero, indicating that they have not bell-shaped distribution even though some are nearly 
closer to zero indicating assumption of approximate normality. Moreover, the skewness of some 
variables like TDPI, DIVPS, INVINCR, TOINTENS, and EQTO are higher or lower than rule-of-thumb 
range of -2 and +2, indicating that the variables are not normally distributed. Their kurtosis also 
shows the same fact since they are outside the stringent range -3 and +3. However, the kurtosis of 
many variables that seem normally distributed according to skewness exhibit non-normality. 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics of the control variables (that are used as instrumental variable) 
not included in here also show that RNDTS, FATS and SGATS have very high skewness and kurtosis, 
indicating non-normality.  
To sum up, all of control dominance and contestability variables except TDPI are assumed as 
normally distributed based on the rule-of-thumb on skewness criteria discussed above. The variables 
not fulfilling the normality criteria would be used without transformation in order to avoid imposing 
artificial information and since we are using a panel data that can be estimated by methods, which 
does not require NIID assumptions.  
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics of control dominance and contestability variables 
                                                                          
        eqto        2875    .70259    .93996    .91713    4.4226    40.669
        pvol        2447     26.55    28.338    10.157    1.0184    4.1968
        tdta        2824    14.705    19.005    18.481    1.4709    6.9435
    tointens        2653    .05682    .06883    .05162    2.1571     9.029
     invincr        2375         0   2.3e+05   3.8e+06    32.942    1234.1
       fcfps        2569      .029    .05339    .61029    1.9313    78.781
       divps        2798      .082    .14666    .26479    10.633    174.51
        dual        2634         0    .25133    .43386    1.1465    2.3146
        pned        2632    .61538    .63746    .19963    .11377    2.8274
         nbh        2656         5    5.3212    2.7257    .49459    3.2526
        abho        2656    37.835     39.99     22.25    .38684    2.6838
       contr        2655    .34553    .34918    .12982   -.19207    3.6066
        monr        2655    .48204    .51207      .199    .51054    3.6766
       shapv        2656    1.1997    1.2125    .27185    .62535    18.351
        tdpi        2656    .01916    .08347    .19998    3.1114    11.438
        c2c3        2656    12.055    13.165    8.1218    1.1682    5.8127
        c1c4        2656    16.385    19.595    13.354    1.5252     5.938
        vpc2        2656      6.93    8.0056    5.4967    1.9526    10.085
        vpc1        2656    12.065    15.934    13.022    1.9717    7.4766
         roa        2793      5.35    6.0141    10.281   -1.3057     28.52
                                                                          
    variable           N       p50      mean        sd  skewness  kurtosis
191 
 
5.5.5 Diagnostic Analyses of OLS Assumptions 
We now know from the data analysis that the data exhibits some problems, namely semi-parametric 
data set, few outliers, and normality of the variables. The diagnostic analyses of OLS assumptions are 
made as a prelude to the determination of appropriate estimation methods. This is presented in 
details as Appendix D. The diagnostic analyses show that normality of residuals, and independence 
of residuals are violated, hence NIID assumption for OLS is not fulfilled even though the residuals are 
identical (no problem of heteroscedasticity).  
5.5.6 Estimation Methods 
5.5.6.1 Characteristics of the SEM  
Based on the discussions in section 5.5.2 the general equations for the empirical structural model 
that would be estimated and analysed in our investigation are:  
 
The possible characteristics and problems of the system of structural equations model are that (1) 
there might be non-recursivity in the relationship among the factors in the model; (2) there might 
raise problems of contemporaneous correlation of errors across the equations in the SEM; (3) there 
might be omitted variables (thus unobserved heterogeneity) from the equations of the model, (4) 
current observable characteristics or actions in a firm will affect its control environment and future 
performances (dynamic endogeneity), and (5) some of the right hand side (explanatory) variables are 
the function of the dependent variable and hence endogenous variables (simultaneous or joint 
endogeneity). 
Non-recursivity of the Model: In determining the methods of estimating the model, we need 
to consider the relationships among the variables and across the equations. Two characteristics we 
know from our theoretical and hence empirical model is that (1) there are reciprocal causal 
relationship between the control factors, and (2) different disturbances (error terms) might not be 
independent of one-another; in other words, the error terms across equations have 
contemporaneous correlation. Since this fact indicates that that our structural equations model is 
non-recursive model, and since OLS is not an appropriate estimation method, we need to choose 
other proper estimation methods.   
Contemporaneous Correlation: Contemporaneous correlation is the correlation between 
the error terms across the equations in the structural equation model. In our SEM which has a 
network relationship among different control factors and performance, we assume that the error 
PRFM      = BRD + DOMIN + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 + ε1 
PNED      = DOMIN + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 +   ε2   
DUAL      = DOMIN + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 +   ε2 
DOMIN   =BRD + CONTST + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 + ε3   
CONTST =BRD + DOMIN   + EXTGM + CTRL + PRFMt-1 + ε4  
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terms in the structural equations system, at the same point in time, are correlated. The SEM 
estimation method that should be applied should take this into account.  
Unobserved heterogeneity: Unobserved heterogeneity arises if there are unobserved factors 
or omitted variables that affect both the dependent and explanatory variables so that after fitting 
the model there is still a relationship with the other omitted variables and the residuals. As already 
mentioned, there are several firm-specific, industry-specific, product markets-specific characteristic 
factors in the firm’s environment that affect firm performance, board structures, and the control 
dominance and contestability in corporations. Himmelberg et al. (1999) argues that the unobserved 
heterogeneity in the contracting environment across firms generates a spurious correlation between 
ownership and firm performance. Hence, since the proxies for DOMIN and CONTEST come from 
ownership structure (cash flow rights), it might also be suggestive that there are omitted variables 
that create spurious correlation between them and firm performance. In empirical investigation 
involving economic issues, it might be quite impossible to explicitly include all such factors. So the 
existence of the endogeneity caused by omission of variables or unobserved heterogeneity is a 
common phenomenon. Wintoki et al. (2009) also argues that cross-sectional variation in observed 
governance structures is driven by both unobservable heterogeneity and the firm history.  
In the estimation of the SEM with unobserved heterogeneity, OLS estimation may be biased and 
cannot eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, which it completely ignores. Nevertheless, it is 
suggested in econometric literature that unobserved heterogeneity can be eliminated by using both 
fixed-effects and instrumental variables (IVs) estimators. However, fixed-effects regression would be 
consistent only if the current values of the independent variables are completely independent of 
past dependent variable. Nevertheless, due to the presence of autocorrelation in our panel data and 
dynamic endogeneity relationships among the variables in the SEM, fixed-effects estimation is not 
proper since it leads to inconsistent estimators.  
Dynamic endogeneity: In our model it is suggested that past performances affect current 
values of control factors. This dynamic endogeneity would also cause spurious correlation between 
the past performance and control factors (especially BRD, DOMIN and CONTEST). The estimation of 
the model with dynamic endogeneity using fixed-effects regression yields spurious estimates of the 
effect of independent variable on the dependent variable even if there is no causal relation between 
them. Hence, dynamic endogeneity in the model calls for other appropriate methods of estimation. 
One possible method is the use of Dynamic panel GMM estimation, which yields unbiased estimator 
by eliminating unobserved heterogeneity factors that affect both the dependent and independent 
variables and some dependent variables that are related to the past dependent variable. However, 
this GMM estimation method of the structural equations model that accounts for dynamic 
endogeneity is not handy yet on STATA version used in this study. Nevertheless, regarding the 
problem, Wintoki et al. (2009) argues that there is a weaker relationship between the explanatory 
variables and the past dependent variable, and hence dynamic endogeneity is less of a concern in 
regressions relating governance (control factors) to firm characteristics. Hence, the inclusion of past 
performance as explanatory variable together with other predictors is not a problem.  
Simultaneous or joint endogeneity: Simultaneity might lead to endogeneity if the 
independent variables are function of the dependent variable or expected values of the dependent 
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variable. This kind of endogeneity is referred to as simultaneous endogeneity. Wintoki et al. (2009) 
argue that simultaneity can arise in the board structure-performance relation from an economic 
perspective. The implication of this perspective is that firms choose their board structure with a view 
of achieving a particular target of performance in that period, in which case there will be a reverse 
causality between board structure and performance and both factors are simultaneously 
determined (Wintoki et al., 2009). This might be true also for DOMIN and CONTST variables and 
performance and also BRD variables. This simultaneous determination makes both OLS and fixed-
effects estimates biased. However, we can use structural equations model and estimate it using IV 
methods like 2-stages least squares (2SLS), seemingly unrelated equations (SURE), or 3-stages least 
squares (3SLS) estimators. However, the IV methods require theoretically based powerful 
instrumental variables in order to account for simultaneity. Another alternative estimation method 
of non-recursive SEM with simultaneity is the full information maximum likelihood (FIML), which 
minimizes the determinants of the covariance matrix related to residuals.  
5.5.6.2 Appropriate Estimation Methods  
Method identification:  It is already noted above that OLS cannot be appropriate to estimate 
the non-recursive SEM with endogeneity problems. Additionally, the fixed-effects estimation fails to 
be appropriate since it cannot handle the dynamic endogeneity. Anyhow, the dynamic panel GMM 
estimation method that can account for dynamic endogeneity could not be used even though it 
provides powerful unbiased and consistent estimates because, as already noted, it is not supported 
by the STATA version used in the analysis. Hence, the IV estimation methods (2SLS, SURE, and 3SLS) 
and FIML would be the possible estimation methods applicable to the SEM characteristics and the 
nature of our data.  
2SLS (2-stage least squares) method would not be appropriate estimation method for our SEM since 
it does not handle contemporaneous correlation across equations and it assumes recursivity of the 
model. Hence, for our non-recursive SEM with different sources of endogeneity and 
contemporaneous error correlation across equations and for a medium sample size, the appropriate 
IV and other estimation methods for the SEM are SURE, 3SLS, and FIML.  
SURE (seemingly unrelated regression), which is also called joint generalized least squares (JGLS) or 
Zellner estimation, may improve efficiency of parameter estimates when there is contemporaneous 
correlation of errors (Zellner 1962, 1963). SURE is a generalization of OLS for multi-equation systems. 
Like OLS, the SURE method assumes that all the regressors are independent variables, but unlike 
OLS, SURE uses the correlations among the errors in different equations to improve the regression 
estimates. Initially, the SURE method requires an initial OLS regression to compute residuals. Then 
OLS residuals are used to estimate the cross-equation covariance matrix. In SURE estimation 
INSTRUMENTS and ENDOGENOUS statements are not needed, because the method assumes there 
are no endogenous regressors.  
For SURE to be effective, the models must use different regressors. SURE produces the same results 
as OLS unless the model contains at least one regressor not used in the other equations. The 
parameters estimates of SURE will be different from that of OLS under two circumstances: (1) when 
there is no contemporaneous correlation of errors across equations (the estimate of the 
contemporaneous correlation matrix is diagonal), and (2) when the independent variables are the 
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same across equations. SURE would yield more efficient estimates than OLS (1) when the sample is 
not small, and (2) if the specification error is not serious.  In estimating small samples, SURE might be 
less efficient than OLS because the need to estimate the covariance matrix from OLS residuals 
increases sampling variability of SURE estimates, thus affecting its efficiency. The consequences of 
specification error are also more serious with SURE than with OLS. Our data is medium and there 
seems to be no serious specification error, hence SURE might be appropriate method of estimation if 
there is no endogeneity problem.  
3SLS (3-stage least squares) method combines the ideas of 2SLS and SURE methods. Like 2SLS it uses 
predicted endogenous dependent variable (regressors), which result in consistent estimates. On the 
other hand, like SURE method, 3SLS takes the cross-equation error correlations into account to 
improve large sample efficiency. In 3SLS estimation, the 2SLS residuals are used to estimate the 
cross-equation error covariance matrix. Three-stage least squares estimation requires three steps: 
(1) first-stage regressions to get predicted values for the endogenous regressors; (2) a two-stage 
least squares step to get residuals to estimate the cross-equation correlation matrix; and (3) the final 
3SLS estimation step. 
FIML (full-information maximum likelihood) estimation method is the final alternative estimation 
method thought for estimating our SEM with the characteristics described above. FIML estimator is 
a system of generalization of the little-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator, but it is 
implemented as an IV method (Hausman, 1975). It involves minimizing the determinants of the 
covariance matrix associated with residuals of the reduced form of equation system. Like LIML 
method, FIML involves assuming that errors are normally distributed. FIML maximizes the likelihood 
function subject to restriction on a particular equation. However, unlike LIML, the likelihood function 
is maximized subject to restrictions on all of the parameters in the model, not just the equation 
being estimated.  
Cautions in estimating SEM:  When estimating SEM using the methods mentioned above, it 
is vital to take certain factors into account. Firstly, although system methods are asymptotically most 
efficient in the absence of specification error (misspecification), they are more sensitive to 
specification error than single equation methods. Hence, even though models are not perfectly 
specified in practice, we need to check whether they are identified or not. The second factor to 
consider and check is sample size. With small sample, 2-SLS is preferred to 3-SLS; and with large 
sample, SUR and 3-SLS are preferable. We should note that SURE is less efficient than OLS in small 
samples. With an average yearly sample of between 450 and 500, our data fits for SURE and 3SLS.  
Thirdly, it is essential to identify the source of contemporaneous correlation among errors across 
equations. If the correlation of errors across equation is from a common omitted variable, it is not 
best to use SURE since SURE parameter estimates are more sensitive to specification errors than 
OLS, in which case OLS may produce better parameter estimates than SURE. SURE estimates are also 
affected by the sampling variation of the error covariance matrix. Hence, in such case, 3SLS remains 
to be the best alternative. The endogeneity problems in the SEM can be handled by 3SLS that uses 
instrumental variables and that is why we discussed the identification of instrumental variables 
previously. Hence, based on the discussions made above, the ideal and most appropriate estimation 
method we used in our investigation is 3SLS.  
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5.6. RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
5.6.1 Results on the Models 
5.6.1.1 Correlation Analysis on VPC1-VPC2 Model 
Table 5.16 shows the correlation coefficients of unstandardized residuals from the separate 
individual OLS (table 5.16a) and 3SLS (table 5.16b) regression of the endogenous variables on their 
respective predictors. The significant correlation between the residuals marked by star (*) at 5% 
significant level show that the pairs are related through their disturbance terms (Gupta, 1983). We 
can see that 3SLS is more strict in providing evidence on the relationships in the disturbance terms 
than OLS. Hence, it is indicative that the use of 3SLS is appropriate in estimating the estimators for 
the SEM since it takes into account the correlation matrix of errors across equations as previously 
discussed. PNED, DUAL, VPC1 and VPC2 are correlated to the ROA through the disturbance term. It 
might be argued that the dependent (board structure and control dominance and contestability) 
variables are endogenous as suggested by researchers and in our theoretical and empirical model.  
Moreover, it can also be argued that the past performance of the firm might influence the set up of 
the current board structure and the stakes of the first and the second largest blockholder hence 
their voting power. This also might confirm the arguments for the theoretical and empirical models 
in this research. Finally, one interesting observation here is that PNED and DUAL as well as VPC1 and 
VPC2 are also related through disturbance term having high significant correlation coefficient 
(0.7487 and 0.6946). Hence, the choice of 3SLS as an estimation method is justified.  
5.6.1.2 3SLS Results on VPC1-VPC2 Model 
The result of the 3SLS regression of the SEM that assumes the first largest as dominant controllers 
and the second largest blockholders as contesters is presented as table 5.17. The table has five 
panels showing the 3SLS regression of each equation within the SEM. It can be seen that the R-
squared for ROA equation (35.16%) is very low. 
  
Table 5.16: Pairwise correlation between the endogenous variables and their residuals 
5.16a:  Correlation coefficient between OLS 
unstandardized residuals  
5.16b. Correlation coefficients between 3SLS 
unstandardized residuals 
Note: The residuals are for ROA, PNED, DUAL, VPC1 and VPC2 equations in sequence, from OLS and 3SLS regressions. 
* Significant at 5% 
      resid5    -0.0394  -0.1142* -0.0491*  0.6479*  1.0000 
      resid4     0.0556*  0.0195   0.0679*  1.0000 
      resid3    -0.4515*  0.7487*  1.0000 
      resid2    -0.5676*  1.0000 
       resid     1.0000 
                                                           
                  resid   resid2   resid3   resid4   resid5
   residvpc2     0.1143*  0.0845* -0.0258   0.6946*  1.0000 
   residvpc1     0.1886*  0.1287*  0.0862*  1.0000 
   residdual    -0.4071*  0.3570*  1.0000 
   residpned    -0.3619*  1.0000 
   resid3roa     1.0000 
                                                           
               resid3~a residp~d residd~l residv~1 residv~2
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Performance (PRFM-ROA) Equation:  The 3SLS estimators show that there is significant 
evidence to believe that the board structure (PNED, DUAL), INVINCR, and the external governance 
mechanism (TOINTENS and TDTA), PVOL and past performance are determinants of current firm 
performance. The proportion of non-executive directors (PNED) shows a significant positive 
Table 5.17: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of VPC1- VPC2 Model 
    VPC1-VPC2 
Equation Variable Coef. z P>z 
PRFM-ROA Pned 12.326 3.53 0.000 
  Dual -8.218 -2.66 0.008 
  vpc1 -0.038 -0.49 0.626 
  vpc2 0.694 1.22 0.223 
  Abho -0.100 -1.34 0.182 
  Fcfps 0.314 1.00 0.318 
  invincr 0.000... -1.80 0.073 
 
tointens 15.146 3.13 0.002 
 
Tdta -0.037 -2.13 0.033 
 
Pvol -0.073 -2.62 0.009 
 
roat1 0.253 8.58 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.3516 
BRD-PNED Dual 0.277 2.70 0.007 
  vpc1 0.056 4.81 0.000 
  vpc2 0.101 4.65 0.000 
  Abho -0.057 -6.61 0.000 
  Nbh 0.229 5.95 0.000 
  Divps -0.079 -1.89 0.059 
  Fcfps -0.006 -0.49 0.626 
  Invincr 0.000... 0.65 0.518 
  Tointens -0.504 -1.94 0.052 
  Tdta -0.000 -0.03 0.976 
  Pvol -0.002 -1.21 0.224 
  roat1 0.005 0.43 0.669 
  R-sq.     0.7448 
BRD-DUAL Pned 1.094 33.85 0.000 
  vpc1 0.006 4.21 0.000 
  vpc2 -0.011 -2.87 0.004 
  Divps -0.153 -6.02 0.000 
  Fcfps -0.015 -1.22 0.221 
  Invincr -0.000... -2.20 0.028 
  Tointens -0.634 -4.27 0.000 
  Tdta -0.005 -10.57 0.000 
  Pvol -0.009 -11.63 0.000 
  roat1 -0.005 -5.47 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.5976 
DOMIN-VPC1 Pned 26.095 3.66 0.000 
 
Dual -12.910 -2.11 0.035 
 vpc2 -1.309 -2.39 0.017 
  Abho 0.914 7.97 0.000 
  Nbh -3.935 -16.22 0.000 
  Divps -0.269 -0.24 0.811 
  Fcfps 0.029 0.12 0.907 
  Invincr -0.000... -0.96 0.335 
  Tointens 6.469 1.57 0.117 
 
Tdta -0.033 -1.24 0.214 
 
Pvol -0.029 -0.59 0.552 
 
Eqto -0.913 -2.02 0.043 
 
roat1 -0.031 -1.03 0.302 
  R-sq.     0.8917 
CONTEST-VPC2 Pned 18.450 2.34 0.019 
 
Dual -9.137 -1.75 0.081 
 vpc1 -0.695 -2.44 0.015 
  Abho 0.654 3.58 0.000 
  Nbh -2.773 -2.86 0.004 
  Divps -0.133 -0.16 0.872 
  Fcfps 0.019 0.11 0.914 
  Invincr -0.000... -0.93 0.351 
  Tointens 4.306 1.11 0.266 
  Tdta -0.023 -1.12 0.263 
  Pvol -0.019 -0.51 0.608 
  Eqto -0.631 -1.48 0.139 
  roat1 -0.023 -1.14 0.253 
  R-sq.     0.7512 
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influence on ROA; and CEO-duality (DUAL) has a significant negative influence on ROA at 1% 
significance level (α). This supports the rationale behind the UK Code of Best Practice.  
On the other hand, we cannot be confident to conclude that the first and the second largest 
blockholders (VPC1 and VPC2) enhance and reduce firm performance respectively. This might be 
interpreted by the possibility of monitoring by the second largest blockholders or the high investor 
protection in the UK corporations that might induce VPC1 to enhance shareholders’ value. The 
ownership concentration, measured as the aggregate holding of all significant blockholders (ABHO), 
has insignificant negative relationship with ROA. The result is consistent with the suggestion of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) that there is no systematic effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance. Free cash flow per share (FCFPS) which is considered in the agency theory to be the 
source of agency costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986) has not any significant 
influence on firm performance. The surprising result is that the increase in investment is found to 
have a negative significant impact on firm performance (ROA) since a positive effect is expected.  
Board Independence (BRD-PNED) Equation:  As it can be observed in table 5.17, the 
proportion of non-executive directors is impacted by CEO-Chair-duality, the voting power of the first 
and the second largest shareholders (VPC1 and VPC2), ownership concentration measured as the 
aggregate stake of all blockholders (ABHO), and the number of blockholders (NBH) at 1% α. This 
result is as expected. The fact that CEO-duality, VPC1 and VPC2 impact PNED positively might 
confirm that board structure or board independence is the bargaining process between the existing 
CEO and the board as suggested by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). DUAL is found to have a positive 
influence on PNED at 1% α. This might also confirm the bargaining theory of board structure 
suggested by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). It might be suggestive that as duality increases, due to 
the bargaining process between CEO and the board, more non-executive board members will be 
elected or represented. The same argument can be made regarding the positive significant relation 
between NBH and PNED.  
Moreover, the result shows that ownership concentration (ABHO) has a negative influence on PNED, 
suggesting that as the aggregate voting power increases the proportion of external directors will 
decrease. The insight that might be suggested is that as the voting concentration increases due to 
the bargaining process, more and more non-independent directors will be elected due to the 
ensuing struggle for control between the significant blockholders that might strive hard to ensure 
their representation in the board. Another interesting result is that as the number of blockholders 
(NBH) increases the proportion of nonexecutive directors increases. We would suggest that this 
might make sense because the dispersion of blockholders (rise in NBH) that have the incentive and 
the power to exert control pressure over their firm might enhance board independence. It might 
follow that if power is concentrated among the very few significant blockholders, the board might be 
dominated by non-independent directors.  
Furthermore, the result of negative relation of dividend per share (DIVPS) or takeover market 
(TOINTENS) and PNED, at 10% α is difficult to explain. However, we might suggest that as takeover 
intensity increases, contestability by the incumbent management in the firm increases, and that 
might lead to the takeover defence in which the controlling blockholders and or managers might 
acquire and accumulate more share for private benefits of control. Hence, the increase in the voting 
power concentration might lead to the balance of control power that might lead to lower PNED. 
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Based on the result showing that TOINTENS has positive impact on ROA in PRFM-ROA Equation 
where TOINTENS has negative relation with PNED in the BRD-PNED equation might indicate that 
takeoverhas the substitution effect on PNED (Walsh and Seward (1990).  
Finally, the result shows that the other external governance mechanisms, debt financing, previous 
performance of the firm (ROA t-1) and market price volatility of stocks show no significant association 
with PNED. Even though the result of the estimators on previous performance might not be efficient, 
3SLS’s capability to handle correlation of errors across equation might ensure the validity of the 
results.  
Board Leadership (BRD-DUAL) Equation: The results of the board leadership equation 
show that PNED affect DUAL positively at 1% α, implying that the rise in PNED enhances CEO-Duality. 
There is no theoretical or empirical rationale that enables us to interpret this result. Anyhow, it is 
arguable that CEO-duality might unite the board leadership and enhance good decision that might in 
turn lead to better performance (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994), and this might be favoured in UK 
listed firms. Moreover, the result also shows that the voting power of the first and second largest 
shareholders have significant positive and negative association respectively with DUAL at 1% α. It 
might be suggested that the first largest blockholders might prefer and thus enhance CEO-duality in 
order to dominate the control within firms, whereas the second largest blockholders, as contestants, 
would deter CEO-duality in order to check dominance in control. This might suggest the empirical 
relevance of the control dominance-contestability hypothesis.  
Furthermore, the result show that with the exception to free cash flow per share (FCFPS) all the 
remaining control variables in the equation (DIVPS, INVINCR, TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL, and ROAt-1) 
have significant negative association with DUAL at 1% α (except INVINCR, which is significant at 5%). 
From the result, it might be suggestive that the negative impact of the external governance 
mechanisms (TOINTENS and TDTA) on DUAL might imply the substitution effects of the EXTGM on 
PNED (that has positively impact on DUAL) as suggested by Walsh and Seward (1990). The negative 
impact of past performance, INVINCR and DIVPS on board leadership variable (DUAL) is 
counterintuitive theoretically or economically.  
Control Dominance (DOMIN-VPC1) Equation:  Panel 4 of the 3SLS regression presented 
as table 5.17 shows that PNED has a positive significant impact on VPC1 at 1% α. The result is not as 
expected since PNED is expected to ensure board independence and enhance the monitoring 
function of the board according to the agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and the UK Code of 
Best Practice.  
Moreover, the result shows that blockholder concentration (NBH) and ownership concentration 
(ABHO) have negative and positive association respectively with VPC1 at 1% α. The economic 
rationale is that as the concentration of significant blockholders decreases (NBH increases) there are 
more blockholders that might participate in the control contests, which might enhance monitoring 
and counter-check the control dominance of the first largest blockholder. On the other hand, the 
significant positive association between ABHO and VPC1 says that the control power or dominance 
of the first largest blockholder will increase as the ownership concentration (ABHO) increases. The 
more the share stakes of the firm are held by the few significant blockholders, the more it will tend 
to empower or ensure the control dominance of the first largest shareholder.  
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Moreover, CEO-duality and the second largest blockholder (VPC2) have negative association with 
VPC1 at 5% α. The result of the negative impact of the presence of CEO-Duality on the control 
dominance by the first largest shareholder is difficult to support with theoretical or empirical 
rationale. However, it might be suggested that in firms with CEO-Duality, the control power of the 
first largest blockholder is curbed by the CEO that dominates the board.  
Finally, the result shows that the main EXTGM variables and ROA t-1 show no significant relationship 
with VPC1. This might be explained by the indirect causal relationship between the variables and 
VPC1. However, equity turnover has a negative significant impact on VPC1 at 5% α. The negative 
relation might suggest that as EQTO increases, the first largest blockholder dominance position will 
decline because (1) other blockholders might buy more shares and raise their voting power that 
enable them contest the position of the first largest blockholder, and/ or (2) the controlling first 
largest blockholder might sell own shares to benefit from the wealth gain or reduce own holding and 
spread stakes across other firms for diversification.  
Control Contestability (CONTST-VPC2) Equation:  The results in panel 5 of 3SLS 
regression in table 5.17 show that CEO-duality, VPC1, and NBH have negative significant association 
with VPC2 at 10%, 5%, and 1% α respectively. This might suggest the validity of the dominance-
contestability hypothesis. The result might suggest that in the presence of CEO-duality, the increase 
in the voting power of the first largest blockholders (VPC1), and the increase in the number of 
blockholders (NBH) might have an inverse relationship with the contests by the second largest 
blockholder. Economically this makes sense since (1) when CEO unifies and holds the leadership of 
the board, the ability to contest by the second largest blockholder will diminish; (2) as the control 
power of the first largest blockholder increases, VPC2 will decrease; and (3) as there are more 
number of significant blockholders in the firm, the ability of the second largest blockholder to exert 
control or contesting pressure will diminish.  
Moreover, PNED and ABHO exhibit positive significant relationship with the contestability of control, 
proxied by VPC2, at 1% and 5% α respectively. The economic (theoretical) interpretation suggested 
by the result might be that (1) as the proportion of nonexecutive directors increases, the ability of 
the second largest blockholder to exert contesting pressure will increase as expected; and (2) the 
increase in ABHO will positively impact VPC2 indirectly by enhancing the presence of more number 
of blockholders (NBH) in the firm that would enhance the struggle for control of the firm.  
5.6.1.3 Control Balance in the Feedback Loop of VPC1-VPC2 Model 
VPC1çèVPC2:  Figure 5.7 presents the pattern of relationship between the variables with 
feedback loop. Real contestability of control comes in to the picture when we consider the 
relationship between the first largest blockholder (assumed to be dominant), VPC1, and the 
contesting second largest blockholder (VPC2). As observed in DOMIN-VPC1 equation, the significant 
negative impact of VPC2 (with β2 = -1.31) on VPC1 at 5% α might reveal that the second largest 
blockholder contests the power of the first largest blockholder by monitoring and checking the 
conducts of the first largest shareholder. However, according to CONTST-VPC2 equation, there is 
significant negative effect of VPC1 (with β1=-0.695) on VPC2 at the same significance level. 
Comparison of the two βs can indicate that the negative impact of VPC2 measured by its coefficient 
(β2=1.31) is greater than that of VPC1 (β1=0.695). Hence, we suggest that the control power of the 
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contestant (VPC2) is greater in the SEM and that control power of the first largest blockholder might 
be contested by the second largest blockholder. This might also explain why both VPC1 and VPC2 
have no significant association with firm performance in panel 1 of table 5.17.  
PNEDçèVPC1:  In BRD-PNED equation, VPC1 has a significantly positive relationship (β=0.056) 
with PNED at 1% α. In DOMIN-VPC1 equation, PNED show significant positive impact (β=26.095), on 
VPC1 at 1% α. Hence, the impact of PNED on VPC1 is greater than the impact of VPC1 on PNED. This 
might suggest that as the proportion of NEDs in the board increases, the dominance by the first 
largest blockholder (C1) will be enhanced.  
DUALçèVPC1:  The 3SLS result shows that the negative impact of CEO-duality on the control 
dominance (VPC1) (12.9 at 5% significance); and that the positive impact of VPC1 on CEO-duality 
(0.0006 at 1% significance). Considering that the feedback loop relations are significant and ignoring 
the slight difference in the significance levels, we conclude that the negative impact of DUAL on 
VPC1 is greater; and hence, in the presence of CEO-duality, the dominance of the first largest 
blockholder will diminish in the equilibrium.   
PNEDçèVPC2:  The 3SLS result shows the proportion of nonexecutive directors has a significant 
positive impact (18.45 at 5% α) on the contestability variable of VPC2. In another equation of the 
structural system, the reversal effect of VPC2 on PNED is 0.101 at 1% α. Comparing the two effects 
we can see that the effect of PNED is greater than that of VPC2. Hence, we conclude that in the 
equilibrium, the increase in the proportion of nonexecutive directors might decrease the necessity of 
contestability.  
Fig.5.7: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of VPC1-VPC2 Model  
 
Note: Own manual construction from table 5.17. 
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DUALçèVPC2:  At 10% α, CEO-duality has a negative impact (9.14) on the contestability by the 
second largest blockholder (VPC2). The reversal relation is that VPC2 has a negative significant 
impact of 0.12 on DUAL at 5% α in another equation. This shows that the dominance variable 
DUALand the contestability variable VPC2 negatively affect each other. However, comparison of the 
magnitude of the effects in indicate that the effect of DUAL on VPC2 is greater than the reverse 
impact and that when there is CEO-duality, the contesting power or ability of the second largest 
blockholder will diminish.  
DUAL çè PNED: The recursive relationship between DUAL and PNED shows that the magnitude of 
the positive impact of DUAL on PNED (0.227 at 1%α), and the positive effect of PNED (1.095 at 1%α) 
on DUAL. The impact of PNED on DUAL is greater than the reciprocal effect of DUAL on PNED. The 
evidence might suggest that the rise in the proportion of nonexecutive directors might have the 
impact of enhancing CEO-duality in the UK firms.   
5.6.2 Coalitions of the ‘First-Two’ and the ‘Ocean’ 
5.6.2.1 3SLS Results on the TDPI-SHAPV Model 
Performance (PRFM-ROA) Equation:  According to 3SLS results (table 5.18) on the 
equation, the total power index of the first two blockholders that are assumed to be dominants 
(TDPI) and the power index of the ‘ocean’, measured as Shapley value (SHAPV), which are assumed 
to be contestants have positive significant relationship with ROA at 1% α. Their same positive impact 
on ROA might mean that if only the first 2 largest shareholders form coalition and try to dominate 
firm decisions, the rest of the blockholders might contest by exerting their monitoring, which might 
lead to a check-and-balance and enhance firm performance in the equilibrium. It might be 
suggestive that dominance and contestability of control in the UK listed firms by blockholder control 
forces is characterized by the formation of coalitions rather than by single blockholders to 
significantly impact firm performance.   
The interesting result is that both board structures used (PNED and DUAL) show negative 
insignificant relationship with ROA unlike when the first largest and the second largest shareholders 
are used in VPC1-VPC2 Model. This might be sensible because when the first two largest 
blockholders make coalition for control, they might dominate the board in firm decisions. Ownership 
concentration measured (ABHO) has negative significant association with ROA at 1% α. Even though 
this result is in line with the second-order agency theory where multiple large shareholders will 
extract or divert rent for private benefits of control and appropriate minority shareholders, it is 
difficult to conclude that ABHO really has negative impact on firm performance for the UK listed 
firms since (1) the premise of endogenous determination of ownership structure depicts that ABHO 
has no systematic relation with performance (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), and (2) 
investor protection is very high in the UK,.  
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The result also shows that takeover market has positive significant influence on ROA, whereas TDTA 
and PVOL show significant negative relationship with ROA, at 5% and 1% α respectively. This 
evidence is the same as in the previous 3SLS regression of VPC1-VPC2 Model. For the lagged 
performance, we also find the same result except that there is difference in their coefficients.  
Table 5.18: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of TDPI-SHAPV Model 
 
    
 
TDPI-SHAPV 
Equation Variable Coef. z P>z 
PRFM-ROA Pned -12.346 -1.33 0.182 
  Dual -2.128 -0.59 0.558 
  Tdpi 6.528 2.70 0.007 
  Shapv 16.954 3.12 0.002 
  Abho -0.088 -2.90 0.004 
  Fcfps 0.292 0.90 0.370 
  Invincr -0.000... -1.34 0.182 
 
Tointens 4.638 0.94 0.348 
 
Tdta -0.037 -2.18 0.029 
 
Pvol -0.135 -3.82 0.000 
 
roat1 0.234 9.08 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.2968 
BRD-PNED Dual 0.275 5.83 0.000 
  Tdpi 0.964 2.34 0.019 
  Shapv 0.603 11.28 0.000 
  Abho -0.010 -2.91 0.004 
  Nbh 0.042 1.98 0.047 
  Divps -0.026 -1.18 0.240 
  Fcfps -0.001 -0.17 0.864 
  Invincr 0.000... 0.80 0.426 
  Tointens -0.475 -3.32 0.001 
  Tdta -0.000 -0.05 0.962 
  Pvol -0.001 -1.25 0.212 
  roat1 -0.000 -0.66 0.508 
  R-sq.     0.9246 
BRD-DUAL Pned 1.415 13.20 0.000 
  tdpi  0.236 4.05 0.002 
  Shapv -0.268 -3.04 0.000 
  Divps -0.118 -4.01 0.000 
  Fcfps -0.013 -1.04 0.297 
  Invincr -0.000... -2.16 0.031 
  Tointens -0.424 -2.55 0.011 
  Tdta -0.004 -8.59 0.000 
  Pvol -0.006 -5.02 0.000 
  roat1 -0.004 -4.36 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.5649 
DOMIN-TDPI Pned 0.981 2.20 0.028 
 
Dual -0.509 -2.02 0.043 
 Shapv -0.335 -1.79 0.073 
  Abho 0.009 14.00 0.000 
  Nbh -0.049 -15.67 0.000 
  Divps -0.095 -1.53 0.126 
  Fcfps -0.002 -0.25 0.801 
  Invincr -0.000... -0.99 0.322 
  Tointens 0.238 1.93 0.053 
 
Tdta -0.001 -1.43 0.153 
 
Pvol -0.002 -1.58 0.115 
 
Eqto -0.032 -1.90 0.058 
 
roat1 -0.000 -0.87 0.386 
  R-sq.     0.1153 
CONTEST-SHAPV Pned 2.833 4.00 0.000 
 
Dual -1.451 -2.48 0.013 
 
Tdpi -2.634 -1.77 0.076 
 Abho 0.025 2.03 0.043 
  Nbh -0.129 -1.66 0.197 
  Divps -0.130 -1.13 0.259 
  Fcfps -0.006 -0.27 0.785 
  Invincr -0.000... -1.08 0.282 
  Tointens 0.648 1.53 0.127 
  Tdta -0.004 -1.53 0.125 
  Pvol -0.006 -1.02 0.308 
  Eqto -0.090 -2.08 0.038 
  roat1 -0.002 -0.96 0.336 
  R-sq.     0.8017 
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Board Independence (BRD-PNED) Equation:  The result shows that CEO-duality has 
positive significant relationship with PNED at 1% α as in subsection 5.6.1. So the same explanation 
applies to this evidence. In conformity with the results in table 5.17, TDPI and SHAPV also have 
significant positive impact on PNED at 5% and 1% α respectively. This makes sense since their voice is 
crucial in deciding the number of NEDs in the board other than hiring executive management that 
join the board.  
Furthermore, the results show that ABHO and NBH have negative impact on PNED at 1% α and 
positive association with PNED at 5% α respectively. These results are almost the same as in table 
5.17. Finally, all the remaining variables (except DIVPS) that have significant impact on PNED in the 
previous subsection retained significance in this subsection.  
Board Leadership (BRD-DUAL) Equation: The result shows that all of the variables except 
FCFPS are determinants of unified board leadership (CEO-duality) at 1% α except for INVINCR and 
TOINTENS that are significant at 5% confidence level. The evidence is almost exactly similar to that of 
the 3SLS regression of VPC1-VPC2 model (table 5.17). Hence, the interpretation of the results made 
in the previous section holds also here. This can be evidence of stability in the SEM.  
The coalition of the first two largest blockholders has a significant positive impact on CEO-duality at 
1% α. That implies CEO-duality will increase as the voting power index of coalition increases. This 
might suggest that when the coalition of the first largest blockholders (TDPI) dominates the firm’s 
decision process, there is the more likelihood and possibility that the position of CEO and the Chair 
are held by the CEO in order to exert dominance in control. However, the SHAPV, which measures 
the power index of the remaining significant blockholders, is found to have a significant negative 
impact on CEO-duality. The result might economically or theoretically suggest that as the power of 
the significant blockholders out of the dominant coalition increases, there is a tendency for them to 
push the leadership of the board to independent leadership, where CEO-duality diminishes.  
Control Dominance (DOMIN-TDPI) Equation:  The 3SLS regression results (panel 4 of 
table 5.18) for the equation are also nearly similar to the results of the control dominance equation 
in the previous section with the few exceptions. The variables PNED, DUAL, SHAPV, ABHO, NBH, and 
EQTO again show significant impact on the dominance variable TDPI. It is only TOINTENS, which is 
not significant when the predicted variable is VPC1, that now show significant relation with TDPI. 
The remaining variables – DIVPS, FCFPS, INVINCR, TDTA, PVOL, and lagged performance (ROAt-1) 
remain insignificant, thus indicating the stability in the SEM.  
The result again confirms the contestability of control when we consider the negative significant 
impact of the contestant variable, SHAPV, at 10%α on TDPI. Remember that VPC2 also has a 
negative impact on VPC1, thus indicating the fair stability of the SEM. The economic or theoretical 
explanation might be that those not in the coalition of the ‘First-Two’ will contest the power of the 
coalition of the first two largest blockholders.  
It can be seen from the result that PNED still has significant positive impact on dominant TDPI at 
5%α. The economic or theoretical rationale might be that with the higher level of the PNED, control 
of the firm decision process might be dominated by the coalition of the first two blockholders for the 
UK listed firms. This might be possible in the UK since there is investor protection and the coalition 
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might make decisions in favour of all shareholders for the shared benefits of control as evidenced 
with the positive impact of TPDI on ROA at 1%α.  
Moreover, the board leadership variable (DUAL) still retains negative association with TDPI at 5% α 
and the magnitude of the effect has decreased from 12.9 to 0.51. The statistical interpretation is 
that the dominance power of the coalition of the first two largest blockholders will diminish, in the 
presence of CEO-duality. This makes sense theoretically since CEO-duality gives the CEO the means 
to dominate the decision processes of the board by unifying the board leadership and to probably 
curb any effort of the contestant.   
Furthermore, the result shows that the two concentration variables used (ABHO and NBH) have 
significant positive and negative impact on TDPI at 1%α respectively. The positive impact of 
ownership concentration (ABHO) on TDPI might reveal that as the stake of all blockholders increases, 
the dominating power of the first two largest blockholders (TDPI) will also increase. This might be 
due to the fact that the advantage the coalition of the first two largest blockholders might have from 
the increase in the number or the decrease in the power of blockholders in the ‘ocean’ that makes 
them scattered players; and hence lower contestability as (ABHO) increases. It might also imply that 
with the increase in ABHO, more stakes of the firm are held by few significant blockholders, which 
might ensure the domination by the coalition of the ‘First-Two’. On the other hand, the result 
indicates that NBH has negative significant impact on TDPI. The economic or theoretical reason 
might be that as the concentration of the blockholders (NBH) increases, the participation of more 
blockholders in control contests might enhance the monitoring role and reduce the dominance of 
the coalition of the ‘First-Two’. 
TOINTENS and EQTO show positive and negative impact on TDPI respectively at 10%α. This might 
suggest that with the increase of takeover intensity, the control of the coalition of the two largest 
blockholders will increase due to the control pressure to contest any takeover offer by increasing 
their stakes, management buy-out, or any other defence mechanism. As for the negative association 
EQTO with TDPI, it might be suggested that the power of the coalition (TDPI) declines with the 
increase in equity turnover because higher equity turnover might enable the contestants in the 
‘ocean’ to buy more shares and increase their control power, and/ or the high EQTO may tempt the 
coalition to sell the shares to benefit from wealth effect or diversification.  
Control Contestability (CONTST-SHAPV) Equation: The result of the 3SLS regression of 
contestability equation shows that again PNED, DUAL, TDPI, ABHO, and NBH have statistically 
significant impacts on the power of the ‘ocean’ (SHAPV). The result is almost similar to the equation 
where VPC2 contests against VPC1 (see table 5.17). Overall, the result indicates that there is stability 
in the SEM.  
The result showing that TDPI has a significant negative impact on the power of the ‘ocean’ (SHAPV) 
at 10% α is as expected since the increase in the power of the coalition of the first two blockholders 
must decrease the power of the ‘ocean’. Moreover, the result shows that CEO-duality has significant 
negative relation with SHAPV at 5%α. This implies statistically that in the presence of CEO-duality the 
contending power of the ‘ocean’ tends to diminish. However, the PNED has significant positive 
impact on SHAPV at 1%α as expected.  
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ABHO and NBH show positive and negative impact on SHAPV as in the previous model except the 
drop in the level of significance. The enhancement of contestability (SHAPV) as ABHO increase might 
be from the indirect impact of resulting decrease in the number of blockholders that might in turn 
enhance the contest for control against the controlling coalition thus increasing the power of the 
‘ocean’. The negative impact of the number of blockholders (NBH) on SHAPV might suggest that the 
voting power of contestants decrease due to ownership dispersion or the difficulty in coordinating 
collective action as the number of blockholders increase.   
TDTA and PVOL show insignificant negative relationship with SHAPV, whereas TOINTENS show 
positive insignificant relation with SHAPV. However, equity turnover has negative relationship with 
the power of the ‘ocean’ at 5%α. This implies that as EQTO rises, there can be more trading volumes 
in circulation and the controlling coalition might buy and lock-in their power of control, thus 
impacting the decrease in the power of the ‘ocean’.  
5.6.2.2 Control Balance in the Feedback Loop of the TDPI-SHAPV Model 
TDPI çè SHAPV: Figure 5.8 shows the feedback relationship between TDPI and SHAP and others. 
The negative magnitude of effect of TDPI on SHAPV is 2.63 (at 10%α), while that of SHAPV on TDPI is 
0.33 (at 10%α). Comparison of the magnitude effect, we might suggest that the coalition of the 
‘First-Two’ has more impact on the ‘ocean’ than the reverse direction of causality, thus, implying 
that there is less contestability when the first two blockholders form a control coalition.  
This result is different in the previous section SEM, where the effect of the contestant (the second 
largest blockholder) is greater than the first largest blockholder. Since the models are quite different 
and have different assumptions of control, we still believe that control is always contestable from 
the significant negative relationship in the feedback loop.  
TDPI çè PNED:  The result show that TDPI has a positive significant effect of magnitude equal to 
0.96 at 5%α on PNED, while PNED has a positive significant effect of magnitude equal to 0.98 at 5%α 
on TDPI. Comparison of the magnitude of effects would suggest that the effect of the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors (PNED) is greater slightly. This might imply that as the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors in the UK listed firms increase, there might be an increase in dominance 
power of the coalition (TDPI) in order to maintain counter-balance in control.  
TDPI çè DUAL: The magnitude of the positive effect of TDPI on DUAL measured by its coefficient is 
0.24 at 1%α, while the negative impact of DUAL on TDPI is 0.51 at 5%α. Comparison of the two 
effects, it is conclusive that negative impact of CEO-duality on the dominance power of the coalition 
of the first two largest blockholders is greater in spite of the difference in the α level. Hence, it is 
suggestive that in the presence of CEO-duality, the dominance by the coalition of the first two 
largest blockholders will diminish.  
SHAPV çè PNED: In the feedback loop, the magnitude of the positive effect of the power of the 
‘ocean’ (SHAPV) on the proportion of nonexecutive directors (PNED) is 0.604 at 1%α, while the 
positive impact of PNED on SHAP is 2.83 at 1%α. The greater magnitude effect of PNED than SHAPV 
is consistent with the first model previously discussed in subsection 5.6.1. Hence, as the proportion 
of nonexecutive directors in the board increases, the necessity of contestability of control might 
diminish and this supports the principles set in the UK Code of Best Practice.  
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SHAPV çè DUAL: The magnitude of negative effect of SHAPV on DUAL is 0.27 at 1%α, whereas the 
negative influence of DUAL on SHAPV is 1.45 at 5%α. The greater impact of SHAPV on DUAL might 
imply that in case there is a coalition of the first 2 largest blockholder, the contestability power of 
the ‘ocean’ counter-balances the presence of CEO-duality. Hence in the UK firms the ‘ocean’ has 
more control position than CEO-duality. Remember that that this result is different when VPC1 and 
VPC2 are assumed as dominants and contestants.  
DUAL çè PNED: According to the result of 3SLS regression the magnitude of the positive impact of 
DUAL on PNED at 1%α is 0.276, while the positive effect of PNED on DUAL at 1%α is 1.42. The 
greater impact of PNED on DUAL than the reversal effect of DUAL on PNED might suggest that in the 
UK firms the increase in the NEDs might have the impact of enhancing CEO-duality when the first 
two largest blockholders form coalition of control. The fact that the same result is found in the other 
previous model is another indicator of the stability of the SEM.  
Fig. 5.8 Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of TDPI-SHAPV Model  
 
Note: Own manual construction from table 5.18. 
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5.6.3 Monopolizing and Contesting Coalitions: C1C4-C2C3  
5.6.3.1 3SLS Results on the C1C4-C2C3 Model  
Performance (PRFM-ROA) Equation: Table 5.19 presents the 3SLS regression of the C1C4-
C2C3 model. The results show that both C1C4 and C2C3 have insignificant relationship with firm 
performance unlike the result in section 5.6.2 but similar to that of section 5.6.1.  
According to the setting of this version of the model, the first and the second blockholders are still in 
the same control position as in section 5.6.1 except that they collude with another blockholder. 
Hence, the insight might be that in the UK firms, the potential coalition for control dominance (C1C4) 
formed to monopolize control, and the potential coalition for contest (C2C3) formed to exert 
monitoring pressure might not enhance firm performance. This might arise from the high agency 
costs of rent extractions by C1C4 and monitoring costs incurred by C2C3. It might be suggested that 
when the benefits for C1C4 equals the monitoring costs incurred by C2C3, the firm has zero profit in 
the equilibrium. Hence, when the powers of the two coalitions counter-balance each other, it might 
be suggested that the board of directors might be efficient to actively allow participation in the 
decision process that might favour all shareholders.  
Supplement to the results discussed above is the impact of PNED and DUAL on firm performance. 
When such coalitions are used instead of TDPI and SHAPV used in section 5.6.2, the board structure 
variables that shows insignificant effect on the performance turn out to be significant. Similar to the 
results in section 5.6.1, PNED show positive significant relation with ROA at 1%α, whereas DUAL 
shows negative impact on ROA at 1%α. The insight is that when there are coalitions of dominance 
and contestants in the firm at the same time, the independent directors and non-unified board 
leadership might play significant roles in enhancing or reducing firm performance due to the 
counter-balancing of the two control forces that gives the board members in the periphery to 
participate actively in the decision process in the UK listed firms. 
The 3SLS result also show that INVINCR, TOINTENS, TDTA, and PVOL and lagged performance 
variable are determinants of firm performance. TOINTENS has positive significant effect on ROA at 
1%α, while TDTA and PVOL have negative impact on ROA at 5 and 1%α-level respectively. Past 
performance has again positive impact at 1%α as in model versions used in sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2, 
thus, confirming the stability in the SEM. Finally, ABHO and FCFPS remained to be insignificant in this 
version of the SEM as in section 5.6.1.  
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Board Independence (BRD-PNED) Equation:  The 3SLS results for the equation are 
different from the same equation in the first version of the SEM (section 5.6.1). Again DUAL, C1C4, 
C2C3, DIVPS, ABHO, NBH and TOINTENS are determinants of PNED at 1%α-level with the exception 
Table 5.19: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of C1C4- C2C3 Model 
    C1C4-C2C3 
Equation Variable Coef. z P>z 
PRFM-ROA Pned 14.654 3.86 0.000 
  Dual -10.338 -3.47 0.001 
  c1c4 0.052 1.15 0.251 
  c2c3 0.064 0.13 0.897 
  Abho -0.033 -0.27 0.791 
  Fcfps 0.299 0.96 0.336 
  Invincr -0.000... -2.00 0.046 
 
Tointens 12.261 2.75 0.006 
 
Tdta -0.044 -2.53 0.011 
 
Pvol -0.077 -2.82 0.005 
 
roat1 0.235 8.43 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.3970 
BRD-PNED Dual 0.325 4.47 0.000 
  c1c4 0.052 5.83 0.000 
  c2c3 0.064 5.49 0.000 
  Abho -0.054 -8.82 0.000 
  Nbh 0.164 6.67 0.000 
  Divps 0.000... 0.00 1.000 
  Fcfps 0.008 0.88 0.380 
  Invincr 0.000... 1.50 0.132 
  Tointens -0.415 -2.15 0.032 
  Tdta 0.001 1.25 0.210 
  Pvol -0.002 -1.53 0.127 
  roat1 0.0003 0.44 0.639 
  R-sq.     0.8535 
BRD-DUAL Pned 1.010 33.63 0.000 
  c1c4 0.006 4.42 0.000 
  c2c3 -0.009 -3.31 0.001 
  Divps -0.157 -6.24 0.000 
  Fcfps -0.015 -1.25 0.213 
  Invincr -0.000... -2.19 0.029 
  Tointens -0.626 -4.23 0.000 
  Tdta -0.005 -10.72 0.000 
  Pvol -0.009 -11.80 0.000 
  roat1 -0.005 -5.45 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.6000 
DOMIN-C2C3 Pned 24.544 4.21 0.000 
 
Dual -11.658 -2.34 0.020 
 c2c4 -0.845 -2.33 0.020 
  Abho 0.927 8.76 0.000 
  Nbh -3.136 -31.56 0.000 
  Divps -1.052 -1.18 0.239 
  Fcfps -0.176 -0.84 0.402 
  Invincr -0.000... -1.51 0.131 
  Tointens 6.546 1.94 0.052 
 
Tdta -0.035 -1.59 0.111 
 
Pvol -0.015 -0.36 0.720 
 
Eqto -0.674 -1.77 0.076 
 
roat1 -0.022 -0.89 0.376 
  R-sq.     0.9457 
CONTEST-C1C4 Pned 22.858 2.44 0.015 
 
Dual -10.795 -1.79 0.073 
 c1c4 -0.895 -2.51 0.012 
  Abho 0.900 3.70 0.000 
  Nbh -2.849 -2.67 0.008 
  Divps -0.866 -0.89 0.372 
  Fcfps -0.187 -0.93 0.350 
  Invincr -0.000... -1.40 0.162 
  Tointens 5.285 1.21 0.226 
  Tdta -0.032 -1.37 0.172 
  Pvol -0.006 -0.15 0.878 
  Eqto -0.549 -1.17 0.243 
  roat1 -0.024 -1.05 0.293 
  R-sq.     0.8807 
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to TOINTENS that show significant effect at 5%. The remaining explanatory variables remained 
insignificant again. This is another indication of the stability of our nonrecursive structural model. 
Additionally, from the R-squared (85.35%) of the equation, it might be indicative that the equation 
has a good fit.   
The positive impact of C1C4 and C2C3 on the PNED might suggest that when there are both 
dominant and contesting coalitions, the contestability in the decision-making processes would 
enhance the proportion of independent directors. However, caution is also required in concluding 
this way since the recommendations on the independent board members in the UK Code might also 
have the impact of enhancing the increase in the PNED. Additionally, CEO-duality has positive impact 
on PNED at 1%α in the presence of C1C4 and C2C3. This might imply that when there are coalitions 
of dominants and that of contestants, the decision-making process would favour CEO-duality so that 
a unified leadership is attained, and that board independence might not matter for the firm.  
Board Leadership (BRD-DUAL) Equation:  Another interesting result is that all variables 
except FCFPS are found to be determinants of CEO-duality at a higher significance level of 1%α 
except INVINCR that is significant at 5%α. So, we have high confidence to suggest that PNED, C1C4, 
C2C3, DIVPS, INVINCR, TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL and lagged performance are determinants of CEO-
duality. The fairly higher R-squared (60%) of the model might be the indication of a fairly good fit of 
the equation in the SEM. The similarity of the result to those presented in section 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 
show that the SEM model is stable.  
The dominance and contestability variables (C1C4 and C2C3) show significant positive and negative 
impact on CEO-duality at 1%α respectively. The dominance variable (C1C4) enhances CEO-duality, 
implying that the CEO-duality is preferred when the dominants monopolize control. However, the 
contestant variable is found to show negative relation with CEO-duality as expected; and this might 
suggest that as the contesting power of the coalition increases, CEO-duality will diminish. As 
previously observed, from the positive impact of PNED on DUAL at 1%α, it might be suggestive that 
board independence enhances CEO-duality. This might happen in a sense that they might be more 
confident and better positioned to participate actively in the decision-making process of the firm 
and might favour CEO-duality as the proportion of NEDs increases for the UK listed firms. Finally, we 
remind that the interpretations of the results on the rest of the variables are predominantly similar 
to the same equation in the two preceding versions of the model.   
Control Dominance (DOMIN-C1C4) Equation:  According to the results of the equation, 
PNED, DUAL, C2C3, ABHO, NBH, TOINTENS, and EQTO are the determinants of control dominance in 
the firm (C1C4). Overall, from the R-squared statistic, we can cautiously say that 94.57% of the 
variations in C1C4 are explained by all the variables in the model. However, the similarity of the 
results with other previous versions assures us of the stability of the SEM. The interpretation of the 
results of many of variables is similar to the two previous sections (especially section 5.6.1).  
The result shows that the contestability variable (C2C3) has a negative impact on C1C4 at 5%α. 
Hence, as contestability increases, the position of the dominant coalition will diminish as expected 
per se the theoretical model. Moreover, PNED has positive impact on C1C4 at 1%α. This result is 
difficult to interpret in the real economic life peculiar to the UK since it is expected that the PNED 
might curb the control power of the dominant coalition. It might be suggestive that the rising voting 
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power of the C1C4 makes it difficult to counter-balance it. CEO-duality has a negative impact on the 
dominant coalition at 5%α, implying that the presence of CEO-duality might reduce the dominant 
position of C1C4.  
Control Contestability (CONTST-C2C3) Equation:  The result of the 3SLS regression is 
similar to those in the previous two sections. Only PNED, DUAL, C1C4, ABHO, and NBH are found to 
be determinants of contestability (C2C3). From the R-squared statistic, it might be suggested that 
88.07% of the variations of C2C3 are explained by all of the variables in the equation, indicating the 
correct specification of the model.  
The interpretation of the results on other variables is almost the same as those in the previous 
sections. Nevertheless, the dominance variable (C1C4) shows negative significant impact on control 
contestability (C2C3) at 5%α as expected according to the theoretical model of this research. 
Contestability must diminish as the monopolization of control is enhanced via the increase in the 
voting power of the dominant coalition. Moreover, PNED has positive impact on contestability of 
control at 5%α. This result is as expected since it is suggestive that the increase in PNED should 
enhance contestability. In the UK case, this might be possible due to high investor protection and the 
counter-balancing between C1C4 and C2C3 that might favour control by the boardroom. Finally, the 
result shows that CEO-duality has negative significant effect on C2C3 at 10%α. This shows that the 
control power of the contestants (C1C3) might diminish in the presence of CEO-duality. 
5.6.3.2 Control Balance in the Feedback Loop of C1C4-C2C3 Model 
C1C4 çè C2C3: Comparison of the magnitude of the negative effects in the feedback loop of C1C4 
(0.895 at 1% α) than the reversal negative effect of C2C3 (0.845 at 5%α) shows that C1C4 dominates, 
even though the closer magnitude might imply that they counter-balance each other.  
C1C4 çè PNED:  The magnitude of the positive effect (0.052 at 1%α) of dominance by C1C4 on the 
NEDs is lower than reciprocal positive impact of PNED on C1C4 (24.54 at 5%α). Hence, the insight is 
that as the proportion of the nonexecutives in the board increases, the dominance of C1C4 coalition 
will be enhanced for the UK firms. The result confirms the evidence in the previous version of the 
model.  
C1C4 çè DUAL: The magnitude of the positive effect of the dominant coalition on CEO-duality at 
1% α is quite small (0.006) compared to the negative impact of DUAL on C1C4, which is 11.66. 
Hence, the presence of CEO-duality diminishes the dominance of the coalition of C1C4. This might be 
related to the leadership unifying effect of CEO-duality that might deter the collective action of 
colluding dominant blockholders in the listed firms. Based on this fact, it might be suggested that 
CEO-duality might mitigate the second-order agency problem where external blockholders might act 
to control the firm for private benefits of control.  
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C2C3 çèPNED: C2C3 has little positive impact (0.064 at 1%α), whereas PNED has a positive impact 
(22.86 at 5%α) on C2C3 as it has on C1C4. The plausible conclusion from the magnitude of the 
effects is that the rise in the PNED in the board of directors enhance the existence and power of the 
contesting coalition (C2C3). This might make the sense since the PNED might be in favour of the 
existence of contestability or the existence of two opposing forces in the boardroom so that the 
check and balance prevails.  
C2C3 çè DUAL: The magnitude of the negative effect of DUAL (10.795 at 10%α) is greater than the 
negative effect of C2C3 (0.0087 at 1% α) might imply that the presence of CEO-duality diminishes 
the power of the contesting coalition (C2C3) as it diminishes the dominating coalition (C1C4). Hence, 
the unification of board leadership, CEO-duality, might be used to deter the control power struggle 
between the dominant coalitions and the contesting coalitions.  
DUAL çè PNED: The SEM 3SLS regression results show that DUAL and PNED have positive impacts 
on each other at 1% α. Comparison of the magnitude of the effects shows that PNED has greater 
causality effect on DUAL than the reversal effect of DUAL on PNED. The statistical interpretation is 
that the presence of CEO-duality is enhanced by the increase in the proportion of nonexecutives in 
the board. This evidence from the UK listed firms is surprising and counterintuitive as the opposite 
effect is expected based on the principles set in the UK Code of Best Practices.  
  
Fig. 5.9: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of C1C4-C2C3 Model  
 
Note: Own manual construction from table 7.19. 
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5.6.4 Monopolizability & Contestability Ratios: MONR vs. CONTR 
5.6.4.1 3SLS Results on the MONR-CONTR Model 
Performance (PRFM-ROA) Equation:  As it can be observed from table 5.20, the 3SLS 
regression result for MONR-CONTR model show that DUAL, MONR, INVINCR, TDTA, SPVOL, and 
ROAt-1 are determinants of ROA. The result has close similarity with the other versions of the model. 
As in the previous section ABHO and FCFPS are found to show insignificant influence on ROA.  
The result shows that MONR is determinant of firm performance whereas CONTR is not. MONR has 
significant effect on ROA at 1% α-level. Hence, the positive insignificant effect of CONTR makes it 
different from the other versions of the SEM used in the previous three sections where both 
dominance and contestability variables are simultaneously and consistently significant or 
insignificant. This is difficult to reason or explain. However, it is worthwhile to note that the 
preceding two versions of the model also show positive impact of the control dominance variable 
(MONR) on ROA. Another surprising result is that PNED is slightly insignificant as in TPDI-SHAPV 
model. However, DUAL still has negative significant impact on ROA at 1% α. Moreover, TOINTENS 
shows positive insignificant relationship with ROA, where as TDTA and PVOL exhibit significant 
negative impact on ROA at 1% α.  
Board Independence (BRD-PNED) Equation:  The 3SLS result on the equation shows that 
only DUAL, CONTR, TDTA, PVOL and ROAt-1 are determinants of PNED. The interpretation of the 
results on these variables confirms the results of the previous versions of the SEM. For example, 
PVOL, which used to have negative impact on PNED previously, has now positive impact at 5%α. 
Such instability raises alarm about the control factors used in this version of the SEM. MONR, ABHO, 
NBH, DIVPS, INVINCR, and TOINTENS show insignificance association. However, some of the results 
are interesting and worth mentioning. The control factors DUAL and CONTR show significant positive 
impact on PNED at 1%α as observed in other versions of the SEM. Additionally, the positive 
significant impact of ROAt-1 and TDTA is confirmed at 5% and 1%α respectively.  
Board Leadership (BRD-DUAL) Equation:  All the explanatory variables except FCFPS and 
INVINCR show significant relationship with DUAL, and hence, they are determinants of CEO-duality. 
Hence, PNED, MONR, CONTR, DIVPS, TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL and ROAt-1 are determinants of CEO-
duality. The result is generally similar to the previous versions of the model with few exceptions or 
slight changes. Their negative impact (except PNED and MONR that have positive impact) on DUAL 
confirms the previous versions (especially section 5.6.3) of the SEM. Hence, the interpretations and 
the discussion of the previous sections hold for this version of the SEM.  
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Control Dominance (DOMIN-MONR) Equation:  The results on this equation show that 
with the exception to CONTR and FCFPS all variables are determinants of the monopolizability of 
corporate control power by a coalition (MONR). PNED, DUAL, ABHO, NBH, DIVPS, INVINCR, TDTA, 
Table 5.20: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of MONR-CONTR Model 
    MONR-CONTR 
Equation Variable Coef. Z P>z 
PRFM-ROA pned 14.963 1.64 0.122 
  dual -12.806 -3.57 0.000 
  Monr 4.219 2.56 0.010 
  Contr -1.120 -0.18 0.932 
  Abho 0.021 0.77 0.394 
  Fcfps 0.203 0.63 0.508 
  invincr -0.000... -2.28 0.022 
 
tointens 8.130 1.57 0.133 
Tdta -0.058 -3.83 0.000 
 
Pvol -0.109 -3.92 0.000 
 
roat1 0.216 9.18 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.3698 
BRD-PNED Dual 0.466 9.37 0.000 
  Monr 0.048 0.32 0.734 
  Contr 0.976 6.25 0.000 
  Abho 0.001 1.38 0.207 
  Nbh 0.006 0.83 0.428 
  Divps 0.028 1.50 0.121 
  Fcfps 0.010 1.43 0.156 
  Invincr 0.000... 0.81 0.410 
  Tointens -0.145 -1.29 0.208 
  Tdta 0.004 3.25 0.001 
  Pvol 0.008 2.15 0.025 
  roat1 0.004 2.12 0.032 
  R-sq.     0.9035 
BRD-DUAL Pned 1.414 16.45 0.000 
  Monr 0.231 3.48 0.001 
  Contr -1.094 -6.31 0.000 
  Divps -0.128 -4.63 0.000 
  fcfps -0.021 -1.64 0.103 
  invincr -0.000... -1.31 0.185 
  tointens -0.349 -2.07 0.038 
  tdta -0.004 -8.07 0.000 
  pvol -0.008 -10.14 0.000 
  roat1 -0.004 -4.53 0.000 
  R-sq.     0.5247 
DOMIN-MONR pned 2.140 5.71 0.000 
  dual -1.015 -4.55 0.000 
  contr -0.421 -1.70 0.249 
  abho 0.003 3.77 0.000 
  nbh -0.064 -18.14 0.000 
  divps -0.077 -2.17 0.034 
  fcfps -0.007 -0.75 0.542 
  invincr -0.000... -1.85 0.068 
  tointens 0.415 2.81 0.010 
tdta -0.003 -3.39 0.001 
pvol -0.004 -2.53 0.013 
eqto -0.041 -2.96 0.006 
roat1 -0.002 -2.11 0.046 
  R-sq.     0.5008 
CONTEST-CONTR pned 0.418 2.90 0.031 
 
dual -0.298 -4.03 0.002 
 
monr 0.445 2.87 0.001 
 abho -0.002 -4.20 0.000 
  nbh 0.021 2.25 0.005 
  divps -0.033 -2.19 0.063 
  fcfps -0.012 -1.91 0.049 
  invincr -0.000... -0.50 0.748 
  tointens -0.160 -1.24 0.162 
  tdta -0.001 -3.29 0.007 
  pvol -0.002 -3.95 0.001 
  eqto 0.016 2.20 0.023 
  roat1 -0.002 -3.07 0.004 
  R-sq.     0.7754 
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PVOL, EQTO, and ROAt-1 have significant effect on MONR. All the signs of the coefficients are almost 
exactly the same as in the previous versions of the SEM and identical with C1C4-C2C3 model. So, the 
same interpretations used apply here. Anyhow, the contestability variable (CONTR) has not 
significant effect on MONR as in other versions of the model even though it retains negative 
coefficient. This might be ascribed to the transformation of the voting powers into ratios in order to 
measure the power ratios.  
Control Contestability (CONTST-CONTR) Equation:  The results of 3SLS regression of 
this equation show different pattern of relationship between the predictors and CONTR compared 
with the previous versions of the SEM. Most variables which showed insignificant relation in the 
preceding versions are significant. The result show that PNED, DIVPS, FCFPS, and EQTO (at 5%α), and 
DUAL, MONR, ABHO, NBH, TDTA, PVOL, and ROAt-1 (at 1%α) are determinants of CONTR. However, 
INVINCR and TOINTENS are insignificant. Only PNED, DUAL, MONR, ABHO, and NBH are the variables 
that also show significant effect as in the previous versions. Hence, the previous interpretations hold 
for them. However, caution is needed in the interpretation of the result on INVINCR and TOINTENS.   
5.6.4.2 Control Balance in the Feedback Loop of MONR-CONTR Model 
MONR çè CONTR:  The magnitude of the positive impact of MONR on CONTR is 0.44 at 1%α 
where CONTR has negative insignificant impact of 0.42 on MONR. According the result, the impact 
of the coalition for monopoly (MONR) is greater and significant, implying that MONR enhances 
contestability.  
MONR çè PNED:  It is observable that the magnitude of the positive impact of PNED on MONR 
(2.14) is greater than the positive insignificant effect of MONR on PNED at 1% α. So, as in other 
versions of the SEM, the result confirms that the increase in PNED enhances MONR.  
 
Figure 6.4: Three-Stage Least Squares Regression of MONR-CONTR Model 
 
Note: Own manual construction from table 5.20. 
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MONR çè DUAL:  Comparison of the magnitude of the effects in the feedback loop show that 
DUAL has a greater negative impact of 1.015 on MONR at 1% α. Hence, the evidence is that with the 
presence of CEO-duality, the monopolizability of power by the dominant coalition will diminish. This 
supports the results in the previous versions of the SEM.  
CONTR çè PNED:  The magnitude of positive impact the proportion of nonexecutives in the board 
on CONTR (0.418) at 5% α is greater compared to the insignificant reciprocal effect of CONTR on 
PNED (0.98) at 1% α . The evidence supports the other previous versions of the SEM.  
CONTR çè DUAL:  It is observable from the result that the magnitude of significant negative effect 
of CONTR (1.09) on DUAL at 1%α is greater than that of the significant negative impact of DUAL 
(0.298) on CONTR at 5%α. The difference in the result of this version of the SEM is that the resultant 
effect is that CONTR affects the presence of CEO-duality negatively, thus suggesting that the increase 
in the power of the contestant coalition will diminish CEO-Duality in UK firms.  
DUAL çè PNED:  Results of this feedback loop show that the magnitude of the positive impact of 
DUAL on PNED (1.414) at 1%α is greater than the positive impact of PNED on DUAL (0.4665) at 1%α. 
This resultant effect indicates that the effect of PNED is greater. The statistical interpretation is that 
the presence of duality will enhance the board independence. This might imply that if such coalitions 
exist, PNED is favoured and enhanced by CEO-duality. This might have a policy implication suggesting 
that it is useful to have united board leadership when such coalitions exist. However, we cast doubt 
to the result since it contradicts C1C4-C2C3 Model, from which it is transformed.  
To sum up, now that the 3SLS regression results and their statistical interpretations are given for 
each equation in each version of the SEM, it would be required to further discuss the summary of 
the evidences and their implications. The following section will present the discussions as a prelude 
to conclusion.   
  
216 
 
5.6.5 Discussion of the Evidence 
Even thought there are several findings or evidence in from the study, we would like to give a brief 
and general account of the main findings. To do this we present an extract of the determinants of 
the five equations corresponding to the five dependent endogenous variables when different 
alternative options of control dominance and contestability are assumed in the SEM using tables 
5.21-5.2.4. Then we use table 5.24 to summarize and present especially the indication of the 
resultant effects in the feedback loop of the nonrecursive SEM.  
5.6.5.1 Determinants of Firm Performance   
The control dominance and contestability variables show different results with different versions of 
the SEM. It is observable that VPC1 has a positive insignificant relation with ROA, whereas VPC1 and 
has negative insignificant impact on ROA (table 5.21). This might indicate that the aggregate control 
power of the first and the second largest blockholders alone might not be determinants of firm 
performance in the UK listed firms. However, the power indices of the coalition of the ‘First-Two’ 
(TDPI) and their contestants (SHAPV) show positive significant effect on ROA. This might imply that 
the coalition of blockholders and their collective actions (TDPI and SHAPV) rather than their 
individual control power (VPC1 and VPC2) are important in enhancing firm performance in the UK 
listed firms. Comparing the magnitude of the effects of TDPI and SHAPV on ROA, the contestability 
variable (16.95) has greater impact in enhancing firm performance, ROA, than TDPI (6.53). This 
implies that contestability (SHAPV) is an important determinant factor in enhancing firm 
performance for the UK listed firms. Moreover, both dominance and contestability variables (C1C4 
and C2C3) also show positive relation with ROA as in TDPI-SHAPV Model, even though they are not 
significant. However, there is no such pattern in the model with MONR and CONTR.  
Overall, with the exception to the model version where the ratio for monopolizability of control by a 
dominant coalition is assumed (MONR show significant positive impact on ROA), the magnitude of 
the effects of the contestability variables (CONTR) is greater than that of the dominant variable. 
Hence, there is evidence that control contestability dominates in the UK listed firms and it enhances 
firm performance. This confirms that the monitoring hypothesis is valid for the UK listed firms.  
There is evidence that gives us confidence that PNED, DUAL, INVINCR, TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL, and 
lagged ROA are the determinants of firm performance measured in ROA. PNED, TOINTENS, and 
lagged ROA enhance firm performance while the rest have the impact of reducing ROA. The results 
present enough evidence that PNED enhances firm performance despite the negative impact in 
TDPI-SHAPV Model. This confirms and supports (1) the empirical validity of the rationale behind the 
recommendations in the UK Code of Best Practice and (2) the suggestion of the agency theory on the 
role of nonexecutive directors as monitors of managers and that the board of directors is the 
internal governance mechanism. Additionally, the result also shows that the magnitude of the 
positive impact of PNED (which is assumed as a contestability variable of the BRD) on ROA is greater 
than the negative effect of CEO-duality (which is assumed as a dominance variable of the BRD) on 
ROA. From this fact, it is suggestive that there is additional evidence showing that contestability of 
control has more determinant effect of influencing ROA than control dominance in the board 
structure for the UK listed firms. Moreover, the evidence that CEO-duality has consistent negative 
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impact on ROA confirms and supports the rationale behind recommendation of the UK Code of Best 
Practice.  
The other interesting evidence is that TOINTENS shows positive impact and hence enhance ROA 
when the dominant and the contestant variables coexist, and PNED has negative or no significant 
impact on ROA. The evidence supports (1) the agency theory on the role of takeover market as a 
monitoring and disciplining external governance mechanism and (2) the hypothesis that takeover is 
a substitute for the internal governance mechanism. Anyway, TOINTENS lose its significance in 2 
versions of the SEM. TDTA and PVOL retained their significant negative impact on ROA consistently 
across the versions of the model. Overall, the evidence on TDTA supports the theory of financial 
distress showing that (1) debt financing reduce firm performance, and (2) debt financing has 
complementarity effect with CEO-duality that reduces firm performance as it increases. Moreover, 
as predicted in the theoretical model and suggested by researchers, lagged ROA shows significant 
positive impact on current ROA, thus confirming dynamic endogeneity relationship. Finally, the 
results show that ownership concentration measured as the aggregate holdings of all blockholders 
(ABHO) has negative impact on ROA even though it shows significance only in one model. Hence, 
due to the mixed and insignificant effects in one of the versions of the SEM and we conclude that 
ABHO has no systematic relation with firm performance. This is confirms the suggestion of Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985).  
Last but not least, it is counterintuitive that the result on investment increase (INVINCR) that is 
expected to be positive shows negative effect on ROA in three versions of the model and the 
magnitudes of the negative impact are too small in magnitude to be noticeable. Anyhow, this might 
suggest that not all investments taken are those with positive net present value (NPV) or will actually 
lead to profitability. Its negative impact might also suggest that there might be rent diversion or 
Table 5.21: 3SLS regression results of the determinants of firm performance (ROA) 
  
  
ROA 
VPC1-VPC2 TDPI-SHAPV C1C4-C2C3 MONR-CONTR 
PNED 12.33*** -12.35 14.654*** 14.962 
DUAL -8.22*** -2.13 -10.338*** -12.806*** 
VPC1 -0.38    
TDPI  6.53***   
C1C4   0.052  
MONR    4.219*** 
VPC2 0.69    
SHAPV  16.95***   
C2C3   0.065  
CONTR    -1.12 
ABHO -0.1 -0.0885*** -0.033 0.0205 
NBH     
DIVPS     
FCFPS 0.3141 0.292 0.299 0.203 
INVINCR -0.0000…* -0.0000… -0.0000…** -0.0000…** 
TOINTENS 15.146*** 4.64 12.261*** 8.13 
TDTA -0.37** -0.037** -0.0436** -0.058*** 
PVOL -0.0733*** -0.135*** -0.0772*** -0.1085*** 
EQTO     
ROA1 0.253*** 0.234*** 0.235*** 0.216*** 
R-Squared 0.3516 0.2968 0.397 0.3698 
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extraction, and hence agency costs, before the accounting results of the firm are reported. On the 
other hand, the negative impact of INVINCR on ROA might suggest that the increment in the cost of 
investment to the firm that does not currently generate cash inflows or does not yet yield break-
even might result in the decrease of the accounting performance measure.   
5.6.5.2 Determinants of Board Structure: PNED and DUAL 
The evidence from the 3SLS regression results shown as table 5.22 indicate some commonalities of 
both board structure variables used in the SEM. There is evidence that there is significant positive 
correlation, which is consistent across the equations and the versions of the SEM, between 
nonexecutive directors’ representation in the board and CEO-duality.  
  
Table 5.22: 3SLS regression results of the determinants of board structures 
 
Panel A: Determinants of NEDs representation 
  
  
P N E D 
VPC1-VPC2 TDPI-SHAPV C1C4-C2C3 MONR-CONTR 
PNED     
DUAL 1.095*** 0.276*** 0.326*** 0.466*** 
VPC1 0.056**    
TDPI  0.964**   
C1C4   0.519***  
MONR    0.048 
VPC2 0.101***    
SHAPV  0.604***   
C2C3   0.065***  
CONTR    0.976*** 
ABHO -0.57*** -0.0099*** -0.054*** 0.0822 
NBH 0.229*** 0.042** 0.164*** 0.006 
DIVPS -0.079* -0.026 0.0000… 0.0283 
FCFPS -0.006 -0.0012 0.0085 0.0099 
INVINCR -0.0000… 0.0000… 0.0000… 0.0000… 
TOINTENS -0.505* -0.475*** -0.415** -0.145 
TDTA 0.00002 -0.00193 0.0693 0.0013*** 
PVOL -0.00207 -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0017** 
EQTO     
ROA1 0.0005 -0.0402 0.659 0.0012** 
R-Squared 0.5976 0.5649 0.6 0.5247 
 
Panel B: Determinants of duality 
  
  
D U A L 
VPC1-VPC2 TDPI-SHAPV C1C4-C2C3 MONR-CONTR 
PNED 1.095*** 1.415*** 1.0997*** 1.414*** 
DUAL     
VPC1 0.006***    
TDPI  0.236***   
C1C4   0.006***  
MONR    0.231*** 
VPC2 -0.012***    
SHAPV  - 0.268***   
C2C3   -0.0087***  
CONTR    -1.094*** 
ABHO     
NBH     
DIVPS -0.153*** -0.118*** -0.157*** -0.128*** 
FCFPS -0.015 -0.0133 -0.0152 -0.021 
INVINCR -0.0000…** 0.0000…** -0.0000…** -0.0000… 
TOINTENS -0.634*** -0.424** -0.626*** -0.349** 
TDTA -0.0047*** -0.004*** -0.0047*** -0.0039*** 
PVOL -0.0088*** -0.006** -0.0088*** -0.008*** 
EQTO     
ROA1 -0.0046*** -0.004*** 0.0046*** - 0.004*** 
R-Squared 0.7448 0.9268 0.8535 0.9035 
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Additionally, all dominance and contestability variables (VPCI, TDPI, C1C4, MONR VPC2, SHAPV, 
C2C3, and CONTR) are found to significantly enhance PNED.  The result is as expected except for 
those of dominance variables, which might be the case for the UK listed firms where board structure 
is enhanced by both dominance and contestability control factors. Moreover, the results also show 
evidence that control dominance variables would enhance CEO-duality, where as contestability 
variables have negative impact on duality. So CEO-duality diminishes as PNED rises. From the 
external governance mechanisms, only TOINTENS, which has positive impact on ROA, is found to 
show consistent negative significant impact on both board structure variables. This is another 
evidence of the substitution effects of TOINTENS on board structure.  
As expected, there is evidence that the ownership concentration (ABHO) and the blockholders 
concentration (NBH) show negative and positive significant impact respectively on board 
independence. The evidence is that the increase in ABHO will reduce NEDs’ representation in the 
board (PNED); and the increase in NBH will enhance PNED. Unlike the results on CEO-duality, we do 
not have conclusive evidence that lagged performance determines PNED. Hence, the evidence show 
that dynamic endogeneity holds with CEO-duality but not with PNED, where the impact of lagged 
performance (ROA) is consistently negative and significant across the three versions of the model. 
The results also show evidence that DIVPS, INVINCR, TOINTENS, TDTA, PVOL, and lagged ROA have 
negative significant impact CEO-duality, hence, as they increase, CEO-duality will diminish.  
5.6.5.3 Determinants of Blockholders Structures 
In general, the result summary in table 5.23 shows that board structure characteristic variables 
(PNED and DUAL), contestability variables (VPC2, SHAPV, and C2C3), ownership/ blockholder 
concentration proxy (ABHO, NBH), external TOINTENS and EQTO are determinants of the dominant 
control (DOMIN) factors. On the other hand, almost the same or countering variables, namely, 
PNED, DUAL, VPC1, TDPI, C1C4, CONTR, ABHO, and NBH are found to be consistent determinants of 
all versions of the contestant (CONTST) factors.  
The summary table shows that there is evidence that PNED has positive significant effect on both 
dominance variables (VPC1, TDPI, C1C4, and MONR) and the contestability variables (VPC2, SHAPV, 
C2C3and CONTR) in all versions of the SEM. Hence, as PNED increases, the corresponding dominance 
and contestability variables will increase. The increase of the dominant control variables with the 
increase in PNED might suggest that the controlling largest blockholder or the controlling coalitions 
of blockholders might have the incentives to exert their control pressure in reaction. Simultaneously, 
the contesting largest blockholder or coalitions of blockholders might do the same thing to counter-
balance the dominant forces, as supported by the evidence from the result that the contesting 
power of blockholder(s) is enhanced by the increase in NEDs’ representation in the board.   
Additionally, the presence of CEO-duality has the negative effect on both dominance variables 
(VPC1, TDPI, C1C4, and MONR) and contestability variables (VPC2, SHAPV, C2C3, and CONTR). The 
presence of CEO-duality that unifies the leadership of the board of directors by bringing decision 
control and decision management into one forum. This might make it difficult for the dominant 
largest blockholder or the controlling coalition to fully exert its control pressure and incentive for 
private benefits of control and invalidates the necessity of dominance. In such a situation, there is no 
dominance that worries the contestants and contestability might also diminish. Hence, the 
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diminishing of dominance and contestability with the presence of CEO-duality confirms the 
economic and theoretical perspectives. Overall, the significant impact of both internal governance 
mechanism variables (PNED and DUAL) on dominance and contestability variables in all versions of 
the SEM might suggest that the UK corporate governance system, where CEO-duality is rare and 
most of the board members are nonexecutive directors, is mainly characterized by enhancement of 
control dominance and contestability as PNED increases and the split of duality is enhanced.  
Moreover, there is evidence that PNED, DUAL, VPC1, TDPI, C1C4, MONR, VPC2, SHAPV, CONTR are 
determinants of control dominance and contestability in the UK listed firms. The results suggest the 
control dominance and contestability variables negatively affect each other, thus confirming the 
propositions in the theoretical framework. Furthermore, the results that contestability variables 
used in the model negatively impact their corresponding dominance variables is another evidence of 
control contestability hypothesis. Additionally, ABHO, NBH and EQTO are also found to be significant 
determinants across equations and versions of the SEM.  
Table 5.23: 3SLS regression results of the determinants of control dominance and contestability  
 
Panel A: Determinants of dominance variables  
  
  
VPC1-VPC2 TDPI-SHAPV C1C4-C2C3 MONR-CONTR 
VPC1 TDPI C1C4 MONR 
PNED 26.094*** 0.981** 24.544*** 2.140*** 
DUAL -12.819** -0.509** -11.658** -1.015*** 
VPC1     
TDPI     
C1C4     
MONR     
VPC2 -1.309**    
SHAPV  - 0.335*   
C2C3   -0.845**  
CONTR    -0.421 
ABHO 0.914*** 0.009*** 0.927*** 0.003*** 
NBH -3.935*** -0.049*** -3.135*** -0.064*** 
DIVPS -0.268 -0.049 -1.052 -0.077** 
FCFPS 0.029 -0.0019 -1.177 -0.0065 
INVINCR -15 -0.0000… -0.0000… -0.0000…* 
TOINTENS 6.469 -0.238** 6.546* 0.415*** 
TDTA -0.0331 -0.0013 -0.035 -0.003*** 
PVOL -0.0287 -0.0023 -0.015 -0.0038** 
EQTO - 0.9133* -0.032* -0.674* -0.041*** 
ROA1 -0.0311 -0.0008 -0.022 - 0.0021** 
R-Squared 0.8917 0.1153 0.9457 0.5008 
 
Panel B: Determinants of contestability variables  
  
  
VPC1-VPC2 TDPI-SHAPV C1C4-C2C3 MONR-CONTR 
VPC2 SHAPV C2C3 CONTR 
PNED 18.450** 2.833*** 22.858** 0.418** 
DUAL -9.137* -1.451** -10.795* -0.298*** 
VPC1 -0.695**    
TDPI  0.236***   
C1C4   -0.895**  
MONR    0.445*** 
VPC2     
SHAPV     
C2C3     
CONTR     
ABHO 0.654*** 0.0254** 0.900*** 0.002*** 
NBH -2.773*** -0.129* -2.849*** 0.021*** 
DIVPS -0.133 -0.13 -0.866 -0.335* 
FCFPS -0.019 -0.006 -0.187 -0.012** 
INVINCR -0.0000… -0.0000… 0.0000...** -0.0000… 
TOINTENS 4.306 0.648 5.285 0.16 
TDTA -0.0233 -0.0037 -0.0325 -0.001*** 
PVOL -0.0187 -0.0058 -0.006 -0.0024*** 
EQTO -0.631 -0.09** -0.549 0.0163** 
ROA1 -0.0233*** -0.0023 -0.0237 -0.0015*** 
R-Squared 0.7512 0.8017 0.8807 0.7754 
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Finally, the cross-sectional observation across the equations (columns of table 5.23) shows that most 
of the variables that are insignificant in the first three versions of the SEM have significant impact 
when MONR and CONTR are used as dependent variables (last columns of table 5.23) even though 
the magnitude of their effects are very low. This should not induce us to reject the other three 
versions since the transformation of the proportions into the ratios might change the original 
content of our information on the variables and caution in interpretation is required.  
5.6.5.4 Control Balance in the Feedback Loop 
General Presentation:  The summary of the correlations in the feedback loop of the 
nonrecursive structural model presented as table 5.4 show an overall insight into control dominance 
and contestability and board structure in the UK listed firms. The table is constructed such that (1) 
the rows are arranged as dominant vs. contestant in the 4 versions of the SEM, (2) the column of 
feedback loop is arranged also as dominant (DOMIN) vs. contestant (CONTST) where the variable 
that come in each row are the dominant variable of the model for DOMIN and contestant variable 
for the CONTST.  
 
The general pattern that can be observed from the table is that the magnitude of the impact is 
greater when the direction is from contestability to dominance (the right hand to the left hand side 
of the loop) when we observe the columns of the table. This indicates the overall validity of the SEM. 
The results in the first three versions of the SEM (columns 2, 3, and 4) that correspond to the rows of 
the feedback loop (column 1) show that the magnitude of the effects of contestability variables on 
dominance variables are generally greater than the impact of dominance variables on contestability 
variables. The evidence might suggest that generally control contestability dominates over control 
dominance in the UK listed firms. This supports the contestability of control hypothesis. 
  
Table 5.24: Summary of the reciprocal relationship between dominance and contestant variables 
  MAGNITUDE OF EFFECT IN DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE SEM 
FEEDBACK LOOP    VPC1-VPC2 TDPI-SHAPV C1C4-C2C3 MONR-CONTR 
DOMIN çè CONTST    -0.695*** & -1.31** -2.63* & -0.33* -0.895**& -0.845**  0.44*** &  -0.42 
DOMIN çè PNED      0.056** & 26.09*** 0.96** & 0.98** 0.052*** & 24.54** 0.48  &  2.14*** 
DUAL çè PNED    0.277*** & 1.095*** 0.276*** & 1.42*** 0.326***&1.0997*** 1.414***  & 0.4665*** 
DOMIN çè DUAL    0.006*** & -12.9** 0.24*** & -0.51** 0.006*** & -11.66** 0.23*** &  -1.015*** 
CONTST çè PNED     0.101*** & 18.45** 0.604***& 2.83** 0.064***&22.86** 0.98 & 0.418** 
CONTST çè DUAL     -0.012** & -9.14* -0.27 & -1.45*** -0.0087***& -10.795* -1.09*** &  -0.298** 
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Dominance and Contestability in Blockholders Structures:  Considering the row 
‘DOMIN-CONTST’ feedback loop of VPC1-VPC2 Model (row 1; column 2), we can observe that the 
effect of contestability (the control power of the second largest blockholder, VPC2) is greater than 
the dominance variable (the control power of first largest blockholder (VPC1). The resultant negative 
effect of VPC2 on VPC1 might suggest that as contestability by the second blockholder rises, the 
dominance of the first largest blockholder will decline. This evidence confirms the monitoring 
hypothesis depicted in the agency theory. It also supports the contestability of control hypothesis 
which is the basis of our model.  
However, in the other three models of the ‘DOMIN-CONTEST’ feedback loop (row1; column 3, 4, and 
5 of the table), where coalitions of blockholders are assumed as dominants and contestants, the 
magnitude of the effects of the dominant variables is greater than their corresponding contestants. 
The result shows that the dominant coalitions (TDPI, C1C4 and MONR) have greater effect on their 
corresponding contestant coalitions (SHAPV, C2C3 and CONTR). Hence, the resultant effects 
deduced from comparison of the effects in the feedback loop show that the direction of causality 
goes from dominant coalition to contestant coalition. This implies that the dominant coalitions in the 
firm are determinants of contestant coalitions.  
Moreover, according to the results of the second and third versions of our SEM (row1; column 3, and 
4), contestability declines as dominance rises. The evidence is that the increases in control 
dominance by coalitions will reduce contestability of control. Even though this will not negate the 
existence of control contestability, it shows that controlling coalitions might have more ability to 
exert control pressures inherent in their collective voting power to reduce the impact of contesting 
coalitions. Finally, as previously noted the surprising positive impact of MONR on CONTR of the SEM 
version when MONR and CONTR are used as dominance and contestability variables respectively 
(row 1; column 5) is difficult to interpret since the model is the transformed version of SEM with 
C1C4 and C2C3 as dominant and contesting coalitions respectively.  
Dominance and Contestability in the Board Structure:  As it can be observed from 
table 5.24 (row 3; column 2, 3, and 4) the 3SLS regression results show that the magnitude of the 
positive effect of PNED on DUAL is greater than the reversal effect of DUAL on PNED in the first three 
models. The results on the first three models indicate that the causality effect goes from PNED to 
DUAL and PNED is one of the determinants of CEO-duality. The statistical interpretation is that the 
presence of CEO-duality is enhanced with the increase in the proportion of nonexecutives in the 
board.  
The insight that the evidence suggest might be, on the one hand, that as the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors in the board rises, there is a unified or unitary board leadership in the UK 
listed firms. It might be suggestive that the higher the proportion of nonexecutive directors the more 
is the preference of the presence of CEO-duality in the UK listed firms. The result raises the question 
why the UK NEDs prefer or enhance CEO-duality in the presence of controlling largest blockholder or 
coalitions of blockholders and their countering corresponding contestants. Hence, it might be 
suggested that in the presence of high control contestability in the UK listed firms, CEO-duality is 
preferred when there are dominants and contestants that exert enough pressure to control and 
monitor each other’s behaviour, and in that case the middle solution is to unify the board leadership 
that might act as neutral and arbitrator between the two opposing control forces within the board. If 
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this is the case, it might contradict the rationale behind the recommendation of the UK Code of Best 
Practice on separating CEO-Chair role in the board of directors.  
However, the result of the SEM with MONR and CONTEST as dominance and contestant variables 
shows the opposite causal effect, and we cast doubt on this result since the model is the 
transformed version of the SEM with C1C4 and C2C3 as blockholders structure variables of 
dominance and contestability. 
To sum up, the determinants of firm performance, board structures, control dominance-
contestability in the blockholders’ structure and in the board structure are discussed above. The 
3SLS regression results of the different versions of the SEM have provided statistically relevant and 
economically and theoretically insightful evidence. Finally, we present a brief conclusion of the 
research in the following section.  
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5.7. CONCLUSION 
The issue of control of corporation is so complex that sets of control forces need to be considered. 
To this end, the main control factors this research considers are board structures, control dominance 
and contestant largest blockholders or blockholders’ coalitions, and external governance 
mechanisms in order to investigate the control of UK listed firms in the FTSE ALL SHARE Index. In 
order to do this a theoretical model of control dominance-contestability that could be the basis for 
the empirical modelling are developed. Then, the empirical model is developed so as to help us to 
test the theory of control dominance-contestability. The characteristics and nature of relationships 
that exist between different control forces of the firm particularly multiple feedback loops and 
endogeneity and its different sources means that several of the control factors and firm 
performance are determined within a structural system and this necessitates the choice of the 
structural equation modelling.  
The structural equation modelling has enabled us to investigate the different control forces that 
could impact firm performance and each other at the same time within a system. The nonrecursive 
SEM model is estimated using 3SLS so as to solve the problem of endogeneity and contemporaneous 
correlations that might exist across the equations. The detailed results of the 3SLS regressions of the 
SEM are discussed in the previous section and summary of the evidences are presented. Discussion 
made on the evidences in section 6.5 reflects the main findings of the research. However, the insight 
into the main findings will be presented in two sets.  
The first set of findings of the empirical research is related to the determination of firm 
performance. In determining firm performance measured in ROA, the evidence that the effect of 
control contestability factors dominates in the UK listed firms and that they enhance firm 
performance than control dominance forces confirms the monitoring hypothesis of the agency 
theory. This can be deduced from (1) the greater magnitude in the positive impact of PNED on ROA 
than the negative effect of CEO-duality on ROA, and (2) the greater magnitude of the positive effects 
of the contestability variables on ROA compared to that of control dominance variables. The 
evidence also confirms and supports (1) the empirical validity of the rationale behind the 
recommendations in the UK Code of Best Practice regarding NEDs’ representation in the board and 
CEO-duality, and (2) the suggestion of the agency theory on the role of nonexecutive directors as 
monitors of managers and that the board of directors is the internal governance mechanism, which 
determines firm performance. Additional evidence that supports the rationale behind the 
recommendations of the UK Code of Best Practice is that CEO-duality show consistent negative 
impact on ROA across the models and that PNED has positive impact on ROA in two versions of the 
SEM.  
Regarding external corporate governance mechanisms, the evidence that TOINTENS enhances ROA 
when the dominant and the contestant variables coexist and PNED has negative or no significant 
impact on ROA supports: (1) the agency theory on the role of takeover market as a monitoring and 
disciplining external governance mechanism, and (2) the hypothesis that takeover is a substitute for 
the internal governance mechanism. The consistent negative impact of TDTA on ROA across the 
versions of the model while PNED show positive influence on ROA provides evidences that support 
the theory of financial distress by confirming that (1) debt financing reduce firm performance, and 
(2) debt financing has complementarity effects with CEO-duality.  
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Moreover, the evidence from the positive impact of lagged ROA on current ROA confirms our 
theoretical model, which is based on suggestions from researchers regarding dynamic endogeneity. 
One further finding worth mentioning is that lagged ROA negatively and consistently influences CEO-
duality provides evidence that support the dynamic endogeneity between firm performance and 
board structure even though this does not hold for NEDs’ representation in the board.  
The second set of findings of the research is related to the control dominance-contestability theory. 
Firstly, the research results provide evidence that control dominance variables would enhance CEO-
duality, where as contestability variables have negative impact on duality. So the enhancement of 
CEO-duality by the rise in control dominance factors and the diminishing of duality as contestability 
rises is evidence of the control dominance-contestability theory from the UK listed firms. Moreover, 
the negative consistent impact of TOINTENS on both PNED and DUAL might suggest evidence for the 
substitution effects of takeover on the board of directors.  
Secondly, the empirical result of positive impact of NBH on board independence might provide 
another evidence of control contestability hypothesis from the perspective that as the number of 
significant blockholders increase there is more active participation in the control (more 
contestability of control) of the firm that might lead to the choice of sufficient number of 
nonexecutives. This evidence of control contestability hypothesis is also supported by negative 
impact of NBH on control dominance variables.  
Thirdly, the results that contestability variables used in the model negatively impact their 
corresponding dominance variables is another evidence of control contestability hypothesis. 
Moreover, comparison of the effects of the pairs shows further insight and confirmation of the 
hypothesis.  
Fourthly, comparison of the magnitude of the effects in the feedback loops reveals further evidence 
of the relevance of control contestability hypothesis showing that control contestability dominates. 
From the resultant higher effect that reveals the direction of causality from contestability to 
dominance of control, it might be suggestive that contestability of control in firms initiates the 
enhancement or the reduction of pressure of control dominance in UK firms. 
Finally, the other empirical evidence on the relevance of control contestability hypothesis is the 
decline of the dominance of the largest blockholder as the contesting force of the second largest 
blockholder rises. However, in the setting when the coalitions of control dominants and contestants 
exist together, the empirical evidence shows that the direction of causality goes from dominant 
coalition to contestant coalition, thus implying that the dominant coalitions in the firm are 
determinants of contestant coalitions. This also supports the control contestability hypothesis and it 
suggests the situation of Nash equilibrium in competition for power.  
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Nevertheless, we admit that there are limitations of this study, which are worthwhile to note. Firstly, 
the theoretical framework of control dominance-contestability theory is not yet developed explicitly 
in this research study. This study just contributes to the discussions and debates on the theory in the 
perspectives of blockholders’ structures by contributing the notion of control dominance-
contestability perspectives.  
Secondly, it is worthwhile to mention that the blockholders’ structures used in the research are 
arbitrarily chosen based on the high investor protection regime in the UK that might diminish the 
open use of coalitions by assuming that it might yet be possible for significant blockholders to form 
undeclared coalitions in order to exert control or monitoring pressure. Additionally, in contrast to 
our assumptions and confinement to coalition of two blockholders, it might also be possible that 
coalitions of more than two blockholders can be formed for corporate control purpose.  
Thirdly, even though the economic rationale and correlation analysis are used in the selection of 
instrumental variables, it might still be arguable that they can be weak or have slight relationship 
(negligible effects) with the endogenous variables. The problem of weak instruments should not 
question the validity of the study since the problem is common to every research that uses data 
coming economic situations and firm environments.  
Fourthly, even though 3SLS has done its good job, one might still recommend the use of FIML for the 
estimation of the SEM to strictly handle different types of endogeneity, missing values and 
contemporaneous and spurious correlations. However, this does not question the validity of the 
study since 3SLS, which is handy to handle the problem of endogeneity, contemporaneous and 
spurious correlations, provided intuitive results on control dominance-contestability hypothesis and 
on other variables consistent with the relevant theories and empirical evidence.  
Finally, it might be arguable that the inclusion of DUAL, which takes the value of 0 and 1, as 
dependent variable in the SEM might pose a problem when using 3SLS. However, the variable is 
included since the equation of dominance board structure is deemed important. It might be 
arguable that the procedure is acceptable since the results are almost consistent in the different 
versions of the SEM and there is stability in the SEM estimation.  
To sum up, despite the limitations the empirical evidence noted above suggest that: (1) the control 
of listed corporations is determined by several control factors that have structural system of 
relationships; (2) the SEM and the 3SLS estimation confirms some of the agency theory perspectives, 
the rationale behind the UK Code of Best Practice, and the different sources of endogenous 
relationships among ownership structure, board structure and firm performance; and (3) it would be 
suggestive to consider control contestability when we investigate the effect of any individual control 
force on firm performance. Based on this, the research would suggest that the development of 
appropriate corporate control theory and board structure model in corporate governance are issues 
to be considered by researchers in the academia and by regulators in private or public institutions.  
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CHAPTER   SIX 
6. CONCLUSION 
The PhD research study has investigated the ownership and control structures and their relation 
with firm performance. The short summary of the evidence from the results of the three empirical 
parts of the study and their interpretations are discussed in this section.  
As a prelude to the investigation of the relationship of ownership and control structures and firm 
performance, Chapter Three of the study has made analysis of ownership and control structures 
from the control potential perspectives. The analysis of the state of ownership structure confirms 
previous relevant studies and the data of the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS). The evidence 
confirms that institutional investors are the most important investor categories and the dominant 
owners of the UK listed firms’ shares. The share ownership by insider is found to be very low even 
though they are still ranked as the second major owner category. The results show that all the rest 
of the identifiable blockholder categories own very low proportion of the common shares of the UK 
listed firms. Hence, institutional ownership and insider ownership are found to be the important 
owner categories of the shares of the listed firms.  
Moreover, the different measures of ownership concentration show that the UK major listed firms 
share ownership is still diffused; hence the evidence is consistent to the findings of previous 
researchers, even at the lower threshold of the disclosure rule level (3%) of the UK. Despite the 
ownership dispersion at 3% cut-off level, the analysis of the number of significant blockholders 
categories and their ownership stake show evidence of the existence of multiple large shareholders 
with significant shareholdings that arguably give the incentives and ability to exert control or 
monitoring pressure on the firm. This might indicate the potential for the second-type agency 
conflict in the UK firms.  
The interesting finding from the evidence in the ownership and control structures is the similar 
characteristic features of two general groups of owner categories in the evolution of ownership 
patterns. Firstly, from similar trends ownership patterns, it might imply that insider owners and 
nonfinancial firms’ owners might exhibit similar behavioural characteristics in their investment 
strategy or that they might follow each other in action since the decision makers are also directors. 
This might conform to the suggestion that the UK shareholders follow institutional investors in 
activism. Secondly, external blockholders categories such as institutional investors, family, banks and 
state might have similar investment outlook or might follow each other or especially institutional 
investors, who are better informed than the others, as research literature suggests. Moreover, the 
insight into the similarity of the feature of ownership evolution of insider owners and nonfinancial 
owners might suggest (1) that management of nonfinancial owners that make investment decisions 
might have network relationships with insider owners of the firm in which they invest and might 
follow each other in actions, and (2) that nonfinancial firms that are managed by their respective 
insiders might be as informed as the inside owners of the firm in which they invest.  
Furthermore, the evidence that the first largest blockholder might not be ultimate or sole controller 
of the firm, and that the coalition of the first 5 largest shareholders cannot even attain majority 
control in terms of their aggregate voting power might suggests that individual blockholder might 
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not control the firm solely and impact firm performance; and hence, this might suggest that the 
collective actions of coalitions and the contestability of control in the UK listed firms where multiple 
large shareholders with minority voting powers might still have the incentives and ability to exert 
control or monitoring pressure in the efforts to control the firm by colluding with each other. The 
indicative collective actions and control contestability suggested an interesting research issue that 
this study has undertaken in Chapter Five.  
The insights from the state and evolution of UK share ownership might be as follows. Firstly, as firms 
increase in size and scope of their operations, the financial capacity of individual or family investors 
will be limited and might not be able to supply enough capital to the expansion or undertaking of 
new projects. Hence, other investment vehicles or sources are required to substitute the limited 
resources from individual investors. Moreover, as firms in the public sector undergo privatization 
and more of their shares sold in public, the role of state as owner of firms diminish being replaced by 
other investor types.  
Furthermore, with the development of the innovation of institutions that pool funds of individuals or 
family and other organizations that are investors, the financial capacity to supply equity funds to the 
firm will increase. This development of institutional investors is what has been going on in the 
Western World in the last several decades and it might be suggestive that they are the potential 
force to substitute family or state investors. Since institutional investors are the pool of investors 
from different owner types, namely individuals or families, nonfinancial firms, state, and banks, it 
might be suggestive that ownership of modern listed firms is on the process of attaining collective or 
institutional ownership with the feature of the fundamental private property ownership rights. This 
might be an unavoidable historical development. Even though the UK institutional investors’ stakes 
has been showing decreases especially in the last two decades according to the UK ONS beneficial 
ownership data, it might be suggestive the increase in their ownership in this study might have been 
due to replacement or substitution by their foreign counterparts.  
Finally, even though this study has no data on it, the suggestive insight into the historical 
development and the state of share ownership of institutional investors might be that there will be 
more institutionalization of share ownership with the increase in the innovation of institutions; and 
this might result in the control of firms by institutional investors group that have more national level 
network relations in the UK and that the predominant share ownership will be collective ownership 
of listed firms that might result in the third-order agency conflict between managers of institutional 
investors on the one hand and the other investors in the firm and the clients of institutional 
investors on the other hand. It might be suggestive that this might be an interesting research issue 
that deserves theoretical underpinning and empirical study.  
Part Two of the study has investigated the relationship between ownership structure (blockholder 
categories) and firm performance. The very surprising result on the impact of insider ownership of 
the UK listed firms on performance is that there is positive significant nonlinear relationship in which 
the magnitude of the marginal effect decreases as the polynomial order of the term of insider 
ownership increases. This might indicate evidence of the diminishing marginal profitability 
suggesting that firm performance will increase at a decreasing rate as insider ownership increases. It 
might also be argued that the reduced rate of performance with the different roots of the 
polynomial might indicate the potential for both an incentive and an entrenchment effect, which are 
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supposed to happen at the same time with one outweighing the other after a certain degree of 
ownership level. Hence, it might be suggestive that the reduced rate of performance could be due to 
the increasing impact of the entrenchment effect which reduces the positive benefits from the 
incentive alignment effect. The evidence is consistent with the alignment of interest hypothesis of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and it is inconsistent with the purely alignment-entrenchment or 
alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis and related empirical findings in literature. The 
finding might cast doubts into the use of arbitrary order of polynomials to investigate nonlinear 
relationship as few of the recent researchers have suggested.  
Moreover, the interesting evidence from the result is that like insider ownership, nonfinancial firms’ 
ownership has positive relation with firm performance. The similar impact of INO and NFO on firm 
performance might suggest the similarity of the decisions or actions on firm investments and 
strategy made by directors of the investee company and the directors of nonfinancial owners or 
their network relationships. The evidence supports the similarity of investment strategy or 
behaviour of INO and NFO regarding the trends of ownership overtime as analysed in Chapter Three 
of this Research Thesis.  
Furthermore, the negative relationship between different aggregate outsider ownership and its 
components, namely external blockholder categories (except nonfinancial firms’ owner categories) 
on firm performance might support the second-type of agency conflict and the appropriation 
hypothesis in literature. The evidence raises the question how the blockholders interact and share 
control of the firm, the possibility of coalition of owner types and the possible contestability of 
control in firms and how firm performance is influenced. This issue is investigated in Chapter Five.  
The result of the impact of other internal governance mechanisms (board of directors) and market 
based mechanisms on firm performance show mixed results in terms of consistency with the agency 
perspectives. Only CEO-duality and board size from board structure variables and takeover intensity 
from market based governance mechanisms show the expected association with firm performance 
according to the agency theory and the rationale behind the recommendations of the UK Code of 
Best Practice. However, the proportion of nonexecutive directors, debt financing and stock price 
volatility that show negative relation with performance is in contrast to the agency perspectives. 
This might raise the appropriateness of the usual methodology used in modelling and estimating the 
effects in literature. The suspect of endogeneity relationship from different sources is believed to 
probably cause such surprising result and this is checked in Chapter Five of this research study.  
Part Three investigated possible interaction or behaviour of blockholders in using their ability to 
exert their control power via their individual or group voting rights attached to their cash flow right 
in the perspectives of control dominance and contestability and their impact to firm performance 
using structural equation modelling. The SEM is thought to be appropriate modelling since a one-
equation modelling analysis in Part Two could not incorporate the economically or theoretically 
relevant endogeneity relationship properly and the results on some governance mechanisms, 
namely PNED and TDTA are inconsistent with the agency perspectives.  
The evidence shows that the chosen contestability variables, namely, the second largest blockholder 
(VPC2 though insignificant), the power of the coalition of the ‘ocean’ (SHAPV), and the coalition of 
the second and third largest blockholders (C2C3) have positive impact on firm performance. The fact 
that the magnitude of contestability variables is greater than the dominance variables might suggest 
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that contestability of control is more dominant than control dominance in the UK listed firms. This is 
one of the empirical evidence of the control dominance-contestability hypothesis. Moreover, the 
insignificant positive impact of the first and the second largest blockholders on ROA might indicate 
that there is no high confidence to conclude that they impact firm performance. This might suggest 
that the first and the second largest blockholders might not be capable of exerting enough effective 
control power and control or monitor the firm individually in terms of their voting power and impact 
firm performance. However, the fact that coalitions of multiple blockholders significantly impact firm 
performance might indicate that coalitions of blockholders interact and share power to control the 
UK listed firms and impact performance. From this it is suggestive that first 2 largest blockholders 
might attain effective control power to exert control pressure and affect performance when they 
make coalitions that will increase their voting power.  
The interesting evidence from the SEM estimations is that the proportion of nonexecutive directors 
(PNED), which showed negative association with firm performance in Chapter Four now show 
positive significant impact on firm performance in the different versions of the SEM. This evidence is 
consistent with the agency perspectives and the rationale behind the recommendations of the UK 
Code of Best Practice. Moreover, the result on PNED in the SEM might confirm the endogeneity of 
PNED and its endogenous relationship with firm performance as literature suggests. However, as in 
the previous Chapter CEO-duality shows consistent negative relationship with performance. This 
evidence supports the rationale behind the recommendations of the UK Code regarding board 
leadership. Interestingly, as expected the evidence of significant negative impact of lagged ROA on 
CEO-duality might indicate the dynamic endogeneity relationship between CEO-duality and firm 
performance. It might suggest that the increase in the previous negative trend in performance 
impacts the current choice of board leadership in which there CEO entrenchment diminishes.  
Furthermore, the fact that PNED has greater magnitude of impact than DUAL on firm performance 
and hence the dominance of contestability in the board in impacting firm performance, might 
provide additional evidence on the dominance of contestability in the UK major listed firms. Further 
evidence on the dominance of control contestability over control dominance, hence confirming the 
control dominance-contestability hypothesis, in the UK major listed firms can be observed from the 
comparison of the magnitude of the effects in the reciprocal loop, where the significant effect of 
control contestability is greater than control dominance variables in three versions of the SEM.  
Finally, as in the previous Part, takeover intensity retains its positive impact on ROA, whereas debt 
financing and stock price volatility retained their significant negative impact on ROA consistently 
across the versions of the model. From the evidence, it might be suggestive that external 
governance mechanisms (takeover intensity and debt financing), and stock price volatility are not 
endogenous variables confirming the design of the SEM.  
The evidence on the determinants of board structure variables shows that all of the blockholder 
control (dominance and contestability) factors enhance NEDs’ representation in the board and the 
preference of CEO-duality. This might be the case in the UK where the positive impact of blockholder 
control forces on PNED might also be influenced by the provisions of the UK Code recommendations 
on nonexecutive directors. However, as expected the control dominance variables enhance CEO-
duality, whereas the contestability variables negatively affect CEO-duality. The later implies that in 
firms where multiple blockholders cooperate in the control of the firm, they do not tend to allow 
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CEO duality, to reduce the power any individual can wield within the firm’s control. The evidence 
confirms the empirical validity of the control dominance-contestability hypothesis. Additionally, the 
empirical result of positive impact of the number of blockholders (NBH) on the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors and the negative impact of NBH on the dominance control factors also 
provide evidence of control dominance-contestability hypothesis. The evidence of the enhancement 
of NEDs’ representation and the reduction of control dominance as the number of blockholders 
increases is expected according to the control dominance-contestability hypothesis.  
The fact that takeover intensity negatively impacts both PNED and DUAL might suggest the 
substitution effects of takeover market on board of directors in determining firm performance. 
Moreover, the significant negative impact of debt financing and stock price volatility on CEO-duality 
might indicate the substitution effects of the market mechanisms on CEO-duality in determining firm 
performance. Furthermore, the fact that both board structure variables (PNED and DUAL) show 
significant impact on blockholder control factors, and that the dominance and contestability factor 
variables also significantly impact the board structure variables confirms evidence of reverse-
causality between board structure and ownership structure, and hence the endogenous 
relationships between ownership structure and board of directors.  
On the other hand, the proportion of nonexecutive directors has significant positive impact on both 
control dominance and contestability variables, which might suggest that the UK nonexecutive 
directors might favour both forces to countercheck and counterbalance each other in the control 
configuration. Moreover, the negative significant effect of CEO-duality on both control dominance 
and contestability variables might suggest that the ability of owners to exert control or monitoring in 
the firm diminishes in the presence of CEO-duality that unifies the board leadership and its decision 
making process. This implies that in firms with CEO-Chair duality there is less control by owners 
(perhaps otherwise they wouldn’t have allowed CEO duality Anyhow, the fact that CEO-duality is 
rare and most of the board members are nonexecutive directors in the UK (according to our data) 
might suggest that the UK corporate governance system is mainly characterized by enhancement of 
both control dominance and contestability such that countercheck and counterbalance are assured 
when as PNED increases. Furthermore, the evidence that the control dominance and contestability 
factor variables negatively affect each other confirms the propositions in the theoretical framework. 
Additionally, the results that contestability variables used in the model negatively impact their 
corresponding dominance variables is another evidence of control contestability hypothesis.  
In summary, the empirical study in Chapter Five revealed interesting insightful evidence on the 
relationship among blockholder control factors, board structure, and their impact on firm 
performance using the control dominance-contestability perspective. Among others, there are key 
results that confirm (1) the empirical validity of the control dominance-contestability hypothesis, 
and (2) the endogenous relationships between ownership structure and firm performance, and 
board structure and ownership structure, and board structure and firm performance, thus 
confirming the suggestions in research literature.   
The evidence for the empirical validity of control dominance-contestability is revealed from the 
following results: (1) the negative impact of contestability factor variables on their corresponding 
dominance variables, and the higher magnitude of effect of control contestability variables on 
control dominance variables in the feedback loop; (2) the diminishing of duality as control 
232 
 
contestability ownership variables rise; (3) PNED, which is assumed to be board’s contestability 
variable, has greater magnitude of impact on duality than the reverse effect of DUAL, which is 
assumed as board’s dominance variable; (4) the positive impact of the number of blockholders on 
control contestability variables and the negative impact of the number of blockholders on control 
dominance variables; and (5) the negative impact of control dominance and contestability variables 
on each other confirms the propositions in the theoretical framework of contestability and the 
control dominance-contestability hypothesis.  
The suggestive insights from the evidence on control dominance-contestability hypothesis might be 
the followings. Firstly, the control configuration of the firm in the presence of multiple large 
blockholders might be more efficient in enhancing firm performance if corporate control is modelled 
such that the coalition of blockholders are tolerated or encouraged in the firm so that counter-check 
and counter-balance is achieved in the firm. Secondly, the control configuration might be more 
efficient in enhancing firm performance if corporate board is modelled such that the dominance 
control in the board (DUAL) is counter-checked or counter-balanced by the encouraging 
contestability in the board (PNED) as attempted in the recommendations of the UK Code. Put 
together, the implication is that the encouragement of control dominance and contestability 
simultaneously is required to achieve efficient control configuration in the firm, in which (1) multiple 
blockholders are prevalent, and (2) there is the potential for the second-order agency conflict. 
Hence, the findings in the research bear recommendations for the positive agency theory since the 
insights drawn suggest how things should work or should look like in order to achieve efficient 
control configuration that the maximizes shareholder value.  
One the other hand, the evidence from this study that reveal the empirical validity of endogenous 
relationships are: (1) the positive impact of PNED on firm performance revealed in the SEM might 
confirm joint endogeneity of PNED and the endogenous (reverse causality) relationship between 
board of directors and firm performance; (2) the significant negative impact of lagged ROA on CEO-
duality, thus showing dynamic endogeneity; (3) both board structure variables (PNED and DUAL) 
show significant impact on the blockholder structure variables, thus revealing reverse-causality 
between board of directors and blockholder structure variables; (4) the dominance and 
contestability factor variables significantly impact the board structure variables, thus confirming 
reverse-causality between board structure and ownership structure; and (5) the negative impact of 
takeover intense on both board of directors variables, and the negative impact of debt financing and 
on CEO-duality indicates the substitution effects of the external governance mechanisms on the 
internal governance mechanism (board of directors) in determining firm performance.  
Nevertheless, arguably the study has some limitations of its own as any other research study. Firstly, 
it might be argued that the number of years for the panel might be short to reveal significant 
changes in the evolution of ownership structure. However, the fact that the results using a five years 
panel data shows that the evolution of the ownership of different ownership and control variables 
used is around the mean, thus implying equilibrium state, it is arguable that the time period chosen 
is enough to provide intuitive results. Additionally, the period is chosen so that it is free from major 
shocks and there is health in the economy that in order to avoid any biases.  
Secondly, the study is confined to the UK major listed firms for the periods under review, and this 
might bar its comparability with data from other countries. The undertaking of comparative study, 
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however, is not attempted due to the broadness of the research in terms of the consecutive 
empirical design and it is more than the scope of the study per se the timeframe. It might arguably 
not a problem since the research study followed similar diverse research studies in literature.  
Thirdly, the study falls short of using other higher thresholds for comparisons. The reason for this is 
that the consideration of more thresholds is found to make study more extensive and complicated 
than the required scope; and this study followed many other researchers that used the same cut-off 
level and one threshold. Admittedly, literature shows that different threshold yield different results, 
thus leading to ambiguities. Hence, it is still an important research issue. Therefore, it is 
recommended that the future research should work on the issue of control threshold that would 
give effective or efficient incentives and ability to exert control pressure or to control the firm.  
Fourthly, the three board structure variables selected in this research are admittedly too few to 
include all board characteristics. However, as explained in previously, the attempt made is to select 
the objectively quantifiable variables rather than using dummy variables that create biases in the 
results. The three board variables are arguably the most important and determinant factors for the 
purpose of this study. However, believing that corporate board is an important issue in corporate 
control and life, the Thesis recommends that future research should work out on the determinants 
of the board and on the board characteristics and board structure that enhance firm performance.  
Fifthly, the study has not made piecewise regressions to further check the alignment-entrenchment 
or alignment-entrenchment-alignment hypothesis suggested in literature regarding nonlinear 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, that would not 
arguably create a problem since this research attempted linear regression, and nonlinear regression 
with one-equation inclusion procedure and a stepwise regression of the polynomials of insider 
ownership with different roots. So, the three attempts are enough relative to other published 
researches that used only one procedure. However, the Thesis recommends that future researches 
should further work on the piecewise regression modelling and procedures (the identification of 
standardized ranges of ownership particularly). It also recommends that further research work 
should be done on the modelling of nonlinear insider ownership assumption that contributes a 
break-through in the debates going on. Finally, researchers should also think about an option of 
coming up with new theory or hypotheses regarding the issue.  
Sixthly, it might be arguable that the regression analysis falls short of controlling for the industry and 
year differences. This is considered and accommodated in Chapter Three. Since the fixed-effects 
regression and clustering robust regression are used besides the GEE in Chapter Four, it is arguable 
that enough attempt is made for the scope of the study as other researchers did. As for Chapter Five, 
what is considered in the modelling is already so extensive. Accounting for the sources of differences 
is found to make the study more complex than it is per se its scope. Additionally, attempts are made 
to avoid dummies that can be sources of biases in the regression results as statistical procedures 
suggest. Hence, it is arguable that the research undertook acceptable procedure per se the 
complexity of the control dominance-contestability perspectives.  
Seventhly, it might be arguable that the inclusion of R&D ratio (RNDTS) and Selling, General and 
Administration ratio (SGATS) that contribute a lot to variance in the models might affect the 
specification error of the models and there might also be omitted variables. This is an argument of 
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statistical procedures. On the one hand, it is admitted and recommended that future research 
consider the issue. On the other hand, it is also statistically arguable that the omission of the 
variables that are economically or theoretically relevant to determine the dependent variable from 
model might lead to specification error. The variables are included in the models of Chapter Four 
because they are believed to be not redundant variables. They are included in the models of Chapter 
Five to play the role of instrumental variables since they are believed to be strictly exogenous 
variables within the structural equation frameworks.  
Eighthly, it might be arguable that the inclusion of the regulated firms such as financial firms and 
utility companies in the sample might not be appropriate according to some literature. However, the 
analysis of the state and evolution of ownership structure in Chapter Three shows that much 
difference is not observed when the comparative analysis of regulated and non-regulated firms is 
undertaken. Based on this fact and since we deal with the analysis of the impact of ownership 
structure (where owner types are categorized according to their common behaviours and 
characteristic features, which is common both for regulated or non-regulated firms) on firm 
performance, this study included regulated firms following other published researches in literature.  
Finally, the use of the chosen dominance and contestability control factor variables and models are 
arbitrary and that it is too early to conclude that the findings on control dominance-contestability 
model in this study explain the complete framework of the control overall dominance-contestability 
theory or hypothesis. This is admitted. However, it might be arguable that based on their voting 
power, the first and the second largest blockholders are taken as the vital players in competing for 
control and in forming coalitions with those having the next viable incentives and ability to exert 
control pressure in the hierarchy of ownership stake in the firm. Hence, despite the work’s lack of 
universality, it might be arguable that a reasonable attempt is done to contribute to the debates on 
the way blockholders interact and share power in the firm. The Thesis recommends that the future 
research should work on the further refinement of the limitations on dominance and contestability 
control factor variables and models.  
In summary, the Theses of this empirical research study suggest the followings. Firstly, there is the 
prevalence of multiple significant blockholders in the modern listed firms even when share ownership 
is dispersed. Secondly, in the presence of multiple significant blockholders in the firm, there is a 
likelihood that the second-type agency conflicts between large shareholders and minority 
shareholders exists, and that might be the dominant force that determines the possible control 
configuration even in listed firms with dispersed ownership. Thirdly and finally, the traditional one-
equation modelling and their estimations in the methodology of looking into the relationship of 
separate share ownership categories or accounting for few of the categories might not precisely 
identify (1) the blockholders’ (control forces’) incentives and ability of exerting control over the 
modern corporations, (2) the problem of endogeneity that might arise in the relationships, and (3) 
the way significant multiple blockholders interact and share control of the firms. Hence, the use of 
structural equations modelling and control dominance-contestability perspectives, in which the roles 
of blockholders structure control forces, internal and external governance mechanisms, and the 
problems of endogeneity are accounted for might be appropriate to reveal the control configuration 
of modern listed firms with multiple large blockholders. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A:  
Diagnostic Analyses of OLS Assumptions (Annex to Chapter Four) 
Table 4.6 presents OLS regression of the first model and the second model, where the non-linear 
association of managerial ownership with firm performance accounted for.  
We recall that the data management and analyses made above show that there are problems in 
using parametric techniques to estimate and test the models due to the problems in the data. The F-
tests of the OLS regression model indicate that the fit of the model as a whole is good, which shows 
that there might not be a problem of specification. However, from the very low R-squared statistics 
that vary from 13.67-13.88% and the adjusted R-squared that varies from 12.97-13.30%, it is 
indicative that very low part of the variation in ROA is explained by the included independent 
variables in the model.  This can be the first signal showing that OLS estimators might not be 
efficient and OLS cannot be the appropriate estimation method. Hence, in order to choose the 
appropriate estimation methods, we first make diagnostic analyses of the OLS assumptions so as to 
check whether the NIID assumptions of OLS are met. 
Normality of residuals:  The graphical tests for normality are first checked after OLS 
estimation. The slim sharper peak of the kernel density plot of the residuals with bell-like normal 
density overlaying shows the residuals are not normally distributed. Moreover, the P-P plot, the 
Table 4.6: Nonlinear OLS regressions on ROA, the first and the second model 
(a): The first Model (b): The second Model 
R2 0.1388 0.1374 0.1367  0.1385 0.1372 0.1366 
  
Note: OLS1 is OLS regression when INO is linear; OLS2 is OLS regression when INO is quadratic; OLS3 is when OLS regression 
is cubic. 
As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.  
                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                           
       _cons      9.1716***      9.4138***      9.5237***  
        ino3                                    0.0000*    
        ino2                     0.0010**                  
       roat1      0.2647***      0.2664***      0.2671***  
       sgats     -0.0166***     -0.0166***     -0.0165***  
        fats     -0.0025        -0.0023        -0.0021     
       rndts      0.0013***      0.0013***      0.0013***  
         age      0.0046         0.0043         0.0040     
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000*       -0.0000*    
        pvol     -0.0891***     -0.0847***     -0.0828***  
        tdta     -0.0206*       -0.0210*       -0.0212*    
    tointens      7.7429**       7.8793**       8.0178**   
       bsize      0.0084        -0.0037        -0.0091     
        dual     -2.5464***     -2.5601***     -2.5606***  
        pned     -2.5061**      -2.6803**      -2.7564**   
        govo      0.0230         0.0215         0.0214     
       banko      0.0142         0.0099         0.0076     
        famo     -0.0265        -0.0200        -0.0171     
         nfo     -0.0050        -0.0054        -0.0056     
       insto     -0.0032        -0.0046        -0.0056     
         ino      0.0607***                                
                                                           
    Variable       OLS1           OLS2           OLS3      
                                                           
OLS on ROA
                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                           
       _cons      9.0976***      9.3400***      9.4533***  
        ino3                                    0.0000*    
        ino2                     0.0010**                  
       roat1      0.2647***      0.2663***      0.2670***  
       sgats     -0.0165***     -0.0165***     -0.0165***  
        fats     -0.0027        -0.0025        -0.0023     
       rndts      0.0013***      0.0013***      0.0013***  
         age      0.0042         0.0040         0.0038     
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000*       -0.0000*    
        pvol     -0.0877***     -0.0841***     -0.0824***  
        tdta     -0.0205*       -0.0209*       -0.0212*    
    tointens      7.5307**       7.7145**       7.8798**   
       bsize      0.0099        -0.0017        -0.0070     
        dual     -2.5713***     -2.5773***     -2.5738***  
        pned     -2.3552*       -2.5581**      -2.6511**   
        outo     -0.0040        -0.0046        -0.0052     
         ino      0.0571***                                
                                                           
    Variable       OLS1           OLS2           OLS3      
                                                           
OLS on ROA
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standard normal probability (P-P) plot to check that the residuals are fitted evenly around the 
regression line, is sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of the data indicates non-normality 
of residuals.  
Furthermore, Q-Q plot of quantile of residuals against the quantile of a normal distribution is also 
found to be sensitive to non-normality near the 2 ends or tails of the distribution, thus indicating 
non-normality. On the other hand, the numerical tests for normality of the residuals by the Shapiro-
Wilk W test for the null hypothesis of no normal distribution yields the p-value, which is significant. 
This indicates that we have to accept the null hypothesis, i.e., non-normality of residuals.  
Homoscedasticity of Residuals:  In the graphical test of heteroscedasticity the plot of 
residuals against the fitted values with centring at y equal to zero show that the data points exhibit 
narrowness and scattered patterns at both of the ends, indicating non-constant variance or 
heteroscedasticity. Moreover, two alternative numerical tests of heteroscedasticity, White’s test and 
Breusch-Pagan test, for the null hypothesis of homogeneous variances show different results. The 
White test shows significant p-value, indicating constant variance, whereas the Breusch-Pagan test 
shows insignificant p-value for chi-square, thus indicating non-constant variance or 
heteroscedasticity. Hence, combining the graphical plots with numerical tests and considering the 
nature of panel data, the sounding judgment is that the residuals are heteroscedastic.  
Multicollinearity:  As a first step in checking for multicollinearity between the independent 
variables, Pearson’s pair-wise correlation result is presented as table 4.7.  
It can be observed from the table that almost all of the correlations between pairs of the variables 
are less than 0.60, which shows that they have no problem of multicollinearity, except the 0.97 
correlation between RNDTS and SGATS, which indicates they have very strong multicollinearity. The 
result shows that RNDTS and SGATS might create problem in model specification statistically. 
However, there is an economic rationale that they are not a function to each other since DataStream 
Table 4.7: Pair-wise Pearson correlation of independent variables 
 
  ino insto nfo famo banko govo pned dual bsize tointens tdta pvol ta age rndts fats sgats 
ino 1.00 
insto -0.11 1.00 
               nfo 0.00 -0.15 1.00 
famo 0.17 -0.09 -0.02 1.00 
             banko -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 1.00 
govo -0.05 0.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 1.00 
           pned -0.15 0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.04 0.12 1.00 
dual -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.13 0.60 1.00 
         bsize -0.05 -0.16 0.09 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 -0.34 -0.44 1.00 
        tointens 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.26 -0.24 0.16 1.00 
tdta -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.25 0.18 0.15 1.00 
      pvol 0.16 0.15 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.27 -0.30 0.02 0.12 -0.05 1.00 
ta -0.04 -0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.31 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 1.00 
    age -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.16 0.01 1.00 
rndts -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 
  fats 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.21 1.00 
sgats -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.97 0.22 1.00 
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calculates SGATS excluding RNDTS. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to make more checks on 
multicollinearity in the model.  
In order to test for multicollinearity in the residuals, assessment of the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
is made to check for the level of multicollinearity. The VIF, which leads us to the tolerance level of 
multicollinearity, 1/VIF, of the model (table 4.8) shows a mean VIF of 9.74. The overall tolerance 
value will thus be 0.10267 (= 1/9.74), which is a bit more than 0.10. This shows that there is a 
multicollinearity problem.   
Moreover, the output shows that the VIF of SGATS and RNDTS are greater than 10, thus confirming 
the result of Pearson’s pair-wise correlation matrix (table 4.7). As a rule of thumb, such variables 
merit further investigation. It might indicate that they might be a linear combination of other 
variables. In the second part of table 4.8 the VIF has improved a lot (1.23) after omitting SGATS and 
RNDTS and running the OLS regression and then executing VIF. However, in our panel data, where 
there are other assumptions not met, it is chosen not to omit one of the two variables from the 
model before trying to estimate using other methods.  
Moreover, another check of multicollinearity made (table 4.9) shows that despite the lower VIF of 
9.54, it can be observed that the VIF for RNDTS and SGATS and an additional variable are still too 
high. The conditional number, which is commonly used as index of global instability of the regression 
coefficients show a figure of 33.4746, where the value 10 or more is an indication of instability of the 
coefficients due to the possible impact of multicollinearity problem, mainly contributed by RNDTS 
and SGATS. The same results are observed estimating and also testing our second model. However, 
since (1) we know that the data on RNDTS and SGATS that measure different items are not function 
of each other, (2) the tolerance from the VIF is not far away from 10 in table 4.8, and (3) since the 
omission of one of the variables from the equations might create the problem of omitted variables 
(omitted variables bias), it is decided to retain them in the model.  
Table 4.8:  Variance inflation factor, VIF, and tolerance using STATA 
(a) Output of VIF check with all involved 
variables 
(b) Output after omitting the SGATS and RNDTS variables with 
very high VIF 
 
    Mean VIF        9.74
                                    
       banko        1.04    0.962817
        govo        1.06    0.940394
         age        1.07    0.935205
         nfo        1.07    0.933497
        famo        1.09    0.920797
       roat1        1.10    0.911544
          ta        1.12    0.891494
         ino        1.13    0.886909
    tointens        1.14    0.879289
        tdta        1.18    0.846084
       insto        1.20    0.834963
        pvol        1.28    0.780837
       bsize        1.50    0.668675
        fats        1.59    0.629634
        pned        1.76    0.569470
        dual        1.99    0.502725
       rndts       76.83    0.013016
       sgats       78.27    0.012776
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
    Mean VIF        1.23
                                    
       banko        1.04    0.962953
        fats        1.04    0.962346
        govo        1.06    0.940427
         age        1.07    0.936236
         nfo        1.07    0.933742
       roat1        1.08    0.923770
        famo        1.08    0.922846
          ta        1.12    0.892092
         ino        1.13    0.887959
    tointens        1.14    0.879386
        tdta        1.16    0.863537
       insto        1.19    0.839610
        pvol        1.28    0.782821
       bsize        1.49    0.669521
        pned        1.75    0.570234
        dual        1.97    0.506676
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
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Linearity:  The plotting the standardized residuals against each predictor variable in the model to 
check for linearity between the predictors and the response variable show that they show some 
patterns of linearity. However, it is difficult to establish the linearity by using plots and there is also a 
room for non-linearity. For instance, we have a good theoretical reason to believe that INO might 
not be linearly correlated with performance.  
Independence of errors:  In the panel data values that comes from the same variable 
overtime and when there can be some form of homogeneity among the elements in a group, it is 
more likely that the errors of different observations can be correlated (autocorrelation of errors) 
with the adjacent time or group than those separated in time or in heterogeneity. The Durbin-
Watson test for autocorrelation made shows that the observed value of DW statistics here is 1.145, 
which is less than 2, the midpoint of the range of the statistics that is from 0 to 4. The DW lower and 
the upper critical values for the statistic are 1.576 and 1.967 respectively. The DW statistics, 1.145, 
falls below the lower dw statistic, 1.576, thus, showing the evidence of positive autocorrelation at 
5% significant level.  
Model specification test:  The last diagnostic test on the model is to ensure whether the 
appropriate variables are included and/ or omitted from the model. This is important since (1) if one 
or more of the relevant variables are omitted, the common variance they share with the rest in the 
model may be wrongly attributed to the included variables, and the error term is inflated, and (2) if 
the irrelevant variables are included, the common variance they share with the rest in the model 
would wrongly be attributed to the irrelevant. The model specification problems or errors would 
affect the estimated regression coefficients substantially, and it is difficult to know the exact 
influence contributed by a predictor variable on the dependent variable.   
Table 4.9: Index of global instability from STATA 
 
  Mean VIF      9.56
----------------------------------------------------
     roat1      1.10    1.05    0.9117      0.0883
     sgats     77.18    8.79    0.0130      0.9870
      fats      1.43    1.20    0.7000      0.3000
     rndts     74.78    8.65    0.0134      0.9866
       age      1.07    1.03    0.9353      0.0647
        ta      1.14    1.07    0.8802      0.1198
      pvol      1.28    1.13    0.7797      0.2203
      tdta      1.17    1.08    0.8582      0.1418
  tointens      1.14    1.07    0.8794      0.1206
     bsize      1.51    1.23    0.6630      0.3370
      dual      1.99    1.41    0.5018      0.4982
      pned      1.75    1.32    0.5707      0.4293
      govo      1.06    1.03    0.9413      0.0587
     banko      1.04    1.02    0.9639      0.0361
      famo      1.08    1.04    0.9233      0.0767
       nfo      1.07    1.03    0.9335      0.0665
     insto      1.20    1.09    0.8342      0.1658
       ino      1.13    1.06    0.8876      0.1124
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
 Condition Number        33.4746 
---------------------------------
    19     0.0066         33.4746
    18     0.0130         23.8343
    17     0.0642         10.7110
    16     0.0919          8.9487
    15     0.1847          6.3130
    14     0.2999          4.9543
    13     0.3563          4.5454
    12     0.4354          4.1119
    11     0.6089          3.4768
    10     0.6385          3.3953
    9     0.7448          3.1438
    8     0.7789          3.0742
    7     0.8250          2.9870
    6     0.9439          2.7925
    5     0.9675          2.7582
    4     1.0961          2.5915
    3     1.2433          2.4332
    2     2.3404          1.7735
    1     7.3609          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0018
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 19,  2228) =  1.145042
Number of gaps in sample:  663
. dwstat
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One of the methods of detecting specification errors is by using the predicted values and the square 
of the predicted values and regress them on the dependent variable as predictors and check their 
significance. The premise is that when the regression model is properly specified, there should not 
be any additional predictor variables that are significant. The post estimation linktest (table 4.10, 
Panel A) shows that the predicted value variables (_hat) is significant, thus indicating that there is no 
specification error. Additionally, the square of the predicted values (_hatsq), which is expected to be 
insignificant (0.133) for correct specification, have no explanatory power. Hence, the linktest in 
which the expected significance of _hat is significant and _hatsq is insignificant reveals that our first 
model is specified correctly, and there is no omitted variable.  
The other specification test, called the Ramsey RESET test (table 4.10, Panel B), is another test for 
omitted variables. It creates new variables based on the predictors and refits the model using the 
new variables and test if any of them would be significant. In STATA, the ovtest command (a post-
estimation command) executes this test. The test, as it can be seen below, shows that the F-test is 
significant to reject the null hypothesis of no omitted variables. This indicates that there is 
specification error, thus, omitted variables.  
 
Finally, even though the results of the two tests used lead us to two opposite conclusions, we 
assume that there might be omitted variables since there can be several other factors that can affect 
firm performance. This is what the R-squared statistics suggest. Adding more predictors into the 
model might improve the R-squared. However, this is not an option since we have already many 
predictors and the addition of more variables in the model affects the degrees of freedom.  
  
Table 4.10: Linktest and Ramsey RESET test for model specification using STATA 
Panel A: Linktest for model specification, STAT 
roa Coef. t P>t 
_hat 0.9407 14.28 0 
_hatsq 0.0071 1.5 0.133 
_cons 0.0135 0.04 0.97 
Note: The goodness-of-fit statistics are: N = 2228; F(2,2225) = 180.66; Prob>F = 0.0000; R2 = 0.1397; and Adjusted R2 = 
0.1389. 
Panel B: Ramsey RESET test, STAT 
 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
                F(3, 2206) =     10.24
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of roa
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APPENDIX B:  
Regression Results in the Primary Analysis (Annex to Chapter Four) 
  
Table 4.17: Regressions on ROA and ROE using OLS, White’s sandwich, IWLS, and clustering robust 
estimations on the second model 
R2 0.1385 0.1385 0.1385 - 0.0804 0.0804 0.0804 - 
Note:    As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.  
OLS is ordinary least squares estimation where linear assumption of INO is used; RobWhite is White’s sandwich 
robust estimation; RobCluster is cluster robust estimation that uses industry as a factor; and RobIWLS is the robust 
regression that uses iterated weighted least squares method.  
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons      9.0976***      9.0976***      9.0976***      8.2007***  
       roat1      0.2647***      0.2647***      0.2647***      0.3163***  
       sgats     -0.0165***     -0.0165***     -0.0165        -0.0057***  
        fats     -0.0027        -0.0027        -0.0027        -0.0026     
       rndts      0.0013***      0.0013***      0.0013        -0.0136***  
         age      0.0042         0.0042         0.0042         0.0032     
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000**      -0.0000*       -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.0877***     -0.0877***     -0.0877        -0.0355***  
        tdta     -0.0205*       -0.0205*       -0.0205        -0.0033     
    tointens      7.5307**       7.5307**       7.5307*        3.1588*    
       bsize      0.0099         0.0099         0.0099        -0.0575*    
        dual     -2.5713***     -2.5713***     -2.5713***     -2.4755***  
        pned     -2.3552*       -2.3552**      -2.3552        -2.8397***  
        outo     -0.0040        -0.0040        -0.0040        -0.0149***  
         ino      0.0571***      0.0571***      0.0571**       0.0201**   
                                                                          
    Variable       OLS          RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS-Robust estimates on ROA
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     25.6049***     25.6049***     25.6049**      20.4451***  
       roet1      0.1681***      0.1681***      0.1681***      0.2253***  
       sgats     -0.0258        -0.0258***     -0.0258*       -0.0145***  
        fats     -0.0438**      -0.0438***     -0.0438**      -0.0102*    
       rndts      0.0023         0.0023***      0.0023*       -0.0194***  
         age     -0.0339        -0.0339*       -0.0339        -0.0075     
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000**      -0.0000         0.0000     
        pvol     -0.2987***     -0.2987***     -0.2987*       -0.0802***  
        tdta      0.0233         0.0233         0.0233        -0.0230     
    tointens      2.7897         2.7897         2.7897        -4.9275     
       bsize      0.8791**       0.8791         0.8791         0.0773     
        dual     -7.5354***     -7.5354***     -7.5354**      -7.7988***  
        pned     -9.5513        -9.5513**      -9.5513        -6.8138***  
        outo     -0.0500        -0.0500        -0.0500        -0.0453***  
         ino      0.0873         0.0873         0.0873         0.0204     
                                                                          
    Variable       OLS          RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS-Robust estimates on ROE
Table 4.18: Regressions on MTBV and PER using OLS, White’s sandwich, IWLS, and clustering robust 
estimations on the second model 
R2 0.0253 0.0253 0.0253 - 0.0529 0.0529 0.0529 - 
Note:    As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
OLS is ordinary least squares estimation where linear assumption of INO is used; RobWhite is White’s sandwich 
robust estimation; RobCluster is cluster robust estimation that uses industry as a factor; and RobIWLS is the robust 
regression that uses iterated weighted least squares method.  
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     14.5276        14.5276        14.5276         2.1451***  
      mtbvt1      0.0098         0.0098         0.0098         0.0064***  
       sgats     -0.0129        -0.0129        -0.0129        -0.0004     
        fats      0.0062         0.0062         0.0062        -0.0023***  
       rndts      0.0029         0.0029***      0.0029*        0.0007***  
         age     -0.0095        -0.0095        -0.0095         0.0002     
          ta      0.0000         0.0000         0.0000        -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.2588*       -0.2588        -0.2588         0.0122***  
        tdta     -0.1486*       -0.1486        -0.1486         0.0004     
    tointens     16.0625        16.0625        16.0625        -0.2444     
       bsize     -0.0418        -0.0418        -0.0418         0.0253***  
        dual      0.2278         0.2278         0.2278        -0.9325***  
        pned     -8.8351        -8.8351        -8.8351        -0.6023***  
        outo      0.0450         0.0450         0.0450        -0.0032***  
         ino      0.0662         0.0662         0.0662         0.0062**   
                                                                          
    Variable       OLS          RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS-Robust estimates on MTBV
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons    -14.6809       -14.6809       -14.6809         7.1689***  
       pert1      0.2674***      0.2674**       0.2674*        0.7558***  
       sgats      0.4588*        0.4588         0.4588***      0.0277***  
        fats     -0.0125        -0.0125        -0.0125         0.0120**   
       rndts     -0.6833        -0.6833        -0.6833        -0.0793*    
         age     -0.2524        -0.2524        -0.2524         0.0018     
          ta     -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000     
        pvol      0.3509         0.3509         0.3509        -0.0789***  
        tdta      0.0375         0.0375         0.0375        -0.0096     
    tointens    -78.2725       -78.2725**     -78.2725***      0.2800     
       bsize     -1.0812        -1.0812        -1.0812        -0.0537     
        dual     46.0523**      46.0523***     46.0523***      4.2341***  
        pned     81.4848*       81.4848**      81.4848**       0.0871     
        outo     -0.1533        -0.1533        -0.1533        -0.0051     
         ino     -0.2518        -0.2518        -0.2518**       0.0064     
                                                                          
    Variable       OLS          RobWhite      RobCluster      RobIWLS     
                                                                          
OLS-Robust estimates on PER
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Table 4 .19: IWLS regressions on ROA, MTBV, ROE and ROE using IWLS robust estimations on the second 
model  
 
R- squar ed - -  -   -   
Note:     As indicated in the legend: *  indicates s ignificance at 10% level; ** indicates si gnificance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance   at 1% level.    
R 2  is not reported  f or RobI WLS .   
                                       
legend:
 
*
 
p<.1;
 
**
 
p<.05;
 
***
 
p<.01                                                                          
       
_cons
      
8.2007***
      
2.1451***
     
20.4451***
      
7.1689***
  
       
pert1
                                                   
0.7558***
  
       
roet1
                                    
0.2253***
                 
      
mtbvt1
                     
0.0064***
                                
       
roat1
      
0.3163***
                                               
       
sgats
     
-0.0057***
     
-0.0004
        
-0.0145***
      
0.0277***
  
        
fats
     
-0.0026
        
-0.0023***
     
-0.0102*
        
0.0120**
   
       
rndts
     
-0.0136***
      
0.0007***
     
-0.0194***
     
-0.0793*
    
         
age
      
0.0032
         
0.0002
        
-0.0075
         
0.0018
     
          
ta
     
-0.0000***
     
-0.0000***
      
0.0000
        
-0.0000
     
        
pvol
     
-0.0355***
      
0.0122***
     
-0.0802***
     
-0.0789***
  
        
tdta
     
-0.0033
         
0.0004
        
-0.0230
        
-0.0096
     
    
tointens
      
3.1588*
       
-0.2444
        
-4.9275
         
0.2800
     
       
bsize
     
-0.0575*
        
0.0253***
      
0.0773
        
-0.0537
     
        
dual
     
-2.4755***
     
-0.9325***
     
-7.7988***
      
4.2341***
  
        
pned
     
-2.8397***
     
-0.6023***
     
-6.8138***
      
0.0871
     
        
outo
     
-0.0149***
     
-0.0032***
     
-0.0453***
     
-0.0051
     
         
ino
      
0.0201**
       
0.0062**
       
0.0204
         
0.0064
     
                                                                          
    
Variable
       
ROA
            
MTBV
           
ROE
            
PER
       
                                                                          
IWLS
 
robust
 
estimates
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Appendix C:  
Regression Results in the Sensitivity or Consistency Analysis Annex 
to Chapter Four) 
 
R-squared 0.1635 0.1399   0.1058   - 
Note:    YearFE is fixed effect regression for time differences; IndustFE is fixed regression for industry differences; Quant50 
is median regression; and YearGEE is general equations estimation regression taking year as categorizing factor. 
 As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.  
 
Table 4.22: Regression with nonlinear assumption of insider ownership in one-equation setting on ROA using 
median, fixed-effects and GEE estimations on the first model 
                                        legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons      8.0451***      8.1647***      9.4671***      8.3046**   
       roat1      0.3417***      0.2640***      0.2455***      0.2641*    
       sgats     -0.0091***     -0.0170***     -0.0149***     -0.0169***  
        fats     -0.0035**      -0.0030         0.0030        -0.0029     
       rndts      0.0008***      0.0014***      0.0012***      0.0014***  
         age      0.0045**       0.0055         0.0019         0.0054*    
          ta     -0.0000***     -0.0000*       -0.0000        -0.0000*    
        pvol     -0.0391***     -0.0829***     -0.1284***     -0.0847     
        tdta     -0.0072*       -0.0197*       -0.0263**      -0.0198     
    tointens      4.2419***      9.4925**       3.0509         9.1501     
       bsize     -0.1056***      0.0419         0.0248         0.0366     
        dual     -3.0812***     -2.3635***     -1.0193        -2.3983***  
        pned     -2.2341***     -2.2641*       -1.4764        -2.2800**   
        govo     -0.0290         0.0051        -0.0021         0.0090     
       banko     -0.0302**       0.0356         0.0253         0.0317     
        famo     -0.0091        -0.0247        -0.0157        -0.0258     
         nfo      0.0028        -0.0252        -0.0113        -0.0211     
       insto     -0.0059         0.0022        -0.0007         0.0012     
        ino3      0.0000         0.0000         0.0000         0.0000     
        ino2     -0.0012        -0.0022        -0.0044        -0.0027     
         ino      0.0248         0.1172         0.1684*        0.1278     
                                                                          
    Variable     Quant50         YearFE        IndustFE       Year_GEE    
                                                                          
ROA
270 
 
  
Table 4.26: Regressions on ROA, ROE, MTBV, and PER using YearFE, IndustFE, Quant50, and YearGEE 
estimations of the second model 
Panel A: Regressions on ROA and ROE 
R2 0.1625 0.1385 0.1045 - 
 
 
R2 0.1588 0.0808   0.0642 - 
 
 
 
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons      8.4763***      9.7022***      7.8899***      8.5761***  
       roat1      0.2649***      0.2471***      0.3433***      0.2649*    
       sgats     -0.0169***     -0.0150***     -0.0104***     -0.0168***  
        fats     -0.0031         0.0028        -0.0031**      -0.0030     
       rndts      0.0014***      0.0012***      0.0009***      0.0013***  
         age      0.0050         0.0018         0.0040**       0.0049*    
          ta     -0.0000*       -0.0000        -0.0000***     -0.0000     
        pvol     -0.0802***     -0.1251***     -0.0393***     -0.0817     
        tdta     -0.0193*       -0.0262**      -0.0056        -0.0195     
    tointens      8.8582**       2.6794         3.6104***      8.5790     
       bsize      0.0244         0.0121        -0.0940***      0.0213     
        dual     -2.4640***     -1.0978*       -3.0932***     -2.4872***  
        pned     -2.2222*       -1.5545        -2.0614***     -2.2444**   
        outo     -0.0025        -0.0014        -0.0076**      -0.0028     
         ino      0.0542***      0.0538***      0.0248***      0.0548***  
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
ROA
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     24.8556***     24.9195***     19.5630***     25.2810***  
       roet1      0.1650***      0.1603***      0.2222***      0.1669     
       sgats     -0.0247        -0.0217        -0.0167***     -0.0254***  
        fats     -0.0455**      -0.0244        -0.0278***     -0.0446     
       rndts      0.0022         0.0019         0.0016***      0.0023***  
         age     -0.0297        -0.0465*       -0.0024        -0.0322***  
          ta     -0.0000**      -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000***  
        pvol     -0.2658***     -0.4192***     -0.0946***     -0.2855***  
        tdta      0.0209         0.0208        -0.0209***      0.0224     
    tointens     11.2247        -6.7507        -3.9713*        6.0390     
       bsize      1.0092***      1.0066***      0.0788*        0.9288**   
        dual     -6.0050**      -1.4956        -9.4844***     -6.9408*    
        pned    -12.4666**      -6.0780        -5.7339***    -10.6819***  
        outo     -0.0614        -0.0427        -0.0245***     -0.0544     
         ino      0.0722         0.0696         0.0394***      0.0812*    
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
ROE
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Panel B: Regressions on MTBV and PER 
R2 0.1013 0.0256  0.0258 - 
 
 
R2 0.1372 0.0524  0.0418 - 
 
 
Note:   YearFE is fixed effect regression for time differences; IndustFE is fixed regression for industry differences; Quant5 is 
median regression; and YearGEE is general equations estimation regression taking year as categorizing factor. 
 As indicated in the legend: * indicates significance at 10% level; ** indicates significance at 5% level; *** indicates 
significance at 1% level.   
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons     12.9098        17.1582         2.1958***     15.0218     
      mtbvt1      0.0098         0.0077         0.0062***      0.0098     
       sgats     -0.0114        -0.0081        -0.0002        -0.0132     
        fats      0.0057         0.0051        -0.0034***      0.0063     
       rndts      0.0028         0.0025         0.0020***      0.0029***  
         age     -0.0063        -0.0137        -0.0002        -0.0103     
          ta      0.0000         0.0000        -0.0000***      0.0000     
        pvol     -0.2231        -0.2690*        0.0068***     -0.2677     
        tdta     -0.1522*       -0.1475*       -0.0003        -0.1479     
    tointens     28.4184         7.4274        -0.1331        12.9824     
       bsize      0.1393        -0.1844         0.0231***     -0.0865     
        dual      2.0465        -0.6660        -1.1784***     -0.2080     
        pned    -11.7680        -9.2665        -0.3709***     -8.1712     
        outo      0.0347         0.0464        -0.0013**       0.0473     
         ino      0.0522         0.0476         0.0048***      0.0696     
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
MTBV
                                       legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
                                                                          
       _cons    -10.5785       -14.1254         8.3881***    -23.8542     
       pert1      0.2670***      0.2671***      0.3946***      0.2675*    
       sgats      0.4756*        0.4561*        0.0456***      0.4284     
        fats     -0.0012        -0.0542         0.0204***     -0.0484     
       rndts     -0.7048        -0.2953         0.0462        -0.6830     
         age     -0.2554        -0.2572         0.0014        -0.2306     
          ta     -0.0000        -0.0000        -0.0000**      -0.0000     
        pvol      0.3541         0.5239        -0.0032         0.3953     
        tdta      0.0298         0.0894        -0.0251***      0.0440     
    tointens    -79.3909       -62.8189        -4.4859       -63.2596     
       bsize     -0.9879        -1.3753        -0.0354        -1.1342     
        dual     47.9509**      38.0787        11.7625***     44.4075***  
        pned     75.1036*       77.8871*        3.6879***     89.4241***  
        outo     -0.1947        -0.1587         0.0079        -0.0899     
         ino     -0.2451        -0.2535        -0.0083        -0.3018     
                                                                          
    Variable      YearFE        IndustFE       Quant50        YearGEE     
                                                                          
PER
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APPENDIX D: Annex to Chapter Five 
Diagnostic Analyses of OLS Assumptions (Annex to Chapter Five)  
5.5.5.1 OLS Regression Analysis 
Table 5.6 presents the OLS regression of the explanatory variables on ROA for the VPC1-VPC2 
version of the model. According to the table, VPC2 has significant negative relationship with ROA. 
Even though not presented here, the OLS results of TDPI-SHAPV and C1C4-C2C3 confirm the same 
fact. Hence, the OLS regressions are inconsistent with confirming Lehman and Weidgand (2000) and 
Laevene and Levine (2008) and they do not support control contestability hypothesis. This questions 
the use of OLS regression method and one-equation model in revealing the control dominance-
contestability in corporate control.  
Moreover, considering the general fit of the versions of the model, the R2 of the four versions of the 
model are in the range of 0.1581 and 0.1601. The result of the OLS regression presented in the table 
below shows that R-squared is very low, and that only 16% of the variation in ROA are explained by 
the predictors, indicating that there might be omitted variables or correlations among the predictors 
or dynamic endogeneity problems. Finally, the simultaneous OLS multiple regressions of the five 
equation might not be free from the same shortcomings stated above. Hence, based on the 
arguments made above, it is indicative that OLS does not give us consistent unbaised estimators, and 
it would be important to make post estimation assumption checks or diagnostic analysis before 
deciding on the appropriate estimation method to be used for the SEM in this study.  
  
Table 5.6: OLS regression of control factors impact on ROA, regarding the VPC1-VPC2 version of the Model 
roa Coef. t P>t 
pned -2.175 -1.910 0.056 
dual -3.496 -6.170 0.000 
vpc1 -0.040 -0.970 0.330 
vpc2 -0.147 -2.240 0.025 
abho 0.074 1.970 0.049 
nbh -0.405 -2.220 0.026 
divps 1.040 1.700 0.089 
fcfps 0.341 1.210 0.227 
invincr 0.000 -1.790 0.073 
tointens 6.712 1.870 0.062 
tdta -0.027 -2.530 0.011 
pvol -0.066 -3.180 0.001 
eqto 0.380 1.850 0.065 
roat1 0.236 11.690 0.000 
_cons 9.738 7.760 0.000 
Note: The goodness-of-fit statistic are: N = 1819; F(2, 1804) = 24.57; Prob>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.1601; 
Adjusted R-squared = 0. 0.1536  
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5.5.5.2 Diagnostic Analysis 
Tests for Normality:  The kernel density distribution of the (kdensity r, normal command of 
STATA) in figure 5.3 show that the distribution of the residuals is not normal since the kernel density 
is more peaked than the normal density. Additonally, the quartile plots (P-Plot and Q-plot, using the 
STATA commands  pnorm r  and qnorm r) show that there is sensitivity of the quartiles at both tails 
of the distribution, indicating non-normality. Hence, the graphical tests for normality show non-
normality of the distribution of the residuals.  
Fig. 5.3: Graphical tests for normality 
kdensity r, normal 
 
qnorm r 
 
 
Moreover, two numerical tests of normality are made. The first method uses the identification of the 
level of outliers to determine normality (table 5.7, Panel A). A programme written by Lawrence C 
Hamilton, Univeristy of New Hampshire, is downloaded using the findit iqr command and the the 
test is carried out using the STATA iqr r command. The result show that there are mild outliers are 
common in any data and are tolerable and are not of great concern.From the result, it is indicative 
that there are 2 sever outliers (1 low and 1 high), and that they accouunt for only an aggregate 0.1% 
of the observations. The test confirms that there are severe outliers, and hence, that normality 
assumption of residuals is violated.  
The other numerical diagnostic method used to test normality is the Shapiro-Wilk W test for 
normality. Considering the assumption of the W test (see table 5.7, Panel B) that residuals are not 
normally distributed as a null hypothesis, the result (using STATA swilk r command) indicate that the 
residuals are not normally distributed since we accept the null hypothesis of non-normality. This test 
show that the NIID assumption of OLS regression is violated.  
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Table 5.7: STATA test for the identification of outliers and the determination of normality 
Panel A: Interquartile range (IQR) test 
Panel B: W test 
 
Test for Homocedasticity of the Residuals:  Both graphical and numerical methods are used 
to check for the homoscedasticity of the residuals. The graphical plot used in figure 5.4, Panel A, 
(produced by STATA rvfplot, yline(0) command) below seem to show that the variances are not 
homogeneous at both ends or tails. However, the tests for heteroscedasticity (White’s test in IM-
Test and the Breusch-Pagan Test, see table 5.8) that assumes variances are homoscedastic as null 
hypothesis, indicate that there is significant evidence to accept the null hypothesis from the higher 
p-values for the Chi-squared statistics. Hence, the variances of the residuals are homoscedastic, 
indicating that one of the NIID assumption is fulfilled and no worry for heteroscedasticity.  
Fig. 5.4: Graphical test of heteroscedasticity 
.rvfplot, yline(0) 
 
Table 5.8: Numerical test of heteroscedasticity 
a) IM-Test, includes White’s test of heteroscedasticity 
b) Breusch-Pagan Test of heteroscedasticity 
 
  
                           % severe outliers   0.05%       0.05%
                           # severe outliers   1           1
                                outer fences    -10.3       22.51
                           % mild outliers     0.71%       0.16%
                           # mild outliers     13          3
                                inner fences   -3.274       15.47
                                               -------------------
                                               low         high
10 trim=  6.394
 median=  6.828    pseudo std.dev.=  3.474        (IQR=  4.687)
   mean=  6.367           std.dev.=  3.321          (n= 1839)
. iqr r
           r     1839    0.95789     46.266     9.724    0.00000
                                                                
    Variable      Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z
                   Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
. swilk r
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Fitted values
                                                   
               Total       217.06    133    0.0000
                                                   
            Kurtosis         9.97      1    0.0016
            Skewness         7.89     14    0.8952
  Heteroskedasticity       199.20    118    0.0000
                                                   
              Source         chi2     df      p
                                                   
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
. estat imtest
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0000
         chi2(1)      =    22.73
         Variables: fitted values of roa
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedastic
. estat hettest
275 
 
Tests for Independence (Autocorrelation):  Since the data is collected on the same variable 
over different time period and there might be similarities of subjects (firms) across industries, it is 
possible that the errors associated with one observation are correlated with the errors of any other 
observations. Since we use a panel data, we need to check for autocorrelation using Durbin-Watson 
test (dwstat command of STATA). The STATA output of Durbin-Watson test (table 5.9) show that the 
dw-statistic with 14 degrees of freedom (df) and 1840 observations (T) is 1.1429778. On the DW 
scale this lies to the left far below 2. The critical points lower dw (dl) and upper dw (du) for the last 
available degrees of freedom (df) and T on statistical table (14 and 1840 respectively) are 1.90941 
and 1.93772 respectively. Hence, the dw-statistic is less than dl, thus, showing that we reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation. Since the dw-statistic falls between 0 and dl (table 5.9, 
Panel B) we have evidence that there is positive serial correlation at 5% significance level. Hence, the 
assumption of independence of residuals of the OLS is violated.  
 
Moreover, the checks made by using the graphical method for checking autocorrelation from STATA 
using the scatter r that plots the fitted values on the independent variables show that the residuals 
are not independent. This can be observed by the visual check of the pattern of the scatter plot for 
VPC1 and VPC2 that are presented as figure 5.5. So, the 2 methods confirm that the residuals have 
positive autocorrelation and there is no independence of residuals. This violates the NIID assumption 
of the OLS regression. 
  
Table 5.9: STATA Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation and the decision rule 
Panel A: Durbin-Watson Test 
Panel B: Decision Rule on DW-statistic 
Critical values at α=0.05 for (df=14, T=1850) = dl = 1.90941; du = 1.93772 
 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 14,  1840) =  1.129778
Number of gaps in sample:  775
. dwstat
          dw = 1.1298 
 
     0                              dl       du       2    4-du        4-dl                   4  
     0                    1.90941   1.93772     2    4-1.93772 4-1.90941                   4 
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Tests for Linearity:  Here it must be noted that we have a multiple OLS regression where several 
independent variables are involved. Hence, the check for linear relationship between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables cannot be straightforward. This check on individual 
independent variables shows that many of the variables show no clear departure from linearity. The 
STATA command acprplot that is used with lowess lsopts(bwidth(1)), which produces lowess 
smoothing with a bandwidth of 1, graphs an augmented component-plus-residual plot for the 
variables. The tests made on the major variables show linearity.  
 
Fig. 5.5: Scatter plot of the fitted values on MONR 
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Fig.5.6: Tests for linearity on VPC1, VPC2, PNED and ABHO 
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Figure 5.6 show that there is not any visual problem of nonlinearity for VPC1, VPC2, PNED and 
ABHO. The minor splitting gap at the end of VPC1 and PNED is not a big problem since there might 
be some few influential observations that cause divergence. So, we conclude that linearity 
assumption is fulfilled.  
Tests for Multicollinearity:  The correlation between different independent variables is checked 
since they may cause very high standard error, low t-statistic, and unexpected changes in the signs 
or magnitudes of coefficients even despite a high R-square. Even though STATA automatically drops 
perfectly collinear independent variables during regression, we might still need to examine for 
multicollinearity if collinearity by using pair-wise correlation and Tolerance and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) methods.  
The pair-wise correlation matrix (see table 5.10) of the independent variables show that there are 
pair of variables that show very high collinearity (more than 0.80). The pairs that exhibit high 
multicollinearity are TDPI and VPC1, C1C4 and VPC1, C1C4 and TDPI, and C2C3 and VPC2. The 
empirical model is designed so that the pairs are not used in the same equation for each version of 
the model by design; hence their multicollinearity is not a problem (table 5.10). Additionally, we 
know that PNED and DUAL are not a function of each other and hence, they do not have 
multicollinearity. The empirical model is designed so that the pairs are not used in the same 
regression equation. The board structure variables and external governance mechanisms are also 
found to have no serious multicollinearity problems.  
The examination of the problem of multicollinearity using the Tolerance and Variance Inflation 
Factor method (table 5.11) shows that only ABHO has a VIF greater than 10. The mean VIF in panel A 
where only the main variables are used in regression is 3.59. As it can be seen in panel B, when the 
control variables are included in the regression the men VIF is 3.19.  Since the mean VIF in both cases 
is less than 10, we conclude that there is no problem of multicollinearity between the independent 
variables.  
  
Table 5.10: Pairwise correlation matrix of independent variables 
  vpc1 vpc2 tdpi shapv c1c4 c2c3 monr contr abho nbh pned dual tointens tdta pvol eqto 
vpc1 1 
               vpc2 0.40 1 
              tdpi 0.86 0.28 1 
             shapv -0.07 0.58 -0.4 1 
            c1c4 0.98 0.49 0.82 -0.01 1 
           c2c3 0.34 0.95 0.20 0.55 0.47 1 
          monr 0.44 -0.22 0.38 -0.22 0.33 -0.3 1 
         contr -0.35 0.27 -0.29 0.25 -0.34 0.26 -0.06 1 
        abho 0.68 0.73 0.50 0.26 0.79 0.79 -0.16 -0.23 1 
       nbh -0.07 0.30 -0.17 0.23 0.08 0.45 -0.59 -0.12 0.59 1 
      pned 0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.15 0.03 -0.08 -0.14 1 
     dual 0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.13 0.00 -0.05 -0.15 0.60 1 
    tointens 0.09 0.05 0.09 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.26 -0.24 1 
   tdta -0.07 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.07 -0.14 -0.25 0.15 1 
  pvol 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.21 -0.11 -0.05 0.21 0.17 -0.27 -0.30 0.12 -0.05 1 
 eqto -0.19 -0.08 -0.16 0.00 -0.17 -0.06 -0.13 0.08 -0.11 0.08 -0.15 -0.29 0.13 0.14 0.21 1 
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Further examination into the problem using the Condition Index method using STATA post 
estimation collin command (table 5.12) shows that the condition number, namely, the index of the 
last variable (35.5160) is very high. Since the condition number is greater than the tolerable index 
(10), it can be stated that there is an indication problem of global stability due to the problem of 
multicollinearity in the model. Since the main contributors of non-stability are PVOL, EQTO and 
ROAT1, which contribute less VIF, we cannot conclude that there is a problem of multicollinearity.  
To sum up, the multicollinearity checks using pairwise correlation and VIF method shows that there 
is no serious problem of multicollinearity between the predictors that are included in each equation. 
However, even though the collinearity diagnostics show the condition number is higher than 10, the 
tolerance level, and this indicates that there is problem of global stability, we conclude that there is 
not serious problem of collinearity based on the VIF result in table 5.12.  
  
Table 5.11: Checks of VIF for test of multicollinearity 
Panel A: SEM: VPC1-VPC2 variables Panel B: SEM: VPC1-VPC2 with control variables 
 
    Mean VIF        3.59
                                    
     invincr        1.02    0.983785
       fcfps        1.02    0.981681
       roat1        1.09    0.919844
       divps        1.11    0.902945
    tointens        1.13    0.883608
        tdta        1.16    0.862048
        eqto        1.20    0.836196
        pvol        1.30    0.768289
        pned        1.70    0.589929
        dual        1.99    0.503399
        vpc2        3.56    0.281177
         nbh        6.73    0.148496
        vpc1        7.87    0.127064
        abho       19.38    0.051610
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
    Mean VIF        3.19
                                    
         age        1.05    0.951317
       fcfps        1.08    0.921685
       divps        1.11    0.901338
       roat1        1.11    0.900486
    tointens        1.13    0.882411
        eqto        1.20    0.833550
        tdta        1.22    0.819880
        fats        1.23    0.814767
       sgats        1.23    0.813985
       rndts        1.29    0.776231
        pvol        1.36    0.737330
        pned        1.70    0.587513
        dual        2.00    0.499563
          ta        3.16    0.316842
     invincr        3.16    0.316790
        vpc2        3.57    0.280266
         nbh        6.75    0.148238
        vpc1        7.88    0.126928
        abho       19.46    0.051377
                                    
    Variable         VIF       1/VIF  
. vif
Table 5.12: Diagnostics of collinearity using STATA Condition Index and Number method 
 
 
 
  Collinearity Diagnostics
  Mean VIF      3.60
----------------------------------------------------
     roat1      1.09    1.04    0.9186      0.0814
      eqto      1.20    1.09    0.8360      0.1640
      pvol      1.31    1.14    0.7660      0.2340
      tdta      1.16    1.08    0.8632      0.1368
  tointens      1.13    1.06    0.8836      0.1164
   invincr      1.02    1.01    0.9839      0.0161
     fcfps      1.02    1.01    0.9806      0.0194
     divps      1.11    1.05    0.9034      0.0966
       nbh      6.78    2.60    0.1474      0.8526
      abho     19.47    4.41    0.0514      0.9486
      vpc2      3.56    1.89    0.2807      0.7193
      vpc1      7.89    2.81    0.1268      0.8732
      dual      1.99    1.41    0.5032      0.4968
      pned      1.69    1.30    0.5910      0.4090
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
 Condition Number        35.5160 
---------------------------------
    15     0.0067         35.5160
    14     0.0190         21.1128
    13     0.0693         11.0676
    12     0.1315          8.0325
    11     0.1777          6.9106
    10     0.2687          5.6192
    9     0.3473          4.9427
    8     0.3975          4.6200
    7     0.5936          3.7806
    6     0.6321          3.6637
    5     0.7704          3.3186
    4     0.9354          3.0118
    3     1.0273          2.8739
    2     1.1393          2.7290
    1     8.4844          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0106
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
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Model Specification Test:  The model fit of the OLS regression is presented as table 5.13 below. 
The F-test statistic test for the overall significance of the regression model is found to be significant. 
It shows that the model as a whole shows the relationship between the dependent and the 
independent variables. But it does not show how good the model is. From the low R-squared 
statistics (0.1601) there is an indication that there is some problem in the model. The adjusted R-
squared is also lower even than R-squared. This problem might arise due to (1) omitted variable or 
included redundant variables, (2) multicollinearity between predictors that bias the contribution of 
the effect of predictors on the predicted variable, and (3) endogeneity where the predictors are 
related to the error term of the predicted variable.  
Diagnostic checks show that multicollinearity is found to be not a serious problem, and this rules out 
our concern about the problem arising from it. Hence, the two other problems suspected might be 
the problem of endogeneity and misspecification (omitted variables and endogeneity. Since 
endogeneity problem might exist, as previously mentioned in our theoretical and empirical 
modelling, there is nothing we can do now except solving it by appropriate estimation method.  
The remaining problem is model specification problem where we need to check for if there are 
omitted variables. In other words we check whether the variables included in the model are 
appropriate and/ or there are omitted variables that should have been included in the model. What 
is to be attempted is to avoid the exclusion of any relevant variable or the inclusion of any 
redundant or irrelevant variable. This procedure is vital because the model specification errors might 
result in inappropriate coefficient estimates and it is difficult to identify the actual contribution of 
the influence of each predictor on the independent variable. In an attempt made to add the firm 
specific control variables, R-squared increased a bit to 0.2015, which is still very low. Hence, we test 
for model specification using the original variables in the model.  
In the STATA Linktest post estimation (linktest command) for single-equation models for the null 
hypothesis of no specification error, it is expected that the variables prediction (_hat) should be 
significant and the squared prediction (_hatsq) should be insignificant to indicate no omitted 
variables. The result of the test (table 5.14) confirms that both prediction and squared prediction are 
significant. Hence, there is specification error in the model.  
Moreover, the Ramsey RESET test carried out by STATA ovtest command performs a regression 
specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables (Ramsey, 1969) creates new variables based on 
the predictors and refits the model using these new variables and checks if any of them are 
significant. The result of the test (table 5.14, Panel B) for null hypothesis of no omitted variables in 
the model shows that the F-test statistic is significant, and hence, we reject the null hypothesis. This 
Table 5.13: OLS model fit tests of the VPC1-VPC2 model 
 
       Total    125220.906  1818  68.8783861           Root MSE      =  7.6356
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1535
    Residual    105177.294  1804  58.3022692           R-squared     =  0.1601
       Model    20043.6123    14  1431.68659           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F( 14,  1804) =   24.56
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1819
. regress roa pned dual vpc1 vpc2 abho nbh divps fcfps invincr tointens tdta pvol eqto roat1
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indicates that we have strong evidence to accept the null hypothesis of new model, implying that 
there have been omitted variables or specification error.  
Both of the test methods used above indicate that the model is not specified correctly and there are 
omitted variables and we need to reconsider our model. However, including the
 
firm-specific variables into the model show that the linktest show that the prediction (_hat) is 
significant and but the squared prediction (_hatsq) is insignificant indicating that the model is 
correctly specified (table 5.15). But the Ramsey test still shows that the model is not correctly 
specified. The test results of the two methods lead us to opposite conclusions. 
Nevertheless, it is understandable that there might be omitted variables when we investigate the 
determinants of firm performance using a panel data since it is suggested that there might be 
several firm- or industry-specific unobserved heterogeneity (Himmelberg et al., 1999) besides the 
macroeconomic shocks that impact firm performance. However, relying on the later linktest results, 
it might be appropriate to retain the model as correctly specified.  
 
Table 5.14: STATA Linktest and Ramsey RESET test for model specification error (1) 
Roa coef. t P>|t| 
 _hat 0.8321 10.09 0 
 _hatsq .01575 2.68 0.007 
 _cons 0.2564 0.65 0.518 
 Note: The goodness-of-fit statistic are: N = 1819; F(2, 1816) = 177.33; Prob>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.1634; 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.1625. 
 
 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
                F(3, 1801) =     14.78
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of roa
. ovtest
Table 5.15: STATA Linktest and Ramsey RESET test for model specification error (2) 
Roa coef. t P>|t| 
 _hat 1.000642 21.44 0 
 _hatsq .0038338 1.64 0.101 
 _cons -.2127356 -0.58 0.563 
 Note: The goodness-of-fit statistic are: N = 1819; F(2, 1816) = 230.87; Prob>F = 0.0000; R-squared = 0.2027; 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.2018. 
 
 
 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000
                F(3, 1796) =      9.36
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of roa
. ovtest
